compatibilism

[Flannel Jesus]

Okay well that just sounds like a confusion unique to biggy then. Sam Harris certainly doesn't think humans don't think (lol), and he obviously doesn't think the process of thought is somehow mutually exclusive with determinism.

Iambiguous would call Harris a "free-will determinist". Right?

Because Sam Harris thinks people are capable of thinking? I don't know. If he does call Sam Harris that for that reason, that seems... entirely silly, to me.

Sam Harris explicitly denies free will, so presumably that's enough to not be called a "free will determinist".

[Flannel Jesus]

That being said, Daniel Dennet (and others, though I can't name them) have made compelling points to argue that, while Sam Harris denies free will and doesn't consider himself a compatibilist, he frames certain things in exactly the ways compatibilists would.

However, these arguments are a bit more involved than just noticing that he believes human beings think things.

[Iwannaplato]

Here's an article about reason, autonomy and determinism. Personally, I'd avoid the word autonomy, but he defines his terms and makes some very clear arguments - at least one is similar to points FJ has raised.

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthWand.htm

[Flannel Jesus]

Here's an article about reason, autonomy and determinism. Personally, I'd avoid the word autonomy, but he defines his terms and makes some very clear arguments - at least one is similar to points FJ has raised.

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthWand.htm

He seems to have a very compatibilist understanding of what "autonomy" means - does he ever get more explicit about it than this?

Accordingly, only the traditional concepts of freedom of choice but not freedom of will can be considered for man: 'Freedom of choice' denotes the possibility that I can do one or the other thing at my own discretion, i.e., autonomy. This means, first of all, that the circumstances do not prevent me from acting so;

This definition of autonomy mirrors the classic compatibilist viewpoint that someone is free if they are able to do as they wish, rather than the libertarian viewpoint that they must also be free from causality

As an aside, this article is fundamentally predicated on weak emergence. Did you notice that? That's kinda amusing.

[Iwannaplato]

Here's an article about reason, autonomy and determinism. Personally, I'd avoid the word autonomy, but he defines his terms and makes some very clear arguments - at least one is similar to points FJ has raised.

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthWand.htm

He seems to have a very compatibilist understanding of what "autonomy" means - does he ever get more explicit about it than this?

Accordingly, only the traditional concepts of freedom of choice but not freedom of will can be considered for man: 'Freedom of choice' denotes the possibility that I can do one or the other thing at my own discretion, i.e., autonomy. This means, first of all, that the circumstances do not prevent me from acting so;

This definition of autonomy mirrors the classic compatibilist viewpoint that someone is free if they are able to do as they wish, rather than the libertarian viewpoint that they must also be free from causality

The part that reminded me of you was.....

As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said. Determinism, however, denies the possibility of freedom: therefore, this appears to be a contradiction that discredits determinism as a logically inconsistent and self-contradictory position.

The argument is captivating. It appears to provide us with an absolutely sound objection that deals the deathblow to determinism. Yet this consideration does not stand up to a more exact test. The premise here is: Whoever seeks knowledge must be free to think rationally. But there are preconditions for this, too — actually they are of a logical and an empirical nature: First of all there are logical rules that must be observed for rational thinking. The capability for this must obviously be trained as well. Scientists just don't fall out of the blue either, but are shaped by genetic dispositions, socialisation, etc. They need a minimum of intelligence, a good education, lots of motivation, discipline and, last but not least, the ability to deal with frustrations and a bit of luck, too. In short, the ability to do scientific work also has preconditions and this also means that it is determined by these preconditions. The argument that at first seemed very convincing, namely, that determinism itself always presupposes freedom from determining conditions for the truth it lays claim to is only valid for irrational determinants, not the conditions of rational thinking. Therefore, for the latter the argument loses its soundness. This 'proof of freedom', which at first seemed irrefutable, also proves itself to be insufficient, indeed.

I thought that was clearly presented. It's about how reasoning is possible, but in a compatiblist view of external vs. internal causes.

[Flannel Jesus]

I just want to explicitly take a minute and quote the bit I found interesting about emergence, for later reference if necessary:

The new perspective made possible by modern system theory is crucial here. Systems are characterized by their own laws. They possess thereby a certain autonomy specific to the system, i.e., independence from the environment of the system, but in such a way — this is important — that everything occurs according to the laws of physics. Natural laws remain unchanged, but there exist dominant system determinants on a high level in the hierarchy — 'high up in the hierarchy' in the sense of their functional status in the system hierarchy; as such, they have a 'controlling' function, so to speak. A 'gap in the causal chain' is as unnecessary for this as are different non-classical laws of nature.

[Flannel Jesus]

Here's an article about reason, autonomy and determinism. Personally, I'd avoid the word autonomy, but he defines his terms and makes some very clear arguments - at least one is similar to points FJ has raised.

https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anth/AnthWand.htm

He seems to have a very compatibilist understanding of what "autonomy" means - does he ever get more explicit about it than this?

Accordingly, only the traditional concepts of freedom of choice but not freedom of will can be considered for man: 'Freedom of choice' denotes the possibility that I can do one or the other thing at my own discretion, i.e., autonomy. This means, first of all, that the circumstances do not prevent me from acting so;

This definition of autonomy mirrors the classic compatibilist viewpoint that someone is free if they are able to do as they wish, rather than the libertarian viewpoint that they must also be free from causality

The part that reminded me of you was.....

As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said. Determinism, however, denies the possibility of freedom: therefore, this appears to be a contradiction that discredits determinism as a logically inconsistent and self-contradictory position.

The argument is captivating. It appears to provide us with an absolutely sound objection that deals the deathblow to determinism. Yet this consideration does not stand up to a more exact test. The premise here is: Whoever seeks knowledge must be free to think rationally. But there are preconditions for this, too — actually they are of a logical and an empirical nature: First of all there are logical rules that must be observed for rational thinking. The capability for this must obviously be trained as well. Scientists just don't fall out of the blue either, but are shaped by genetic dispositions, socialisation, etc. They need a minimum of intelligence, a good education, lots of motivation, discipline and, last but not least, the ability to deal with frustrations and a bit of luck, too. In short, the ability to do scientific work also has preconditions and this also means that it is determined by these preconditions. The argument that at first seemed very convincing, namely, that determinism itself always presupposes freedom from determining conditions for the truth it lays claim to is only valid for irrational determinants, not the conditions of rational thinking. Therefore, for the latter the argument loses its soundness. This 'proof of freedom', which at first seemed irrefutable, also proves itself to be insufficient, indeed.

I thought that was clearly presented. It's about how reasoning is possible, but in a compatiblist view of external vs. internal causes.

That's interesting but also... hard to wrap my head around a little bit? I need to read it all again...

[Flannel Jesus]

And this part reminds me of something you frequently argue:

'Freedom of will', on the other hand, would mean that my actions are not only independent of external compulsion but also of the internal structure of my Self, in addition, and that means: My actions would be, so to speak, independent of myself — undoubtedly a most paradoxical idea.

[Iwannaplato]

And this part reminds me of something you frequently argue:

'Freedom of will', on the other hand, would mean that my actions are not only independent of external compulsion but also of the internal structure of my Self, in addition, and that means: My actions would be, so to speak, independent of myself — undoubtedly a most paradoxical idea.

Yes, I thought that was similar to what I've tried to convey. I wouldn't go so far as to say it must be paradoxical. But I'm not sure what the appeal is. If we start from your (compatiblist) version of freedom, where there external is not controlling me. Then go for pure free will where internal causes are not affecting my decisions.

And it's not random.

?

[Flannel Jesus]

And this part reminds me of something you frequently argue:

'Freedom of will', on the other hand, would mean that my actions are not only independent of external compulsion but also of the internal structure of my Self, in addition, and that means: My actions would be, so to speak, independent of myself — undoubtedly a most paradoxical idea.

Yes, I thought that was similar to what I've tried to convey. I wouldn't go so far as to say it must be paradoxical. But I'm not sure what the appeal is. If we start from your (compatiblist) version of freedom, where there external is not controlling me. Then go for pure free will where internal causes are not affecting my decisions.

And it's not random.

?

In that vision of free will, it's as if the "me" that's making a "free" decision is... undefined, at least prior to the decision. No memories, no prior state, no preferences.

That's certainly not what I feel like when I make a choice.

[phyllo]

Yes, I thought that was similar to what I've tried to convey. I wouldn't go so far as to say it must be paradoxical. But I'm not sure what the appeal is. If we start from your (compatiblist) version of freedom, where there external is not controlling me. Then go for pure free will where internal causes are not affecting my decisions.

And it's not random.

?

No, it's that there is a pure, real "I" which is not controlled or limited by the physical laws. The decisions come from this real "I".

You see that when free-willists insist that everyone knows something like "God exists" or "Slavery is wrong". The pure, real "you" knows.

(The fact, that dasein is completely incompatible with this concept, notwithstanding. )

[Iwannaplato]

No, it's that there is a pure, real "I" which is not controlled or limited by the physical laws. The decisions come from this real "I".

But that real I would need to be devoid of desires, preferences, expectations, models of the world. I mean, all those things that lead to our decisions. Otherwise the moment before the decision is made, all those internal causes, would, well, cause my choice.

You see that when free-willists insist that everyone knows something like "God exists" or "Slavery is wrong". The pure, real "you" knows.

You may be right statistically. I mean, perhaps many free will people think that they just know stuff. But I don't see how that must be hinged to free will.

(The fact, that dasein is completely incompatible with this concept, notwithstanding. )

Yes, I thought it was very strange that Iambiguous thought free will and dasein could work together. They're utterly opposed. HIs version of dasein contradicts free will.

[Flannel Jesus]

Yes, I thought it was very strange that Iambiguous thought free will and dasein could work together.

No doubt his thought process was rooted existentially in dasein.

[phyllo]

But that real I would need to be devoid of desires, preferences, expectations, models of the world. I mean, all those things that lead to our decisions. Otherwise the moment before the decision is made, all those internal causes, would, well, cause my choice.

The pure, real "I" is "influenced but not determined" (to quote H. Quirk) by these factors.

It's basically floating above all these things, able to apply a desire or drop a desire at will.

[Iwannaplato]

The pure, real "I" is "influenced but not determined" (to quote H. Quirk) by these factors.

So, we have the influences, and what else leads to the decision.

IOW he is acknowledging that these things have effects, but do not determine the decision/action. Fine. But from there his values, goals, desires, understanding of the world is not affecting his decision. So, what does?

It's basically floating above all these things, able to apply a desire or drop a desire at will.

Which I can't rule out, but it can't have anything to do with him.