An Argument About Free Will

[MGL]

Your conscious self is not in control of sub atomic occurences in your physical brain.

If my conscious self is physical ( or a temporal slice of reality ) , whatever it is, it is ultimately made up of sub atomic occurences and my best guess is that these are occuring in the brain. I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else. The macroscopic temporal slice of reality is the same slice of reality as its sub-atomic constituents.

[MGL]

QM events do not occur in everyday circumstances....

How do you know that QM events do not occur in some everyday circumstances?

Like what?

Like anything you like, but as we are focusing on free will, like for instance the words we choose to express our opinions. How do you know that some of the ideas that pop into our head are not the product of a random QM process?

[John]

I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else.

So if we're slaves to determinism we can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions (probably the most common objection to arguments against free will but based on the fact that it makes people uncomfortable rather than because it's wrong) and if we do things because of random sub-atomic occurrences we still can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions.

My biggest problem with many of the arguments for free will is that its advocates don't seem to be able to define it in any meaningful way or to define it in a way that leads to more of the personal responsibility that they so desire.

[Notvacka]

What is the difference between a temporal slice of physical reality and physical phenomema? I would have thought by referring to some physical penonema I am referring to a temporal slice of reality.

That's it! Your temporal slice of reality has no physical extension and physical reality is not sliced up like that, it's something that happens in the realm of imagination. The only difference between yesterday and tomorrow is our current perspective. Every day is a yesterday and a tomorrow. The concept of "now" only exists in our imagination.

If my conscious self is physical ( or a temporal slice of reality ) , whatever it is, it is ultimately made up of sub atomic occurences and my best guess is that these are occuring in the brain. I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else. The macroscopic temporal slice of reality is the same slice of reality as its sub-atomic constituents.

I don't consider the conscious self as "physical", though there is a physical level below it. It emerges on another level. Think of the particles moving in the brain as letters in a book and consciousness as the emergng text. Without the letters, there would be no text, but the letters are not the text. And the text doesn't write itself.

[MGL]

[quote="Notvacka] I don't consider the conscious self as "physical", though there is a physical level below it. It emerges on another level. Think of the particles moving in the brain as letters in a book and consciousness as the emergng text. Without the letters, there would be no text, but the letters are not the text. And the text doesn't write itself.[/quote]

How exactly does consciousness emerge from the physical? How does a sensation of redness emerge? Is there anyway you can explain this emergence that allows it a meaningful separate identity to the stuff it emerges from? I am afraid your analogy does not help me. I would say the text is simply identical to the physical arrangement of letters. What is added to the concept of the text by considering it as emerging from the letters without being identical to them and their arrangement?

[Notvacka]

How exactly does consciousness emerge from the physical? How does a sensation of redness emerge? Is there anyway you can explain this emergence that allows it a meaningful separate identity to the stuff it emerges from?

I don't know, and I don't think that anybody else does, either.

How it happens is not important. It obviously does. Your experience of consciousness is what you experience it to be. It's not independent from the physical level below, but it's not identical to it either. Another analogy: It's like watching a roll of film lying in a box compared to watching the film projected on a screen. You can point to the celluloid in the box and say "there is the movie" and you would be right, in a sense. But the movie is the immaterial content of the film, not the physical medium it's encoded in.

I am afraid your analogy does not help me. I would say the text is simply identical to the physical arrangement of letters. What is added to the concept of the text by considering it as emerging from the letters without being identical to them and their arrangement?

Just the entire content? This is the problem of reductionism. You can reduce a text to letters, and you can reduce a human being to molecules. But then you lose the level above. The analogy only goes so far, though, since consciousness is a special case. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

I have tried to explain this many times, and some people get it right away, while others never seem to get it. On the other hand, I don't get how you could consider randomness compatible with free will either.

[Arising_uk]

... How does a sensation of redness emerge? ...

I don't know, and I don't think that anybody else does, either.

I thought it emerged due to different 'sized' photons hitting the retina four in a 'row'? - R. Feynman, QED.(QED the book)

[chaz wyman]

QM events do not occur in everyday circumstances....

How do you know that QM events do not occur in some everyday circumstances?

Like what?

Like anything you like, but as we are focusing on free will, like for instance the words we choose to express our opinions. How do you know that some of the ideas that pop into our head are not the product of a random QM process?

You mean CAUSED by QM?
Just goes to prove that indeterminism implies a deterministic universe.
But I should remind you that we are talking about FREE WILL.
Randomness cannot contribute to what most people mean by freedom as opposed to necessity.
A random thought is not free is it random.

[chaz wyman]

I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else.

So if we're slaves to determinism we can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions (probably the most common objection to arguments against free will but based on the fact that it makes people uncomfortable rather than because it's wrong) and if we do things because of random sub-atomic occurrences we still can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions.

My biggest problem with many of the arguments for free will is that its advocates don't seem to be able to define it in any meaningful way or to define it in a way that leads to more of the personal responsibility that they so desire.

Good point.

[lancek4]

M seems to argue in her essay that our 'dualistic' reality that we know has been conditioned thru the centuries by a particular causal stream of argument that she describes.
Is this correct?
If so, how are we to be able to discern which knowledge is 'skewed' by this condition and which is not?
M , Are you attempting to argue a 'new and improved' Hegelian system?
It seems that is what is going on as you address the individual arguments.
Please clarify.
Have you proposing an absolute definitional relation between objects?

[MGL]

You mean CAUSED by QM?
Just goes to prove that indeterminism implies a deterministic universe.

Causation does not have to be deterministic.

[MGL]

But I should remind you that we are talking about FREE WILL.
Randomness cannot contribute to what most people mean by freedom as opposed to necessity.
A random thought is not free is it random.

Can you provide a meaningful definition of free will that does not imply randomness? Either are actions are wholly determined, in which case we do not have a free will, or they are not - in which case they must have an unpredictable and inherently random component. If you think this is incompatible with free will, then you must consider the concept of free will as meaningless, not just an impossibility.

You may if you like, subscribe to a compatibilist notion of free will, where free will is compatible with determinism, but I would not define this as free will in the strictest sense and would consider this as a completely different concept.

I sense the main reason people don't like the idea of our thoughts or actions being random is that this conjures up the idea of a puppet being controlled by random strings and behaving erratically. The answer to this is that there is no distinction between the random thoughts and the thinker. The thinker is not being controlled by random thoughts, the thinker IS the random thoughts. Also, the randomness of the thought is always constrained by the deterministic context of the thought. There will be goals and circumstances that restrict or focus the options of the thinker. Thus some actions will always be more likely than others.

[chaz wyman]

You mean CAUSED by QM?
Just goes to prove that indeterminism implies a deterministic universe.

Causation does not have to be deterministic.

That has to be the funniest thing this week.

It can be indetermined, but that implies that it is determined, just unknown.

[chaz wyman]

But I should remind you that we are talking about FREE WILL.
Randomness cannot contribute to what most people mean by freedom as opposed to necessity.
A random thought is not free is it random.

Can you provide a meaningful definition of free will that does not imply randomness?

There is no free-will. The will is determined by that which preceded it.

Either are actions are wholly determined, in which case we do not have a free will, or they are not - in which case they must have an unpredictable and inherently random component.

You misunderstand the concept of free-will as given us by Christian ideology. It assumes that we are able to choose regardless of our experience. That our soul is able to have a 'god's eye' view' of our condition and is able to make the 'right' choice, regardless of the determining factors of our lives. It is as if everyone has the open and free choice to open the door to Jesus; to choose good over evil; to do what god thinks is right etc. This is banal as it is impossible.
I can't see where random choice has any role to play in this.


If you think this is incompatible with free will, then you must consider the concept of free will as meaningless, not just an impossibility.

A thing that is impossible is meaningless. That doe snot stop you describing it.


You may if you like, subscribe to a compatibilist notion of free will, where free will is compatible with determinism, but I would not define this as free will in the strictest sense and would consider this as a completely different concept.

The will is determined, as we are the agents of change. But though we may do as we will, but we cannot will as we would will.

I sense the main reason people don't like the idea of our thoughts or actions being random is that this conjures up the idea of a puppet being controlled by random strings and behaving erratically. The answer to this is that there is no distinction between the random thoughts and the thinker. The thinker is not being controlled by random thoughts, the thinker IS the random thoughts. Also, the randomness of the thought is always constrained by the deterministic context of the thought. There will be goals and circumstances that restrict or focus the options of the thinker. Thus some actions will always be more likely than others.

No one can tell if there might be a small random element in our thought, or whether any thing that looks like an anomaly could be understood by as yet unconsidered causal factor of which there may be many. But when I have the choice of tea or coffee - I do not randomly choice to visit a car showroom and ask for a coffee coloured BMW. How random do you think this is ?

[MGL]

How exactly does consciousness emerge from the physical? How does a sensation of redness emerge? Is there anyway you can explain this emergence that allows it a meaningful separate identity to the stuff it emerges from?

I don't know, and I don't think that anybody else does, either.

How it happens is not important. It obviously does. Your experience of consciousness is what you experience it to be. It's not independent from the physical level below, but it's not identical to it either. Another analogy: It's like watching a roll of film lying in a box compared to watching the film projected on a screen. You can point to the celluloid in the box and say "there is the movie" and you would be right, in a sense. But the movie is the immaterial content of the film, not the physical medium it's encoded in.

...This is the problem of reductionism. You can reduce a text to letters, and you can reduce a human being to molecules. But then you lose the level above. The analogy only goes so far, though, since consciousness is a special case. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

I have tried to explain this many times, and some people get it right away, while others never seem to get it. On the other hand, I don't get how you could consider randomness compatible with free will either.

If it is far from obvious that consciousness emerges from the physical. To me, it seems more obvious that consciousness IS something physical.
I have no problem with things being more than the sum of their parts, but this concept is adequately accounted for by considering the arrangement of the parts.
Perhaps it is too much to expect you to explain how consciousness emerges from the physical, but perhaps you could explain further the concept of emergence. So far I get the impression that emergence is the generation of one phenomena from another where the former phenomena has properties that can not be explained by reduction to the properties of the latter. What's the difference between this and magic?

Your analogy of the movie is no help either. To realise the immaterial content of the film requires the intervention of conscious beings, the very thing you are trying to trying to explain with this analogy.