Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

Maybe I need to clarify - and apologies for sub-optimal expression.

I think the following is IC's version of a theistic argument for moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts.

Premise: God says X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, God says homosexuality is an abomination.)

Conclusion: Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, homosexuality is indeed an abomination.)

Now, I say this argument is both invalid and unsound - or at least not shown to be sound. It's invalid because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise - and wouldn't do for any agent - any subject term in the premise. Also, saying something is so doesn't make it so. Also, non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

And it's unsound, because, like all supernaturalist beliefs, theism is unevidenced and therefore irrational. It's all made-up claptrap.

And the cruelty and suffering caused by this claptrap is - for example, with regard to homosexuality - truly a moral abomination. Which IC endorses. Christianity is truly a disgusting religion, which is why the morally rational either abandon it or try to mitigate its wickedness.

[Immanuel Can]

I could always say I cultivate an opinion that X is morally wrong, rather than a delusion.

Don't let the word offend you: it's accurate.

No, if I think I have an opinion, and I actually do have an opinion, that is not a delusion.

THAT YOU HAVE an opinion is not a delusion. But the CONTENT of that opinion can still be, in spite of that. And subjectivism must insist it is just that.

I am talking about the type of opinion that is not "truth apt".

We don't know if it's that: who says that moral claims are not "truth apt?" You may assert your belief that they are. I think not. We can't just sail past that point as if it's settled; it's certainly not.

You're taking the analogy the wrong way. I was not using it in direct application to morality, but rather as illustrative of the fact that there are differences between an "opinion" and a "delusion." And there very clearly are differences between the two...one being its touchpoint (or lack thereof) with reality. A "delusion" is marked by a significant departure from reality. That's what morality is, according to subjectivism; nothing in reality provides grounds for holding that sort of "opinion," it insists.

Think of opinions like: I prefer Italian food to Indian, or I prefer blue to red, or I prefer toothache to country and westen music. Those are not subject to any objective truth -although the last example might appear to be.

I understand the analogy...I just can see that it's really problematic for your view.

If moral claims are just "tastes" or "preferences," they are nothing that can be extended beyond the tip of your own nose. Nobody else has reason to accept them, because there's no grounds in the common reality for your preference over anybody else's -- if subjectivism is true.

Which, I would say, it is not.

[Immanuel Can]

2 'My team's invented god says so' is a justification for a moral opinion.

It's interesting that you find it necessary to use an argument I've refused to adopt, and that you've avoided all the terms I did use. I wasn't reticent to say exactly what I mean.

It seems you're finding it necessary to misrepresent my case in order to have some way of seeming to "refute" it.

A made-up line, with a criticism that doesn't address what was said...why would you prefer that to an actual quotation, or to responding to the line of argumentation I actually DID use?

I didn't misrepresent your argument.

Yes, you did. You literally said that the reason I gave for morality was "God says so." But that's not what I said at all.

Rather, what I said was that morality is grounded in the nature, character AND expressed wishes of God. And they are in descending order of importance, I might add: the first two are determinative of the third, since God never expresses a wish that is not in accord with His own nature and character.

I don't mind you arguing with that, but failing to recognize it would indeed be misrepresentation of my position. I cannot defend, on your behalf, a position I simply did not take. You have, perhaps, been misled by the "divine commmand" school of ethics, or by something like the Euthyphro mistake; but I can't help you with either...they're just not positions I take.

[Immanuel Can]

Maybe I need to clarify - and apologies for sub-optimal expression.

I think the following is IC's version of a theistic argument for moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts.

Premise: God says X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, God says homosexuality is an abomination.)

Conclusion: Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, homosexuality is indeed an abomination.)

QED. That's a misrepresentation, on two counts.

Firstly, what I said is there were two ways to come to the same conclusion, not one: both nature and revelation speak against it. But I did not says that homosexuality was wrong ONLY because revelation speaks against it. See my previous response for a better view of it.

I trust that clears things up.

[Immanuel Can]

... that doens't mean that all opinions are truth-apt, only that there appears to be such an option.

There is no option of the Wrexham women winning the Prem. The Prem is a men's league, and the Wrexham woman aren't even elligible for it.

So if I say the Wrexham women will win the Prem, you have every right to note that I believe things that are totally illusory...I'm having delusions about what it takes, or even what it means, to win the Prem. I may not even know what the Premier League is.

We've already covered a similar situation with your insistence that you understand Frege-Geach in the face of your obvious ignorance about the actual theory.

Boring and irrelevant. Call it the F-G theory, or call it the Wimble-Wobble theory. From now on, let's call it the WW. Either way, it's the same problem, and it's very simple: any account alleged to be of "morality" that cannot generate even one syllogism of approbation or prohibition clearly knows nothing about whatever morality is.

That problem stays, obviously, regardless of any alterations in preferred nomenclature. It's logical and analytical. If a theory can't meet that challenge, then it has nothing to tell us about morality.

[FlashDangerpants]

There is no option of the Wrexham women winning the Prem. The Prem is a men's league, and the Wrexham woman aren't even elligible for it.

So if I say the Wrexham women will win the Prem, you have every right to note that I believe things that are totally illusory...I'm having delusions about what it takes, or even what it means, to win the Prem. I may not even know what the Premier League is.

We've already covered a similar situation with your insistence that you understand Frege-Geach in the face of your obvious ignorance about the actual theory.

Boring and irrelevant. Call it the F-G theory, or call it the Wimble-Wobble theory. From now on, let's call it the WW. Either way, it's the same problem, and it's very simple: any account alleged to be of "morality" that cannot generate even one syllogism of approbation or prohibition clearly knows nothing about whatever morality is.

That problem stays, obviously, regardless of any alterations in preferred nomenclature. It's logical and analytical. If a theory can't meet that challenge, then it has nothing to tell us about morality.

lol

[FlashDangerpants]

It's interesting that you find it necessary to use an argument I've refused to adopt, and that you've avoided all the terms I did use. I wasn't reticent to say exactly what I mean.

It seems you're finding it necessary to misrepresent my case in order to have some way of seeming to "refute" it.

A made-up line, with a criticism that doesn't address what was said...why would you prefer that to an actual quotation, or to responding to the line of argumentation I actually DID use?

I didn't misrepresent your argument.

Yes, you did. You literally said that the reason I gave for morality was "God says so." But that's not what I said at all.

Rather, what I said was that morality is grounded in the nature, character AND expressed wishes of God. And they are in descending order of importance, I might add: the first two are determinative of the third, since God never expresses a wish that is not in accord with His own nature and character.

I don't mind you arguing with that, but failing to recognize it would indeed be misrepresentation of my position. I cannot defend, on your behalf, a position I simply did not take. You have, perhaps, been misled by the "divine commmand" school of ethics, or by something like the Euthyphro mistake; but I can't help you with either...they're just not positions I take.

Don't mind me, I'm just quoting this for easy searchable reference next time we need a conversation about honestly representing the point against which you are arguing. Where it now turns out we will be in total agreement. Hurrah.

[Peter Holmes]

Maybe I need to clarify - and apologies for sub-optimal expression.

I think the following is IC's version of a theistic argument for moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts.

Premise: God says X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, God says homosexuality is an abomination.)

Conclusion: Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally right and Y is morally wrong. (For example, homosexuality is indeed an abomination.)

QED. That's a misrepresentation, on two counts.

Firstly, what I said is there were two ways to come to the same conclusion, not one: both nature and revelation speak against it. But I did not says that homosexuality was wrong ONLY because revelation speaks against it. See my previous response for a better view of it.

I trust that clears things up.

No. The 'nature' argument is risible. Same-sex sex is commonplace in many species, and not just the higher primates. And it exists successfully alongside reproductive sex.

And you ignore the invalidity and unsoundness arguments. Waste of effort. Let's leave it there.

[Immanuel Can]

No. The 'nature' argument is risible.

That's subjective. The Bible claims there's a profound natural difference that everybody should be able to detect, and which only people who have become deranged do not know. See Romans 1: 26-31.

"For this reason God gave them [God deniers] over to degrading passions; for their women exchanged natural relations for that which is contrary to nature, and likewise the men, too, abandoned natural relations with women and burned in their desire toward one another, males with males committing shameful acts and receiving in their own persons the due penalty of their error. And just as they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a depraved mind, to do those things that are not proper, people having been filled with all unrighteousness, wickedness, greed, and evil; full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, and malice; they are gossips, slanderers, haters of God, insolent, arrogant, boastful, inventors of evil, disobedient to parents, without understanding, untrustworthy, unfeeling, and unmerciful; and although they know the ordinance of God, that those who practice such things are worthy of death, they not only do the same, but also approve of those who practice them." (underline mine)

Most importantly normal reproduction reflects the nature and purposes of God -- so much so that God identifies both sexes as "made in His image" in their union. But sodomy reflects quite a different set of values, and reflects quite a different "god."

And you ignore the invalidity and unsoundness arguments.

I didn't. I dealt with it. But you didn't believe me, so here:

"A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound." (Source: the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an academic, peer-reviewed source).

It is just as I said: "valid" refers to form. "Truth" refers to the content. "Soundness" refers to a syllogism having both.

[iambiguous]

...what I said was that morality is grounded in the nature, character AND expressed wishes of God. And they are in descending order of importance, I might add: the first two are determinative of the third, since God never expresses a wish that is not in accord with His own nature and character.

Okay, let's think this through...

Alice has an abortion.

Is that moral or immoral?

Well, in regard to some, those who are naturally good and those who are of good character will never choose abortion. Whereas in regard to others, those who naturally good and who embody good character may choose an abortion because abortion is not inherently immoral.

Those, say, who embrace one of the many, many conflicting moral narratives and political agerndas here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... ideologies

So, which point of view is the correct one?

Well, according to IC, if you are someone who thinks exactly as he does about abortion, that means that you are by nature good and necessarily embody good character. So, that means you will become a Christian.

But not just any Christian. After all, there are many different interpretations of Christianity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_C ... 20distinct

And of the 2.6 billion total Christians around the globe, 1.345 billion of them are Catholics.

And then to complicate things further, Christians are not the only ones who worship and adore the God of Abraham. There are also 1.6 billion Muslims and 14 million Jews.

No, Immanuel Can will roundly assure you, true Christians are only those who think about the Christian God precisely as he does.

Go ahead, ask him how he can prove this definitively beyond a mere "leap of faith" or that truly pathetic "wager".

[Harbal]

Don't let the word offend you: it's accurate.

No, if I think I have an opinion, and I actually do have an opinion, that is not a delusion.

THAT YOU HAVE an opinion is not a delusion. But the CONTENT of that opinion can still be, in spite of that. And subjectivism must insist it is just that.

I think you will find that it is only you who is insisting.

We don't know if it's that: who says that moral claims are not "truth apt?" You may assert your belief that they are. I think not. We can't just sail past that point as if it's settled; it's certainly not.

My opinion on any moral issue makes no claim of truth, it only indicates my approval or disapproval of a stuation that has moral implications. I do not disapprove of homosexuality, for example, how can that be something that is truth apt? Regardless of how determined you are not to accept that; it is settled as far as I'm concerned.

You're taking the analogy the wrong way. I was not using it in direct application to morality, but rather as illustrative of the fact that there are differences between an "opinion" and a "delusion." And there very clearly are differences between the two...one being its touchpoint (or lack thereof) with reality. A "delusion" is marked by a significant departure from reality. That's what morality is, according to subjectivism; nothing in reality provides grounds for holding that sort of "opinion," it insists.

My definition of morality is something along the lines of; a subjective opinion about an ethical issue. Any discussion I have about morality will be in reference to that definition on my side of it. You don't define morality that way, but you don't get to decide whether anyone else is allowed to or not.

I understand the analogy...I just can see that it's really problematic for your view.

If moral claims are just "tastes" or "preferences," they are nothing that can be extended beyond the tip of your own nose. Nobody else has reason to accept them, because there's no grounds in the common reality for your preference over anybody else's

Yes, that's right, and what I've been saying all along.

[Immanuel Can]

...abortion is not inherently immoral.

You can't just assume the conclusion you want...especially when it's the opposite of objectively right.

Well, according to IC, if you are someone who thinks exactly as he does about abortion, that means that you are by nature good and necessarily embody good character.

False step.

I never said and never even implied that HUMAN character has any value in indicating what morality is. You should go back and read again: it's God's nature and character.

Mankind is fallen. He is not a reliable source of information about morality. He's a flawed source, at best. So he has many different opinions about all kinds of things; but the rightness or wrongness of his moral opinions is entirely dependent on their correspondence to the objective values, which are grounded solely in God.

I hope that clears up the mistake.

[Immanuel Can]

My opinion on any moral issue makes no claim of truth, it only indicates my approval or disapproval of a stuation that has moral implications."

"Has"? "It already HAS moral implications?" If it already HAS them before you get there, then you're not a subjectivist at all. You're arriving at a situation that already has its own moral implications, objectively, and are trying to figure out what they might be.

That does seem a better description of what morality is...but it won't fit with subjectivism.

I do not disapprove of homosexuality, for example, how can that be something that is truth apt?

Two ways: first, it is true that you disapprove of homosexuality if, and only if, you disapprove of homosexuality. But that's trivial, because no person's approval or disapproval matters to the moral equation. So we come to the second way: your antipathy to homosexuality is "true" in the sense of "truly moral" if it corresponds to God's nature, character and expressed wishes.

My definition of morality is something along the lines of; a subjective opinion about an ethical issue.

I see that. But you can't legitimately distinguish it as an "ethical" issue if such are merely non-moral issues before you arrive on scene. Then, what you mean is "a subjective opinion about anything."

You don't define morality that way, but you don't get to decide whether anyone else is allowed to or not.

I don't, you're right. God does. But I am granted by Him the right also to debate that.

You have your own rights, and can choose to ignore that if you wish. But I think that would be unwise, if what I'm saying turns out to be the truth.

[Peter Holmes]

So, using IC's quoted definitions of validity and soundness.

Premise: God says X is morally right and Y is morally wrong.
Conclusion: Therefore (it's a fact that) X is morally right and Y is morally wrong.

This is invalid because, even if the premise were true, the conclusion could be false - given that a moral assertion can have a truth-value - which is the issue with regard to moral objectivity.

And the argument is unsound, because the truth-value of the factual premise is unsupported, and the moral conclusion's even being truth-apt at all is the issue.

All the rest is merely preaching. Not valid and sound argumentation.

[Harbal]

My opinion on any moral issue makes no claim of truth, it only indicates my approval or disapproval of a stuation that has moral implications."

"Has"? "It already HAS moral implications?" If it already HAS them before you get there, then you're not a subjectivist at all. You're arriving at a situation that already has its own moral implications, objectively, and are trying to figure out what they might be.

That does seem a better description of what morality is...but it won't fit with subjectivism.

That sounds like something you would need to take up with a subjectivist then.

I do not disapprove of homosexuality, for example, how can that be something that is truth apt?

Two ways: first, it is true that you disapprove of homosexuality if, and only if, you disapprove of homosexuality. But that's trivial, because no person's approval or disapproval matters to the moral equation. So we come to the second way: your antipathy to homosexuality is "true" in the sense of "truly moral" if it corresponds to God's nature, character and expressed wishes.

I don't have any antipathy towards homosexuals, and I don't believe in God.

You don't define morality that way, but you don't get to decide whether anyone else is allowed to or not.

I don't, you're right. God does. But I am granted by Him the right also to debate that.

You have your own rights, and can choose to ignore that if you wish. But I think that would be unwise, if what I'm saying turns out to be the truth.

You say that God is the absolute and final judge of moral right and wrong, and you unquestioningly accept that. So, as far as morality is concerned, you are always going to abide by whatever God has laid down. Let's take that as understood. So then when it comes to a particular moral issue, let's say rape, do you not have any personal moral opinion about it, that is your own, and not derived from God. Obviously, such an opinion would be irrelevant, and have no validity whatsoever, but would you not have a personal opinion, nonetheless?