Philosophy Now Forum

I think the poster who said that materialists are nominalists is correct. A concept is a name given to a group of particulars.

For a materialist concepts at best are signifiers that do not refer to any concept or universal. A name is only a signifier that signifies nothing.
A signifier is the pattern of ink on a piece of paper,or the sound waves produced by pronouncing the word.
Anyway, my wife and I are going out. As the terminator said,""I'll be back"!

raw_thought wrote:For a materialist concepts at best are signifiers that do not refer to any concept or universal. A name is only a signifier that signifies nothing.
A signifier is the pattern of ink on a piece of paper,or the sound waves produced by pronouncing the word.
Anyway, my wife and I are going out. As the terminator said,""I'll be back"!

No, a name does not signify nothing, it signifies what it names - i.e. if I slap a sticky note on my desk that says 'desk,' then I have named my desk. If I say 'desk' and point to the desk, I have used a different method of naming.

If I name the group of all things that are blue 'blue' then I have named a group of material things. The group may be vague and incomplete, but so be it, I've named a vague and incomplete group. If you twist my arm and force me to come up with a criterion by which any thing will be counted among this group or not, I may just say - 'whatever I call 'blue' after perceiving it is in the group' - or, 'whatever a random sampling of ten English speakers unanimously call 'blue; after observing it will count as blue'. They're workable, if imperfect definitions - but they are material.

Wittgenstein used the example of pointing to a spot and saying 'stand there.' We do not draw a precise circle and tell someone to stand within the boundaries (unless the circumstances call for it) - as the vague gesture of pointing usually does the job. I don't have to precisely define what it is I name 'blue' unless specific circumstances call for a more precise definition. As such, the 'specific circumstances' will dictate how the boundaries need to be defined.

raw_thought wrote:So you agree with me?
You agreed with all my arguments.

Not really, as I'm not sure of the point you are trying to make, is it that you think concepts, abstractions, et al, are things in their own right and are floating around out there somewhere separate from these bodies?

raw_thought wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Qualia are what something feels like or looks like. How can one see red and not have it appear?
I find the anti-qualia people silly.
If pain is only c fibers firing ( that one doesnt feel pain), there is nothing wrong with torture.
I will start a thread about qualia.

Good, but find me a materialist that doesn't think it is a problem that it is impossible to show a blind man what's the difference between red and green.
Even a materialist knows his limits.

Dennett.
Ironically, I was talking to a prof in NC. Dennett had visited. The prof said that Dennett admitted (in private ) that he takes such an extreme position (that there is no such thing as qualia etc) to be in the public eye. For example, Dennett actually said that an on light switch knows that the light is on.
Of course he must believe such things because they fit his weltanschauung. If they are false, eliminative materialism must be false.
I do not expect anyone's acceptance of that story because it is hearsay. However, my experiences with that prof have convinced me that he is honest.

I've heard Dennett is a bit of a fruitcake too. I heard that the human failure to be able to describe their experience of green / or red is a failure of language.
I think he is the exception to the rule, and demonstrates how stupid such a pure materialistic positions is.
I person never have had eyes will never know what red is like. It is an utter absurdity to say otherwise. That would not bar him from being a materialist to think so.

All things have their place.

Wyman wrote:I think the poster who said that materialists are nominalists is correct. A concept is a name given to a group of particulars.

Obvious.
What's the question?
Question: What are concepts according to materialism?
Answer: To materialism concepts are names.
What are names? Names are "flatus vocis".

raw_thought wrote:Do materialists believe that concepts are physical and tangible?
If I understood everything about Einstein's brain,would I understand Relativity?
Does a light switch in the "on" position know that the light is on?
The concept "book" does not refer to an object that has a specific size,shape,weight,language,title or any quantified property. * If only physical objects exist,then the concept "book" is meaningless because it does not refer to a physical object.
If knowledge is only a physical pattern, does that mean that a book that no one ever reads knows something?
* In other words a book can be any size,weight...etc.

Bit of a silly question. It's a bit like asking if one could understand everything about a computer motherboard, could one perform advanced computer calculations.

“No, a name does not signify nothing, it signifies what it name”
Wyman
The signifier http://changingminds.org/explanations/c ... nified.htm “book” does not refer to a particular book.
Matter cannot signify anything. An arrow does not point at anything it is our interpretation that makes it point.
"materialism" is not a name. It is a concept. Since materialists do not believe that concepts exist, they cannot believe in materialism!

raw_thought wrote: "materialism" is not a name. It is a concept.

It is a concept for you. Not for a "materialist".

"materialism" is not a concept? It is a name for a particular physical object?

it's just a name. a fucking, stupid, silly name.

"Materialism" refers to what? Names must refer to something!

The name "unicorn" refers to what?

David Handeye wrote:The name "unicorn" refers to what?

me

raw_thought wrote:“No, a name does not signify nothing, it signifies what it name”
Wyman
The signifier http://changingminds.org/explanations/c ... nified.htm “book” does not refer to a particular book.
Matter cannot signify anything. An arrow does not point at anything it is our interpretation that makes it point.
"materialism" is not a name. It is a concept. Since materialists do not believe that concepts exist, they cannot believe in materialism!

You and that website just state things. You do not present any arguments. 'Book' names a group of objects. Put an object in front of me and I'll tell you whether or not it is in that group. 'Materialism' names a group of spoken and written words that belong to the group 'materialism.' Think of it like a drop down list on your computer - when you click on 'file' you are not clicking on a concept, but a symbol that takes you to a group of other symbols.