SteveKlinko wrote: ↑Wed Nov 04, 2020 7:00 pm
Advocate wrote: ↑Wed Nov 04, 2020 6:10 pm
SteveKlinko wrote: ↑Wed Nov 04, 2020 4:43 pm
I have given some more thought to this link. Yes, it is difficult to understand how Intellectual Pursuits can be in the Neural Activity. But at a more fundamental level it is also difficult to understand how something like the Experience of Redness is in the Neurons. We can Correlate that Neurons fire and Redness happens, but the Redness itself seems to be such a Categorically different Phenomenon from Neural Activity that it must happen in some kind of Conscious Space. It is inconceivable how it could occur in the normal Physical Space that Science knows. If Redness is in Physical Space then I ask all Physicalists: How can this be possible? What is the basic Principle that makes it so? I already know they don't have the answer. The point is that something as fundamental as the Experience of Redness does not seem to be in the Physical World. Think about Redness itself. It is a thing in and of itself. What is Redness? Where is Redness?
It's simply a different metaphorical understanding of the same physical stuff. They're not different things in any sense. I challenge anyone to show in what sense they are even possibly different. Positing that they are inherently different based on nothing, as you've done here, leaves you the burden of proof because we already have a sufficient answer.
To illustrate, a "walker" in the "game of life" is not a separate thing, it's just a pattern we recognize as an entity because that pattern corresponds to a formula we already understand. If you choose the right (wrong) level of understanding, things can seem more intentional than they are.
Of the things I posted, what two things are obviously not different, where I say they are different?
I'm editing this to be more specific:
Is a Thermometer not different from the Temperature?
Is a Scale not different from the Weight?
Why is it seemingly impossible to bridge the understanding between our internal experience and the “external” view of brain functioning.
We are the experience, and we are wanting something to explain this internal feel of experience, from the outside going ons of the brain. Why does this redness have this particular look, compared to say, blueness?
All that can be said from our perspective as experience, is, there is redness, or there is blueness.
From the outside, no redness or blueness can be found. The redness is an expression of the differences of materials, reflecting different wavelengths of photons into our eyes, whose differences are identified by our retina’s as different energetic activations of the three separate detectors which correspond and activate fully when a specific frequency of photon hits that trio of cone cells. The cone cells don’t work separately, they are a combined detection system. As such, any signal from each trio of cone cells already contains information regarding colour detection as “this” colour and not “those other colours”.
Imagine the signal coming from each trio of cone cells corresponds to a particular Morse code (just an example). Each Morse code corresponds to a particular colour in the light spectrum, which cannot be separate from this trio cone system.
That colour signal travels to the visual perception networks and is interpreted, and “decoded” into the particular colour which we become conscious of. The colour information is now contained in the code which is sent to the perceptual network, yet only exists as some agreement between sender and receiver. The perceptual network then interprets that colour, and a colour is seen corresponding to the specific activation signal from that trio of cone cells back in the retina.
The colour is the specific pattern of information interacting with the perceptual system. That’s all we can say at this point. It doesn’t explain why red is red, but, it does explain why red is not like blue, or green. The difference comes from the difference in signal from the three interacting cone cells in the retina (simplified, we are talking essentially about a pixel in our vision). It doesn’t explain the character of that particular colour, just that there is a difference between colours, due to the difference in signal, due to the difference in wavelength interacting with the cone cells.
We are asking for an explanation of the internal, from the external. If we agree that there is an internal, and an external then must we agree that these two worlds must talk to each other conceptually?
They are two different worlds. But the internal world exists imbedded within the external world. Yet there is a boundary between the two worlds, and the internal world can only be known from the internal world. So to try to go outside the internal world and explain it from the external is seemingly impossible.
But remember, the external is only known by the internal. The external world is a conceptual understanding from within the internal subjective. It is a shared conceptual subjective agreement of what lies outside of our subjective experience. The blobs of colour and shape are actually conceptualised as matter, comprised of particles, and subatomic particles.
But we don’t have access to that layer of existence, only to this subjective ground of our existence. We can indirectly infer its existence. Yet only know it through this subjective construct which is experience.
Imagine you were a simulated being inside a computer (just imagine that was possible to create consciousness within a computer). Our subjective world is similarly a construct. You don’t “see” the actual world as it is, only as it seems from this construct. Could this simulated being ever understand the basis of the construct or its experience, or the computer, from its perspective inside as a simulated consciousness?
That’s like the situation of trying to understand consciousness, in relation to the brain, from the point of view of consciousness itself.
We don’t stand outside of consciousness. We are consciousness itself. Can consciousness ever know itself from within itself? I don’t know.
