Philosophy Now Forum

Actuality is independent from the mind. Reality is a subset of Actuality that we recognize and store a mental version of. All "what is the nature of" questions are semantic.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 amWhilst you don't like labels, it is very obvious you MUST be a philosophical realist fundamentally else you would be in one of the anti-realist camp, idealism, pragmatists, etc.
Based on what you have posted [from Moore to Sellars, Bunge, Bueno, Sayer, Bhaskar ] I don't see in what ways you would concede there is no mind independent reality and accept the opposite.
Meillassoux view is one of those on the fringes and controversial.

I presume your materialism is confined to the following typical materialism;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
or if different, how is your materialism difference from the main of the above?

I took a brief look and I have no major problem with the Wikipedia entry as a general overview of materialism. As I said before, I don't think it's hard to miss what the concept entails, but the same can be said about idealism. I have never denied that I'm a realist and right from the start I have posited the existence of mind-independent realities.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am I would prefer the following interpretation;

1. Generally, Realism is a necessary evolutionary default, i.e. reality is independent of the mind, thus culminating in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

2. Idealism is basically this, i.e. cannot be independent of the human conditions and mind;

In philosophy, idealism is a diverse group of metaphysical views which all assert that "reality" is in some way indistinguishable or inseparable from human perception and/or understanding, that it is in some sense mentally constructed, or that it is otherwise closely connected to ideas.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

Thus the main criteria that differentiate realism from idealism is whether one is non-mental-centered or mental centered respectively.

Your last description of the distinction between realism vs idealism (non-mental-centered or mental centered) completely misses the mark. Since the terms have different uses, it would be better to make clearer distinctions between realists vs non-realists (or anti-realists), idealists vs non-idealists and materialists vs immaterialists. The basic, common sense, pre-theoretical picture of the world, as it appears to the common man, is this: there is an "external" realm of all things called the world with an underlying causal order and an "internal" domain of the subjects that grasp with their senses the apparent properties of this world, assimilating them through their cognitive apparatus. The "internal" domain is then the subject's mental model of an external world, and this external world includes other subjects. And here arrive the philosophers who will take position on several matters regarding this picture from an ontological or epistemological point of view:
1) From the view of ontology:
1.1 Ontological realism: the division between subjects and objects is true. Subjects are just a different class of objects and the "internal" domain is subsumed within the "external" realm.
1.2 Ontological non-realism (anti-realism): the division between subjects and objects is not true. All that exists is the "internal" domain of subjects, where "external" objects are just products of the senses and mind.
2) From the view of epistemology:
2.1 Epistemological realism: the subjects' minds have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order can be true.
2.2 Epistemological non-realism (anti-realism): the subjects' minds cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order cannot be true.
2.3 Epistemological agnosticism: claims about the access of the subjects' minds to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, cannot be known to be true or false.
Idealism can be associated with 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3 alone. It can also be the combination of 1.2 with any epistemological view (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Immaterialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is immaterial, and this notion is also considered idealism. It's an old brand of idealism, given that the nature of the underlying causal order, as understood by modern materialistic science, is of a recent making. In theory, although representing an outdated, anachronistic position, one can posit the existence of an immaterial external realm.
By the same token, non-idealism can be associated with 1.1 and 2.1 alone. Materialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is material, and this notion is also considered scientific realism.

The OP asks whether 1.1 is true or not. You deny 1.1 and affirm 1.2. You are then an idealist, regardless of your epistemological realism in 2.1. Kant simply dismissed ontology, bypassing the fact that there can't be an epistemology without an underlying ontological foundation, given that a sentient subject is presumed. So it's fair to assume his view is 1.2., but there are different interpretations of whether he endorsed 2.1, 2.2 or 2.3.

I affirm 1.1 to be true, because I'm an ontological realists. I'm also an epistemological realists, so I affirm 2.1. I also affirm that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is material, so I'm a materialist. To be an idealist I would have to be an ontological non-realist and either an epistemological non-realist or an epistemological agnostic.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 amIf your materialism is non-mental centered then you are in material-realist.
If one's view of "matter" is mental-centered, then one is a material-idealist.

From your perspective where matter is non-mental centered, i.e. independent of human condition, then in respect of your perspective, I would regard my stance as an immaterialist.
This is the same for Kant, from the realist perspective, Kant opposed materialism, thus he is a immaterialist.

There's simply no "non-mental" epistemology, by definition it implies the mental. Therefore, there cannot be a non-mental perspective. Ontologically speaking, there cannot be a non-mental materialism either, and to have a metaphysical distinction between mental and non-mental is good old dualism, which is just another form of idealism. Metaphysical realism does not deny the objective existence of mental stuff, it just puts that mental stuff as a subordinate order of physical processes.

You're just confusing the ontological stance with the epistemological one. And quite honestly, I find the concept of material-idealist completely absurd. Materialism implies that there's a physical substance (matter) of which the fundamental fabric of reality is made of, and that among the objects of this material domain, there are physical beings with minds, and these minds are subordinate byproducts of that matter. By definition then, matter in materialism (an ontology) cannot be "mental-centered" without becoming immaterialism. Immaterialism is plain ontological idealism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am Paul Guyer??
Paul Guyer is another hardcore realist and it is "blasphemous" for him to write an article on 'idealism'.
This is the same mistake SEP committed with Nicholas Stang another realist writing on 'Transcendental Idealism'.
Surely there is a problem of confirmation bias from the two hardcore realists above.

This is really funny. I mean, I don't like to press the argument of authority, but here we have a bunch of Kant scholars, not all of them particularly hostile to Kant's philosophy, which as soon as it is shown that they have a different interpretation of Kant than yours, you immediately disqualify them. Paul Guyer proved to be quite unconfortable to your views, so there you go: he's just another "blasphemous hardcore realist". Never mind that the dude...

[...]is the author of nine books on Kant, including Kant and the Claims of Taste (1979), Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987), Kant (2006), Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2007), and Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume (2008). He is the editor of six anthologies of work on Kant, including three Cambridge Companions, and is co-editor of a volume on the work of his teacher Stanley Cavell. He is also the co-translator of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and Kant's Notes and Fragments, all in the Cambridge Edition of Immanuel Kant, of which he is General Co-Editor. He is on numerous editorial boards, including those of The Kantian Review, Kant-Studien, and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. [...] His next project is a study of the impact of Kant's moral philosophy on the subsequent history of philosophy, for a series on The Legacy of Kant that he is editing for Oxford University Press.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am To be more precise, despite rejecting immaterialism, Berkeley should be a realist ultimately since he believed there is an independent God that exists independently from his mind, i.e. non-mental-centered reality.

This is plainly absurd. Berkeley a realist? Really? As explained above, taking an epistemological stance of realism is not enough to associate someone with (modern) philosophical realism. The key is your ontological stance, which is undoubtedly idealistic in Berkeley.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am That is the problem.
1. You assumed objects exist from the non-mental-centered perspective.
2. I on the other hand take it that objects exist from the mental-centered perspective.
This is the point of the OP, you cannot prove 1 as true!

No, I don't need to assume objects, as that is what comes by default in our sensibility. That's the pre-theoretical common sense view, which affects all of us just the same, before one takes a philosophical stance. And then each one's ontological pressumptions (that the division between subjects and objects is true or false), lead to other logical consequences. Your mistake is that you depart from the epistemological stance, while the OP implies an ontological stance (the anti-realism of 1.2), which is no better provable than 1.1. That's the main cause of your confusion.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am Since you are never acquainted with the real thing out there but only is acquainted with the sense-data related to that independent external thing empirically, you are an empirical-idealist.
This is the truth, your stance is that, the only reliance upon which you have with reality are the empirical sensation, evidences, etc. in your mind, thus mental-centered.

Again, that's the epistemological foundation of phenomenalism. The problem is, epistemology can say nothing of ontology, which means you cannot deny the actual existence of the thing out there, not without reapplying the same skeptical template to the supposedly first-hand evidence of sense-data, denying yourself the actual existence of the empirical sensations and ending in the major problems of phenomenalism that we already know.

Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 10:41 pm Your last description of the distinction between realism vs idealism (non-mental-centered or mental centered) completely misses the mark. Since the terms have different uses, it would be better to make clearer distinctions between
realists vs non-realists (or anti-realists),
idealists vs non-idealists and
materialists vs immaterialists.

The basic, common sense, pre-theoretical picture of the world, as it appears to the common man, is this:
there is an "external" realm of all things called the world with an underlying causal order and an "internal" domain of the subjects that grasp with their senses the apparent properties of this world, assimilating them through their cognitive apparatus.

The "internal" domain is then the subject's mental model of an external world, and this external world includes other subjects.
And here arrive the philosophers who will take position on several matters regarding this picture from an ontological or epistemological point of view:

1) From the view of ontology:
1.1 Ontological realism: the division between subjects and objects is true.
Subjects are just a different class of objects and the "internal" domain is subsumed within the "external" realm.
1.2 Ontological non-realism (anti-realism): the division between subjects and objects is not true. All that exists is the "internal" domain of subjects, where "external" objects are just products of the senses and mind.

I like the way you analyze the above, but I don't agree.

Ontology-in-general is about the study of ‘being’ but
I don’t agree with ‘ontology’ in the above sense, i.e. specific substance-ontology [thing-in-itself].

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

2) From the view of epistemology:
2.1 Epistemological realism: the subjects' minds have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order can be true.
2.2 Epistemological non-realism (anti-realism): the subjects' minds cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order cannot be true.
2.3 Epistemological agnosticism: claims about the access of the subjects' minds to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, cannot be known to be true or false.

There are certain nuances that you need to take into account, i.e. 3.1 below

3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

Idealism can be associated with 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3 alone.
It can also be the combination of 1.2 with any epistemological view (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3).

In my case, idealism is not associated with 1.2, 2.2 nor 2.3. My ‘idealism’ is associated only with 3.1.

Immaterialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is immaterial, and this notion is also considered idealism. It's an old brand of idealism, given that the nature of the underlying causal order, as understood by modern materialistic science, is of a recent making. In theory, although representing an outdated, anachronistic position, one can posit the existence of an immaterial external realm.
By the same token, non-idealism can be associated with 1.1 and 2.1 alone. Materialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is material, and this notion is also considered scientific realism.

For anyone who agree with your definitions above, then they will agree with your description of what is materialism vs immaterialism.
Since I do not agree with substance ontology as in 1.1, 1.2, or 2.1 to 2.3 I have nothing to do with materialism or immaterialism in those senses.

Kant had a specific definition of “what is matter.” So in this case, matter is just matter, i.e. no question of ‘materialism’ nor immaterialism.
When I mentioned ‘materialism’ it is to argue that such a term cannot be true.

The OP asks whether 1.1 is true or not.
You deny 1.1 and affirm 1.2.
You are then an idealist, regardless of your epistemological realism in 2.1.
Kant simply dismissed ontology, bypassing the fact that there can't be an epistemology without an underlying ontological foundation, given that a sentient subject is presumed. So it's fair to assume his view is 1.2., but there are different interpretations of whether he endorsed 2.1, 2.2 or 2.3.

Yes, the OP 1.1 re substance ontology is true or not.
Note "substance" ontology not just ontology [being] in general.

1.1 and 1.2 refers to substance ontology. Kant argued against substance ontology, as such Kant cannot be identified within 1.1 or 1.2 at all.
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 also refer to substance ontology, therefore has no relevance for Kant [mine as well].

What is relevant for Kant [mine as well] is only 3.1 o i.e. transcendental idealism aka empirical realism.

I affirm 1.1 to be true, because I'm an ontological realists. I'm also an epistemological realists, so I affirm 2.1. I also affirm that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is material, so I'm a materialist. To be an idealist I would have to be an ontological non-realist and either an epistemological non-realist or an epistemological agnostic.

You are a substance ontologist, note the below. That is why you are agreeable with 1.1 and 2.1.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

Yes, to be the typical idealist, you will need to be substance-ontology non-realist, which you are not.

In Kant’s case, he is not the typical idealist since he is not a substance-ontology non-realist, but he is an empirical realist aka transcendental idealist.

Hope you can see the nuances above.

Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 10:41 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 amIf your materialism is non-mental centered then you are in material-realist.
If one's view of "matter" is mental-centered, then one is a material-idealist.

From your perspective where matter is non-mental centered, i.e. independent of human condition, then in respect of your perspective, I would regard my stance as an immaterialist.
This is the same for Kant, from the realist perspective, Kant opposed materialism, thus he is a immaterialist.

There's simply no "non-mental" epistemology, by definition it implies the mental. Therefore, there cannot be a non-mental perspective.
Ontologically speaking, there cannot be a non-mental materialism either, and to have a metaphysical distinction between mental and non-mental is good old dualism, which is just another form of idealism. Metaphysical realism does not deny the objective existence of mental stuff, it just puts that mental stuff as a subordinate order of physical processes.

You're just confusing the ontological stance with the epistemological one.
And quite honestly, I find the concept of material-idealist completely absurd.
Materialism implies that there's a physical substance (matter) of which the fundamental fabric of reality is made of, and that among the objects of this material domain, there are physical beings with minds, and these minds are subordinate byproducts of that matter. By definition then, matter in materialism (an ontology) cannot be "mental-centered" without becoming immaterialism. Immaterialism is plain ontological idealism.

I am aware of the difference between 'ontology' and 'epistemology' but I believe [hermeneutically] one need to have 'knowledge' [epistemology] of ontology.

• Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. -wiki
  
  Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. -wiki

Epistemology is basically mental, i.e. anything to do with knowledge has to be mental, i.e. involving the human brain.

Now we are using our brains [engaging mentally] to have knowledge of

• 1. Mind independent ontological things, i.e. realism - non-mental centered
  2. Non-mind independent thingss - anti-realism - mental-centered

Realism claim that things exist independent of the human mind, thus it is literally non-brain-mind-mentally centered.

Anti-realism claim that things exist in association with the mind, thus brain-mind-mentally centered.

Therefore the knowledge [epistemology] of independent ontological beings [realism] is termed epistemology that is non-mental centered epistemology.
Anti-realism is the opposite.

So the whole issue with realism, materialism, or idealism boil down to about either the issue is mentally-centered or non-mentally centered.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am Paul Guyer??
Paul Guyer is another hardcore realist and it is "blasphemous" for him to write an article on 'idealism'.
This is the same mistake SEP committed with Nicholas Stang another realist writing on 'Transcendental Idealism'.
Surely there is a problem of confirmation bias from the two hardcore realists above.

This is really funny. I mean, I don't like to press the argument of authority, but here we have a bunch of Kant scholars, not all of them particularly hostile to Kant's philosophy, which as soon as it is shown that they have a different interpretation of Kant than yours, you immediately disqualify them. Paul Guyer proved to be quite unconfortable to your views, so there you go: he's just another "blasphemous hardcore realist". Never mind that the dude...

[...]is the author of nine books on Kant, including Kant and the Claims of Taste (1979), Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987), Kant (2006), Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2007), and Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume (2008). He is the editor of six anthologies of work on Kant, including three Cambridge Companions, and is co-editor of a volume on the work of his teacher Stanley Cavell. He is also the co-translator of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and Kant's Notes and Fragments, all in the Cambridge Edition of Immanuel Kant, of which he is General Co-Editor. He is on numerous editorial boards, including those of The Kantian Review, Kant-Studien, and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. [...] His next project is a study of the impact of Kant's moral philosophy on the subsequent history of philosophy, for a series on The Legacy of Kant that he is editing for Oxford University Press.

As I had suggested you have to be very familiar with the history of how the analytic philosophers got interested in Kant from the start, i.e. with Peter Strawson's The Bounds of Reason.

I read somewhere [need to search for it] Strawson initially found certain aspects of the Transcendental Analytic of Kant interesting to some degree but to his horror he later discovered the whole of the CPR is too metaphysical for him, thus he never ventured to study Kant thoroughly and fully. But by then he was committed academically with Kant.

It is the same with Guyer who abhorred Kant's philosophy but nevertheless was trapped into it as a profession and found it too late to change direction thus got involved with translating, teaching and involving with various Kantian project. Show me where Guyer ever stated anything positive about Kant central idea?

After Guyer's generations those analytic philosophers who ever got involved with Kant's philosophers are already armed with knives [inherited from Guyer et al] when they deal with Kant's philosophy. Again show me one Guyer's disciple who had stated anything positive about Kant central idea?

These analytical philosophers has ideological, psychological, cultural, political anti-Kantian blood in them.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am To be more precise, despite rejecting immaterialism, Berkeley should be a realist ultimately since he believed there is an independent God that exists independently from his mind, i.e. non-mental-centered reality.

This is plainly absurd. Berkeley a realist? Really? As explained above, taking an epistemological stance of realism is not enough to associate someone with (modern) philosophical realism. The key is your ontological stance, which is undoubtedly idealistic in Berkeley.

Fundamentally a realist believes in the existence of something independent of the human conditions.
There is no denial, Berkeley a staunch theist believed in an independent existence of an ultimate thing called God - the ultimate Absolute external independent thing or the Father of all externality!
Thus Berkeley is ultimately a realist as defined.

Berkeley's idealism is rather a side issue.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am That is the problem.
1. You assumed objects exist from the non-mental-centered perspective.
2. I on the other hand take it that objects exist from the mental-centered perspective.
This is the point of the OP, you cannot prove 1 as true!

No, I don't need to assume objects, as that is what comes by default in our sensibility. That's the pre-theoretical common sense view, which affects all of us just the same, before one takes a philosophical stance. And then each one's ontological pressumptions (that the division between subjects and objects is true or false), lead to other logical consequences. Your mistake is that you depart from the epistemological stance, while the OP implies an ontological stance (the anti-realism of 1.2), which is no better provable than 1.1. That's the main cause of your confusion.

Your problem is you are not aware of the nuances from different perspectives.
Note my explanation in the previous post.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu May 20, 2021 10:00 am Since you are never acquainted with the real thing out there but only is acquainted with the sense-data related to that independent external thing empirically, you are an empirical-idealist.
This is the truth, your stance is that, the only reliance upon which you have with reality are the empirical sensation, evidences, etc. in your mind, thus mental-centered.

Again, that's the epistemological foundation of phenomenalism. The problem is, epistemology can say nothing of ontology, which means you cannot deny the actual existence of the thing out there, not without reapplying the same skeptical template to the supposedly first-hand evidence of sense-data, denying yourself the actual existence of the empirical sensations and ending in the major problems of phenomenalism that we already know.

Why epistemology cannot say anything of ontology?

On the surface, yes, but I believe ultimately one need knowledge [epistemology] of ontology.
And the knowledge of substance ontology is that substance ontology is not true.

Regardless of epistemology or ontology, the reality and truth is humans are only acquainted with the sense-data related to that supposed [if it ever exist] independent external thing.
As such, what you claimed as empirically real is confined to the sense-data, thoughts, ideas in your brain only [never in touch with the supposed real object], thus you are an empirical idealist.

You stated above;

Idealism can be associated with 1.2, 2.2
1.2 Ontological non-realism (anti-realism): the division between subjects and objects is not true. All that exists is the "internal" domain of subjects, where "external" objects are just products of the senses and mind.
2.2 Epistemological non-realism (anti-realism): the subjects' minds cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order cannot be true.

Since your mind has access only to sense-data, therefore, as you stated,
"you cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality" i.e. the supposed independent thing out there.
Based on this fact that you only have access to the sense data and cannot access the real independent thing, you are definitely an idealist. You cannot deny this.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am 3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

Still beaten by indirect "non-substance realism". reality is subsumed within transcendental idealism, while at the same time transcendental idealism is also subsumed within Reality.

In other words the world is in us (everything we experience is happening in the head, shaped via human conditions), but we're also in the World (the head is just a part of the World). Apparently Kant was too shallow to see this. I wonder why.

[quote=Atla post_id=511778 time=1621761593 user_id=15497]
[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=511776 time=1621757604 user_id=7896]
[b]3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism[/b] [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.
[/quote]
Still beaten by indirect "non-substance realism". reality is subsumed within transcendental idealism, while at the same time transcendental idealism is also subsumed within Reality.

In other words the world is in us (everything we experience is happening in the head, shaped via human conditions), but we're also in the World (the head is just a part of the World). Apparently Kant was too shallow to see this. I wonder why.
[/quote]

Kant was right about metaphysics except when he went woo. If he failed in any way it was because of the idea of transcendent forces, not how the mental and the material fit together.

Incidentally, y'all are completely wasting your time and energy. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain. Everything else follows by logical extension.

Advocate wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 2:46 pm

Atla wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:19 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am 3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

Still beaten by indirect "non-substance realism". reality is subsumed within transcendental idealism, while at the same time transcendental idealism is also subsumed within Reality.

In other words the world is in us (everything we experience is happening in the head, shaped via human conditions), but we're also in the World (the head is just a part of the World). Apparently Kant was too shallow to see this. I wonder why.

Kant was right about metaphysics except when he went woo. If he failed in any way it was because of the idea of transcendent forces, not how the mental and the material fit together.

Incidentally, y'all are completely wasting your time and energy. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain. Everything else follows by logical extension.

Kant doesn't seem to have settled on indirect realism, for example he thought that space and time are purely apriori. He missed the twofold nature of space and time. And he was far from nondual indirect realism, which is the correct philosophy.

(Also, more like "patterns in the brain" is a metaphor for "mind".)

[quote=Atla post_id=511802 time=1621778892 user_id=15497]
Kant doesn't seem to have settled on indirect realism, for example he thought that space and time are purely apriori. He missed the twofold nature of space and time. And he was far from nondual indirect realism, which is the correct philosophy.

(Also, more like "patterns in the brain" is a metaphor for "mind".)
[/quote]

Did i mention academic topics are an opportunity cost to understanding? Also, everything is a metaphor for life.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Mar 14, 2021 7:59 am I had opened the following threads;

• Humans are the Co-Creator of Reality They are In [1]
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISdBAf-ysI0 AL-Khalili
  
  Humans are the Co-Creator of Reality They are In [2]
  viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32476
  
  Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality
  viewtopic.php?f=11&t=25316
  
  Reality is an Emergence
  viewtopic.php?f=5&t=28671

As usual those who opposed will argue the above is absurd because they interpret that I am claiming humans literally and physically created the whole universe like humans created physical objects like furniture, motor vehicles, airplanes, ships, trains, building, and the likes.

I had emphasized and I did NOT say humans literally or physically created the entire universe somehow. Don't associate my sense of co-creating with the above.

What I am stating is the emergence of the existence of reality [creation of] is inevitably entangled with the human conditions.
As such, humans are co-creators of the reality they are part and parcel of.

If anyone claimed otherwise, one cannot prove there is an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself.

So, prove to me reality-in-itself exists independent of human conditions and I will withdraw my claim.

You mind is a cesspit of non sequiturs.

Advocate wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 3:55 pm

Atla wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 3:08 pm Kant doesn't seem to have settled on indirect realism, for example he thought that space and time are purely apriori. He missed the twofold nature of space and time. And he was far from nondual indirect realism, which is the correct philosophy.

(Also, more like "patterns in the brain" is a metaphor for "mind".)

Did i mention academic topics are an sorry cost to understanding? Also, everything is a metaphor for life.

Indirect realism is part of "minimal" understanding. Unless we want to go 100% instrumentalist, in which case why bother with philosophy.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Mar 14, 2021 7:59 am I had emphasized and I did NOT say humans literally or physically created the entire universe somehow. Don't associate my sense of co-creating with the above.

What I am stating is the emergence of the existence of reality [creation of] is inevitably entangled with the human conditions.
As such, humans are co-creators of the reality they are part and parcel of.

If anyone claimed otherwise, one cannot prove there is an existing independent-of-human-mind external world - reality-in-itself.

So, prove to me reality-in-itself exists independent of human conditions and I will withdraw my claim.

You are failing to draw a valid distinction.
By saying that humans are co-creators of reality that they are part and parcel of you are giving humans a god like power to do more than simply be the creators of car, and tables, but of "reality itself".
Most idealist would shy away from that idea, but saying that we create our own version of a phenomenal reality by which the real world is only partially known because of the limitations of the senses and the need to construct a coherent understanding of the world. This is not the same as saying co-creators. Humans are not creating the universe. They can modify tiny bits of it by making mobile phones and eating apples.
The only way your view could stick is by defining "reality" as something that is internal to each of us.
You have no claim to make, because it is absurd, and there is no need to prove anything of the kind about "reality-in-itself", which is actually easy enough to prove.
Just meet me in the same room, and I can make you say that reality exists with a length of rope a towel and a bucket of water.

[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=502065 time=1615705140 user_id=7896]
prove to me reality-in-itself exists independent of human conditions and I will withdraw my claim.
[/quote]

Reality-in-itself exists independent of human conditions as far as we know "for all intents and purposes" because it's always there when we check and a difference that makes no difference is no difference. You cannot simply reach into the transcendent and pull out transcendent knowledge. Reality is what we experience, call it what you will.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Ontology-in-general is about the study of ‘being’ but
I don’t agree with ‘ontology’ in the above sense, i.e. specific substance-ontology [thing-in-itself].

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

There's nothing in 1.1 and 1.2 that requires objects to be of a particular constitution. All that counts is whether one acknowledges the subjects/objects division or not, and whether subjects are subsumed into the category of objects. Surely, ontology will submerge into the inquiries of what is the nature of the objects, what are their properties, but it does not prescribe a given constitution by default. Objects are made of "stuff" and ontology goes on to say what this "stuff" might be all about. If one takes the position that objects made of stuff is an unwarranted, hypothetical assumption, one is saying that objects might not have properties at all, in other words, that they might be unstructured, a view that is immediately defeated by the very notion of having differentiated objects to deal with in the first place. That they might be actually property-less and without structure implies taking the ontological nihilistic position of believing there's nothing at all, just a void. That's a radical position that no serious philosopher has ever taken. BTW, to deal with the problem in the OP, one is assuming reality has some properties and structure. Kant would not have been able to write one single word if he did not believe it.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am

2) From the view of epistemology:
2.1 Epistemological realism: the subjects' minds have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order can be true.
2.2 Epistemological non-realism (anti-realism): the subjects' minds cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order cannot be true.
2.3 Epistemological agnosticism: claims about the access of the subjects' minds to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, cannot be known to be true or false.

There are certain nuances that you need to take into account, i.e. 3.1 below

3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

Not at all. If it were possible (it is not), a non-substance ontology would not even have objects. You're just circumventing the requirement of an ontological stance accompanying the epistemological stance, by dismissing ontology completely, which as I said cannot be had. You're back to square one of your confusion: departing from an epistemological stance that ignores the implied subject. Isn't there something that knows? You obviously must make that assumption, which then takes you to 1.2, which is your actual stance: not believing the division between subjects and objects. All that exists is the "internal" domain of subjects, where "external" objects are just products of the senses and mind. You're an ontological non-realist at the end of the day.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am

Idealism can be associated with 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3 alone.
It can also be the combination of 1.2 with any epistemological view (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3).

In my case, idealism is not associated with 1.2, 2.2 nor 2.3. My ‘idealism’ is associated only with 3.1.

As I said, there is no one taking the ontological nihilism stance, and at the end of the day your arguments are just trying to conceal that you are associated with 1.2, ontological non-realism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am

Immaterialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is immaterial, and this notion is also considered idealism. It's an old brand of idealism, given that the nature of the underlying causal order, as understood by modern materialistic science, is of a recent making. In theory, although representing an outdated, anachronistic position, one can posit the existence of an immaterial external realm.
By the same token, non-idealism can be associated with 1.1 and 2.1 alone. Materialism is the notion that the order of reality seen from 2.1 is material, and this notion is also considered scientific realism.

For anyone who agree with your definitions above, then they will agree with your description of what is materialism vs immaterialism.
Since I do not agree with substance ontology as in 1.1, 1.2, or 2.1 to 2.3 I have nothing to do with materialism or immaterialism in those senses.

But then you could only be an ontological nihilists. This does not fit with all of your previous arguments, so I guess you're again just trying to get away from the logical traps you have put yourself into.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Kant had a specific definition of “what is matter.” So in this case, matter is just matter, i.e. no question of ‘materialism’ nor immaterialism.
When I mentioned ‘materialism’ it is to argue that such a term cannot be true.

If Kant had some predicates about matter, that would be an ontological stance. Is it a property of objects or not? If not, where else does it come from?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Note "substance" ontology not just ontology [being] in general.

1.1 and 1.2 refers to substance ontology. Kant argued against substance ontology, as such Kant cannot be identified within 1.1 or 1.2 at all.
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 also refer to substance ontology, therefore has no relevance for Kant [mine as well].

So, are you saying that you and Kant do not accept "substance ontology", but that there's another class of ontology you do adhere to? What is it?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am What is relevant for Kant [mine as well] is only 3.1 o i.e. transcendental idealism aka empirical realism.

Repeating that verse from Kantian scripture is no longer serving a purpose for you in this discussion.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am I am aware of the difference between 'ontology' and 'epistemology' but I believe [hermeneutically] one need to have 'knowledge' [epistemology] of ontology.

• Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. -wiki
  
  Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. -wiki

Epistemology is basically mental, i.e. anything to do with knowledge has to be mental, i.e. involving the human brain.

Now we are using our brains [engaging mentally] to have knowledge of

• 1. Mind independent ontological things, i.e. realism - non-mental centered
  2. Non-mind independent thingss - anti-realism - mental-centered

Realism claim that things exist independent of the human mind, thus it is literally non-brain-mind-mentally centered.

Anti-realism claim that things exist in association with the mind, thus brain-mind-mentally centered.

Therefore the knowledge [epistemology] of independent ontological beings [realism] is termed epistemology that is non-mental centered epistemology.
Anti-realism is the opposite.

So the whole issue with realism, materialism, or idealism boil down to about either the issue is mentally-centered or non-mentally centered.

You're just repeating what I already responded to: Ontological and Epistemological stances

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am As I had suggested you have to be very familiar with the history of how the analytic philosophers got interested in Kant from the start, i.e. with Peter Strawson's The Bounds of Reason.

I read somewhere [need to search for it] Strawson initially found certain aspects of the Transcendental Analytic of Kant interesting to some degree but to his horror he later discovered the whole of the CPR is too metaphysical for him, thus he never ventured to study Kant thoroughly and fully. But by then he was committed academically with Kant.

It is the same with Guyer who abhorred Kant's philosophy but nevertheless was trapped into it as a profession and found it too late to change direction thus got involved with translating, teaching and involving with various Kantian project. Show me where Guyer ever stated anything positive about Kant central idea?

After Guyer's generations those analytic philosophers who ever got involved with Kant's philosophers are already armed with knives [inherited from Guyer et al] when they deal with Kant's philosophy. Again show me one Guyer's disciple who had stated anything positive about Kant central idea?

These analytical philosophers has ideological, psychological, cultural, political anti-Kantian blood in them.

This ad hominem argument against Kant's scholars that you don't agree with is a major fallacy of yours. Saying they have "anti-Kantian blood in them", "armed with knives" is the kind of argument one would expect from dogmatic cultist followers. And so you make assessments about Paul Guyer and other scholars in terms of "stating positive things". They just give their best interpretation, that might be biased by other philosophical doctrines, but in that sense no less biased than any other interpretation that you would endorse. If I said that Henry Allison got carried away in his "passion for Kant", the argument would be meaningless for proving him wrong.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am Why epistemology cannot say anything of ontology?

Because it is not the subject matter of epistemology? How is asking what we actually know related to asking what there actually is?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am
Regardless of epistemology or ontology, the reality and truth is humans are only acquainted with the sense-data related to that supposed [if it ever exist] independent external thing.

No, that's not "regardless of epistemology or ontology", that is precisely "regarding epistemology or ontology".

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am As such, what you claimed as empirically real is confined to the sense-data, thoughts, ideas in your brain only [never in touch with the supposed real object], thus you are an empirical idealist.

But you have no proof of that ontological/epistemological claim. People having the pre-theoretical view, having the manifest image, does not necessarily entail having a scientific image of reality that can categorically deny the existence of mind-independent objects "in touch" with our brainly ideas of them.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 10:13 am
Since your mind has access only to sense-data, therefore, as you stated,
"you cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality" i.e. the supposed independent thing out there.
Based on this fact that you only have access to the sense data and cannot access the real independent thing, you are definitely an idealist. You cannot deny this.

I surely did. Since you cannot prove that the sense data is not connected to the objects, which is what would necessarily be implied in 1.1 (the division between subjects and objects is true. Subjects are just a different class of objects and the "internal" domain is subsumed within the "external" realm), you cannot prove ontological realism to be false. You can take, of course, the non-realist ontological position, but then will have to deal with its epistemological shortcomings.

Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 7:29 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Ontology-in-general is about the study of ‘being’ but
I don’t agree with ‘ontology’ in the above sense, i.e. specific substance-ontology [thing-in-itself].

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory
Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.

There's nothing in 1.1 and 1.2 that requires objects to be of a particular constitution. All that counts is whether one acknowledges the subjects/objects division or not, and whether subjects are subsumed into the category of objects. Surely, ontology will submerge into the inquiries of what is the nature of the objects, what are their properties, but it does not prescribe a given constitution by default. Objects are made of "stuff" and ontology goes on to say what this "stuff" might be all about. If one takes the position that objects made of stuff is an unwarranted, hypothetical assumption, one is saying that objects might not have properties at all, in other words, that they might be unstructured, a view that is immediately defeated by the very notion of having differentiated objects to deal with in the first place. That they might be actually property-less and without structure implies taking the ontological nihilistic position of believing there's nothing at all, just a void. That's a radical position that no serious philosopher has ever taken. BTW, to deal with the problem in the OP, one is assuming reality has some properties and structure. Kant would not have been able to write one single word if he did not believe it.

I have stated many times, but you simply ignored it.
By Kant's Copernican Revolution it is implied he rejected substance ontology.

Note again,

• Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

I am the one who raised the OP so I am setting the intention therein, i.e. the OP's reality-in-itself is the same thing-in-itself in the above definition of substance ontology.

If you refer to ontology in general there are loads of perspectives to ontology, note,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

Kant rejection of ontology is explicit in his CPR leveraging on his Copernican Revolution,

Here is a quickie mention;

Indeed, two central teachings from these earlier portions of the Critique — the transcendental ideality of space and time, and the critical limitation of all application of the concepts of the understanding to “appearances” — already carry with them Kant’s rejection of “ontology (metaphysica generalis).”
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/

The point is the philosophical realists [you included] take the stance that there is really something X i.e. the thing-in-itself that beyond the appearance of X.

Kant on the other hand, start with direct sensations, appearances and experiences and make the attempt to understand what are these about without taking the stance that there is really something X i.e. the thing-in-itself that exists as real beyond the appearance of X.

Kant merely provided the assumption or at best a hypothesis for something X, i.e. the thing-in-itself, but that is not accepting there is really something X beyond experience.
At the conclusion, Kant confirms the hypothesis of something-X is an illusion.

Kant had already warned realists and people like you;

Kant in CPR wrote:Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
B397

This is why you are unable to understand the above views thus wrongly and continually imposes YOUR realist's view onto Kant.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am

2) From the view of epistemology:
2.1 Epistemological realism: the subjects' minds have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order can be true.
2.2 Epistemological non-realism (anti-realism): the subjects' minds cannot have access to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, and claims about this causal order cannot be true.
2.3 Epistemological agnosticism: claims about the access of the subjects' minds to the underlying causal order of reality, whatever it is ontologically speaking, cannot be known to be true or false.

There are certain nuances that you need to take into account, i.e. 3.1 below

3.1 Epistemological Empirical Realism [anti-ontological_realism]. Non-substance-ontology speaking, external objects exist independent of the subject but this is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

Not at all. If it were possible (it is not), a non-substance ontology would not even have objects. You're just circumventing the requirement of an ontological stance accompanying the epistemological stance, by dismissing ontology completely, which as I said cannot be had. You're back to square one of your confusion: departing from an epistemological stance that ignores the implied subject. Isn't there something that knows? You obviously must make that assumption, which then takes you to 1.2, which is your actual stance: not believing the division between subjects and objects. All that exists is the "internal" domain of subjects, where "external" objects are just products of the senses and mind. You're an ontological non-realist at the end of the day.

If you refer to the wiki link re ontology above,
you will note there are many perspectives to ontology besides substance-ontology.

Note I referred to Kant's Copernican Revolution approach which has nothing to do with substance-ontology [grounded on the thing-in-itself].
Kant explicitly rejected ontology and if there is any ontology to Kant's view, it is definitely not substance-ontology.
Where Kant dealt with objects, they are empirical objects without any substance-ontological elements.

Where there is something that knows, it is not an ontological self but an empirical self that dissolve upon physical death.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am

Idealism can be associated with 1.2, 2.2 and 2.3 alone.
It can also be the combination of 1.2 with any epistemological view (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3).

In my case, idealism is not associated with 1.2, 2.2 nor 2.3. My ‘idealism’ is associated only with 3.1.

As I said, there is no one taking the ontological nihilism stance, and at the end of the day your arguments are just trying to conceal that you are associated with 1.2, ontological non-realism.

I am not involved with 1.2 substance-ontological non-realism.
Mine is substance-ontological nihilism [i.e. nothing to do with substance-ontology] whilst I am entangled with empirical reality.

What is there to conceal?
I am openly entangled with empirical reality.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am For anyone who agree with your definitions above, then they will agree with your description of what is materialism vs immaterialism.
Since I do not agree with substance ontology as in 1.1, 1.2, or 2.1 to 2.3 I have nothing to do with materialism or immaterialism in those senses.

But then you could only be an ontological nihilists. This does not fit with all of your previous arguments, so I guess you're again just trying to get away from the logical traps you have put yourself into.

I have nothing to do with substance-ontology, thus substance-ontological-nihilists is meaningless to me.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Kant had a specific definition of “what is matter.” So in this case, matter is just matter, i.e. no question of ‘materialism’ nor immaterialism.
When I mentioned ‘materialism’ it is to argue that such a term cannot be true.

If Kant had some predicates about matter, that would be an ontological stance. Is it a property of objects or not? If not, where else does it come from?

Kant's basis of 'matter' is based on real empirical experiences, sensation and the likes.
When I experienced seeing an apple and eating it for survival or pleasure, there is no need to bother where is the ULTIMATE source it came from -other than I had planted the tree or bought the apple from the market.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am Note "substance" ontology not just ontology [being] in general.

1.1 and 1.2 refers to substance ontology. Kant argued against substance ontology, as such Kant cannot be identified within 1.1 or 1.2 at all.
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 also refer to substance ontology, therefore has no relevance for Kant [mine as well].

So, are you saying that you and Kant do not accept "substance ontology", but that there's another class of ontology you do adhere to? What is it?

Since Kant's approach is based on the Copernican Approach, the question of ontology is not critical to Kant.
Kant mocked the idea of 'ontology' in various parts of the CPR.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:13 am What is relevant for Kant [mine as well] is only 3.1 o i.e. transcendental idealism aka empirical realism.

Repeating that verse from Kantian scripture is no longer serving a purpose for you in this discussion.

Point is you cannot rely on false beliefs that you had been right re our discussion on transcendental idealism.