The Philosophy Discussion Forum

Wyman wrote:
However, the one area where my materialist intuition pauses is at conceptualization and inductive knowledge. I'll stop here, because I doubt you would agree with my 'higher functions' analysis and conversations are only productive, when at all, when the parties agree or reach understanding at each step.

And recognition.

I apologize for taking so long to respond, but I think slow and move slower. I owe Greylorn a response, and he will be irritated about some things that I posted here, so take your time reviewing this post.

G

Yes, above all, recognition! I think we've had a moment here, Gee.


Gilbert Ryle's 'The Concept of Mind' sets out a materialist critique of, well, the 'concept of mid.' I re-read it a couple years ago and I agree with everything in it (which never happens). He was a very good writer and although I don't think his ideas are original, he set out the issues very well. He coined the phrases 'the ghost in the machine' and 'category mistake' in the essay.

Thinking that the mind is anything but a concept, residing 'in' something and acting 'on' other things, is like a naive person who visits Oxford University. He is shown around the buildings - here is the library, there is the registrar's office, etc. The naive person looks at the guide and says, 'This is all wonderful, sir, but where is the university?' This is an example of a category mistake.

Thinking that there is something in the human body pulling the levers and pushing the buttons, is nothing but a belief in ghosts, and Ryle claims that there is no ghost in the [human] machine. And I suppose when neuro-physics gets sufficiently progressed, there may come a day when a neurologist gives a tour around a human brain - 'Here is where concepts are formed, here is where vision is processed, etc.' and a naive philosophy student will say 'Yes, sir, but where is the mind?'

Gee wrote:
That theory makes no sense to me. How does one have an illusion that they are conscious? Illusion is a mental phenomenon, so I would think that in order to have an illusion that you are conscious, you would first have to be conscious. I am pretty sure that my table does not have illusions. I could be wrong. It is possible the my table dreams of doing nefarious things with the chairs when I am not looking.

It works a bit like this:

When Dennett takls about consciousness being an illusion, he is probably referring to the work done by Prinz. Immediate Level Representations Theory was developed by Prinz as a result of his previous studies in the role of attention in consciousness.

Descartes can take some historical credit for this, with his "I think therefore I am." Regardless as to whether you think consciousness is embodied or disembodied, one thing is as plain as the nose on our face. There is a subjective aspect to consciousness. In other words, there is an "I" that makes sense of the world. Consciousness is unified into a single first person perspective because there must be somewhere all of this sensory information that we gain from the world is going, and there must be an "I" that is the neural core of consciousness.

As it turns out neurological studies have shown the exact opposite. Consciousness is in fact dis unified, there is no neural core of consciousness located anywhere in the brain, consciousness can and does occurs in may different parts of the brain at the same time.

When Dennett talks about consciousness being an illusion he actually means there is no first person account, instead there are lots of first person accounts, In other words, there are many "I's" that make up the subjective perspective. Prinz has tackled this problem with his A.I.R theory. Prinz attempts to solve the problem by saying consciousness is "delivered" to us because we are always seeking it out.

It is hard to sum up in a few lines, but think of a guitar being plucked in any random fashion, Most of the time the plucking will not produce anything of significance, but given enough plucking eventually music that is recognizable will emerge for a period of time, then fade back into just random plucking of notes. Using this rough analogy consciousness is delivered to us at a certain place and under certain conditions.

There is no doubt that a first person perspective is very important to every individual and it is extremely advantageous and important to have this type of awareness. From a neurophilosophical perspective consciousness is nothing special, it is just that we seek this particular aspect out most of the time because it it to our advantage.

A.I.R. is only a new theory so I don't think it is up on wikipedia yet, but you will find it on professional websites. Anyone who wants to read it may be able to explain the content better than myself.

Wyman wrote:

Wyman wrote:
However, the one area where my materialist intuition pauses is at conceptualization and inductive knowledge. I'll stop here, because I doubt you would agree with my 'higher functions' analysis and conversations are only productive, when at all, when the parties agree or reach understanding at each step.

And recognition.

I apologize for taking so long to respond, but I think slow and move slower. I owe Greylorn a response, and he will be irritated about some things that I posted here, so take your time reviewing this post.

G

Yes, above all, recognition! I think we've had a moment here, Gee.


Gilbert Ryle's 'The Concept of Mind' sets out a materialist critique of, well, the 'concept of mid.' I re-read it a couple years ago and I agree with everything in it (which never happens). He was a very good writer and although I don't think his ideas are original, he set out the issues very well. He coined the phrases 'the ghost in the machine' and 'category mistake' in the essay.

Thinking that the mind is anything but a concept, residing 'in' something and acting 'on' other things, is like a naive person who visits Oxford University. He is shown around the buildings - here is the library, there is the registrar's office, etc. The naive person looks at the guide and says, 'This is all wonderful, sir, but where is the university?' This is an example of a category mistake.

Thinking that there is something in the human body pulling the levers and pushing the buttons, is nothing but a belief in ghosts, and Ryle claims that there is no ghost in the [human] machine. And I suppose when neuro-physics gets sufficiently progressed, there may come a day when a neurologist gives a tour around a human brain - 'Here is where concepts are formed, here is where vision is processed, etc.' and a naive philosophy student will say 'Yes, sir, but where is the mind?'

If you like Ryle, then you will probably like Dennett and his Cartesian theater. In my previous post I made an indirect reference to it.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater

If you like Ryle, then you will probably like Dennett and his Cartesian theater. In my previous post I made an indirect reference to it.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater

I read about one third of Consciousness Explained. I found it long-winded and boring, although you're right, I probably agree with him mostly. I plan on going back and reading through the whole thing because he seems central these days.

Nietzsche characterized philosophical writing (going from memory here, so I am paraphrasing badly) as of three types. As the turtle walks, as the frog jumps and as the ganges flows. He made up a word for each of these. Dennett is as the turtle walks, as is Aristotle, Kant, and Russell, for instance. They go on and on and on - in order to see the forest for the trees, they insist on inspecting and tagging every damn tree in the forest before they get to the big picture.

Plato and Nietzsche are certainly as the ganges flows. Wittgenstein and Descartes are as the frog hops. As is Ryle, barely.

Gee wrote:

Impenitent wrote: it merely demonstrates your anthropomorphic reasoning... giving human qualities to non human entities (mechanical or organic)... sentience and consciousness...

-Imp

This is nonsense. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is well respected and peer reviewed. It is accepted as a reference in all forums, even science forums.

If you want to study consciousness, the first thing you must do is to remove the religious dogma from your thinking.

G

I never said the SEoP wasn't a reference. I said your reasoning was anthropomorphic. You are positing human qualities to non human things. Your appeal to "philosophic dogma" even states: "Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined."

-Imp

Wyman wrote:

If you like Ryle, then you will probably like Dennett and his Cartesian theater. In my previous post I made an indirect reference to it.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater

I read about one third of Consciousness Explained. I found it long-winded and boring, although you're right, I probably agree with him mostly. I plan on going back and reading through the whole thing because he seems central these days.

Nietzsche characterized philosophical writing (going from memory here, so I am paraphrasing badly) as of three types. As the turtle walks, as the frog jumps and as the ganges flows. He made up a word for each of these. Dennett is as the turtle walks, as is Aristotle, Kant, and Russell, for instance. They go on and on and on - in order to see the forest for the trees, they insist on inspecting and tagging every damn tree in the forest before they get to the big picture.

Plato and Nietzsche are certainly as the ganges flows. Wittgenstein and Descartes are as the frog hops. As is Ryle, barely.

Wyman,
Nice analogies. The book you won't read, Digital Universe -- Analog Soul, is a frog that hops along the shoreline before jumping into the Ganges, hoping to find a floating log.
Greylorn

Greylorn Ell wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:

Greylorn Ell wrote:

While the distinctions between intellectual and sensory information are valid, it is their integration that leads to consciousness. Jane's experience of sound augments her formal study of it, exactly like my formal study of the physics of sound connected with and augmented my experience of it.

Yes, that is what the science tells us so that would be the end of the argument for many. However, some philosophers are not happy with the scientific account so they try to point out its weakness by using an (a) and (b) distinction. That's just what people like Nagel and Jackson do for a living. A bit like scientists doing physics for a living.

Ginkgo,

There are quite a variety of individuals who are scientists, including botanists, psychologists, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc. Most of these are "soft" scientists, meaning that they are essentially ignorant of any physics principles except what they might learn from documentary TV, or from studying gravity by falling off the back of a turnip truck.

They are easily identified because they insist upon being called "Doctor" whoever. (Watch the snarky women on "Bones" and compare them to the men who pull guns and put their (television) lives on the line. You'll get the picture; the series is successful because it reflects real life.) There are some incompetent physicists who also insist upon the title, but real physicists eschew it. Have you ever heard of Big Al referred to as "Doctor" Einstein?

For the fun of it, look up Richard Feynman's books or use this link: https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=ri ... nman+books See if you can find the title "Dr." or "Ph.D" anywhere. He earned a Nobel Prize for his development of "Quantum ElectroDynamics," or QED, but eschewed formal titles because he did not want to be associated with the unimaginative professors who dominated his workplaces.

Soft scientists do not do physics for a living. That's a job for real physicists.

My statement was not a reiteration of some scientist's opinion. It came from my understanding of science and philosophy. Perhaps you misunderstood what I wrote. Let me put it more clearly. Any distinction between (a) and (b) (referring to prior conversations) is utter bullshit invented by philosophers who are viewing reality through spray-painted glasses.

I do not know who "Nagel and Jackson" are, or what ideas they might have generated. For all that I know they could be a comedy act, and I hope that the Nagel component is not the ex-mayor of New Orleans. I'm not a formally trained philosopher, having taken my first university course while my first philosophy book was at the printers.) If N & G are typical philosophers, as seems likely, they will not have produced useful ideas. If you believe that they have generated ideas that are constructively related to the question of consciousness, kindly give me enough information (e.g. first names, publications) to check them out. Thank you.

I guess what this amounts is to claiming that being a philosopher doesn't make one a good physicist. In exactly the same way as being a physicist doesn't make one a good philosopher. If this is what you are saying then I would agree.

Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson are the two philosophers I mentioned.

Impenitent wrote:
I never said the SEoP wasn't a reference. I said your reasoning was anthropomorphic. You are positing human qualities to non human things. Your appeal to "philosophic dogma" even states: "Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined."

-Imp

Interesting isn't it? How does a single cell organism such as a protozoa swim around, find food and find a mate and demonstrate a limited capacity to learn? Even more interesting is the fact that this organism doesn't have one single neuron.

The answer suggested by Penrose and Hameroff is the organism uses the quantum potential contained within the microtubules that make up the structure of its body.

At the beginning of this year it was confirmed by a group of Japanese scientists that microtubules do carry out a quantum function. I read this in a wikipedia link somewhere.

Gee wrote:

Wyman wrote:I like your point that (and tell me if I paraphrase incorrectly) consciousness as awareness is different from mind.

Consciousness and awareness are exactly the same thing.

Wyman wrote:Worms are aware, motion detectors, as Imp says, are aware in a way. So not all 'conscious' things have brains.

Agreed. But consider that awareness is dependent upon the thing that it is aware of.

If you were in a room where there was absolutely no light, but your eyes were quite functional and open, could it be said that you possess vision? No, because you can not see anything. Awareness works the same way, so if you possess awareness but are aware of nothing, do you possess awareness? Awareness must be aware of something and seems to require focus in order to exist, so it is dependent upon the physical for it's existence.

Gee,
Forewarned that I'll find some material in this post irritating, I'm perusing it even more carefully (4x now) than most. Lots of useful points here.

Here I wish to quibble with your assertion about awareness and its dependence upon a thing of which to be aware. Point in doing so is not to quibble with your choice of terminology, but to obtain core concepts and perhaps settle upon a common terminology for their discussion.

Following up on an example I provided a few days back, suppose that I build a computer controlled telescope and program it to scan the sky for random stars, and set it to work. It is a simple, low-resolution instrument only capable of detecting those stars that humans can see with eyes alone. Therefore on most of its journey it will encounter what seems to it to be empty space devoid of information, like human eyes in a dark room. Now and then its instruments will register a small electrical voltage, indicating that it had encountered a star (or something).

The question is, does the observation (the tiny voltage) constitute awareness? I say no. The status of the instrument does not change as a function of what it "sees." It just registers the voltage blip and moves on, scanning the sky, while its voltmeter twitches now and then. The twitches do not change this simple instrument's behavior. It does not record the voltage twitches on a paper chart, or bother to note the points in the night sky where they occurred. It is unaware and unconscious.

I can program the instrument's computer with a behavioral patter that might be considered as "awareness." It could stop when it finds a star and measure the intensity of its light at different wavelengths (colors). These readings can be printed out for posterity, taking a measurement of the star and recording its position in the sky.

I think that this pause in behavior to take measurements would meet your standards for awareness. If so, perhaps we can define awareness not as a function of sentience (the instrument is as fully sentient when it is scanning a dark sky as when it locates a point of light), but as the focusing of attention upon a particular source of information.

Next question is, if not, what terminology would you propose?

I ask this because when I am in a black room, I have vision. All my neuro-optical hardware still functions. My retina can register signals, and if they appear, will send them to my brain. It does not matter if there are no signals. (My telescope must have vision whether or not there is anything for it to observe, else it will observe nothing.)

I would argue that in a black room I have better vision. I will notice a tiny, momentary flash of light in a black room that I would never be able to observe in normal lighting. You can verify this for yourself. Leave your home late at night when the sky is clear and the moon is down, find a chair and spend a few seconds checking out the night sky. Then don a blindfold and wait "visionless" as you would say, for ten minutes. Remove the blindfold. You will see a brighter sky with more stars. The vision that you claim not to have had for ten minutes will have improved.

How can something improve while it did not exist?

This little conundrum suggests that your only serious failure as a philosopher is your tendency to confuse mechanisms with their functions.

Gee wrote:I suspect that this is the reason for so many different levels of consciousness, as different species have the capacity to be aware of different things in different degrees.

This statement makes it perfectly clear that your version of consciousness is entirely different from mine, and does not allow for distinctions. Given that, you must have stopped reading DUAS long ago.

I wonder if you know of a term other than consciousness that can incorporate any distinctions between chimpanzees and normally conscious humans?

Would self-awareness work for you, or would you claim that chimpanzees, dogs, and cats are self-aware?

Perhaps my deeper question is, do you acknowledge any distinction between your mental mechanisms and processes and those of my telescope and your cats?

Greylorn

Wyman wrote:Thinking that the mind is anything but a concept, residing 'in' something and acting 'on' other things, is like a naive person who visits Oxford University. He is shown around the buildings - here is the library, there is the registrar's office, etc. The naive person looks at the guide and says, 'This is all wonderful, sir, but where is the university?' This is an example of a category mistake.

Thinking that there is something in the human body pulling the levers and pushing the buttons, is nothing but a belief in ghosts, and Ryle claims that there is no ghost in the [human] machine. And I suppose when neuro-physics gets sufficiently progressed, there may come a day when a neurologist gives a tour around a human brain - 'Here is where concepts are formed, here is where vision is processed, etc.' and a naive philosophy student will say 'Yes, sir, but where is the mind?'

Wyman,

Not if that philosophy student has examined the principles of Beon Theory. It proposes that there are two components of consciousness.

1. The cerebral cortex. (Hypothalamus and thalamus are distinct minibrains that perform the body's autonomic functions, like heart rate, glandular activation, etc. (The oft-mentioned "little brain" in human males.)

2. Beon. This term is not a new word for "soul." It references an entirely new definition of the ancient "soul" notion, as an entity that is entirely physical (in the physics sense of the term), interactive with energy. Beon is a perfectly natural kind of entity, not something created by or cared about by any "God." Beon is the only kind of entity in the universe that is capable of self-awareness.

Beon's purpose (at low levels, of course) is simply to become self-aware. The brain/body system provides opportunity, nothing more. Few beons take advantage of it, and spend their brief integration with a human brain as passengers, not drivers.

3. Mind is not an entity. Descartes, despite his insights, created this linguistic confusion by identifying "soul" with "mind." I think that this is what formally trained philosophers would regard as a "category mistake," conflating an entity (or mechanism) with its function.

Mind is a function, not an entity. In humans or other mechanisms with brains and interconnected beon, mind is what we get with both mechanisms/entities working together, each knowing its job of the moment.

Ryle, like other thoughtful philosophers, defeated Descartes' conflation of soul with, or as, mind. His efforts were pissed away on a category mistake, and do not apply to Beon Theory. Beon is not a ghost. It has been empirically verified, and when the right physicist reads my book long after I've left this goofy place, beon as a distinct entity and the mechanism for consciousness, will be scientifically verified with all the requisite bells and whistles.

This is just off the top of my head. The ancient Greeks defined the soul negatively as that which leaves the body after it dies. If the soul, or your beon, is to be verified by science, would this be a good place to start? Measure what is different pre-death and post-death and look there for clues?

At any rate, even if there is something more to the materialist story than collections of particles and their functions, no materialist will ever accept it unless it is verifiable by observation. And those who accept things on less than that aren't looking - they've already found something that fits their emotional personality and makes them feel good - like religion, spirituality, meditation, etc.. And no amount of evidence (or perhaps to some, only overwhelming evidence) will convince them otherwise.

I posted sumthin' lengthy (for me) yesterday.

Reviewing it later, I found it contributed nuthin' to the conversation so I deleted it.

The questions and comments that follow also (probably) contribute nuthin' to the conversation.

*shrug*


As any one participating can and will, please, self-examine and -interrogate.

Do you note any division between 'you' (your awareness of the world and self) and your flesh?

As I regard 'me' I find no indwelling spirit, no little man in my brain, observing the vehicle it, or he, rides in.

I hold up my hand and look at it and find I am looking at myself.

I wiggle my toes and find I'm not operating meat machinery but moving part of myself.

I apply parsimony and conclude I am the flesh, not a rider or user of it.

My awareness of the world (an awareness that reflects back on itself so as to measure my apprehending of 'now' against my remembering of 'then') is real, a physical perspective (a literal position in [relation to] the world) of a kludge of flesh, blood, bone, and organ.

I am an animal in, and moving through, the world, and in the same way I use legs to walk and run, I use brain to think, to self-reference, to assess, to conclude, to provide motivation for, and direction to, my legs (and the rest of me).

Is it possible to separate 'walking' from legs?

Is it possible to isolate 'walk' (as thing) from legs?

Or, is walking what legs 'do'?

Is it possible to separate 'mind' (thinking, self-referencing) from brain?

Or, is 'mind' what brain 'does'?

Henry Quirk: I'll give it a shot.

Take the unconscious (a general term describing many various processes 'outside' of conscious awareness).

Example 1: Experiments where the answers to questions are shown (by measurements of skin temp, neural activity) to occur prior to the subject consciously answering - such as by pressing a button.

Example 2: You perform activities such as driving a car on a familiar route, or riding a bike without being consciously aware of doing it - automatically.

There are many examples of unconscious processes that philosophers love to talk about and I'm sure you're aware of.

If there is an unconscious(or subconscious) 'you' and a conscious 'you' then there is a natural, logical division to be drawn at that point between two aspects of 'you.' When you crave a cigarette, or a drink, but have decided to quit, you clear the house of cigarettes and alcohol because you know that in the future, there will come a point where the temptation is too much. You protect 'yourself' from 'yourself.' Are you protecting your rational self from your appetites? If they are the same 'self' then why do they disagree so much?

I guess you would say that they are two parts of the same whole. The function of the one is ________ (insert Darwinian explanation) and the function of the other is _________ (different Darwinian explanation).

And doesn't it seem at times as if there is, above those two aspects, another, who serves as a tie breaker - a kind of conscious awareness that unifies the disparate experiences and judgments of the rational and emotional? And as I believe Gingko has pointed out in past posts, it appears that there is some scientific basis in concluding that even the upper realm of conscious awareness is not a unity either.

Now when I use terms such as 'rational' and 'emotional' and 'awareness,' these are just manufactured terms used to illustrate the point that many divisions can be made within the 'whole' person. Neurologists could come up with a large multitude of categories. These unconscious thoughts and desires lay under the surface, then come up to the surface at times. Sometimes several appear at the surface at once, with untold numbers under the surface, secretly influencing. On the surface, these thoughts run through our heads and are processed by multiple 'conscious processes.'

So when you say:

Do you note any division between 'you' (your awareness of the world and self) and your flesh?

As I regard 'me' I find no indwelling spirit, no little man in my brain, observing the vehicle it, or he, rides in.

I think we could just as easily say that we consist of a multitude of selves and 'little men' battling it out. Some are subterranean night dwellers, some are sexual perverts, some are prudes, some are amateur psychologists, some are logical 'Vulcans.' The fact that we do think of ourselves as unified is the riddle that many are perplexed by.

The example of looking at your hand is a specific situation where not many processes need be brought into play - it is a limiting example.

Maybe consciousness is a competition among 'selves' wherein the winner appears to have been 'you' the whole time. In such case, the unity of consciousness could be said to be an illusion.

"Henry Quirk: I'll give it a shot."

You can just call me 'Henry'.

#

"Experiments where the answers to questions are shown (by measurements of skin temp, neural activity) to occur prior to the subject consciously answering - such as by pressing a button."

You're referring to the Libet experiments, yes?

Here...

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2 ... 8Vk6JRdVA0

...may not be an out-n-out debunking, but -- certainly -- the beginning of one.

#

"You perform activities such as driving a car on a familiar route, or riding a bike without being consciously aware of doing it - automatically."

Yes, I call these habits or routines (or skills).

I do all manner of things without much thought.

This, however doesn't mean without 'any' thought.

As I drive: I drive (a cluster of intent, actions, reactions, responses), I fiddle with the radio (another cluster of intent, actions, reactions, and responses), I pick my nose (yet another cluster), etc.

This means, to me, that I'm capable of carrying out a variety of complex tasks simultaneously (by partially automating some of the actions involved).

But always, it seems to me, 'I' am present.

#

"There are many examples of unconscious processes that philosophers love to talk about and I'm sure you're aware of."

This 'unconscious' is, I think, just what happens 'at the back' of consciousness, not 'below it'.

Certainly, there is all kinds of 'automation' going on in me, stuff I'm not conscious of (because I don't have to be) but this is not to say these processes are 'in the cellar' of my consciousness.

Such automation isn't registered at all, has no place in my awareness (till my attention is required...for example: no one considers the heart till it goes shitty [into arrest]).

The smooth function of my heart (and many other pieces, parts, and processes that comprise me) is not 'un' or 'sub', it's 'non'.

#

"...doesn't it seem at times as if there is, above those two aspects, another, who serves as a tie breaker - a kind of conscious awareness that unifies the disparate experiences and judgments of the rational and emotional? And as I believe Gingko has pointed out in past posts, it appears that there is some scientific basis in concluding that even the upper realm of conscious awareness is not a unity either."

In my experience there's just 'me' with appetites (impulses) I choose (wisely or not) to satisfy or not.

#

"I think we could just as easily say that we consist of a multitude of selves and 'little men' battling it out. Some are subterranean night dwellers, some are sexual perverts, some are prudes, some are amateur psychologists, some are logical 'Vulcans.' The fact that we do think of ourselves as unified is the riddle that many are perplexed by."

And that maybe the experience of many (certainly, it's a model promoted by many ), but --again -- not mine.

I say up-thread, 'As I regard 'me' I find no indwelling spirit, no little man in my brain, observing the vehicle it, or he, rides in."

I could have also said: I detect no divisions in my psyche, no struggle between competing aspects of 'me'.

There's just 'me' with appetites and impulses (sometimes contradicting appetites and impulses). I don't dicker or parley with myself. I assess the 'needs' involved, the price to be paid for satisfaction (or denial) and act accordingly (though not always wisely).

#

"The example of looking at your hand is a specific situation where not many processes need be brought into play - it is a limiting example."

The cluster and sequence of action, reaction, and response involved in my regarding myself (my hand) is no more or less complex than anything I might do. It involves intent and agency just as surely as driving the car (by routine) or performing brain surgery (with full attention brought to bear).

#

"Maybe consciousness is a competition among 'selves' wherein the winner appears to have been 'you' the whole time. In such case, the unity of consciousness could be said to be an illusion."

Or, mebbe consciousness (mind, self, 'I'ness) is exactly what I think it is: an ongoing, self-referencing, action done by certain animals of particular and peculiar complexity.

henry quirk wrote:
"Maybe consciousness is a competition among 'selves' wherein the winner appears to have been 'you' the whole time. In such case, the unity of consciousness could be said to be an illusion."

This is probably the preferred scientific interpretation.

Experimentation points to consciousness being dis unified. On this basis it is very difficult for us to identify any dis unified state of mind. In order to identify a dis unified state we would need to catch ourselves not attending- such a state can only be inferred, never actually observed. Consciousness is always presented to us as a unified state because of the role attention plays in this process.

Just on a brief note, parallel streams of consciousness and operating on "automatic pilot" requires a different explanation.


If we ask ourselves if we can isolate your walking from our legs then we are unifying two experiences into a single experience. We undertake unification just by pondering such questions.