compatibilism

[phyllo]

His desire to hold it in, is also caused.

By himself, yeah.

One can consider him an agent who does stuff.

Unlike iambiguous and "some determinists" who attribute all decisions and actions to the laws of nature and forget entirely about the person thinking, choosing and acting.

[Iwannaplato]

His desire to hold it in, is also caused.

By himself, yeah.

One can consider him an agent who does stuff.

Unlike iambiguous and "some determinists" who attribute all decisions and actions to the laws of nature and forget entirely about the person thinking, choosing and acting.

Victim determinism as opposed to holistic determinism.

[henry quirk]

You're oddly moving into Bahman territory where you view us as monads so if different parts of us have different desires, this shows we have free will.

I said nuthin' about a free will having different parts with different desires. And: I didn't hold that out as an evidence.

If I gotta piss: I decide if I'm goin' now or later.

Stan is his bodily urges and his social urges and his values urges.

Is that all he is? Various urges are the sum of him?

[henry quirk]

it seems to me that there are so many things to take into account, some of which we don't really understand, and *there are so many differing definitions and interpretations of the terms, that any meaningful conclusion is probably not possible.

*That's at the root if it, I think (I've said so myself, up-thread, way the hell back). We don't agree on definitions, our interpretations don't jibe. We, more often than not, talk at, and past, one another, not to each other.

[henry quirk]

his choice is determined by the combination of the body urge to pee and the social or other desires to not pee.

I say his choice is determined by him as he weighs the value of this vs that vs the other.

It doesn't matter if you cause it or the external causes it as far as determinism.

Definitionally, it matters.

No one is arguing that our desires and urges and values that form desires aren't causal.

You're arguing, instead, the drives and values are the cause. I'm arguing he's the one who desires and values and he is the cause.

All the causes, internal and external lead to the next moments event/decision whatever.

In context: there's only one cause, the free will himself.

[Iwannaplato]

You're oddly moving into Bahman territory where you view us as monads so if different parts of us have different desires, this shows we have free will.

I said nuthin' about a free will having different parts with different desires. And: I didn't hold that out as an evidence.

If I gotta piss: I decide if I'm goin' now or later.

Stan is his bodily urges and his social urges and his values urges.

Is that all he is? Various urges are the sum of him?

No, he has values which give which are preferences about how the world should be, which comes down to both nuanced and blunt desires. He hopefull is motivated by empathy and curiosity also. My point was that BOTH the things you mentioned stem from emotions, desires, values which are all causal. They are internal causes.

[henry quirk]

One can consider him an agent who does stuff.

One can. What one means by agent, that's in question. My definition will definitely different from yours. When we each say I consider him an agent who does stuff we're sayin' different things.

Here, from just below -- the person thinking, choosing and acting -- I can, have, said stuff very similar in describing the libertarian free will. You refer to that person as I do but mean sumthin' very different.

Unlike iambiguous and "some determinists" who attribute all decisions and actions to the laws of nature and forget entirely about the person thinking, choosing and acting.

Biggy is a doofus, but on this subject he's right on the money. We're creatively and causally active and responsible, or, we're creatively and causally impotent and not responsible. The third option -- we're kinda, sorta creatively and causally active while, at the same time, we're kinda, sorta creatively and causally impotent and therefore are only kinda, sorta responsible -- is nonsense.

[henry quirk]

My point was that BOTH the things you mentioned stem from emotions, desires, values which are all causal.

And my point: he feels, desires, values. These are not causes. These are what he does. He causes.

[Iwannaplato]

My point was that BOTH the things you mentioned stem from emotions, desires, values which are all causal.

And my point: he feels, desires, values. These are not causes. These are what he does. He causes.

So, you cause your desires. Why do you choose that desire or value and not another one? Me, I have desires for those things?

You either go back to a tabula rasa: no desire no value no urge no emotions that for some random reason chooses these things, or you go back to a desire. Randomness or a previous state with emotions, desires and values that are a part of me cause what I do want choose long for resist, stifle and and so on.

Saying that what drives you to choose (to be) any of these things is nothing in particular makes it all random. If it not nothing then it was an already existing desire value urge emotion that drove you to the next desire, act, attempt.

But that's your choice of explanatory factors: a qualitiless something or other that chooses for no reason, or a human with desires, values, urges, fears etc that are causal. Or you can frame as those are you, but they are causal. I am not a victim of my desires, they are me. I am one with them. They are the motivators, they are my motivating part of me.

Are you choosing randomly? If not, then there are desires that led to the next moment. Those desires are part of you, but still causes. This does not mean you are a victim to them since they are you.

[henry quirk]

So, you cause your desires.

No, I desire. We're not sayin' the same thing. You see this, yes?

Desiring is what I do. I desire pizza. Will I have pizza? Let me think on it...

[Flannel Jesus]

Are you choosing randomly? If not, then there are desires that led to the next moment. Those desires are part of you, but still causes. This does not mean you are a victim to them since they are you.

I don't think he's ever gonna engage with the actual issues you're raising my guy.

[phyllo]

One can. What one means by agent, that's in question. My definition will definitely different from yours. When we each say I consider him an agent who does stuff we're sayin' different things.

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/

Here, from just below -- the person thinking, choosing and acting -- I can, have, said stuff very similar in describing the libertarian free will. You refer to that person as I do but mean sumthin' very different.

In a deterministic universe, a person thinks, chooses and acts.

Biggy is a doofus, but on this subject he's right on the money. We're creatively and causally active and responsible, or, we're creatively and causally impotent and not responsible.

It's impossible for someone or something to be "causally impotent". As James pointed out at ILP, If something has no effect at all then it doesn't exist.

[henry quirk]

I don't think he's ever gonna engage with the actual issues you're raising my guy.

Well, that's not very generous.

We -- he and I -- talk past one another, neither of seeming to get the other, both at fault (if there's fault to be assigned), but I'm the one failing to engage.

No, not generous at all.

[phyllo]

IWP is giving reasons why he thinks what he thinks. You're just restating your position without reasons.

[henry quirk]

You understand agency and libertarian free will are two different things, yes? You understand agent causation is not synonymous with agency, right?

So, again, when I talk of the agent it isn't the same as when you do.

It's impossible for someone or something to be "causally impotent".

I agree, but I'm a libertarian free will, not a necessitarian. Not my job to defend the necessitarian position that man is creatively & causally impotent.