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Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:00 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 5:49 pm Great. Now assume that the size of the universe is twice of the solar system. What is the chance of having the life now?
We haven't the faintest idea. Including that we'd not have the faintest idea if it's more or less likely in that scenario.
How do you estimate the chance by using your dice?
You can't in this situation, because we haven't the faintest idea what the probability is.
I mean do you roll the dice twice?
Again, any answer here is completely arbitrary. Bayesian probability doesn't work.
You have more opportunity therefore it is reasonable that the chance for the bigger universe is related to rolling your dice twice.
That's not actually based on any reason whatsoever. You'd need some way to have some grounding for estimating probability, but there is none if we don't have frequentist data. Bayesian probability doesn't work. The only data we have is that on the size the universe happens to be, there's at least one iteration where there's life. That doesn't tell us anything useful for predictive probability.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:00 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 5:49 pm Great. Now assume that the size of the universe is twice of the solar system. What is the chance of having the life now?
We haven't the faintest idea. Including that we'd not have the faintest idea if it's more or less likely in that scenario.
That is not correct. We will see.
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:00 pm
How do you estimate the chance by using your dice?
You can't in this situation, because we haven't the faintest idea what the probability is.
Could we agree that the probability of having life L is P. It does no matter what P is. It could be small or large.
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:00 pm
I mean do you roll the dice twice?
Again, any answer here is completely arbitrary. Bayesian probability doesn't work.
No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:00 pm
You have more opportunity therefore it is reasonable that the chance for the bigger universe is related to rolling your dice twice.
That's not actually based on any reason whatsoever. You'd need some way to have some grounding for estimating probability, but there is none if we don't have frequentist data. Bayesian probability doesn't work. The only data we have is that on the size the universe happens to be, there's at least one iteration where there's life. That doesn't tell us anything useful for predictive probability.
It does.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 8:03 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
Think of two isolated boxes that each is filed by atoms. Atoms initial condition is random. The probability that the life appears in any of these boxes is P. What is the chance for having the life at least in one of the boxes? As simple as that.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 9:38 pm
by Skepdick
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 8:03 pm Think of two isolated boxes that each is filed by atoms. Atoms initial condition is random. The probability that the life appears in any of these boxes is P. What is the chance for having the life at least in one of the boxes? As simple as that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 9:55 pm
by bahman
Skepdick wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 9:38 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 8:03 pm Think of two isolated boxes that each is filed by atoms. Atoms initial condition is random. The probability that the life appears in any of these boxes is P. What is the chance for having the life at least in one of the boxes? As simple as that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain
Even Boltzmann brain is necessary to happen in an unbounded whole.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Sun Feb 14, 2021 10:36 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 8:03 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
Think of two isolated boxes that each is filed by atoms. Atoms initial condition is random. The probability that the life appears in any of these boxes is P. What is the chance for having the life at least in one of the boxes? As simple as that.
Are you disagreeing that you need to make all of the assumptions I listed?

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Mon Feb 15, 2021 12:42 am
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 10:36 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 8:03 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
Think of two isolated boxes that each is filed by atoms. Atoms initial condition is random. The probability that the life appears in any of these boxes is P. What is the chance for having the life at least in one of the boxes? As simple as that.
Are you disagreeing that you need to make all of the assumptions I listed?
I made our lives easier.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:02 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
(a) could be the case but it is not the case, I mean the reality as it is started. It is better to replace (b) with the chance for having life in a solar system size is p. (c) is not necessary then as it is discussed for (a). (d) I agree.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:07 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:02 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
bahman wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:14 pm No, the answer is very clear and not arbitrary. If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box.
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
(a) could be the case but it is not the case, I mean the reality as it is started. It is better to replace (b) with the chance for having life in a solar system size is p. (c) is not necessary then as it is discussed for (a). (d) I agree.
Okay, so if you'd say that (a) isn't a necessary assumption for what you'd written, can you explain how what you'd written would be the case without the assumption of (a)?

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:11 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:07 pm
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:02 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Sun Feb 14, 2021 6:25 pm
That's only on the assumptions that (a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations), (b) at least some of the possible combinations of the materials in the box would amount to life, (c) we have endless time for the materials in the boxes to enter their random dynamic arrangements, and (d) the boxes do not interact in any manner that can affect outcomes.

But that's not what we we're assuming is it? You didn't ask about boxes with conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d).
(a) could be the case but it is not the case, I mean the reality as it is started. It is better to replace (b) with the chance for having life in a solar system size is p. (c) is not necessary then as it is discussed for (a). (d) I agree.
Okay, so if you'd say that (a) isn't a necessary assumption for what you'd written, can you explain how what you'd written would be the case without the assumption of (a)?
The beginning was not random but rather a very uniform form of a substance. If I understand your question correctly.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:25 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:11 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:07 pm
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:02 pm
(a) could be the case but it is not the case, I mean the reality as it is started. It is better to replace (b) with the chance for having life in a solar system size is p. (c) is not necessary then as it is discussed for (a). (d) I agree.
Okay, so if you'd say that (a) isn't a necessary assumption for what you'd written, can you explain how what you'd written would be the case without the assumption of (a)?
The beginning was not random but rather a very uniform form of a substance. If I understand your question correctly.
The question is about this thought experiment that you proposed:

"If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box."

So that we're literally talking about boxes that we're imagining, etc.

My claim was that among other assumptions, that's only on the assumption that "(a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations)."

You said that your thought experiment, as presented, doesn't require that assumption.

So I'm asking you to explain how your thought experiment could work without assumption (a). The answer to this wouldn't be anything about the actual universe. We're talking about your thought experiment.

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:36 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:25 pm
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:11 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:07 pm
Okay, so if you'd say that (a) isn't a necessary assumption for what you'd written, can you explain how what you'd written would be the case without the assumption of (a)?
The beginning was not random but rather a very uniform form of a substance. If I understand your question correctly.
The question is about this thought experiment that you proposed:

"If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box."

So that we're literally talking about boxes that we're imagining, etc.

My claim was that among other assumptions, that's only on the assumption that "(a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations)."

You said that your thought experiment, as presented, doesn't require that assumption.

So I'm asking you to explain how your thought experiment could work without assumption (a). The answer to this wouldn't be anything about the actual universe. We're talking about your thought experiment.
I think it is correct to agree with the new thought experiment (because it summerize what we discussed): think of one box that is filled by a very hot stuff. You then cool the stuff until other forms from simple to complex appear. Let's say that the chance of having life is P in a given moment in one box. What is the chance of having at least one life in one of the boxes?

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Wed Feb 17, 2021 9:37 pm
by Terrapin Station
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:36 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:25 pm
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:11 pm
The beginning was not random but rather a very uniform form of a substance. If I understand your question correctly.
The question is about this thought experiment that you proposed:

"If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box."

So that we're literally talking about boxes that we're imagining, etc.

My claim was that among other assumptions, that's only on the assumption that "(a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations)."

You said that your thought experiment, as presented, doesn't require that assumption.

So I'm asking you to explain how your thought experiment could work without assumption (a). The answer to this wouldn't be anything about the actual universe. We're talking about your thought experiment.
I think it is correct to agree with the new thought experiment (because it summerize what we discussed): think of one box that is filled by a very hot stuff. You then cool the stuff until other forms from simple to complex appear. Let's say that the chance of having life is P in a given moment in one box. What is the chance of having at least one life in one of the boxes?
You're ignoring what I'm asking/requesting from you. (Hence why I said that you're just giving up on this without meeting the objections I'm forwarding.)

Re: Anselm’s ontological argument is wrong

Posted: Thu Feb 18, 2021 12:17 pm
by bahman
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 9:37 pm
bahman wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:36 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:25 pm

The question is about this thought experiment that you proposed:

"If you have one box, as big as the solar system, filled with atoms then the chance of having life is P which P is the chance that to have a proper side of a dice. Now suppose you have two boxes. The probability to have life in each box is P. The question is what is the chance for having the life in two boxes. Obviously the chance increases since you are allowed to roll the dice twice, one for each box."

So that we're literally talking about boxes that we're imagining, etc.

My claim was that among other assumptions, that's only on the assumption that "(a) the arrangements in the boxes are dynamically random (that is, they regularly enter different arrangements of all possible combinations)."

You said that your thought experiment, as presented, doesn't require that assumption.

So I'm asking you to explain how your thought experiment could work without assumption (a). The answer to this wouldn't be anything about the actual universe. We're talking about your thought experiment.
I think it is correct to agree with the new thought experiment (because it summerize what we discussed): think of one box that is filled by a very hot stuff. You then cool the stuff until other forms from simple to complex appear. Let's say that the chance of having life is P in a given moment in one box. What is the chance of having at least one life in one of the boxes?
You're ignoring what I'm asking/requesting from you. (Hence why I said that you're just giving up on this without meeting the objections I'm forwarding.)
I am not ignoring. I argued against them. (a) for example, is not valid since we know what the initial condition was. (b) I accepted. (c) is not needed since (a) is not valid. (d) I accepted.