Philosophy Now Forum

If folks believe in shit, let them.

Not your (or my) concern till the shit-believers decide to make you (or me) believe in shit (or make you [or me] walk some line founded in shit).

When the shit-believers cross that line, you can try to talk the shit out of them and I can try to beat the shit out of them with a baseball bat.

But, as long as they keep their shit to themselves it's -- again -- not your (or my) problem.

Immanuel Can wrote:The question then becomes, "Supposing it were good for strict Materialists to continue to believe that morality is a real and morally or deontologically binding thing, but as Materialists we know that morality is at most a psychological or sociological phenomenon, but nothing that refers to reality or truth in any objective sense.

Well, 'strict Materialism' is not a philosophical step I feel compelled to take. I'm not sure what you mean by it, but as you note above:

Immanuel Can wrote:...in science, we make provisional theories about what might or might not be the right description of a phenomenon.

With regard to science, I am entirely at ease with not 'knowing'; I am much more certain that abusing other people is 'wrong' than I am of any mathematical or philosophical model of the universe.

Immanuel Can wrote:Suppose we know morality is, then, nothing but one of these convenient deceptions that produces some "better" or "good" result, such as preventing children from breaking into my car ( See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME77DsLu2wI).

I'll look at the link later, but people can clearly suffer from the consequences of others behaviour. You can't make people care, but you can do your best to protect potential victims

Immanuel Can wrote:Is there then any way to justify allowing people to continue believing in a binding morality?

Some version of the golden rule will suffice, but all efforts to systematise it fail. It is dependent on people being able to empathise, and some people simply lack this basic skill.

Immanuel Can wrote:Or ought we to tell them the truth: namely, that as soon as they are unobserved, or if they are convinced their society won't catch them, or the police are not watching, or if they are more powerful than those who object and are reasonable sure they can force their will, or if even if they fear punishment they are willing to take the risks of being detected, or if they happen to move to a different culture with different mores, then they should realize they are perfectly free to break into anyone's car, or to do any other 'good', 'bad', noble, bloody-minded or generous or underhanded thing they please?

The thing is, incarceration, corporal or even capital punishment don't deter everyone. Not even the threat of eternal damnation has ever proven effective in preventing some people abusing other peoples property and bodies. The USA has an unusually high number of citizens who describe themselves as Christian, but still finds it necessary to lock up a greater proportion of its people than any other nation on Earth. Saudi Arabia regularly chops the hands and even heads off people who are not put off by the risk of being detected. Some people are mental, frankly in a way that, to my mind cannot be attributed to some divinely ordained 'free will'. They are ill in a way that a 'good god', certainly an omnipotent one, really ought to be able to circumvent.

Well, 'strict Materialism' is not a philosophical step I feel compelled to take. I'm not sure what you mean by it,

I just mean what it usually means, at least when it's used in the context of philosophy.

If it helps, I would accept this definition: "In philosophy, the theory of materialism holds that the only thing that exists is matter; that all things are composed of material and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions. In other words, matter is the only substance. As a theory, materialism is a form of physicalism and belongs to the class of monist ontology." (Source: Princeton)

For a Materialist, all properties such as emotions, values and morals must at least in principle be explicable in terms of physical things like neurons, neurochemical reactions and electricity, not in some metaphysical referent like "soul" or "self", " or like "objective value" or "moral truth".

If that's not you, okay. But I guess the next question would be, what non-material entities do you believe exist? And would "morality" be one of those non-material entities?

Some version of the golden rule

See: https://philosophynow.org/issues/74/The ... en_Anymore. It won't work, and isn't universal.

But let's even suppose the article above were completely wrong...that the Golden Rule *were* universally-accepted by all cultures, and that against all odds, it *would* work. From a Materialist perspective, that would be a case of what Marsh is talking about: an atheist would know the GR, like every other moral rule, was a mere edict-of-convenience, one without any objective binding authority.

So would you accept the idea of allowing the GR to be taught to people as binding, because having them believe in the GR was 'good' for something, even though you knew it was not objectively binding at all?

If you would, you've answered Marsh's question in the affirmative: that it is okay to convince people to believe a lie in order to achieve a 'good' outcome.

The thing is, incarceration, corporal or even capital punishment don't deter everyone...

.

This paragraph would be relevant to a different discussion, but perhaps not so relevant to this one. Marsh is asking us to accept that there might be such a thing as a lie that could produce a result we think is good -- not so much of a stretch, really. And certainly, unless you tell people NOT to do certain things, they are quite likely to do them. If you can convince them that to do them is 'bad', it's no stretch to say they will do them less. So I don't think his premise is contentious.

And if so, then his premise is modest enough to allow us to reintroduce the question:

Is it 'better' for a Materialist to teach his kids things like "It's morally wrong to do drugs, steal, cheat, molest others, etc." when he knows very well that own philosophy denies that morality is anything but a figment of the individual or collective bias?

Immanuel Can wrote:For a Materialist, all properties such as emotions, values and morals must at least in principle be explicable in terms of physical things like neurons, neurochemical reactions and electricity, not in some metaphysical referent like "soul" or "self", " or like "objective value" or "moral truth".

If that's not you, okay. But I guess the next question would be, what non-material entities do you believe exist? And would "morality" be one of those non-material entities?

Well, since you ask, I'm an empiricist. I don't 'believe' in entities, or even matter. I know there are phenomena, and if I can create a coherent story that is consistent with those, well and good. But while any such narrative may include all sorts of things, it doesn't commit me to a particular ontology. I think the most plausible explanation for the phenomena that give the impression that the universe is made of some sort of stuff is some stuff the universe is made of, it might not be, but it is a good working hypothesis. To that extent I am a materialist.
I don't believe "properties such as emotions, values and morals" exist independently of people emoting or judging; they are not things in themselves, and it is demonstrably not the case that people who are taught that they are behave better.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Some version of the golden rule

See: https://philosophynow.org/issues/74/The ... en_Anymore. It won't work, and isn't universal.

Well, I think I have addressed that by saying:

uwot wrote:Some version of the golden rule will suffice, but all efforts to systematise it fail. It is dependent on people being able to empathise, and some people simply lack this basic skill.

Still, I don't think the article is very compelling. (This ones much better: https://philosophynow.org/issues/104/Ph ... d_Branches ) Stephen L. Anderson distinguishes between the negative and positive application; of the negative he says:
"the negative version may be fulfilled (if we wish to construe it that way) simply by ignoring our neighbor, for as long as we are not directly implicated in his harm, we have not transgressed the negative version of Golden Rule ethics."
We spend most of the time ignoring the great majority of humankind: it is not practical to do otherwise and I don't think there is anything blameworthy in that. Indeed, if I am minding my own business, I would choose that other people do likewise, in which case it is a positive version.
But there's more:
"This negative version of the Golden Rule is particularly minimal if we happen to be among those millions of people in the world who believe that a person’s lot in life, even his suffering, is caused by fate or karma: to ‘not do harm’ might then mean that we have a duty to leave him alone. Perhaps we might think it is in his ultimate best interest to suffer, and thereby to achieve his penance, enlightenment, or moksha. To be sure, we might not see things this way, and we might decide to help the sufferer. But – and here is the key point – under the negative version of the Golden Rule we would have no obligation to help him."
Well, yes, even Buddhists can be fundamentalist nutjobs.

Earlier Anderson cites the Buddhist version of the golden rule: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” (Udana-Varga 5:18) which is an entirely negative version. It is one of eight listed. Of the positive versions Anderson complains:
"If it is our duty to ‘love’ our ‘neighbor’ (version 7) or our ‘brother’ (version 5), then we might well ask, “Who is my ‘neighbor’?” or “Who is my ‘brother’?”
You say, Immanuel Can:

Immanuel Can wrote:It won't work, and isn't universal.

No, of course not if you are going to exclude those you don't regard as your 'brother' or 'neighbour'. That is one of the things that is wrong with religion.

Immanuel Can wrote:But let's even suppose the article above were completely wrong...that the Golden Rule *were* universally-accepted by all cultures, and that against all odds, it *would* work.

The point about morality is not whether it 'works' or not. The idea that if you could frame a moral imperative in such a way that everyone who was capable of understanding it would adhere to it (even though it goes back to Socrates) is complete nonsense.

Immanuel Can wrote:From a Materialist perspective, that would be a case of what Marsh is talking about: an atheist would know the GR, like every other moral rule, was a mere edict-of-convenience, one without any objective binding authority.
So would you accept the idea of allowing the GR to be taught to people as binding, because having them believe in the GR was 'good' for something, even though you knew it was not objectively binding at all?

Does the fact that it isn't binding make it a bad rule? Moral edicts, of convenience or otherwise, are not laws, they are principles according to which laws are made, some of them. It is those laws which are binding, which you will discover if you are caught breaking any.

Immanuel Can wrote:If you would, you've answered Marsh's question in the affirmative: that it is okay to convince people to believe a lie in order to achieve a 'good' outcome.

This is a further example of you drawing conclusions from your own invented premises.

Immanuel Can wrote:

The thing is, incarceration, corporal or even capital punishment don't deter everyone...

.
This paragraph would be relevant to a different discussion, but perhaps not so relevant to this one. Marsh is asking us to accept that there might be such a thing as a lie that could produce a result we think is good -- not so much of a stretch, really.

This was marsh8472's last word on the matter:

marsh8472 wrote:I came up with the question while reading "Can Man Live Without God" by Ravi Zacharias. The message I took away from what he wrote was that an atheistic worldview is meaningless, baseless, lacks morals, leads to suicide, genocide, misery etc... My first thought is that even if everything he said were true, it has no bearing on whether or not theism is true and that it's still better to believe what is true rather than what people want to believe to give their lives meaning and sense of purpose. But this assumes that the value of holding a true belief outweighs the value of believing a non-truth for one's own well-being. But does it?

It is actually you that asks us to believe a lie.

Immanuel Can wrote:And certainly, unless you tell people NOT to do certain things, they are quite likely to do them.

This is one of those glib statements you make, that seems plausible, but for which you I doubt you have the slightest evidence.

Immanuel Can wrote:If you can convince them that to do them is 'bad', it's no stretch to say they will do them less. So I don't think his premise is contentious.

Perhaps not, but it is trite. I repeat what I said in my last post:

uwot wrote:The thing is, incarceration, corporal or even capital punishment don't deter everyone. Not even the threat of eternal damnation has ever proven effective in preventing some people abusing other peoples property and bodies.

Immanuel Can wrote:And if so, then his premise is modest enough to allow us to reintroduce the question:

Is it 'better' for a Materialist to teach his kids things like "It's morally wrong to do drugs, steal, cheat, molest others, etc." when he knows very well that own philosophy denies that morality is anything but a figment of the individual or collective bias?

You need to be able to distinguish between offering guidance and deception. It is not a lie to tell a child that it is good to treat others as you would have them treat you. Telling them that terrible things will happen to them for eternity if they fail to do so may not be a lie, but it is a disgusting idea to put into a child's head.

Immanuel Can wrote:
And if so, then his premise is modest enough to allow us to reintroduce the question:

Is it 'better' for a Materialist to teach his kids things like "It's morally wrong to do drugs, steal, cheat, molest others, etc." when he knows very well that own philosophy denies that morality is anything but a figment of the individual or collective bias?

Or, on the other hand we could frame the question like this:

Is it better for a theist to teach his kinds things like "It's morally wrong to do drugs, steal,cheat,molest others, etc" when he knows very well know his own philosophy claims that morality is grounded in a long tradition of Platonic idealism?

Both propositions are equally absurd.

Or, on the other hand we could frame the question like this:

Is it better for a theist to teach his kinds things like "It's morally wrong to do drugs, steal,cheat,molest others, etc" when he knows very well know his own philosophy claims that morality is grounded in a long tradition of Platonic idealism?

This rejoinder obviously begs the question.

Even if we granted you to be right about that, it would only supply an additional case that needed to be answered, but would not refute the problem of the Materialist. Proving that the Theists' view was inconsistent would not do anything to show that the Materialists' view was not equally inconsistent. Materialism has to stand on its own two feet, not merely hope to defeat one of its opponents and then win merely by default.

So? How does Materialism respond to its inability to ground morality? Does it go ahead and teach as truth that which it knows is not truth, because it's "better" in some way for people to behave morally? If so, we've got our answer.





P.S. -- As an aside (since it's really irrelevant to the present problem) we don't have reason to grant your claim, for three simple reasons: 1) the Platonic Idealism myth depends on a straightforward logical fallacy of mistaking similarity for causality, 2) even if it did not, "knows this hypothesis very well" doesn't describe most Theists, since this theory is actually not very well known, even among skeptics, let alone Theists, and 3) most importantly, logic. For even if Theism *were* grounded in Platonism, that would not logically impair its ability to generate moral premises, since you would then have to show that Platonism itself was not grounded before you could say so. So long as Theism *was* grounded in Platonism, and if Platonism itself were grounded rationally, it would be capable of rationally producing those moral premises.

But as I say, you needn't waste time disproving Platonism: for the viability of Platonism or Theism clearly doesn't help or hurt the Materialists' home-grown inconsistencies, if such exist. It's just irrelevant to saving Materialism.

No, of course not if you are going to exclude those you don't regard as your 'brother' or 'neighbour'. That is one of the things that is wrong with religion.

Well, I grant you it's wrong with every *other* religion, but if you read the account of the GR in the New Testament, you'll see that Christianity makes all people "brothers" or "sisters", even outcasts and self-declared enemies. (It's right in the same context, actually.) So that criticism is one of which Christianity is not guilty, whatever else we can say.

Does the fact that it isn't binding make it a bad rule?

Sorry, you mistake me. Let me explain.

I don't mean "binding" in anything but a duty-creating way -- and in that sense, all moral/ethical rules have to have some duty-creating force, or you can see that they aren't "rules" at all. For example, if "Thou shalt not murder" does not assert some duty greater than "Thou shalt murder whomever thou pleasest," then "Thou shalt not murder" is self-evidently not what we call a moral "rule" at all. It doesn't even rise to the definition. This is not to say they can never be broken, but at least all-thugs-being-equal they must assert more duty to follow them than not to follow them, or they don't rise to the level of being a "rule" analytically. That's pretty straightforward stuff, put that way.

You need to be able to distinguish between offering guidance and deception. It is not a lie to tell a child that it is good to treat others as you would have them treat you.

Why not? If, as a Materialist, one is bound logically to know that there is not duty not to take advantage of others -- indeed, if one can even conceive it as a great opportunity for survival of the fittest, and so arguably a positive incentive to take every advantage -- and yet one is telling one's children that there is some sort of duty not to do it, how is that not a lie?

In fact, it seems a paradigm case of a lie, doesn't it? You then know one thing, but you fabricate another to advance some "good" purpose you perceive. That's exactly the sort of instance Marsh was positing for Theists.

Telling them that terrible things will happen to them for eternity if they fail to do so may not be a lie, but it is a disgusting idea to put into a child's head.

That would be irrelevant to helping the Materialist out, since he doesn't believe any of this is true and doesn't assert it. Making Theists wrong wouldn't make Materialists right. So this is really a different discussion.

But to honour it anyway, let me just say this: you seem quite confident that what they might say on this point isn't true: otherwise, how do we explain the epithet "disgusting"? And that would then put a burden on you to show your evidence that what the putative Theists in this case say is not perfectly true -- assuming that's what you want to assert here.

Immanuel Can wrote:I don't mean "binding" in anything but a duty-creating way -- and in that sense, all moral/ethical rules have to have some duty-creating force, or you can see that they aren't "rules" at all.

It doesn't really matter whether you say laws or rules; in my view moral principles are not binding in the sense you suggest. Without your theism there is no duty.

Immanuel Can wrote:For example, if "Thou shalt not murder" does not assert some duty greater than "Thou shalt murder whomever thou pleasest," then "Thou shalt not murder" is self-evidently not what we call a moral "rule" at all.

If by 'we' you mean the collection of people that share your view then I can't argue with that. If you mean to include yours truly, I think there is a difference between a general principle along the lines of 'Do unto others etc' and a specific law or commandment. I doubt there are many people who commit murder because that is what they wish others to do to them.

Immanuel Can wrote:It doesn't even rise to the definition.

When Samuel Johnson created the first English dictionary, he gravelled the length and breadth of the British Isles to discover how words were used. While there is some general agreement that facilitates communication, there is no definition of 'moral "rule"', something even you acknowledge, albeit unconsciously by your use of quotation marks.

Immanuel Can wrote:This is not to say they can never be broken, but at least all-thugs-being-equal they must assert more duty to follow them than not to follow them, or they don't rise to the level of being a "rule" analytically. That's pretty straightforward stuff, put that way.

As I intimated above, I have a very tolerant attitude to language, partly a result of indifference to analytic philosophy, but since you bring it up, precisely what do you mean by "rule"?

Immanuel Can wrote:

... It is not a lie to tell a child that it is good to treat others as you would have them treat you.

Why not? If, as a Materialist, one is bound logically to know that there is not duty not to take advantage of others -- indeed, if one can even conceive it as a great opportunity for survival of the fittest, and so arguably a positive incentive to take every advantage -- and yet one is telling one's children that there is some sort of duty not to do it, how is that not a lie?

Apparently you have forgotten; I am not your straw man materialist. If you want to discuss such a person, you ought to establish that they actually exist. If you could stop making up premises that you then draw unsound conclusions from, we could advance this discussion a lot quicker.
Duty has nothing to do with it. I don't feel any duty to anyone not to treat other people in way that I wouldn't wish to be treated. The people who take advantage of, or harm others are not this species you call materialists, they are to a greater or lesser degree sociopaths and are more than capable of believing in exactly the same god and messiah that you do.

Immanuel Can wrote:In fact, it seems a paradigm case of a lie, doesn't it?

Only to you. You manage to assume I think like you even though I quite evidently do not. Do you not think that you are lying to yourself?

Immanuel Can wrote:You then know one thing, but you fabricate another to advance some "good" purpose you perceive.

No I don't.

Immanuel Can wrote:That's exactly the sort of instance Marsh was positing for Theists.

I don't think so

Immanuel Can wrote:

Telling them that terrible things will happen to them for eternity if they fail to do so may not be a lie, but it is a disgusting idea to put into a child's head.

That would be irrelevant to helping the Materialist out, since he doesn't believe any of this is true and doesn't assert it. Making Theists wrong wouldn't make Materialists right. So this is really a different discussion.

If you can find a Materialist that fits your profile, you should have it with them.

Immanuel Can wrote:But to honour it anyway, let me just say this: you seem quite confident that what they might say on this point isn't true: otherwise, how do we explain the epithet "disgusting"? And that would then put a burden on you to show your evidence that what the putative Theists in this case say is not perfectly true -- assuming that's what you want to assert here.

I am entirely confident that it is disgusting: if it is not true, then it is disgusting that theists to make up such an ugly nonsense. If it is true, then it is disgusting of god to treat blameless children in such a way.

Immanuel Can wrote:
This rejoinder obviously begs the question.

Even if we granted you to be right about that, it would only supply an additional case that needed to be answered, but would not refute the problem of the Materialist. Proving that the Theists' view was inconsistent would not do anything to show that the Materialists' view was not equally inconsistent. Materialism has to stand on its own two feet, not merely hope to defeat one of its opponents and then win merely by default.

Well, it isn't inconsistent and it does stand on its own two feet so I don't see the problem.

Immanuel Can wrote: So? How does Materialism respond to its inability to ground morality? Does it go ahead and teach as truth that which it knows is not truth, because it's "better" in some way for people to behave morally? If so, we've got our answer.

It doesn't have to respond to any grounding claims, other than it is grounded in human rationality. We don't need to introduce an additional category grounded in some higher order concept of "right' or "wrong" in order to say that a particular act is really, really right or really, really wrong.

There is something strange about the idea that the materialist concept of rightness or wrongness isn't "real" enough when compared to the theist who knows the genuine article.

So, this type of naturalism doesn't go ahead and teach that molesting, cheating or providing them will illegal drugs is wrong and then in the same breath, turn around and say, However, this all baseless when it comes to morality. Why would I say or do that? Why would anyone want to do say or do that? The only people who do this sort of thing are people who can't or won't accept that such behaviour is wrong because it harms others.

Immanuel Can wrote:
P.S. -- As an aside (since it's really irrelevant to the present problem) we don't have reason to grant your claim, for three simple reasons: 1) the Platonic Idealism myth depends on a straightforward logical fallacy of mistaking similarity for causality.
2) even if it did not, "knows this hypothesis very well" doesn't describe most Theists, since this theory is actually not very well known, even among skeptics, let alone Theists, and 3) most importantly, logic. For even if Theism *were* grounded in Platonism, that would not logically impair its ability to generate moral premises, since you would then have to show that Platonism itself was not grounded before you could say so. So long as Theism *was* grounded in Platonism, and if Platonism itself were grounded rationally, it would be capable of rationally producing those moral premises.

But as I say, you needn't waste time disproving Platonism: for the viability of Platonism or Theism clearly doesn't help or hurt the Materialists' home-grown inconsistencies, if such exist. It's just irrelevant to saving Materialism.

(1) I think you mean Plato's logical causality.

(2) No more and no less than the materialist who believes his moral advice to his kids is baseless.

(3} I didn't say this was not possible.

Where was I trying to disprove Platonism? I was pointing out that both statements are meaningless responses to the question,

It doesn't have to respond to any grounding claims, other than it is grounded in human rationality. We don't need to introduce an additional category grounded in some higher order concept of "right' or "wrong" in order to say that a particular act is really, really right or really, really wrong.

There is something strange about the idea that the materialist concept of rightness or wrongness isn't "real" enough when compared to the theist who knows the genuine article.

So, this type of naturalism doesn't go ahead and teach that molesting, cheating or providing them will illegal drugs is wrong and then in the same breath, turn around and say, However, this all baseless when it comes to morality. Why would I say or do that? Why would anyone want to do say or do that? The only people who do this sort of thing are people who can't or won't accept that such behaviour is wrong because it harms others.

And yet, atheists in the last century harmed 142 million people..well, if "harm" means "killing." Think Mao, Stalin, Pol Pot, the Kim Jongs, and the other various heads of the avowedly atheist states. And consider that the last century, in which almost none of the wars were religious, killed more human beings than had died in all wars in history combined.

So apparently "naturalistic" morality is not so uniform or nearly so moral as you would suggest. No religion, not even Islam, can compete with the legacy of moral depravity of atheist states in the 20th Century: in fact, statistically, none even comes close. It really doesn't seem as if they know so much about being good...or even not harming people.

It doesn't really matter whether you say laws or rules; in my view moral principles are not binding in the sense you suggest. Without your theism there is no duty.

Quite right. And that is why the Materialist or atheist, if you prefer, is in no position at all even to justify his question, "Is it right to..." As in, "Is it right to tell children a lie about God or about morality."

For while in practice atheists personally do (thank God), sometimes choose morality over amorality, they have no means to justify a duty to make the same choice for anyone else.

It makes one wonder how they get so morally uppity about what they perceive Theists to be doing. After all, on an atheists account, there isn't even a duty to tell the truth.

However, whatever else one can say about Theists, at least they aren't hypocrites of this particular sort. They at least (by definition) believe in what they say, even if you think it's wrong-headed. Materialists, on the other hand, do precisely what Marsh is questioning: when they advocate any moral duties at all, they are simply promoting a lie because they consider it "better" to do so.

But what should we expect? On an Materialist account, there isn't even a duty not to be a hypocrite.

Immanuel Can wrote:
And yet, atheists in the last century harmed 142 million people..well, if "harm" means "killing." Think Mao, Stalin, Pol Pot, the Kim Jongs, and the other various heads of the avowedly atheist states. And consider that the last century, in which almost none of the wars were religious, killed more human beings than had died in all wars in history combined.

So apparently "naturalistic" morality is not so uniform or nearly so moral as you would suggest. No religion, not even Islam, can compete with the legacy of moral depravity of atheist states in the 20th Century: in fact, statistically, none even comes close. It really doesn't seem as if they know so much about being good...or even not harming people.

I'm not sure what this has to do with any of my comments. I didn't mention anything about uniformity of outcomes.

Immanuel Can wrote:...the Materialist or atheist, if you prefer, is in no position at all even to justify his question, "Is it right to..." As in, "Is it right to tell children a lie about God or about morality."

What you are saying is that "Is it right to..." just means "Is it god's will that..." How do you know god's will?

Immanuel Can wrote:And yet, atheists in the last century harmed 142 million people..well, if "harm" means "killing." Think Mao, Stalin, Pol Pot, the Kim Jongs, and the other various heads of the avowedly atheist states. And consider that the last century, in which almost none of the wars were religious, killed more human beings than had died in all wars in history combined. ...

Bit of a strawman really as none were killed in the name of Atheism but Communism whereas the theists killed in the name of their religion. I'd also point to many being killed due to incompetent economics rather than actually just killed and note that population and technology allowed the greater numbers.

So apparently "naturalistic" morality is not so uniform or nearly so moral as you would suggest. No religion, not even Islam, can compete with the legacy of moral depravity of atheist states in the 20th Century: in fact, statistically, none even comes close. It really doesn't seem as if they know so much about being good...or even not harming people.

But then like the religious they claimed it was in the name of doing 'good' so not much difference?

Interesting you single out Islam as I'd guess that Christianity has killed more in its name?

I think we're going to find out if the religious can kill as many now they have access to advanced weaponry which they never had before and given their past I don't hold out much hope that their 'God' nor 'its' moral law will be dissuading them, as it hasn't in the past.

What you are saying is that "Is it right to..." just means "Is it god's will that..." How do you know god's will?

That is an important question. But it's not the question Marsh has given us.

Marsh wants to know if it's ever okay to teach people what you know is a lie in order to promote some "good" or "better" outcome?

And what we see is that the Materialist/atheist/relativist (whatever) not only routinely does so inasmuch as he/she promotes morality, but that he/she lacks even the warrant for the concepts with which to issue any moral condemnation of lying.

Now, if we apply that to Theists, we note that what Marsh is suggesting is not something Theists do. For by definition, a "Theist" is one who actually believes what he/she claims in respect to morality. And at least if a Theist falls short of his/her own moral best, he/she has the warrant for the concepts necessary to be corrigible about that.

This makes me wonder about Marsh's real question here: if it is not a question it is coherent to ask with reference to Theists, and yet if it is genuinely a coherent question, it must amount to something like this:

"Is it okay for a Materialist/atheist/relativist to promote morality in order to promote some "better" outcome, even though he/she believes (by definition of being a Materialist, atheist or relativist) that it is a lie?

And we have at least part of an answer: "Materialists/atheists/relativists don't have a logical basis upon which morally to condemn lies."