Re: Free Will vs Determinism
Posted: Wed Mar 22, 2017 9:30 pm
The issue of whether free will is deterministic or "random", really boils down to an issue of definition of a metaphysics of free will. From this perspective, one finds an innumerable amount of definitions. To reduce free will to one definition in many respects leads to a one dimensional viewpoint whose only definition can result as a series interconnected primitives/axioms that reduces the nature of free will to a non-zero sum game of "stacked" definitions.
To argue for or against free will requires an axiomatic take on what free will is, leading to a level of subjectivity amidst observers resulting in a "probabilistic" definition as those partaking in such a discussion will have specific viewpoints compared to those who do not. It is these viewpoints which lends itself to an inherent probabilistic definition.
Take for example the nature of your standard philosophy forum. The average member has often put more time and effort in trying to understand such perceptions; and in review of these perceptions usually take a fallibilistic approach as the sheer numbers of opinions leads one to a mentally where justification does not always equal truth.
Taken from just the nature of definition alone, as to what free will is, requires acknowledgement of the probabalistic nature of definition when coming from the perspective of "man as the measurement of all things." It is within this nature of definition, requiring an inherent probabilism that we can observe a dualism between:
1) A necessary stability, observed through the ability to manifest beginning angles of measurement.
2) A necessary flux corresponding from the furtherance of that beginning angle of measurement.
It is within this duality of "stability" and "flux" that a duality of causality and non-causality occurs, which appears at the surface as contradictory but in reality can be observed as a minimum of 2 dimensions required in order to understand the nature of what constitutes free will.
When dealing with causality, or stability, one has to take the perspective of
exact A + exact B = exact C.
However, just using the above example and nature of aquiring definition we observe a lack of exactness/definition which corresponds to
A + exact B
exact A + B
or
A+B
all of which, through application of Chaos theory, do not equal exact C. And yet we are stuck with a minimum form of defintion in both A and B that corresponds in nature to subjective Axioms.
A fusion, from a Hegelian view of sythesis, can be aquired in order to give further definition, as to what free will contains as elements, without really giving an contradictory limit to it.
(Causality/stability)+(flux/randomness)= Probabilistic Determinism
****(The name of which I have to give credit to Stephen Hawking).
It is from a perspective of a probabilistic determinism, that the option of an answer "C" can be attributed for:
A + exact B
exact A + B
or
A+B
without having any specific contradictions that view both "Causality" and "Randomness" not as perspectives fighting for dominance but rather different dimensions of the same thing.
Now as to the magnitude of these dimensions, that is another argument all together as a hypothetical free will that composes 99.9999999....% of the human condition versus one that composes .0000000000...1% is still free will either way.
The need for stability allows certain Platonic forms to exist, as order implies existence, while requiring a necessary element of flux that allows for propagation. Take for example the platonic form of a tree. The form of a tree is the form of a tree regardless of how it manifests. But the ability for it to manifest in variety falsely puts question as to what a tree really is, as the questions occur is a tree with 100 branches more of a tree than
one with 2? And you get the points, as forms as strictly measures of possible functions rather than the functions as 1 dimensional specifics. This same argument can be applied to the form and function of what free will is and is not, taking into account a necessary propogative element that allows for "possibility."
One cannot say that the free will is completely random as complete randomness implies a complete deficiency in existence through a deficiency in order.
One cannot say that free will is completely deterministic either as a complete determinism does not account for any form of variables changing within the succession of variables. And this succession of variables requires a degree of flux inherent within the variable itself.
So the best course of action in regards to the question of "Free Will" vs. "Determinism" is to view it as a non-zero sum game of "Free will" and "Determinism" both manifesting each other as a "Probabilistic Determinism".
To argue for or against free will requires an axiomatic take on what free will is, leading to a level of subjectivity amidst observers resulting in a "probabilistic" definition as those partaking in such a discussion will have specific viewpoints compared to those who do not. It is these viewpoints which lends itself to an inherent probabilistic definition.
Take for example the nature of your standard philosophy forum. The average member has often put more time and effort in trying to understand such perceptions; and in review of these perceptions usually take a fallibilistic approach as the sheer numbers of opinions leads one to a mentally where justification does not always equal truth.
Taken from just the nature of definition alone, as to what free will is, requires acknowledgement of the probabalistic nature of definition when coming from the perspective of "man as the measurement of all things." It is within this nature of definition, requiring an inherent probabilism that we can observe a dualism between:
1) A necessary stability, observed through the ability to manifest beginning angles of measurement.
2) A necessary flux corresponding from the furtherance of that beginning angle of measurement.
It is within this duality of "stability" and "flux" that a duality of causality and non-causality occurs, which appears at the surface as contradictory but in reality can be observed as a minimum of 2 dimensions required in order to understand the nature of what constitutes free will.
When dealing with causality, or stability, one has to take the perspective of
exact A + exact B = exact C.
However, just using the above example and nature of aquiring definition we observe a lack of exactness/definition which corresponds to
A + exact B
exact A + B
or
A+B
all of which, through application of Chaos theory, do not equal exact C. And yet we are stuck with a minimum form of defintion in both A and B that corresponds in nature to subjective Axioms.
A fusion, from a Hegelian view of sythesis, can be aquired in order to give further definition, as to what free will contains as elements, without really giving an contradictory limit to it.
(Causality/stability)+(flux/randomness)= Probabilistic Determinism
****(The name of which I have to give credit to Stephen Hawking).
It is from a perspective of a probabilistic determinism, that the option of an answer "C" can be attributed for:
A + exact B
exact A + B
or
A+B
without having any specific contradictions that view both "Causality" and "Randomness" not as perspectives fighting for dominance but rather different dimensions of the same thing.
Now as to the magnitude of these dimensions, that is another argument all together as a hypothetical free will that composes 99.9999999....% of the human condition versus one that composes .0000000000...1% is still free will either way.
The need for stability allows certain Platonic forms to exist, as order implies existence, while requiring a necessary element of flux that allows for propagation. Take for example the platonic form of a tree. The form of a tree is the form of a tree regardless of how it manifests. But the ability for it to manifest in variety falsely puts question as to what a tree really is, as the questions occur is a tree with 100 branches more of a tree than
one with 2? And you get the points, as forms as strictly measures of possible functions rather than the functions as 1 dimensional specifics. This same argument can be applied to the form and function of what free will is and is not, taking into account a necessary propogative element that allows for "possibility."
One cannot say that the free will is completely random as complete randomness implies a complete deficiency in existence through a deficiency in order.
One cannot say that free will is completely deterministic either as a complete determinism does not account for any form of variables changing within the succession of variables. And this succession of variables requires a degree of flux inherent within the variable itself.
So the best course of action in regards to the question of "Free Will" vs. "Determinism" is to view it as a non-zero sum game of "Free will" and "Determinism" both manifesting each other as a "Probabilistic Determinism".