Philosophy Now Forum

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 am

Self-Lightening wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 12:36 amNo, since there would then be no (non-practical) reason to posit any noumena at all.

Kant 'needs' noumena for his philosophy, but Kant's philosophy is about not positing any (non-practical) noumena. So imo you may not know either what he meant. He ended up using noumena as a limiting concept, and was against positing them.

Kant needs noumena to underlie phenomena in some sense, but Kant says it's impossible to know that noumena underlie phenomena.
Kant needs noumena to 'cause' phenomena in some sense, but Kant says causation only applies within phenomena, so noumena can't 'cause' phenomena.

No wonder people can't figure out what Kant actually meant. He didn't even know it himself.

I disagree. If noumena exist, they underlie phenomena, by definition. But it's impossible to know if they exist, because we can only know phenomena. Noumena would "cause" phenomena, not in the sense of phenomenal causation, but of underlying the phenomena, of being the thing as it is which we can only know as it appears. So why posit noumena at all? For practical reasons, one of which is that Kant needs or "needs" them for his philosophy.

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 am

That's not nondual, though. If it was really nondual, all that's beyond phenomena would be other phenomena. And that's basically what Nietzsche (with Peirce, Plato, and others) suggests: see my "A study in Nietzschean religious philosophy", section 2—Nietzsche's philosophy as objective subjectivism; in other words, noumenal phenomenalism, or real idealism, etc.

Again why do you claim that's what Kant meant?

I'm doing nothing of the sort. This was about your indirect realism, not about Kant.

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 amIf the noumenon is just a limiting concept, then we can't claim that (in the metaphysical sense) the noumena aren't just more phenomena, because we can't know what they are and what they aren't.

Well, to be sure, if we posit noumena, we can by definition not know what they are. However, we can, by that same definition, know that they're not phenomena.

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 amYes naturally as a nondualist I see the noumena as more phenomena (in the metaphysical sense).

You mean, because you don't literally see them (perceive them)? But if all that's beyond the phenomena you perceive is phenomena you don't perceive, why even call these noumena? Phenomena are by definition not noumena and vice versa. Also, this makes you an idealist, not a realist; an objective idealist, or a real idealist, or whatever you wish to call it (just not a something something realist).

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 am

Those are just practical reasons to believe in objective existence, though...

In a more serious philosophy than Kant's anything can be reduced to practical reasons, but why would we?

Are you alluding to pragmatism by any chance? I disagree that that's more serious, if not than Kant, then at least than Nietzsche and the premodern philosophers. More precisely, serious philosophy is both serious and playful. It's theoretical first and foremost, and the practical only serves the theoretical. So serious philosophy is seriously theoretical and playfully practical.

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 am

We have evidence that the mind does not seem to be transcendent to the ideas for practical purposes?

Of course we have evidence duh, no metaphysical duality was ever uncovered by science in the human head, nor was a universal mind ever shown to exist. Nor has anyone successfully demonstrated such things "philosophically".

And yet, the mind seems to be transcendent to the ideas—that is, there seems to be a metaphysical dualism. Otherwise, where did we even get that idea? What I'm suggesting is that there's a practical reason for that.

Self-Lightening wrote: ↑Sun Sep 01, 2024 2:19 am

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 am

Self-Lightening wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 12:36 amNo, since there would then be no (non-practical) reason to posit any noumena at all.

Kant 'needs' noumena for his philosophy, but Kant's philosophy is about not positing any (non-practical) noumena. So imo you may not know either what he meant. He ended up using noumena as a limiting concept, and was against positing them.

Kant needs noumena to underlie phenomena in some sense, but Kant says it's impossible to know that noumena underlie phenomena.
Kant needs noumena to 'cause' phenomena in some sense, but Kant says causation only applies within phenomena, so noumena can't 'cause' phenomena.

No wonder people can't figure out what Kant actually meant. He didn't even know it himself.

I disagree. If noumena exist, they underlie phenomena, by definition. But it's impossible to know if they exist, because we can only know phenomena. Noumena would "cause" phenomena, not in the sense of phenomenal causation, but of underlying the phenomena, of being the thing as it is which we can only know as it appears. So why posit noumena at all? For practical reasons, one of which is that Kant needs or "needs" them for his philosophy.

What is noumena to phenomena is like [though not exactly] what is 'cause' to 'effect' which is basic logic from associations, habits and customs. [it is logically absurd that there can be appearance without anything that appears]
As Hume pointed out there is no ontological 'cause' and Kant argued there is no ontological substantial constitutive noumena. The noumena is merely a thought to satisfy the lingering basic logical impulse to be extended for practical use. [a useful illusion].

The noumena extended to the thing-in-itself, then to absolute-freedom, ens realissimum are regulatively necessary as ideals and guides for his practical philosophy.

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Aug 31, 2024 7:02 amYes naturally as a nondualist I see the noumena as more phenomena (in the metaphysical sense).

You mean, because you don't literally see them (perceive them)? But if all that's beyond the phenomena you perceive is phenomena you don't perceive, why even call these noumena? Phenomena are by definition not noumena and vice versa. Also, this makes you an idealist, not a realist; an objective idealist, or a real idealist, or whatever you wish to call it (just not a something something realist).

According to Kant, the philosophical realist [absolute mind independent] is also a empirical idealist, i.e. what is possible to him empirically are only mental sense date in his brain while his supposedly-real-thing is beyond the empirical existing absolutely mind-independent out there, eternally out of his reach.

Also the philosophical realist is a transcendental realist because what is real to him is transcendental and beyond his empirical reach, thus can only speculate and grope.

On the other hand, Kant is an empirical realist, i.e. whatever is real is confined to what is empirically possible without any need to speculate and posit something beyond the empirical at all. As such, an apple out there is just 'an-apple-out-there' which is verifiable and justifiable via a human-based biology [plant and fruits] framework and system, and which can be eaten.

In addition, Kant is a Transcendental Idealist, i.e. his idealism is dealt with the human mind and the collective but not claimed as absolutely real [avoiding solipsism].
What is real to Kant is empirical realism.

All of Kant's CPR and post-CPR views [one long argument] are grounded on his vision and mission of perpetual peace via the effective unfoldment and manifestation of the moral law within [the individual self].

Self-Lightening wrote: ↑Sun Sep 01, 2024 2:19 am I disagree. If noumena exist, they underlie phenomena, by definition. But it's impossible to know if they exist, because we can only know phenomena. Noumena would "cause" phenomena, not in the sense of phenomenal causation, but of underlying the phenomena, of being the thing as it is which we can only know as it appears. So why posit noumena at all? For practical reasons, one of which is that Kant needs or "needs" them for his philosophy.

Well imo Kant didn't go so far, I used to have the same misunderstanding of his philosophy. We can only say that noumena "underlie" phenomena as sort of an epistemological metaphor, but it has zero ontological relevance.

Well, to be sure, if we posit noumena, we can by definition not know what they are. However, we can, by that same definition, know that they're not phenomena.

You mean, because you don't literally see them (perceive them)? But if all that's beyond the phenomena you perceive is phenomena you don't perceive, why even call these noumena? Phenomena are by definition not noumena and vice versa. Also, this makes you an idealist, not a realist; an objective idealist, or a real idealist, or whatever you wish to call it (just not a something something realist).

Again imo you misunderstood Kant, just as I used to. Noumena are not phenomena only in the epistemological sense, but we can make zero ontological claims about noumena.

But if you're correct (and Kant was indeed this much self-contradictory) then it's better to compare my indirect realism without using the concept of noumena. 3 categories:

- the phenomena we directly experience
- phenomena we don't experience directly, but can infer their existence with some degree of certainty/accuracy
- unknowable phenomena we can say nothing about

Again, I'm neither a realist nor an idealist, I'm a nondualist.

Are you alluding to pragmatism by any chance? I disagree that that's more serious, if not than Kant, then at least than Nietzsche and the premodern philosophers. More precisely, serious philosophy is both serious and playful. It's theoretical first and foremost, and the practical only serves the theoretical. So serious philosophy is seriously theoretical and playfully practical.

No, I meant that Kant was still clinging to the certainty of the a-priori mental categories or whatever, when we can't have any certainty anywhere in philosophy.

And yet, the mind seems to be transcendent to the ideas—that is, there seems to be a metaphysical dualism. Otherwise, where did we even get that idea? What I'm suggesting is that there's a practical reason for that.

That's just a way of a thinking, to me as a nondualist they don't seem transcendent.