Is morality just a subset of reason?

[Hobbes' Choice]

I've done option number one...and option number two is a suggestion clearly worthy of your character, but no thanks.

We're done. I'm reminded of the proverbial dictum about the wise disposition of jewelry, and shall act accordingly.

When you try to prove your case, come back and we can talk until then maybe you can insert your ideas where you keep your jewels.

Run along now, like the scolded child that you are.

[mysterio448]

It would seem appropriate I get you perfectly clear before I continue. So have I got your gist yet?

Yes.

... a moral argument involves at least one objective fact of the situation and at least one subjective condition. In the WWII example, one of the facts (or at least assumptions) was that an American ground invasion against Japan would be extremely difficult and would cost many American lives; one of the subjective conditions in the situation was that the US wanted to minimize American casualties. The idea that the US wanted to cut down on their casualties is a fact. The opinion can be considered a fact in the sense that it is a fact that the individual holds that particular opinion.

Let me run what I'm hearing from you on this again. My understanding interprets you to be saying this:

Premise 1 = An American ground invasion will be difficult and costly in lives.
Premise 2 = We want to minimize that.
Conclusion = It is moral to bomb the Japanese.


Can that be it? Did anyone bother to ask the Japanese?

I feel I must have you wrong, since as you can see, the above syllogism is not only invalid in form but merely prudential (i.e. a thing done for the sake of achieving some outcome). Or are you saying moral = prudential, that the fact of just having a goal is capable of morally justifying anything to achieve that goal? Or are you saying that "moral" isn't an informative word or real concept at all, and we ought just to go with "prudential" in its place? (I'm not being glib...I can't quite see how to make it work.)

Once again, your syllogism yields an invalid conclusion. The conclusion of the argument will not be something general like "It is moral to bomb the Japanese," and such a conclusion implicitly suggests that it is OK to bomb the Japanese whenever one feels like it from now on. Instead, the conclusion would be something more specific like "Therefore, we should bomb the Japanese [in this situation]."

Furthermore, I think you still don't understand my overall point. I am claiming that morality is a subset of the reasoning process itself; morality is not found in the specific conclusions that one arrives at through the reasoning process. Also, the premises of the arguments we make should be considered to be variables within any given situation. There is an infinite amount of details and considerations in any situation that could be used within the framework of one's moral argument; there are multiple goals once may seek to achieve or perspectives to look at the situation from. Part of the moral reasoning process is finding the right premises, in addition to finding the right conclusion.

I'm confused. I don't know how you would define the word "moral" but I understand it to refer to "a judgment that works best to produce a desired outcome." If an action does not produce a desired outcome, then in what sense is the action good?

Prudentially, not morally. I understand "moral" to imply value judgment, and "prudence" merely to imply efficacy. That's the normal distinction in Moral Theory.

To illustrate, if prudence = morality, then these two arguments are identical in their sense.

My neighbour's wife is beautiful.
I desire beautiful things.
I must have what I desire.
I must have my neighbour's wife.

And

My neighbour's wife is beautful.
I desire beautiful things.
I must have what I desire.
I am right to have my neighbour's wife. (Here "must have," the prudential form, is supplanted by "am right," the moral form.)

Would you say that they are the same? Or is there a meaning in the latter that is absent from the former? If so, what would that meaning be?

You talk about values, but what good are values if they do not produce a desired outcome? You criticize efficacy, but what good are your values if they are not effective? It seems that you believe in values for the sake of values; this seems pointless to me.

In regards to the arguments about the neighbor's wife, my question is: Why shouldn't I have my neighbor's wife? Maybe I deserve her; maybe she would be happier with me; maybe her husband doesn't deserve her or doesn't appreciate her. It seems that your implication here is that stealing a man's wife is wrong in itself. But I don't believe that is true. Right and wrong are not to be found from outside the context of the situation but from within the context.

Also remember that in moral reasoning the premises one chooses are as important as the validity of the conclusion. If the premises of this particular argument are truly and honestly the most important and pertinent premises in the situation, then I absolutely should steal my neighbor's wife. In morality, the onus is on me to take the best premises under consideration. For example, say I drive by an ice cream parlor and decide I want some ice cream – this could be considered a premise for a moral argument. But say I subsequently recall that I am morbidly overweight and diabetic – I might decide that the latter premise takes precedence over the former. I might decide that my long-term health is more important than the instant gratification I would getting from eating ice cream. This choosing of the optimal premises is a vital part of moral reasoning.

Morality is a subset of reason: this means that it is not the conclusions themselves that are obligatory but the reasoning process itself.

What causes reason to be "obligatory"? Don't a whole lot of people do without it, and pursue impulses rather than reasoning? And if so, and if they prefer not to reason, how would it become "obligatory" that they do otherwise? (Again, sincere question here.)

I could ask the same of you. You believe in absolute moral values, but if I want to simply ignore these absolutes, for what reason should I do otherwise?

But to answer your question: what makes the reasoning process obligatory is that the reasoning process involves the individual getting what he wants, rather than getting what society wants or getting what some non-existent God wants. The moral conclusion that he draws emanates from his own desires and goals; moral reasoning is obligatory simply because it is reflexive – by doing the "right thing" you are essentially getting what you already want. It is like the ice cream example from earlier: moral reasoning is often about denying yourself something you want in favor of something you want even more. On the other hand, moral absolutism is about denying yourself things you want simply because God says so. I think one reason why people do bad things sometimes is not so much because the person is a bad person, but because the only moral framework he knows is an empty and pointless one.

I have never used the phrase, "working for and being supported by some cultural group." I don't know where you got that from, but I never said it.

Sorry: I should have clarified my use of quotation marks there. I wasn't attempting to quote you, just do indicate that the enclosed expression was suspect or "loose" in application. To rephrase, I mean that every "goal" (to use your word) is taken by a particular individual or cultural group. And it seems to me that if having a "goal" issues in a favourable moral judgment, then it becomes automatic that whatever that individual or group takes as it's "goal" confers "goodness" or "rightness" or "morality," if you will, on that "goal."

Hence the ISIS example. They are certainly individuals or a cultural group, and they certainly have goals. But "moral"? That seems too much to think.

As my ice cream example indicates, no moral premise is ever good or moral in itself; the onus is on the individual to choose the moral premises that address their highest, most precious needs and desires. To obtain one's desires is the only meaningful understanding of "good." What would be the point of me going through life depriving myself of everything I want, and then following a bunch of extraneous rules and engaging in a bunch of extraneously prescribed endeavors that offer me no satisfaction whatsoever? Ultimately, being good is about getting what you want; morality is not about being yourself or about being someone you're not – it is about being your best self.

Anyway, an act is ultimately only as good as its outcome.

Okay, but then how do we judge the "goodness" of the outcome, so as to evaluate the act? Do we mean that an act is "good" merely if proves efficacious for some purpose ("goal") we can get some group to want to achieve? Again, you can see the problem I'm having with your view: it looks like you're saying, "If it works, and if people want it, it's right." And it looks like you're saying that's what morality is.

But that's not what morality is in any theory I know but Pragmatism: and Pragmatism is inherently amoral, since it identifies "moral" and "prudent" as the same concept.

I feel I'm missing a piece of what you're trying to say. It just doesn't seem to work as a description of "morality." Any way I turn it, it looks merely like prudential self-interest, and seems to lack the duty-causing and value-conferring elements that are inherent to usual accounts of morality: that is, I can't see why anyone would be compelled to respect and accept-as-justified someone else's merely prudential reasoning.

I think one thing you are not considering is that moral absolutism also has a dark side. The people who were behind the murders and tortures of the Inquisition and the Salem witch trials were moral absolutists. Al Qaeda and ISIS are moral absolutists. When an Islamic terrorist takes a knife and begins carving off a man's head, hears him screaming in agony, hears the pig-like squeals as his windpipe is severed, feels the warm blood gushing from the wound where his head used to be, all the while he is thinking to himself, "I am doing God's work." This is the downside of moral absolutism, and in particular the kind of moral absolutism that emanates from belief in God. This is the downside of thinking that some acts are good or evil a priori.

I have seen the flaws of moral absolutism in my own life. There have been times in my life when people have intrusively forced their help on me, thinking they were doing "the right thing" when they were actually making things worse for me. Other times, I have seen people who felt free to indulge themselves in some adversarial or questionable behavior because they were acting on the preconception that their behavior was simply "not wrong" in an a priori sense. Moral absolutism often does not respect the complexity and nuances of life. On the other hand, thinking of morality in terms of the reasoning process will tend to avoid such problems.

[Immanuel Can]

Instead, the conclusion would be something more specific like "Therefore, we should bomb the Japanese [in this situation]."

I don't claim more than that. It still seems morally problematic to me, though.

You talk about values, but what good are values if they do not produce a desired outcome? You criticize efficacy, but what good are your values if they are not effective? It seems that you believe in values for the sake of values; this seems pointless to me

.

I've been unclear, perhaps. let me clarify, if I can.

I'm not criticizing efficacy per se, but rather questioning efficacy for questionable goals. Something that is "efficacious" in producing evil is hardly desirable, as I think you'll agree. For this reason, "efficacy" cannot be asserted to be a moral property (helping us with concepts like "right" and "wrong") but rather only as a prudential property (helping us with issues like "how fast," "how soon," and "with what minimal effort" we do something).

The Holocaust was undoubtedly "efficient." Trains ran well, factories burned effectively, and the purposes of particular persons and subcultures were realized quickly. But I think neither you nor I would regard it as "moral," even if it was efficient.

So "efficiency" all by itself won't solve the problem of morality.

Also remember that in moral reasoning the premises one chooses are as important as the validity of the conclusion.

Oh, indeed. They determine the possibility of the justification of the conclusion. Bad premises lead to good conclusions only by accidental bad logic. Usually, and where logic is rigorous, they lead only to bad conclusions. Carry on.

In morality, the onus is on me to take the best premises under consideration.

Also true: but how shall we locate "best"? On what scale shall we weigh our impulses? And worse still, others will clearly have contrary impulses, often ones irreconcilable with ours. Absent any objective measure, how should we know "good" or "better," let along what is "best"?

A similar problem crops up with this:

I think one reason why people do bad things sometimes is not so much because the person is a bad person, but because the only moral framework he knows is an empty and pointless one.

"Empty" of what? "Pointless" with regard to what objective? In order to know "empty" and "pointless," one would have to know what "fulness" entailed, and what the "point" of our endeavours actually should be. But again, absent a scale, how do we know either term?

And again...

Ultimately, being good is about getting what you want; morality is not about being yourself or about being someone you're not – it is about being your best self.

What is the "best human self"? To know that, I'd have to have some idea of my ideal self, and where would I get that? How do I know what I am, and what I really need, if I don't have any objective standards for that? Are my personal intuitions so reliable, or even infallible, that I always know what's "best" for me and do it? How many smokers are good examples of the contrary?

The upshot: value-laden language always need objective justification. Otherwise, it's just an emotive expression, something considerably short of morally impressive.

But to answer your question: what makes the reasoning process obligatory is that the reasoning process involves the individual getting what he wants, rather than getting what society wants or getting what some non-existent God wants.

Agreed. I don't want what some "non-existent" God wants. On the other hand, anyone would be crazy not to want what the existent God wants, assuming what He wants is our good...which I do.

I could ask the same of you. You believe in absolute moral values, but if I want to simply ignore these absolutes, for what reason should I do otherwise?

Well, as a moral objectivist, I could simply point out that you are making an error. The objective moral code is against you. (Hold that thought for one minute while I deal with what I think your first question after that might be, below.)

On the other hand, moral absolutism is about denying yourself things you want simply because God says so.

Oh, no. I think we have a misunderstanding here. Moral absolutes are not "absolutism." I'm not advocating "absolutism." "Absolutism" is a political description having to do with making people do things by force. I'm no advocate of that. In fact, many believers in moral absolutes are dead against absolutism, precisely for the reason that they believe in particular moral absolutes. John Locke is a superb example of this: his whole rationale for human rights and freedoms is based on moral absolutes...but is totally anti-absolutist.

Moreover, I don't find your characterization the rationale for moral absolutes reflective of me or any believers in moral absolutes that I know personally. I would say they might be a very good description of ISIS, or something like that, but in no way reflective of how I think about it. To say that "God says something" does not exclude the possibility that He says it for good reason. He may, for example, tell us not to kill people because He loves and values them. Or He may tell us not to commit adultery because He knows that fidelity is more conducive to our real happiness. But it's totally unnecessary to suppose his commands to us would simply have to be arbitrary in that way.

I think one thing you are not considering is that moral absolutism also has a dark side.

Can I go further? Moral absolutism is evil. To force others to believe in your views using political machinations or force is itself totally immoral. John Locke again spells this out well.

It is true that some bad people believe in moral absolutes too. But it's not that fact that makes them bad: it's the particular absolutes the hold. I think that's important to note, especially in our era, wherein moral relativists themselves have sometimes shown teeth. Consider, for example, the vogue for pillorying any dissent to various agendas as "sexist," "racist," "homophobic," Islamophobic," "imperialist," "Eurocentric" or whatever. As Malcolm Muggeridge so astutely observed, especially in the media age, the Left's tools of character assassination are so effective as to "make thumb-screws seem paltry" by comparison.

Nevertheless, religious torture and leftists torture are both moral abominations, so we can set both aside, I think.

On the other hand, thinking of morality in terms of the reasoning process will tend to avoid such problems.

I think this is too much to hope. I actually wish your were right about their being some universal moral mechanism for deciding moral matters -- at least in a superficial way, it would greatly improve our methods of solving conflicts. But it's just not so. There is no straightforward link between factual and moral propositions, as Hume said in his famous "Guillotine". They aren't of the same kind, so mixing them in any syllogism will issue in false judgments.

And if we're talking about dangers, consider the danger of us thinking that "reason has shown us" that X or Y is true. That would make every dissenter to that view "irrational," and possibly "retrograde," "evil" or whatever. And then "reason" would justify us killing them, just as the Koran, the Haddiths and the Imams justify the slitting of throats in the desert. Except false "reason" is an even more implacable enemy to human rights; for the religious zealot may yet be uncovered for what he is; but if a false universal "reason" speaks, and if its moral judgments come against us, how then shall we stand?

I see that danger modelled in the Soviet and Maoist atrocities of the last century -- none of which had a lick to do with religion or moral absolutes at all. They were all perpetrated in the name of things like secular reason, evolving historical destiny, the good of the race, and progress.

Something to think about, no?

[mysterio448]

In morality, the onus is on me to take the best premises under consideration.

Also true: but how shall we locate "best"? On what scale shall we weigh our impulses? And worse still, others will clearly have contrary impulses, often ones irreconcilable with ours. Absent any objective measure, how should we know "good" or "better," let along what is "best"?

The same problem emerges with objective measures. How do you prove that your "objective measures" are any better than another person's "objective measures"? The fact is, in the real world there are no moral objective measures. The best we can hope for is to look inside ourselves, find what we really want the most, and hope that conflicting parties can find some kind of compromise or point of agreement in which everyone gets what they want.

"Empty" of what? "Pointless" with regard to what objective? In order to know "empty" and "pointless," one would have to know what "fulness" entailed, and what the "point" of our endeavours actually should be. But again, absent a scale, how do we know either term?

Many people are raised to believe that they should perform acts of kindness and to deprive themselves of some of their impulses because it is "the right thing to do" or because it will please God or get them into heaven. But to some people, these reasons are hollow. In the end, people want real, concrete satisfaction, not abstract satisfaction through compliance to impractical rules. I think deep down we all know that God doesn't exist, and that this life is all there is, and the satisfaction you attain in this life is the only satisfaction you will ever attain. Therefore, I feel a purely spiritual basis and motivation for morality is inherently flawed and ineffective.

What is the "best human self"? To know that, I'd have to have some idea of my ideal self, and where would I get that? How do I know what I am, and what I really need, if I don't have any objective standards for that? Are my personal intuitions so reliable, or even infallible, that I always know what's "best" for me and do it? How many smokers are good examples of the contrary?

The upshot: value-laden language always need objective justification. Otherwise, it's just an emotive expression, something considerably short of morally impressive.

Being your best self is about asking yourself the best and most pertinent questions about what you're doing and why you're doing it. It is about asking yourself who you are and who you want to be and what is really important to you. Your best self is not something you can ever know but is something you must search for and pursue.

Some people think that being good is about self-deprivation, but on the contrary, I believe that being good is about satisfaction on the deepest level of one's being. You keep asking me to provide objective values that are obligatory for everyone; but such values have no real substance. They are merely fabricated measures of social control; they serve to impose order on the masses, but are not meant to confer personal meaning or a deep, introspective satisfaction. This can only come with searching for one's best self and satisfying its needs and wants. Remember my ice cream example from earlier.

Agreed. I don't want what some "non-existent" God wants. On the other hand, anyone would be crazy not to want what the existent God wants, assuming what He wants is our good...which I do.

My point was that I don't believe in God, and many other people don't either. So "what God wants" is a meaningless motivator for me and people like me. And even if God does exist, he is terribly quiet and aloof, and his representatives more often than not are hypocrites.

Well, as a moral objectivist, I could simply point out that you are making an error. The objective moral code is against you. (Hold that thought for one minute while I deal with what I think your first question after that might be, below.)

This is not a good deterrent. People break the law all the time, even though they know full well that their acts are illegal and they can incur actual, concrete punishment if caught. So "the objective moral code is against you" is just not enough; you might as well say "The boogeyman will get you."

I think this is too much to hope. I actually wish your were right about their being some universal moral mechanism for deciding moral matters -- at least in a superficial way, it would greatly improve our methods of solving conflicts. But it's just not so. There is no straightforward link between factual and moral propositions, as Hume said in his famous "Guillotine". They aren't of the same kind, so mixing them in any syllogism will issue in false judgments.

And if we're talking about dangers, consider the danger of us thinking that "reason has shown us" that X or Y is true. That would make every dissenter to that view "irrational," and possibly "retrograde," "evil" or whatever. And then "reason" would justify us killing them, just as the Koran, the Haddiths and the Imams justify the slitting of throats in the desert. Except false "reason" is an even more implacable enemy to human rights; for the religious zealot may yet be uncovered for what he is; but if a false universal "reason" speaks, and if its moral judgments come against us, how then shall we stand?

I see that danger modelled in the Soviet and Maoist atrocities of the last century -- none of which had a lick to do with religion or moral absolutes at all. They were all perpetrated in the name of things like secular reason, evolving historical destiny, the good of the race, and progress.

Something to think about, no?

One thing that is important to remember – which I think I may have mentioned before – is that logic and reason do not really involve truth. They are about validity. Consider this syllogism:

P1: Some dolphins are friendly to humans.
P2: Dolphins are fish.
C: Therefore, some fish are friendly to humans.

This syllogism is perfectly valid according to the rules of logic. However, it so happens that the second premise is factually incorrect. Thus the entire argument is unsound. My point is that the rules of logic, as far as I can tell, are perfect and absolute; but is us who must make sure that we provide the right premises. With logic, you get out what you put in. Thus there is no danger that moral judgments based on moral reason can "come against us." Moral reasoning is more about organizing one's own motivations more so than imposing demands on others.

[Immanuel Can]

My apologies for the long break since your response, Mysterio. I wasn't ignoring you, just massively preoccupied with the details of life.

The same problem emerges with objective measures. How do you prove that your "objective measures" are any better than another person's "objective measures"?

Oh, that's no problem at all. I'm objectively "taller" than my brother. Everyone knows it, and everyone agrees. There isn't even a controversy. "Tallness" is an objective measurement: and you can do it in centimetres or inches or jelly beans, and it will turn out the same. But that's not what you're worrying over, is it? Rather, you add...

The fact is, in the real world there are no moral objective measures.

But this is the essential question: is "moral" a real property, like "tallness," or merely a fictive matter of taste? I say the former, and you say the latter, it would seem. But assuming I were right (just as a heuristic device, for now) then "rightness" would be as objective as "tallness." So we have to settle the question of the objective existence of morality before we can say whether or not "rightness" is objective.

Now, what I would point out is that while you talk as if it's not, you continually find it necessary to resort to terms that imply objective moral standards. For example, would you say my view was "worse" than yours? Well, if it is, then that's an objective judgment on your part: and if it's not "worse," then why argue at all? As the saying goes, then "I'm okay, and you're okay."

And yet we're having this debate....so....

Now, here is a further example of you using objective moral language that you have declared illegitimate already...

The best we can hope for is to look inside ourselves, find what we really want the most, and hope that conflicting parties can find some kind of compromise or point of agreement in which everyone gets what they want.

"Best" is an uninformative term here unless it refers to some common reality. Unless I share your view of "best," how can it tell me anything? You may as well write, "The rxvl we can do is..." It would mean as much, if I have no idea of what you mean by "best."

Secondly, who told us we're entitled to, or ought to seek to get "what we want"? Do not people want all sorts of thing we conventionally call "good" but also a host of thing we call "bad"? How shall we differentiate, absent any objectivity to our language?

Many people are raised to believe that they should perform acts of kindness and to deprive themselves of some of their impulses because it is "the right thing to do" or because it will please God or get them into heaven.

Quite true. I agree. But we should ask ourselves if that' s the ONLY reason for people to do acts of kindness or to set aside their impulses for the good of others. If there can be better reasons (and I certainly believe there are), then the failure of those people you mention to grasp the right reasons is no stroke against the idea of objective morality.

In fact, your judgment against them, your claims that their views are "hollow," "unreal," "unsatisfying," and "impractical" (your terms, from the last message) all require objective measures: fulfilling, real, satisfying and practical respectively. But it seems to me that you have already denied these have any objective standing, since you deny that the corresponding moral values exist. One cannot be "fulfilled" unless one can specify what objective "fullness" looks like, and one cannot be "practical" except "practical for" some objective purpose. But that fulness or purpose needs its own objective meaning, or the terms are simply uninformative of anything -- rxvl again.

Being your best self is about asking yourself the best and most pertinent questions about what you're doing and why you're doing it

.
"Best"? On what scale of value? "Pertinent"? To what objective good goal? You would need both, in order for your claim to hold.

It is about asking yourself who you are and who you want to be and what is really important to you. Your best self is not something you can ever know but is something you must search for and pursue.

Now you have an objective "self" that you must serve? What else can be understood from "who you are"? If you're not already objectively something in specific, you'll be incapable of serving its interests, since it could have no objective good. And how can we "pursue" or "search" for that which is inherently unlocatable because it's objectively unreal, by your account? Have you sent us grasping for smoke?

I'm not being obtuse here: absent any objective meaning to any of your value terms, it's impossible to be understanding anything from your claims. But I think both you and I DO think you're trying to say something here, and I think it's not nearly so hard as you are making it to say what that is. Only your claim that such terms have no objective meaning stands between us and agreement on the meaning of what you're saying.

My point was that I don't believe in God, and many other people don't either. So "what God wants" is a meaningless motivator for me and people like me. And even if God does exist, he is terribly quiet and aloof, and his representatives more often than not are hypocrites.

"I and many people don't believe" is a poor start here. The same was once true of the roundness of the Earth, and look where that ended up?

As for the numbers game, Atheists are still no more than 4% of the world's population, in fact. (CIA stats.) But it surely won't matter how many people believe or don't believe, IF the thing in which they are disbelieving is objectively true anyway. That would be "Bandwagon Fallacy".

If God is an objective reality, then He may care whether or not we believe in Him: if He is not, then it won't matter if we do or don't. But either way, belief will not make Him exist (as Atheists are swift to point out) and disbelief will not make Him disappear (as Atheists almost never notice).

This is not a good deterrent. People break the law all the time, even though they know full well that their acts are illegal and they can incur actual, concrete punishment if caught. So "the objective moral code is against you" is just not enough; you might as well say "The boogeyman will get you."

Who said "deterrence" was the goal? Indeed, who said "motivation" either? You did, but I certainly didn't. Actually, I don't believe either. And I'd agree with you that the deterrent and motivation values of any moral code are low. That's why there has to be much more than a moral code to faith.

And as for the "boogeyman," the comfortable thing about him is that he doesn't objectively exist. But surely the vexed question here is whether or not God exists, and it can't be bypassed by comparison with the boogeyman unless we've already shown the comparison is just.

More importantly, the boogeyman isn't real. What if God is?

One thing that is important to remember – which I think I may have mentioned before – is that logic and reason do not really involve truth. They are about validity. Consider this syllogism:

I am well aware of this principle. But thanks for going over it again. It may be salient to our discussion later.

My point is that the rules of logic, as far as I can tell, are perfect and absolute; but is us who must make sure that we provide the right premises. With logic, you get out what you put in.

This is quite right, I think.

Thus there is no danger that moral judgments based on moral reason can "come against us." Moral reasoning is more about organizing one's own motivations more so than imposing demands on others.

Oh, not at all! Even the term "moral" has no meaning to a solipsist.

"Moral" is attached to the concept "ought," which historically, is actually a contraction of "owe-it." Morality is about what you "owe" to other people, not about what you, in some circular sense, "owe to yourself." For how can you "owe" yourself anything? Surely if you are yourself the only moral count-er in the universe, then "owe" to anyone or anything goes out the window. You can only then ask, "What do I want?" but never, "What to I owe to do?" What you "ought" to do is a description of what other moral count-ers require of you, expect of you, and impose upon you; and also of what duties you require, expect and impose upon them.

There is no "moral" in a world of one. "Moral" always takes at least two, and often many more.

The purpose of reason is to produce necessary agreement on what is logical, given particular agreed-upon premises. You and I are simply in disagreement as to the right premises, but not the necessity of reason.

Reason BY ITSELF (that is, absent any particular objective, moral premises) has no advocacy to offer for any morality at all.

Thanks for your insights. Sorry again for the delay.

[Hobbes' Choice]

My apologies for the long break since your response, Mysterio. I wasn't ignoring you, just massively preoccupied with the details of life.

The same problem emerges with objective measures. How do you prove that your "objective measures" are any better than another person's "objective measures"?

Oh, that's no problem at all. I'm objectively "taller" than my brother. Everyone knows it, and everyone agrees. There isn't even a controversy. "Tallness" is an objective measurement: and you can do it in centimetres or inches or jelly beans, and it will turn out the same. But that's not what you're worrying over, is it? Rather, you add...

The fact is, in the real world there are no moral objective measures.

.

This is NOT objective.

You are RELATIVELY taller than your brother.

In fact you are short, compared to another.

You are simply revealing your solipsistic nature.

The real problem comes when you try to apply your assumptions to moral questions, as there is no moral "truth" that does not carry with it assumptions to which no objective rubric can stand..

When you figure this out, then come back, otherwise you might as well have stayed away.

[Immanuel Can]

Mysterio:

When you get back, maybe you can explain to Hobbes why "tall-ness" is a relative judgment, but "tall-er" is an objective comparison. But you'll need to use small words, and duck the hail of irrelevant pejoratives.

If he ever offers anything that you consider relevant, feel free to include it in your own words, in response to me yourself. Otherwise, I shall simply be ignoring his ranting. My life's too short for me to be bothered with all that.

[Immanuel Can]

A relevant quotation:

“We have not been able to show that reason requires the moral point of view, or that all really rational persons should not be individual egoists or classical amoralists. Reason doesn’t decide here. The picture I have painted for you is not a pleasant one. Reflection on it depresses me… Pure practical reason, even with a good knowledge of the facts, will not take you to morality.”

- Kai Nielsen, atheist ethicist

[Dubious]

As a secular directive, morality functions as a restraining order on society to neutralize as much as possible the antisocial proclivities of its individual shareholders. Within the context of reason, morality serves as its executive function if it's going to make all the parts work sufficiently well as one machine.

[Hobbes' Choice]

A relevant quotation:

“We have not been able to show that reason requires the moral point of view, or that all really rational persons should not be individual egoists or classical amoralists. Reason doesn’t decide here. The picture I have painted for you is not a pleasant one. Reflection on it depresses me… Pure practical reason, even with a good knowledge of the facts, will not take you to morality.”

- Kai Nielsen, atheist ethicist

What's your point, and why have you not heeded what he has said?

[Hobbes' Choice]

As a secular directive, morality functions as a restraining order on society to neutralize as much as possible the antisocial proclivities of its individual shareholders. Within the context of reason, morality serves as its executive function if it's going to make all the parts work sufficiently well as one machine.

A bit circular.
The point is how we determined what is and what is not 'anti-social'. It is antisocial because it is not moral, or is it immoral because antisocial.
And a bit top-down.
Morality needs to complicity of all parts, not just in service of the executive. And I am not talking in an ideal way. Even the most cruel and draconian regimes need the support of the people - one might say, especially that type.

As Hume pointed out with billiard balls, on a priori grounds no amount of reason can predict the out come of two balls striking. For all we know they may as well transform into a bowl of flowers. You have to observe, and then apply inductive inference from the information. Though determined, a crowd is far more difficult to predict, as in each individual is a billion brain cells all more complex than a billiard ball. One can bring statistic to bear, but, thus far psycho-history is still a dream of Asimov, and today's psychology and sociology are more like arts than science.
At the heart of all morality is human emotion, and base human instincts.
There is a good reason the fictional Mr. Spock found humans puzzling: reason is not enough.
All conclusions are limited and governed by irrational endemic assumption, the unknown knowns, these provide us with 'rational' conclusions, that can lead to the promotion of Jews to a new land, or to their extermination in equal measure. It can lead to slavery or emancipation.

[mysterio448]

The fact is, in the real world there are no moral objective measures.

But this is the essential question: is "moral" a real property, like "tallness," or merely a fictive matter of taste? I say the former, and you say the latter, it would seem. But assuming I were right (just as a heuristic device, for now) then "rightness" would be as objective as "tallness." So we have to settle the question of the objective existence of morality before we can say whether or not "rightness" is objective.

I don't believe that morality is a matter of taste but is a matter of reason. Deciding what is moral is not to be thought of as a discrete decision but as an ongoing intellectual process.

Now, what I would point out is that while you talk as if it's not, you continually find it necessary to resort to terms that imply objective moral standards. For example, would you say my view was "worse" than yours? Well, if it is, then that's an objective judgment on your part: and if it's not "worse," then why argue at all? As the saying goes, then "I'm okay, and you're okay."

You are equivocating. One view being "worse" than another is not "worse" in a moral sense but in a sense of quality.

"Best" is an uninformative term here unless it refers to some common reality. Unless I share your view of "best," how can it tell me anything? You may as well write, "The rxvl we can do is..." It would mean as much, if I have no idea of what you mean by "best."

I think you're just being difficult here. If everyone gets what they want, then that is the best possible outcome no matter how you look at it.

Secondly, who told us we're entitled to, or ought to seek to get "what we want"? Do not people want all sorts of thing we conventionally call "good" but also a host of thing we call "bad"? How shall we differentiate, absent any objectivity to our language?

First of all, if everyone gets what they want then no harm is done to anyone, therefore there is no "bad" in the situation. Second, for what reason should people not seek to get what they want?

In fact, your judgment against them, your claims that their views are "hollow," "unreal," "unsatisfying," and "impractical" (your terms, from the last message) all require objective measures: fulfilling, real, satisfying and practical respectively. But it seems to me that you have already denied these have any objective standing, since you deny that the corresponding moral values exist. One cannot be "fulfilled" unless one can specify what objective "fullness" looks like, and one cannot be "practical" except "practical for" some objective purpose. But that fulness or purpose needs its own objective meaning, or the terms are simply uninformative of anything -- rxvl again.

I'm not quite sure what it would mean for something to be "objectively fulfilling," "objectively satisfying," or "objectively practical." It seems to me that these things are all relative. Fulfilling is fulfilling relative to something comparatively less fulfilling, satisfying is satisfying relative to something comparatively less satisfying, and so on.

"Best"? On what scale of value? "Pertinent"? To what objective good goal? You would need both, in order for your claim to hold.

.

The scale of value for "best" and the goal for "pertinent" are relative to the questions concerning what you are doing and why you are doing it. Morality is not about looking outside oneself for some objective goal but about looking within oneself, seeking true satisfaction and setting aside petty whims of the ego or the emotions.

It is about asking yourself who you are and who you want to be and what is really important to you. Your best self is not something you can ever know but is something you must search for and pursue.

Now you have an objective "self" that you must serve? What else can be understood from "who you are"? If you're not already objectively something in specific, you'll be incapable of serving its interests, since it could have no objective good. And how can we "pursue" or "search" for that which is inherently unlocatable because it's objectively unreal, by your account? Have you sent us grasping for smoke?

I think you have made the mistake of interpreting the word "objective" as "real" and "relative" as "unreal." I think your understanding of "objective" is largely illusory. Many things in the universe are not "objective," as you interpret the concept. Time is not objective but is relative and malleable. A quantum particle is not "objectively" a particle or a wave but is paradoxically both, and its identity can seem to change relative to an observer. Most of an atom consists of a field of virtual particles, particles randomly popping in and out of existence; thus an atom lacks objective substance. Schrodinger's equation says that a quantum particle exists in all possible quantum states simultaneously. A rainbow exists but has no "objective" location; it's location is relative to the perspective of the observer. The concept of "smallness" is real but it is not objective: a baby is considered small but not small compared to a mouse, which is not small compared to a cockroach, which is not small compared to an ant, which is not small compared to a flea, then a bacterium, a virus, a molecule, an atom, a proton, an electron, a quark, etc. Yet it makes no sense to say that smallness is not real, it is only relative. As you can see, things don't need to be objective to be real. Therefore, there is nothing necessarily unreasonable in saying that the best self is something that cannot be fully known, only sought out and pursued. It is also not unreasonable to say that, in a universe in which so many things are relative or in a state of ontological flux, that morality may not necessarily be objective.

"I and many people don't believe" is a poor start here. The same was once true of the roundness of the Earth, and look where that ended up?

As for the numbers game, Atheists are still no more than 4% of the world's population, in fact. (CIA stats.) But it surely won't matter how many people believe or don't believe, IF the thing in which they are disbelieving is objectively true anyway. That would be "Bandwagon Fallacy".

If God is an objective reality, then He may care whether or not we believe in Him: if He is not, then it won't matter if we do or don't. But either way, belief will not make Him exist (as Atheists are swift to point out) and disbelief will not make Him disappear (as Atheists almost never notice).

You are missing the point. Whether God really exists or not is not the issue. The issue is that God has no authoritative influence over someone who doesn't believe he exists. A good moral model is something that will be applicable and intuitive to both believers and non-believers.

And as for the "boogeyman," the comfortable thing about him is that he doesn't objectively exist. But surely the vexed question here is whether or not God exists, and it can't be bypassed by comparison with the boogeyman unless we've already shown the comparison is just.

More importantly, the boogeyman isn't real. What if God is?

I must have missed something. How do you know for certain that the boogeyman doesn't exist?

Oh, not at all! Even the term "moral" has no meaning to a solipsist.

"Moral" is attached to the concept "ought," which historically, is actually a contraction of "owe-it." Morality is about what you "owe" to other people, not about what you, in some circular sense, "owe to yourself." For how can you "owe" yourself anything? Surely if you are yourself the only moral count-er in the universe, then "owe" to anyone or anything goes out the window. You can only then ask, "What do I want?" but never, "What to I owe to do?" What you "ought" to do is a description of what other moral count-ers require of you, expect of you, and impose upon you; and also of what duties you require, expect and impose upon them.

There is no "moral" in a world of one. "Moral" always takes at least two, and often many more.

I am an atheist, which implies that I do not believe in an afterlife. I believe that this life is all I have and ever will have. Therefore, all that ultimately matters, as far as I am concerned, is my personal satisfaction in this life. Now, my satisfaction does not necessarily imply abject selfishness and egocentrism. I desire to be fair to others because it satisfies me to do so. Ultimately, what good is it to give people what I owe them and to fulfill their expectations and requirements and all that if I derive no kind of satisfaction from this? I feel that morality exists to serve me and I do not exist to serve morality. The fact is, not everyone has a desire to follow a bunch of extraneous moral rules, however everyone does want satisfaction; therefore, I think the only effective motivator for morality is to tie people's actions into their own satisfaction somehow.

Furthermore, morality is meaningless unless I understand how it relates to me and pertains to my own interests. Everything I experience in life is from my own perspective, so it makes no sense to make decisions based on someone else's perspective. At the end of the day, I am the person who must deal with the consequences of all my decisions -- not God. So it makes no sense to exercise a moral regime that favors God's interests if they are at the expense of my own.

One more thing: You keep talking about objective morals; give me an example of an objective moral rule that should be followed unconditionally and is not subject to compromise through reason.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't believe that morality is a matter of taste but is a matter of reason. Deciding what is moral is not to be thought of as a discrete decision but as an ongoing intellectual process.

But, as Kai Neilson rightly points out, "reason" isn't going to get you morality. You pointed out the essential problem yourself, in your last message: bad premises + logic = bad (or at least invalid) conclusion. Good premises + logic = valid conclusion. EVERYTHING depends on the premises, not on the reasoning that follows from them. The reasoning can be unimpeachable, but if the premises are bad you're going to get errant conclusions.

So I'm agreeing with you that reasoning is useful as a process -- but only after the RIGHT premises are put into the reasoning-mechanism. It' the premises that need justification.

IC wrote:

For example, would you say my view was "worse" than yours? Well, if it is, then that's an objective judgment on your part: and if it's not "worse," then why argue at all? As the saying goes, then "I'm okay, and you're okay."

You responded:

You are equivocating. One view being "worse" than another is not "worse" in a moral sense but in a sense of quality.

Not so. There's no equivocation there. It won't matter if you take it as morally-worse or quality-worse: you're still going to have the same problem, namely that you'll need to prove that whatever moral standard or quality standard you're referring to is the correct one. And absent any objective moral OR quality standard, how are you going to do that?

I think you're just being difficult here. If everyone gets what they want, then that is the best possible outcome no matter how you look at it.

If Hitler gets what he wants, and Mother Teresa gets what she wants, then we're all good? Implausible, for obvious reasons.

First of all, if everyone gets what they want then no harm is done to anyone, therefore there is no "bad" in the situation. Second, for what reason should people not seek to get what they want?

First of all, the "no harm" standard is purely negative, and not enough to ground any social arrangement. Basically it implies "leave each other alone." That's all. No positive good is implied by it. But secondly: because what people want is often evil.

I'm not quite sure what it would mean for something to be "objectively fulfilling," "objectively satisfying," or "objectively practical." It seems to me that these things are all relative. Fulfilling is fulfilling relative to something comparatively less fulfilling, satisfying is satisfying relative to something comparatively less satisfying, and so on.

Whenever you use a scale, you are rationally obliged to apply a teleological view of your own. For example, if you say X is "more fulfilling" than Y, you could not possibly judge that without some view of what "human fulfillment" ultimately consists in. Or if you say X is "more practical" than Y, you are obligated to say "practical for goal Z, A or B, which are the right 'practical' purposes for us to have."

Morality is not about looking outside oneself for some objective goal but about looking within oneself, seeking true satisfaction and setting aside petty whims of the ego or the emotions.

I understand you assert this is so -- but I see nothing that even suggests why you would think you're right about it. "True satisfaction"? How is anyone going to get that without knowing what "satisfaction" is? "Satisfaction" of what impulse? For what purpose? To what end?

Interestingly, you then refer to "whims" as "petty," and the "ego or the emotions" as likewise. But how can you know this, if all you've got to go on is some provisional feeling of "satisfaction"? What makes one thing "petty" and another "satisfying"? For it surely must be apparent to you that ego can be very strong, and what you regard as "whims" are often major issues to other people.

I think you have made the mistake of interpreting the word "objective" as "real" and "relative" as "unreal."

No. "Relative" is always "relative TO." There is no such thing as "relative to nothing at all." If you have a relative term, you have a scale, like "good, better, best." And you always have to say "better FOR...X, Y, or Z," then defend those values X, Y and Z, objectively (meaning, in a way that others are obliged to believe) or there's no reason for a rational person to believe you're right at all.

I think your understanding of "objective" is largely illusory. Many things in the universe are not "objective," as you interpret the concept. Time is not objective but is relative and malleable.

Then make it go backwards for us. I want to be young again.

A quantum particle is not "objectively" a particle or a wave but is paradoxically both, and its identity can seem to change relative to an observer.

All this...light waves, Schrodiger's Cat, etc. Is presently being revisited because of new scientific developments. It is now thought that a strategy called "modest observation" is capable of yielding a definite answer to this apparent paradox: and if so, we'd be unwise to make much of a popular misconception teetering on the brink of disproof. But either way, it's merely an argument from analogy, and that strategy always requires definite showing that the analogy is apt, and does not contain a significant difference from its referent. In this case, the analogy from physics to morality is clearly far too stretched to be compelling.

You're making the old mistake of arguing from "relativity" (i.e. a scientific theory about the physical world) to "relativism" (i.e. an ideology about the metaphysical). There's never been a good argument to be made that way. See, you say...

It is also not unreasonable to say that, in a universe in which so many things are relative or in a state of ontological flux, that morality may not necessarily be objective.

No, that does not follow. That illegitimately jumps from physics to metaphysics, from an IS statement to an OUGHT, and from facts to moral assessments.

You are missing the point. Whether God really exists or not is not the issue. The issue is that God has no authoritative influence over someone who doesn't believe he exists.

If I were being cheeky I'd say, try disbelieving in your government, and see if that works for you.

Whether or not one "believes" others have authority over one has nothing to do with whether or not they do. Your government will lock you up if you steal, even if you protest you don't believe in governments. Likewise, if a moral law -- or a moral law Giver -- exists, then the fact that a person doesn't know that it exists will not stop it applying. But metaphysicians are fond of pointing to human conscience as an indication that we do, indeed, know the existence of at least some objective moral imperatives. Whether or not they're right, ignorance of the law is no excuse, especially if the law has been revealed in some form and can be known. Then refusal to know would just be willful disobedience. And we even recognize that in common law.

A good moral model is something that will be applicable and intuitive to both believers and non-believers.

"Applicable" yes: but a thing can be "applicable" without your say-so. See the government example above. "Intuitive," it's not clear why you would think that: why would you assume that morality must be "intuitive"? Can you go further with that?

I am an atheist, which implies that I do not believe in an afterlife. I believe that this life is all I have and ever will have.

Yes. Christopher Hitchens said that too. I wonder if he's as happy now with his position as he was then.

Therefore, all that ultimately matters, as far as I am concerned, is my personal satisfaction in this life. Now, my satisfaction does not necessarily imply abject selfishness and egocentrism.

But, as Kai Nielson points out, on an atheist account, why would you have any hesitation about abject selfishness and egocentrism? After all, there's no objective evil, so those things are essentially as "good" as any other value on earth. But you clearly don't think they are, so now you have to ask yourself why you don't think they are.

I desire to be fair to others because it satisfies me to do so. Ultimately, what good is it to give people what I owe them and to fulfill their expectations and requirements and all that if I derive no kind of satisfaction from this? I feel that morality exists to serve me and I do not exist to serve morality.

That may make you a "better" person than if you did otherwise. But on an atheist account, it's impossible to see that it does. I'm personally glad you're a nice person in this regard: but nothing in your atheism makes you choose to be this way rather than any other. After all, there are no objective standards, according to what you've said...so if you were an axe-murderer, you would be just as "good" a person as you are now. After all, it seems the term "good" has no objective referent or scale of values, according to your view.

The fact is, not everyone has a desire to follow a bunch of extraneous moral rules, however everyone does want satisfaction; therefore, I think the only effective motivator for morality is to tie people's actions into their own satisfaction somehow.

I think this mixes up two different issues: 1) the justification for morality, and 2) the motivation for morality. If a law against -- say adultery -- actually exists, the question of whether that is a good law is different from the question of whether or not I'm going to want to obey it.

I think that perhaps that may be at the root of your dilemma regarding morality: perhaps you think that whatever morality is, you have to *like* it before it counts. But it would be hard to see why that has to be true. It would only be reasonable to suppose in the case that nothing you could possibly *like* could be bad. But I don't think we'll have any trouble making the case that people *like* a great many bad things. Some like to smoke and give themselves cancer. Some like theft. Some enjoy torture, rape or murder....the cases can be multiplied very easily. And it must be clear to anyone that in at least some of these cases, the perpetrator is not going to find any moral law against those actions "motivating."

Motivation is an important issue, but it's not primary. "Is there a law?" comes before "Do I like the law?" for the second already assumes the first, as you can see.

Thanks for the response. Over to you.

[Hobbes' Choice]

As a secular directive, morality functions as a restraining order on society to neutralize as much as possible the antisocial proclivities of its individual shareholders. Within the context of reason, morality serves as its executive function if it's going to make all the parts work sufficiently well as one machine.

A bit circular.
The point is how we determined what is and what is not 'anti-social'. It is antisocial because it is not moral, or is it immoral because antisocial.
And a bit top-down.
Morality needs to complicity of all parts, not just in service of the executive. And I am not talking in an ideal way. Even the most cruel and draconian regimes need the support of the people - one might say, especially that type.

As Hume pointed out with billiard balls, on a priori grounds no amount of reason can predict the out come of two balls striking. For all we know they may as well transform into a bowl of flowers. You have to observe, and then apply inductive inference from the information. Though determined, a crowd is far more difficult to predict, as in each individual is a billion brain cells all more complex than a billiard ball. One can bring statistic to bear, but, thus far psycho-history is still a dream of Asimov, and today's psychology and sociology are more like arts than science.
At the heart of all morality is human emotion, and base human instincts.
There is a good reason the fictional Mr. Spock found humans puzzling: reason is not enough.
All conclusions are limited and governed by irrational endemic assumption, the unknown knowns, these provide us with 'rational' conclusions, that can lead to the promotion of Jews to a new land, or to their extermination in equal measure. It can lead to slavery or emancipation.

[Hobbes' Choice]

I don't believe that morality is a matter of taste but is a matter of reason. Deciding what is moral is not to be thought of as a discrete decision but as an ongoing intellectual process.

But, as Kai Neilson rightly points out, "reason" isn't going to get you morality. You pointed out the essential problem yourself, in your last message: bad premises + logic = bad (or at least invalid) conclusion. Good premises + logic = valid conclusion. EVERYTHING depends on the premises, not on the reasoning that follows from them. The reasoning can be unimpeachable, but if the premises are bad you're going to get errant conclusions.
.

The trouble is with your approach is that all your premises are based on unfounded suppositions, as all moral laws are. They are always contingent of the sectional interests of the people who wield the moral power, regardless of ANY objective criteria.

The problem does not lie with reason or logic but with what assumptions to apply them, and in moral cases there is no objective ground. Moral are rooted in complicated social, and emotional states, bound from customary and therefore relative and contingent positions which in healthy societies are always in a state of flux.
Pretending you can bring moral absolutes and objective criteria is a untenable conservative and unresponsive position. You might think you are objective but moral law has to respond to change.