Philosophy Now Forum

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:44 pm Okay, supply your argument. Please.

Here's the original quote:

And, of course, what he likes or dislikes is also compatible with determinism as he understands it.

Then what he wants or does not want and Schopenhauer's assessment of that.

"Man can do what he wants, but man can't want what he wants." It was Arthur Schopenhauer who wrote: “Man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily." the philosopher's shirt

On the other hand...

"Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the 'doers of our deeds') is nonetheless unshakeable." Cambridge University Press

Same thing? Is our "unshakeable sense of responsibility" but one more inherent manifestation of the psychological illusion of free will?

So, let's break this quote into 2 parts: the part BEFORE he says 'on the other hand', and the part after. That's fair, I think -- you normally say 'on the other hand' if you're about to say something that contrasts with what you said prior, so the latter stuff should be a break, in some sence, from the prior stuff.

Now, the first part of what he said is where the specific quote in question is:

Then what he wants or does not want and Schopenhauer's assessment of that.

"Man can do what he wants, but man can't want what he wants." It was Arthur Schopenhauer who wrote: “Man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily." the philosopher's shirt

It's of course clear to me, and it should be to you, that not a single word of this is about questioning the legitimacy of things said in determinism. Schopenhauer's words don't say anything at all to that effect, nor do any of biggy's. Schopenhauer himself is a compatibilist, so it's unlikely he himself "questions the legitimacy of things said in determinism" -- that's generally not what compatibilists think.

However, in the second part of biggy's quote above, he gives the only HINT (and it is just a hint, it's not explicit - it's ambiguous, remember) that he might be talking about his age-old bullshittery about "questioning the legitimacy of things said in determinism", and that is when he says this: "one more inherent manifestation of the psychological illusion of free will?"

Note that that quote, the only HINT towards your intepretation, only comes into his post AFTER he says 'on the other hand' - it is separated, in complete contrast, from the part of the quote in question, the first half, where he rambles on about 'then this, then that'.

If he meant for the first half to be questioning the legitimacy of things said in determinism, why would his only HINT that that's what he's talking about be said AFTER saying 'on the other hand'?

That's not clear communication. That's... ambiguous.

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:30 pm Iambiguous adapts all statements to his own ideas.

Whenever he sees the words "moral responsibility", he jumps to his own definition of it.

And often without writing his definition. Someone else might actually interact with Sam Harris' argument. Then he would likely encounter how Harris is justifying it and defining it. Then that person-other-than-Iambigious could say that he finds Harris' definition false or idiosyncratic and give his basis for that. This other person would just jump to conclusions: Harris is really a free will determinist. Harris thinks brains are exceptions from determinism. And he doesn't justify these jumps, even just going on his own definitions. He just plops it out as self-evident.

So when Harris writes "moral responsibility", then that has to mean Harris believes in autonomy(the Iambiguous version) and free-will(the Iambiguous version). Harris is therefore a "free-will determinist".

Right, exactly and this is where I think Flannel Jesus is right about ambiguity. We certainly know he is unconvinced by Sam Harris. That is clear. We know he thinks that Sam Harris, really, underneath, is a closet free willist of some kind. But what is ambiguous is all the defnitions.

And he's shameless in not giving a poop about how Sam Harris reached his conclusion. While at the same time expressing interest in what Sam Harris means. Any 7 year old without abusive parents knows how one can get a better sense of what Sam Harris means....read Sam Harris. See what he means by those terms. See what his argument is.

Instead he throws his impression of Sam Harris into the air, hoping other people will defend his hallucinated Sam Harris and take on the burden of justifying something. So, he can go on not being convinced while others toil.

And Harris needs to explain how human brains got autonomy. Etc.

Well, you know the routine.

'Routine' is a perfect word for it. As in 'comedy routine.'

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:56 pm

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:53 pm Here is a weird part of these discussions:

You live in a free-will world and you want a car. That's okay.

You live in a determined world and you want a car. There's something suspicious and illegitimate about that.

Where's that discussion?

That's the impression I get when Iambiguous talks about "wants". And some other free-willers as well, but they are less direct.

And it extends to "choice" as well.

In a free-will world, I choose to buy a car. Okay.

In a determined world, I choose to buy a car. Whoa ... Something not right there ... Your brain compelled that. No choice was really made.

(Buy a car. Get an abortion. )

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 2:15 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:56 pm

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 1:53 pm Here is a weird part of these discussions:

You live in a free-will world and you want a car. That's okay.

You live in a determined world and you want a car. There's something suspicious and illegitimate about that.

Where's that discussion?

That's the impression I get when Iambiguous talks about "wants". And some other free-willers as well, but they are less direct.

And it extends to "choice" as well.

In a free-will world, I choose to buy a car. Okay.

In a determined world, I choose to buy a car. Whoa ... Something not right there ... Your brain compelled that. No choice was really made.

(Buy a car. Get an abortion. )

OK, I think I know what you mean.

When I read this post and got to Your brain compelled that. I just shook my head and laughed. Iambiguous and his brain compelling him. Who is this him?

I get it. That issue doesn't solve the whole determinism thing. I can understand the idea might still be offputting. But he could actually say...Yeah, I see what you mean. I am my brain(and body). It doesn't compel me, and then go on and still argue that 'choice' is not the right word or has meanings that don't fit. He wouldn't have to give up his project, but he acts like it, since he can't manage to admit things.

My point being he could actually admit that it's a poor way of wording it, to the degree that it is false, AND STILL have his general position.

But he simply can't admit that or look at it. It's like his whole world and argument would come crashing down if he said to you or FJ - OK; you're right about that.

And then you could have REAL discussion of your disagreement, likely focusing on the word 'choice' or something similar.

But instead of letting himself do that, he just goes on using that ridiculous formulation.

And further, I think it allows an expression of victimhood, it allows him to frame the issue with him as a victim. He is even compelled by his brain.

The ghost in the machine.

And often without writing his definition. Someone else might actually interact with Sam Harris' argument. Then he would likely encounter how Harris is justifying it and defining it. Then that person-other-than-Iambigious could say that he finds Harris' definition false or idiosyncratic and give his basis for that. This other person would just jump to conclusions: Harris is really a free will determinist. Harris thinks brains are exceptions from determinism. And he doesn't justify these jumps, even just going on his own definitions. He just plops it out as self-evident.

It comes down to this:

Iambiguous wrote :
It's not what you claim to know about Harris or what he says he believes about free will. It's about whether or not either one of you were ever able to claim or to believe something else instead.

Iambiguous doesn't actually care what Harris is writing, what Harris believes about determinism and responsibility. He only cares about how Harris came to believe it.

Which is why Iambiguous blows off the definitions, the reasoning and the arguments.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Tue Nov 07, 2023 7:38 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Tue Nov 07, 2023 5:42 amI mean, unless you perversely decide, for no reason at all, to go against your nature, and do things you don't want to do and nothing in you would lead you to do, again for no reason at all.

I'm havin' déjà vu.

If my nature is to self-direct, why would I choose to be directed by others? I could. I could grit my teeth and take orders. I'd have to have some damned good incentive to do that (I don't do larks).

I didn't mention others. It's just if you do what you want, well you wanted to do it before you did it. It was determined by your wants (and knowledge you had (hopefully) and values you have and so on. If your action isn't caused by those things then free will only seems to offer some perverse going against your own values/desires which are informed by your knowledge etc.

Others aren't in my image there.

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 3:05 amIf cutting a path in the jungle is an example of libertarian free-will

I didn't say cutting a path in the jungle is an example of free will..

This is what I said...

henry quirk wrote: ↑Mon Nov 06, 2023 2:37 pm

phyllo wrote: ↑Mon Nov 06, 2023 2:09 pm

You are in a jungle with a machete. You look around. You decide where the best place is to cut. The decision is based on the environment, your ability, your goals, your tools. The path is created by your cutting. It wasn't there before you cut it. When you look back, you say "Yeah, that path was determined. I would not cut anything differently. I thought that it was the best cut to make at that time and place. "

See, that to me, sounds like libertarian free will, not compatibilism or necessitarianism. I decide where to cut, I imagine, I assess, I prepare, I do, I determine, I cause. Not my history or the bump & grind of particles in motion, or my genes, or my brain chemicals, or...

do ants, jaguars, boars also have libertarian free-will when they make a path in the jungle? How about beavers building dams. Or birds building nests? Or termites?

Not as I see it, no. Insofar as I'm aware none of those are anything but bio-automations.

I didn't say cutting a path in the jungle is an example of free will..

Whatever.

My patience is limited.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 7:38 amYou're still just alluding to things instead of saying them.

We'll have to agree to disagree.

you aren't saying why.

I did say why. If you disagree *shrug* I can't help you.

yet the scenario you're here agreeing with is perfectly "necessitarian"

If you're a necessitarian: that's how you read it.

I'm not: I read it differently.

the agent in question was necessarily always going to do the exact thing he did in the exact way he did it

If you're a necessitarian: that's how you read it.

I'm not: I read it differently.

Rewind time, rewind the agent and environment to their previous states, and he will necessarily do it the same way every time - that's "necessitarianism", that's what you're agreeing with.

If you're a necessitarian: that's how you read it.

I'm not: I read it differently.

Now, I've addressed this matter of interpretation several times. I'm done with it.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 2:59 pmI didn't mention others.

You commented about going me against my nature.

I pointed out, as my nature is to self-direct, to go against my nature would be to choose to be directed by others.

meh...no point in beatin' a dead horse

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 3:37 pm I pointed out, as my nature is to self-direct, to go against my nature would be to choose to be directed by others.

That's fine. I've never quite understood what the free will people are on about - and by the way I categorize myself as agnostic on the issue. I want to do what I want to do. This is informed by many things and contrained by facets of reality. But I make my choices out of my desires, values and so on. I think those things cause what I choose to do. I understand that you don't see that as leading to determinism, but let's set that aside for a moment, so you understand my previous point about what I call the perverse option of free will.

Many people in the world, when they talk about free will, are talking about freedom from external control. I damn well will pull out my Smith & Wesson if the government comes here and tells me I have to.....(and of course the same attitude can be held by people who would use other means to resist and to keep doing what they value/want. But when they talk about free will they are not necessarily taking a position on there being many possible futures. You could call it a political freedom/attitudinal valuing of being free and getting to do what one wants (unless it takes freedoms from others or harms others, such clauses often involved).

But then you have ontological free will. The future is not determined. I might decide to become a plumber tomorrow. I might decide to do something else. There are many possible futures. My choices (and the choices of others) lead to one of these but they COULD have led to others. I am free. I am free from both external control and inevitable causes inside myself.

OK, so many futures are possible. And what we mean here is not we can't tell what the future will be because it complicated. It means that at an ontological level any number of things might happen because I am free to choose, causes in me and external to me do not inevitably lead to one timeline, the one timeline this universe is going to have.

Here's the issue I am raising. You have some guy: Henry. He loves plumbing. It's good money and it fits how much time we wants to put in in school etc. That's what he wants.

The determinist would say that his wants (and evaluations, etc.) lead inevitably to his choice. It's still determinism, but we're not just talking about external factors. Internal ones are also causes. That's the determinist.

The ontological free will person says No!!!!! He could choose to not be a plumber. It's not just that we don't know what he will choose, its that he could make different choices. OK, fine.

But why wouldn't he choose what he wants. And let's not take this as me being naive. Of course, if he has no arm or he doesn't have the money to go to tradeschool and his wife just gave birth and so on might change the range of choices he considers, even if he has that strong desire. But those all entail wants and evaluations of what is possible. He wants to support his wife and kid now. He wants to train himself in a job but he wants to train himself for a job he can do (one that doesn't need arms or whatever.).

So, to me free will offers the perverse choice of going against one's own desires and values. Ontological free will.

If ontological free will is the case, then tomorror Henry could choose to do what he wants, go to plumbing training. Or he's free to not be caused by his own desires/wants/goals, that are all present and causes in his choice. Not, he's free, they do not cause him to do it. They just, I don't know act as information. But then when he decides what to do why would he go against his desires values and evaluation of the situation.

It seems to me those things always lead to the choice he was always going to make OR!!!!!!!!

free will offers him the option to choose some runner up choice.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Nov 08, 2023 3:39 pm meh...no point in beatin' a dead horse

Oh, I didn't see this. Well, above I tried a different approach, a little overview like. I would guess you're right we're joined in beating a dead horse. Give it a read. I think at least you'll understand better what I have been getting at. I have no illusions that my blabbing will change other people's positions and it wasn't my goal. But I gave it a good old try to see if I could make what I've been getting at clear. And heck, it's not like I want you to stop believing in free will, however you think of it.

I'm actually less "necessitarian" than Henry thinks - my view of that scenario is informed more by compatibilism than by ideas about strong determinism. But he's done so I won't quote him to drag him back in.

As a compatibilist, determinism doesn't actually make much of a big difference to me. The alternative to determinism is that there is some amount of randomness in the world - randomness doesn't do anything, as far as I can tell, towards creating any sort of "freedom", not the sort that free willists believe in.

Iwannaplato wrote:Phyllo made it clear that what happened was always going to happen. That does not fit with Libertarian free will.

What phyllo posted:

phyllo wrote:You are in a jungle with a machete. You look around. You decide where the best place is to cut. The decision is based on the environment, your ability, your goals, your tools. The path is created by your cutting. It wasn't there before you cut it. When you look back, you say "Yeah, that path was determined. I would not cut anything differently. I thought that it was the best cut to make at that time and place."

Then -- click -- henry reacted to that. It sounded [to him] like something you'd hear from a free will advocate.

And I concurred.

henry quirk wrote:See, that to me, sounds like libertarian free will...

Sounds like it to me too.

But in the either/or world, cutting a path through a jungle revolves around coming up with the most rational manner in which to do so. The reason the path was created is left out.

That's why I introduced a moral element: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSw5l5jMnPM