Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 3:04 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote:You assumed I am that stupid to respond to your argument with your statement "Kant didn't believe that"?
When I refer to Kant's Copernican Revolution, it imply I am referring to its whole context [which I had presented many times] in addressing my point.
It appears you do not understand the essentials of Kant's Copernican Revolution which I had mentioned and explained many times.
In the full context of the above, Kant claimed "all attempts" by the philosophical realists for the ultimate external things has "ended in failure".
When he proposed "that Objects must conform to our Knowledge" it is implied that he wanted to start with knowledge and experience to justify whether there is an object-in-itself and NOT to take it the object-in-itself is GIVEN.
Your problem is you are stuck in the philosophical realist dogmatic stance thus cannot understand Kant's proposals.
I don't know how to say this without sounding rude, but when are you going to argue for yourself? I mean, we were discussing what it takes to be a realist or an idealist, and how we should address the issue of ontology, for which I advanced some arguments and you seemed to be onboard to discuss what were your stances on the issue. But then, just as you are doing right now, you come back with things like "
Kant said this, Kant believed that, etc." It's the kind of answer one gets from preachers when they are caught off-guard with their dogmatic arguments, they feel lost and resort immediately to the sacred scriptures. I am expecting your own answer.
Even if I give my own answers I will still revert to Kant who had presented the established and very rigorous argument I agree with. Why invent the wheel?
My answer would be this,
Realists take that there a really real something X beyond appearance, sensation and experience, i.e. something X that exists as real and independent of the human conditions.
I as a non-realist [transcendental idealist] do not agree with the above view.
My approach is dealing directly with appearances, sensations and experience and understanding what the whole process of cognition is about without a care/damn for any something X beyond appearances, sensation and experience.
Since Kant had presented the argument which I agree and support my views, I am thus relying on Kant as the authority and thus refer to his argument in the Critique of Pure Reason.
I don't see any problem with the above which is typical within the philosophical community.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
There you go, you are being rhetoric based on your rigid perspective, i.e. the only alternative to stuff is "non stuff".
Why must that be the the case?
I said there are TWO alternatives. Why couldn´t any of those be the case? What is your own take?
Your two alternatives are only applicable to a realist's view. You assumed there is the realist's something-X [stuff], if otherwise there is no X [non-stuff].
From the transcendental realist view, I don't accept your basis of the two alternatives as a premise for my argument. Rather I begin my premise with appearances, sensation and experienced without accepting there is a thing-in-itself that is given.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
Note very sure of your point.
What I can say is Kant [me included] do not have any problem justifying empirical realism and transcendental idealism.
Within empirical realism, the subject is independent of the object thus there exists and external reality independent of the human mind [at that level]. However all the above are subsumed within transcendental idealism, i.e. not independent of the human conditions.
I want to hear counterarguments, not what doctrine of Kant's sacred scripture you want to hang on to.
I don't see anything wrong with the above.
Who is the philosophical community has ever declared Kant's CPR as some sort of sacred scripture?
It is very common for Kantian philosophers to quote Kant in supporting their argument.
If I ever to produce my view on such issues, it would exactly be the same as Kant's main theme. So why waste my time instead of referring to Kant's CPR.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
From the transcendental idealism POV, it can be justified there isn't really something X beyond the appearance of X.
Since it is the point of departure, isn't that just begging the question?
I stated it can be justified subject to producing the actual justification which we have to refer to Kant's CPR.
Since I am referring to justification from primary sources, where is the begging the question?
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
There is a big difference if "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" as something real without there is the thing-in-itself beyond sensation.
Explain the difference, then. What is it?
When realists take it as a philosophical principle there is something X beyond "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" even before justifying and proving it, they are really begging the question.
On the other hand, the non-realist [me] merely focus on what is "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" without consideration of something x and let the evidence points to the direction of what is justified.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
From an empirical realist POV, Kant accept experience itself is really real.
What would make hallucinations less real? The experience is the same, isn't it?
What is real is specific to Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK].
When a hallucination is subject to the scientific method, it is not real per se relative to the scientific FSK.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
The reality of "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" are verifiable and justifiable by science within the scientific FSK.
Verifying and justifying against what? The scientific framework only works with the ontology of materialism. The framework on its own is nothing without it. It would be the equivalent of making the "direct sensations, appearances and experiences" the real things in themselves.
Note the scientific framework merely ASSUMED the ontology of materialism and NOT all scientific frameworks assume the ontology of materialism.
In any case, the assumption of ontology is science is not critical to science per se since science is science as per its FSK and science is not philosophy per se.
When scientists produced scientific knowledge the question is whether it is testable, repeatable and useful, has potential use, or merely for knowledge sake.
Scientists don't give a damn with any ontology of materialism. It is only some philosophers of Science who bring in the ontology of materialism in their Philosophy of Science and not all philosophers agree with that.
Veritas Aequitas wrote:
Note Kant's CPR is one long argument of >800 pages, thus I cannot present that whole argument to substantiate my point. You'll need to understand the whole argument before you condemn it as silly.
There is a part of the discussion that deals with how Kant should be interpreted. But that's not the topic of the OP, so you should focus on arguing on your own without making everything an issue about Kant, especially if you're only goint to say: "that's what transcendental idealism entails".
As I had stated, I am the one who raised the OP and it significantly entailed the reference to Kant's thing-in-itself.
In any of your attempt to prove an independent reality-in-itself exists as real, I will counter you with the arguments from Transcendental idealism which is essentially from Kant.
You may insist I interpret Kant [
a non-realist] wrongly and insist philosophers like Guyer [
realist] has the right interpretation. Did you see the mismatch [& inherent confirmation bias] there i.e. a realist interpreting a non-realist's book?