Philosophy Now Forum

The difference between factual and non-factual assertions, such as moral and aesthetic ones, has nothing to do with who produces or accepts them - how many people agree with them - but rather the nature of the claims they make. Here are examples of each kind of assertion.

1 The assertion 'water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen' is factual and so has a truth-value, because it claims something about a feature of reality. Its truth-value (true or false) is independent of opinion. Whether only one person, or a majority, or everyone believes it is true or false is irrelevant. The claim 'this is true simply because X believes it is true' is false and absurd.

2 The assertion '[abortion] is wrong' is non-factual and so has no truth-value. (Insert the moral issue of choice: capital punishment, eating animals, homosexuality, and so on.) There is no feature of reality, 'the wrongness or rightness of [abortion]', whose existence can justify the claim that [abortion] is wrong (or right). Or rather, moral objectivists and realists have yet to show that such moral features of reality exist.

Instead, moral assertions express value-judgements, which are subjective. And that's why who produces them and how many people agree with them is irrelevant. Even if everyone believes that [homosexuality] is wrong, that doesn't make homosexuality wrong, because 'homosexuality is wrong' is not a factual claim, with a truth-value. And the claim 'this is wrong simply because X believes it is wrong' has no place in a rational moral argument.

And the irony is that, if moral assertions were factual (as objectivists claim), their truth-value (as with all factual claims) would be independent of opinion. And that means everyone's opinion. Independent of opinion tout court. Not a matter of opinion.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 6:47 am The difference between factual and non-factual assertions, such as moral and aesthetic ones, has nothing to do with who produces them

This is a faulty premise. It hints to the religion of mind-independence, ignoring the fact that all knowledge is product of minds.

The similarity between all assertions (factual or moral) is that they are a product of minds. And so it has everything to do with who produces them.
Because the mind who produces them invents the vocabulary to speak about them.

Words such as "assertion" were invented by a mind.
Words such as "objective" were invented by a mind.
Words such as "right" and "wrong" were invented by a mind.


Peter simply doesn't understand what "objective" means to an empiricist. Peter doesn't understand how we come to SAY that something is "objective" and "mind-independent" (even though we know that nothing is mind-independent). Peter simply doesn't understand how those words are used.

Because he's too busy doing philosophy to understand how evidence-based reasoning works.

Univalence believes that 'nothing is mind-independent'. So, idealist cards on the table. Bit of a problem for a self-identifying empiricist - an epistemological foundationalist.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 8:22 am Univalence believes that 'nothing is mind-independent'.

Strawman.

We SAY that things are mind-independent (even though knowledge is never mind-independent) when things are testable/reproducible/falsifiable.
And I have told you (at least 10 times now) how to empirically test/reproduce/falsify the wrongness of murder.

You are empirically and statistically challenged, but that's not the worst. I've given you the reading required to cure your own ignorance, yet you maintain your religion.

Evidence-based reasoning is beyond most philosophers' grasp...

Univalence has to wriggle to avoid the contradictions in its argument. It has entertainment value.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 8:35 am Univalence has to wriggle to avoid the contradictions in its argument. It has entertainment value.

Well, that's a double-standard.

Ignores numerous contradictions in his own argument. Focuses on "contradictions" in mine.

Let me remind you that contradictions are immaterial to an empiricist. They are just linguistic artefacts.
Our descriptions of; and arguments about reality are not prescriptive upon reality.

The "Law" of non-contradiction is made up. It's not an actual law - like gravity.
Under the premises of your own argument the LNC is subjective, and so - I am free to ignore it.

Philosophers care about arguing. Scientists don't. Ignore my words and my argument for all I care. Just look at the evidence.

* At least 700 years reduction in murder
* Soldiers refuse to kill despite lack of consequences
* Christmas truce between World War I soldiers

So tell me again how majority of people aren't wired that way?

1 If people believe murder is morally wrong, then the murder rate falls. (Empirical evidence.) So 'murder is morally wrong' is a fact.

2 If people believe murder is not morally wrong, then the murder rate rises. (Empirical evidence.) So 'murder is not morally wrong' is a fact.

If the second argument is ridiculous, which it is, then so is the first argument. They have exactly the same structure.

The failure is in arguing from the consequences of people's moral beliefs to the supposed 'truth' or 'correctness' of those beliefs.

And if 'a fall in the murder rate is a good thing' is a fact, then people's beliefs and their consequences are irrelevant anyway.

Univalence is unable to see the absurdity and moral redundancy of its argument. But others can judge for themselves.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 10:12 am 1 If people believe murder is morally wrong, then the murder rate falls. (Empirical evidence.) So 'murder is morally wrong' is a fact.

2 If people believe murder is not morally wrong, then the murder rate rises. (Empirical evidence.) So 'murder is not morally wrong' is a fact.

Strawman. Not everything that goes on in your head is a 'belief'. Anybody who isn't completely ignorant of Neuroscience knows this.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 10:12 am If the second argument is ridiculous, which it is, then so is the first argument. They have exactly the same structure.

This another one one of Peter's double standards.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 10:12 am The failure is in arguing from the consequences of people's moral beliefs to the supposed 'truth' or 'correctness' of those beliefs.

Peter has not offered any epistemic criteria for 'correctness' yet. He claims that some knowledge is possible, but moral knowledge isn't.
Yet his refusal to address the The problem of criterion is merely a form of special pleading.

Morality is an epistemic problem. To pretend otherwise is to deceive your interlocutors.

First show a moral assertion such as 'murder is wrong' makes a knowledge-claim. Then ask about epistemic criteria. The burden of proof is with moral objectivists and realists. Nothing so far.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 10:43 am First show a moral assertion such as 'murder is wrong' makes a knowledge-claim.

Peter. Are you sure you don't suffer from Alzheimer's? I told you this last week already.

It's exactly the same counter-argument as the one you are making! Both sentences have an identical grammatical and semantic structure!
If one is a knowledge claim then so is the other.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 10:43 am Then ask about epistemic criteria. The burden of proof is with moral objectivists and realists. Nothing so far.

There's a higher chance of Jesus returning and converting water into wine than for me to 'prove' anything to you.
You ask the impossible. "Proof" is only a meaningful concept in a deductive/axiomatic systems. Like Logic and Mathematics.

Reality isn't one of those.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning
deductive certainty is impossible in non-axiomatic systems such as reality, leaving inductive reasoning as the primary route to (probabilistic) knowledge of such systems

You are using deductive mode of reasoning in an inductive universe.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon May 27, 2019 2:41 pm I assume you know what a category error is.

'The burden of proof' is a philosophical illusion and a self-defeating notion in a universe where proof is impossible.
Which begs a question: If you know damn well that proof is impossible then why do you keep insisting that others 'prove' anything to you?

It's 2019. The methods you are using to arrive at 'truth' have been dead for at least 300 years. Wake up.

I have given you the theory and the supporting evidence. The burden of falsification is on you.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jun 09, 2019 6:35 pm I ask: 'person or meat?


In context: the question 'person or meat?' is all that matters.


If meat: the pregnant woman can do as she likes.
.

RE: PERSONHOOD and ABORTION



Henry's question: "Person or meat?" is what the abortion debate is really all about. But no one, so far, has responded to his query. In my opinion, it is the most important question of all, and it needs to addressed. So here in my view on the matter...


When a male human sperm cell fertilises a female human egg cell (ovum) what then happens is a zygote (assembly of new genome) forms, then morula, embryo, foetus and eventually birth. The beings at all of the various in utero developmental stages are all irrefutably considered human life. This is an established objective scientific fact. The scientific debate on the issue is now concluded and finalised.


As Henry rightly suggests, the abortion debate is not centred around the technical, biological question of whether or not human zygotes and embryos and foetuses are living human beings - they are (!). It is about distinguishing the PHYSICAL/biological human being ("the meat" as Henry puts it) from the ontological human PERSON The human person refers to the ontological individual, a single, concrete entity that exists and is not an aggregation of of smaller constituent parts, nor a part of a greater whole. Its unity is intrinsic. The human person is also an entity possessing moral status ( by moral status, I basically mean a certain amount of innate dignity, worth/value, and thereby, an absolute entitlement to certain fundamental human rights, in particular, (in this case), an unassailable right to life.


So, let's look at how this notion of human personhood plays out in the context of potentiality and actuality. These are two concepts frequently used in the abortion debate to argue that a foetus or pre-foetus should not be considered a human person. A fully mobile adult, for instance, has an actualised capacity for walking, whereas a foetus or embryo has the potential to walk. A zygote may thus be considered a a potential person, but not yet a person according to some pro-choice activists. On the other hand, it is possible to consider than an actual person (like you) was NEVER a POTENTIAL person. Right, Henry ? And thus that zygotes, embryos and foetuses were ALWAYS persons.


My point is that actuality and potentiality need to be considered as two interrelated concepts on the same continuum and not in a distinctly discrete, dichotomous fashion. In the case of pre-natal and post-natal human beings, change is only in relation to the continuum of development. The difference between actuality and potentiality is merely a difference between stages along a continuum. Because personhood is an ontological concept, then exhibiting actual characteristics in INHERENT in the "potential" being. The ontological person is, as mentioned, not a sum of its parts, so exhibiting qualities of an actualised person in the "potential" state qualifies a being as a human person. In the case of an embryonic human (being) and that same human (being) later in life there is only a degree of difference, and the changes from embryo to infant to adolescent are merely changes of natural development of the entity that constitutes the the ontological person (who existed at the moment of fertilisation, and from that moment possessed legitimate moral status and was thereby entitled, absolutely and unequivocally, to the right to life).


Regards


Dachshund

-1- wrote: ↑Wed Jun 05, 2019 7:14 pm You two realize that you completely switched positions. Both of you took up the other's.

This is precisely how Auman's agreement theorem is meant to work.

As explained in this video

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 6:47 am Instead, moral assertions express value-judgements, which are subjective.

Most so-called value judgements are expressed as floating abstractions and do reflect individual's subjective views. By floating abstraction I mean things are described as, "right, " "wrong," "good," "bad," "important," "unimportant," "necessary," and, "unnecessary" as though such attributes were inherent in whatever thing or action is being described. All these terms, however, are value terms and all value terms identify relationships, and have no meaning if the exact relationship is not identified. They are floating abstractions because, like saying something is "inside" or "left" means nothing unless what a thing is inside of or what a thing is left of has no meaning. Saying that a thing is good, important, or necessary means nothing without specifying what a thing is good for, important to, of necessary for.

A thing's value is determined by its relationship to some end, purpose, goal, or objective. If a thing supports, furthers, or favors some particular end or purpose it has a positive value, such as good or right. If thing undercuts, inhibits, negates some particular end or purpose it has a negative value, such as bad or wrong.

Since only human beings have ends, purposes, goals, or objectives, values only pertain to human choices and actions. While there is no metaphysical predetermined life goal any individual must choose, and historically human beings have chosen almost every possible objective to live for, one's own values will be determined by one's own personal objectives.

Whatever an individual chooses as their objective is relative and subjective only in the sense that one's goals must be individually chosen and one's values will be related to their objective. With regard to anyone's personal objectives, however, what will be a positive value and what will be a negative value is absolute, determined by the nature of reality, the nature of the physical world and one's own nature as a human being. One may choose anything as their personal objective or purpose, but cannot do just anything to achieve that objective or purpose. If one chooses to a musician, only learning music and developing the skill necessary to play an instrument will achieve that goal. If one chooses to be a doctor, it cannot be achieved by studying racing cars. Only by studying medicine and developing the skills necessary to use that medical knowledge can achieve that objective.

While no one must choose to live successfully and happily in this world, one's personnel success and happiness is the objective to which ethical values pertain. Ethical values are the principles by which individuals make choices that will achieve one's own success and happiness. Those principles are absolute and determined by the nature of reality and one's own nature as a human being, and determine what things will achieve one's goals and which will result in disaster and failure.

Why do ethical values only pertain to the pursuit of success and happiness as a human being? Because all other possible goals or objectives do not require any values. To be a failure as a human being, to be unhappy and unsuccessful does not require any particular choice or behavior. Failure is the default condition of all those who not discover what is required to be a human success, that is, to be a moral (ethically correct) individual.

Dachshund wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 2:31 pm RE: PERSONHOOD and ABORTION



Henry's question: "Person or meat?" is what the abortion debate is really all about. But no one, so far, has responded to his query. In my opinion, it is the most important question of all, and it needs to addressed. So here in my view on the matter...

A really good response. Thanks for that, D.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 5:46 pm

Dachshund wrote: ↑Mon Jun 10, 2019 2:31 pm RE: PERSONHOOD and ABORTION



Henry's question: "Person or meat?" is what the abortion debate is really all about. But no one, so far, has responded to his query. In my opinion, it is the most important question of all, and it needs to addressed. So here in my view on the matter...

A really good response. Thanks for that, D.

I agree that is what the clinical abortion debate is about. It is a very complex debate even when the known scientific facts are on the table. The next question is what method should we decide with .

To begin with we should keep biased appeals out of it, such as Henry's emotional language "piece of meat". There is no way a living foetus is a piece of meat.

Next, we should decide that circumstances alter cases. This is more time consuming than simply obeying a bald injunction covering all cases of clinical abortion.It's as serious matter and merits long and sober thought.