A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies

[RCSaunders]

if every event that can be described by the physical sciences could possibly be anything other than what it is . . .

Determinism isn't the case if just SOME events have SOME degree of non-0/non-1 probability for multiple outcomes, even if we're only talking about two outcomes, and even if they're only very slightly different from each other.

Surely you don't admit that possibility if you are a physicalist.

If you decide you are going to make determinism a matter of statistics instead of mechanics you have undermined the entirety of physical science. Every state of the physical universe is either determine by the immediately preceding state, or it isn't. It is not statistically likely, it either is, or it isn't.

All statistics depend on some degree of ignorance. Determinism is the case whether anyone knows what the actual case is or not. In the physical realm there is no possibility of any event being other than what it is--not sums of events, but individual events. The only reason in statistics different outcomes are possible is because you do not know what each determined individual event is, but if you did, even the determined sum would be known.

For there to be a truly undetermined event, it would have to occur without explanation, totally capricious and without cause. Anything that is totally inexplicable and has no cause is neither physical or scientific. If there is any phenomenon that is not determine, it is either not physical, or, the concept, "physical," will have to be expanded to include a new principle that makes the undetermined possible. There is no sound reason not to do the latter. It is actually what you are attempting to do with your, "statistics," argument.

[Terrapin Station]

Surely you don't admit that possibility if you are a physicalist.

Yes, I do.

If you decide you are going to make determinism a matter of statistics instead of mechanics you have undermined the entirety of physical science.

I'm talking about (ontological) freedom rather than determinism. I'm not a determinist. But it only undermines determinism, which is a good thing.

Every state of the physical universe is either determine by the immediately preceding state, or it isn't.

"It isn't" is the best answer there.

It is not statistically likely, it either is, or it isn't.

Based on what?

All statistics depend on some degree of ignorance.

No. That only follows if one is a determinist, which would have to be a faith belief.

Determinism is the case whether anyone knows what the actual case is or not.

That's simply stating your faith.

For there to be a truly undetermined event, it would have to occur without explanation, totally capricious and without cause.

Again, it doesn't have to be "totally capricious."

"Either determinism is the case or things are completely random" is a false dichotomy.

If there is any phenomenon that is not determine, it is either not physical, or, the concept, "physical," will have to be expanded to include a new principle that makes the undetermined possible.

No, that's just nonsense. Physicalism doesn't imply realism on physical laws and it doesn't imply some commitment to determinism as basically a religious belief.

[RCSaunders]

I'm talking about (ontological) freedom ...

I have no objection to making up one's own concepts to identify a new idea, but if you are going to do that, it would help if you explained what that concept is meant to identify. What is, "ontological," freedom. It sounds mystical to me, like something that can just be without explanation or cause. I do not believe that is what you mean, and would appreciate your explaining it, if you care to.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm talking about (ontological) freedom ...

I have no objection to making up one's own concepts to identify a new idea, but if you are going to do that, it would help if you explained what that concept is meant to identify. What is, "ontological," freedom. It sounds mystical to me, like something that can just be without explanation or cause. I do not believe that is what you mean, and would appreciate your explaining it, if you care to.

It's not making up anything. I explained this earlier, although I know someone asked other than you (I just don't recall who asked about it at the moment).

Ontological freedom is what must obtain to some extent in order for free will to be possible. Ontological freedom is different than, say, political or religious freedom (even though political, religious and other sorts of freedom require that ontological freedom obtains, too).

As I've been trying to explain to RogerSH, ontological freedom is a very simple idea. It obtains when it's the case that from some antecedent state of affairs, A, at time T1, the immediately following consequent state, at T2, can at least be either B or C, where B and C are incompatible (that is, though both B and C are possible at T1, only one can turn out to be the case at T2).

So to keep things as simple as possible, if we imagine "state of affairs A" denoting a particle, x, traveling with a particular velocity at T1, where we're denoting the very last moment prior to x striking another particle, y at T2, then ontological freedom obtains if at A (at T1), it's possible that either y will move with velocity v or with slightly different velocity w at B (T2), where there are no other/intervening factors determining whether y moves with velocity v or w at T2 after being struck by x.

[Skepdick]

Ontological freedom is what must obtain to some extent in order for free will to be possible.

That's the sort of sentence philosophers blurt out when they have nothing of value to say.

It's 2021. Ontology itself doesn't obtain.

If it did you'd have foundations.

[RCSaunders]

As I've been trying to explain to RogerSH, ontological freedom is a very simple idea. It obtains when it's the case that from some antecedent state of affairs, A, at time T1, the immediately following consequent state, at T2, can at least be either B or C, where B and C are incompatible (that is, though both B and C are possible at T1, only one can turn out to be the case at T2).

If both B or C are, "possible," it means if either occurs it does so for no explainable reason--i.e. magic, miracle, or serendipity. If there is a reason why whichever does occur does so, it only seemed either was possible because you were ignorant of that reason.

Admitting magic, miracle, and cosmic, "whim," hardly seems scientific to me. It sounds more like childish foot-stamping insisting, "sometimes things happen for no reason whatsoever."

Thanks for the explanation.

[Skepdick]

As I've been trying to explain to RogerSH, ontological freedom is a very simple idea. It obtains when it's the case that from some antecedent state of affairs, A, at time T1, the immediately following consequent state, at T2, can at least be either B or C, where B and C are incompatible

It would've been a simple idea, had you not been a dumb sophist leaving out the most important detail.

How does the "incompatibility" (of B and C) obtain?

[Terrapin Station]

Admitting magic, miracle, and cosmic, "whim," hardly seems scientific to me. It sounds more like childish foot-stamping insisting, "sometimes things happen for no reason whatsoever."

If non-zero/non-one probability or "cosmic whim" sometimes obtains, what's not at all scientific is denying it. The task is to take note of the world as it is, however it happens to be. The task (in doing science, philosophy, etc.) isn't to try to make it fit our preconceptions, preferences or our failure to think outside of templates we might have had drilled into us via however we were socialized.

Again, "everything happens deterministically" is a faith-based belief.

[Skepdick]

Again, "everything happens deterministically" is a faith-based belief.

All beliefs are contingent, and therefore faith-based.

[RCSaunders]

If non-zero/non-one probability or "cosmic whim" sometimes obtains, what's not at all scientific is denying it.

Of course, nothing for which there is evidence must ever be evaded. But, what you are calling a, "non-zero/non-one probability," is not, "evidence," and is, in fact, physically impossible, unless one admits that there can be physical events without any physical cause or explanation.

If there are causes or reasons that explain any physical events other than those that can and are identified by the physical sciences, they are not physical causes (because they must be discovered some other way). That certainly does no deny the possibility of such events but does preserve what is meant by science.

If there could be physical events that were uncaused and unexplained in the merely physical world, if what you are calling, "non-zero/non-one probability or 'cosmic whim' sometimes obtained," were a fact, there would be no reason why the whole of physical existence could not completely vanish or entirely change its nature tomorrow. If any cosmic whim is possible, there is no way to determine how often or how radical such an undetermined event could or would be.

Fortunately, there are no such events and the laws of physics are perfectly safe and planes will not start falling from the sky, because there just is (and logically cannot be) any, "evidence," for what you are calling, "non-zero/non-one probability."

The task is to take note of the world as it is, however it happens to be. The task (in doing science, philosophy, etc.) isn't to try to make it fit our preconceptions, preferences or our failure to think outside of templates we might have had drilled into us via however we were socialized.

Yes, exactly. If one has been taught by their science and philosophy professors that, "everything is physical," [like some other radicals are taught and believe, "everything is mind," or, "everything is spirit," or pick your own everything is...] they are going to be forced to rationalize their way into explaining how one can both know the laws of physics correctly describe the behavior of physical existence and the contradictory view that they can be violated--sometimes.

Again, "everything happens deterministically" is a faith-based belief.

Absolutely, in exactly the same way believing everything is physical is a faith-based belief. There is zero evidence for undetermined physical events, but almost infinite evidence for undetermined living and conscious events.

I think our real difference is more a semantic disagreement than substantive one. You agree that there can be real events that are not physically determined, that is, explained in terms of the laws of physics alone, but think of those cases as exceptions. I agree that there are undetermined real events and that they are exceptions. The difference is, you want to call those exceptional cases physical, and I prefer to call them perfectly natural and ontological but not physical.

If you choose to call life, consciousness, and volition and those aspects of their behavior that cannot be described in terms of physical determination as, "physical exceptions," you certainly may. I prefer to call life, consciousness, and volition, "non-physical," to distinguish those attributes of living physical entities (organisms) from all those that are strictly determined by physical laws (the vast majority of physical existence).

Otherwise, I do not see there is much difference in our view, except that, for me, there must be an aspect of reality that is totally knowable and reliable (physically determined) or nothing can be truly known or certain, and what is capable knowing that knowable reality cannot itself be determined, or that knowledge is not possible.

[Terrapin Station]

Of course, nothing for which there is evidence must ever be evaded. But, what you are calling a, "non-zero/non-one probability," is not, "evidence," and is, in fact, physically impossible, unless one admits that there can be physical events without any physical cause or explanation.

How would you be figuring that acausal events are (physically) impossible?

. . . there would be no reason why the whole of physical existence could not completely vanish or entirely change its nature tomorrow. If any cosmic whim is possible,

Again, "Either strong determinism is the case or things are completely random" is a false dichotomy.

the laws of physics are perfectly safe . . .

If you're a realist on the laws of physics, what, exactly, do you take the laws to be ontologically? I'm just curious.

Absolutely, in exactly the same way believing everything is physical is a faith-based belief.

No, it isn't. There is empirical evidence of physical existents and no evidence of nonphysical existents. (Not to mention that the notion of nonphysical existents isn't even coherent.)

There is zero evidence for undetermined physical events,

There's no evidence that determinism is the case either. Evidence of causality versus a lack of the same is an iconic issue, first explained in detail by Hume.

The difference is, you want to call those exceptional cases physical, and I prefer to call them perfectly natural and ontological but not physical.

For the freedom vs determinism issue, I don't think it matters whether we're physicalists or not.

[RogerSH]

I'm afraid I use the jargon of mechanical science, my background. An underdetermined mechanical system . . .

Okay, but can you point to a scientific usage of "underdetermined" in the way you're using it? I'm not familiar with it being used in the context of anything but theorizing in the sciences, either.

I did have a quick browse so can at least answer that question!
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10 ... 01947-0_33

This contribution presents an optimization based inverse kinematics approach to determine solutions for under-determined systems.

or https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals ... 423FE857A4

…overdetermined and underdetermined kinematic problems are considered separately to derive consistent arm solutions….

[RogerSH]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world.

The issue is not some concept of, "free will," a notion derived from religion, but, "volition," which means human behavior is determined by conscious choice.

In a determined universe there is no volition.

Why not? If the determined universe unfolds in such a way that there is consciousness, then human behaviour being determined by consciousness and by physical processes is just two different ways of describing the same thing - like a CD being a plastic disc with lots of pits on the surface and being a recording of some piece of music being two ways of describing the same thing.

[RCSaunders]

There is empirical evidence of physical existents and no evidence of nonphysical existents.

Perhaps you don't mean exactly what that says, but if there are only physical existents and no nonphysical existents, you are equating physical with existence itself.

But existence does not mean physical. "Exists," only means, "is," without regard to the mode of its existence. There are more nonphysical things that exist than physical things. Physical existents are properly referred to as entities to distinguish them from all existents that are not physical.

If only the physical existed, there would be no knowledge, no history, no geography, no science, no philosophy, no ideas or concepts, no language, no logic, no reason, and no literature. There would be no fiction and none of the characters and events of fiction would exist--but of course they do exist, not as physical entities, not ontologically, but epistemologically and only psychologically in the conscious minds of human beings. When the last human mind ceases to exist, all those epistemological existents will cease to exist.

[RogerSH]

You might like to think of "intention" as metaphorical, but to be more literal, if the unconscious choosing system A has a model of the world

What would it mean to say that something unconscious "has a model of the world"?

An 'intelligent' thermostat might well have a mathematical model of the immediate surroundings - the only part of the world relevant to its output - to predict changes of temperature arising from diurnal effects.

in which the difference between two subsequent states of B does not appear, then the output we are calling its choice would be indifferent to that distinction, hence, metaphorically they are

interchangeable from the point of view of the intentions of A.

And what is this saying? Intention is not indifferent. It's the opposite.

This calculation - with the metaphorical "intention" of keeping the room temperature constant - would be indifferent to events like the arrival of a cosmic ray particle somewhere else.