compatibilism

[iambiguous]

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

Overall, the problem of causal determinism highlights the tension between our intuitions about free will and the scientific understanding of the world. While the issue remains unresolved, it continues to be an important area of philosophical inquiry, with implications for our understanding of human agency, responsibility, and moral accountability.

Intuition. Isn't this by far the most intriguing and mysterious reaction that we have to "I" in the world around us? It's not quite entirely rational, not quite entirely emotional, not quite entirely instinctive. It's that deep down inside "I just know" punch in the gut that we end up falling back on time and again.

In other words, no matter how much my brain tells me it is quite reasonable to conclude that the human brain is just more matter and that all matter inherently obeys the laws of matter, there's just no way in hell I can actually believe that I am typing these words right now without "somehow" having acquired at least some measure of autonomy.

Now, back up into the intellectual clouds...

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism

Reasons-responsive compatibilism is a form of compatibilism that attempts to reconcile the apparent conflict between determinism and free will. According to reasons-responsive compatibilists, free will is compatible with determinism if our actions are responsive to reasons in the right way.

What actions? Given what particular set of circumstances? If you are a proponent of reasons-responsive compatibilism please note how that all unfolds in your head so as to bring about one set of behaviors rather than another. And "the right way" in regard to what? In other words, someone taps you on the shoulder and insists that what you did is, instead, an example of "the wrong way" of doing things.

The basic idea behind reasons-responsive compatibilism is that our actions can be both determined and free if they are the result of our deliberation and are responsive to reasons in a way that reflects our values and desires. This means that our actions are not determined by external factors, but rather reflect our internal motivations and beliefs.

Of course: that truly mysterious part of our brain revolving around "values and desires" and "motivations and beliefs" that are "somehow" all our own. We "just know" intuitively that this is the case.

[attofishpi]

Regarding Determinism and Free Will..

Believe it or not, I am interested in what your answers to the below questions on this thought experiment would be?

Boony's Room.
Two identical copies of cricketer David Boon were made unbeknownst to him. The two copies of Boony, instantly appear facing each other from opposite corners of a white room that is 3 metres cubed, identical in all directions.

There are no causal effects differing in each of the Boony's slightly differing positions in spacetime. Nothing in this thought experiment regarding each version of David Boon once instantiated within the room is different in any way.

What happens next?
Do they both, at the same time, ask the exact same question of each other?
Do they end up arguing because they both keep attempting to interject at precisely the same time with precisely the same dialogue?

After five minutes, the pair hear a voice asking them to draw a picture of their favourite fruit on the wall and are told there is a pencil in their left pocket.

Do they both turn and draw on the same symmetrically opposite part of the wall?
Do they both draw identical images of the fruit?

[iambiguous]

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) is a philosophical concept that states that a person is morally responsible for their actions only if they could have acted differently in the circumstances. In other words, if a person has no alternative options available to them, then they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

PAP is often used in discussions about free will and moral responsibility. It suggests that for someone to be morally responsible for an action, they must have had the ability to choose a different course of action. If a person was forced to act in a particular way or had no other options available, then they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

How about PAP not as a principle or as a concept but entirely in sync with an actual set of circumstances?

In other words, there are different ways in which to construe it "for all practical purposes". On the one hand, someone puts a gun to your head, and tells you to do something that you believe to be immoral...or else. Or else you die.

On the other hand, no one puts a gun to head but your brain, wholly in sync with the laws of matter, compels you to do the same thing. But your brain in turn compelled you to believe it was immoral.

Critics of PAP argue that it is not always necessary for there to be alternative possibilities for a person to be morally responsible for their actions. For example, if someone is suffering from a mental illness and does something harmful to themselves or others, they may not have had the ability to choose differently due to their illness. However, they may still be held morally responsible for their actions because they had a duty to seek help or treatment for their illness.

Here, however, there are countless possible circumstantial permutations. Who is to say precisely when someone should have sought out treatment? Someone may be afflicted with a condition such that this was not even realistically possible. And even here the assumption is already made that we do have free will. Thus, enabling us to opt for treatment.

In other words, there may be no distinction at all between mental afflictions and determinism.

Overall, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities remains a topic of debate and discussion among philosophers, particularly regarding its implications for free will and moral responsibility.

Or, all told, this debate and discussion itself is unfolding in the only possible reality.

[iambiguous]

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

Frankfurt Cases

Frankfurt cases are a philosophical thought experiment introduced by philosopher Harry Frankfurt to explore the concept of free will and moral responsibility. The thought experiment involves a scenario where a person's actions are predetermined and yet they are still held responsible for those actions.

Yes, a thought experiment. That way you only need a bunch of words telling you what another bunch of words mean. Unless, perhaps, there is a way empirically, experientially, experimentally, etc., to actually demonstrate out in the world that we live and interact with others in why we can be both determined to do something but still responsible for doing it.

Frankfurt cases are often used to challenge the idea that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities, as suggested by the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). According to Frankfurt, the fact that the person was unable to choose the other action does not diminish their moral responsibility for the action they did take. He argues that moral responsibility is determined by factors such as intentions, character, and the ability to understand the consequences of one's actions, rather than by the availability of alternative options.

Again, this is no less preposterous to me. All I can ever hope for then is that someday someone will actually be able to reconfigure the words above into an assessment that is actually not preposterous to me.

If Mary is unable not to abort Jane, perhaps that is because she was never actually able to possess the intentions, character, and ability to give birth. Again as though "somehow" when it comes these "internal" mental states, the human brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter is just...different?

Instead, the Harry Frankfurts of the world juxtapose that with "external" determinants. Mike puts a gun to Mary's head and says "abort that baby or die".

But to some determinists, Mike himself never had the intention, the character or the ability not to do that himself either.

[Flannel Jesus]

All I can ever hope for then is that someday someone will actually be able to reconfigure the words above into an assessment that is actually not preposterous to me.

Why do you hope that? You've clearly decided that compatibilism is nonsense. Why do you still scour the internet articles about it? You show more of an interest in compatibilism than most compatibilists do - why is that? Why not just reject it and move on, like most other people on this forum who have rejected compatibilism?

I'm not saying you SHOULD move on, I'm just wondering why you don't, why you read more and more and post these silly posts to yourself

[iambiguous]

All I can ever hope for then is that someday someone will actually be able to reconfigure the words above into an assessment that is actually not preposterous to me.

Why do you hope that? You've clearly decided that compatibilism is nonsense. Why do you still scour the internet articles about it? You show more of an interest in compatibilism than most compatibilists do - why is that? Why not just reject it and move on, like most other people on this forum who have rejected compatibilism?

I'm not saying you SHOULD move on, I'm just wondering why you don't, why you read more and more and post these silly posts to yourself

Thanks, but no thanks. I'm just not interested in making this all about me. I'm interested in others making an attempt to explain why compatibilism -- Mary could not not abort Jane but is still morally responsible for doing so -- seems reasonable to them.

The new bottom line [mine] is that a virtual friend of mine from the now defunct Ponderer's Guild emailed me about a forum she had found. It's one that attempts to meld philosophy and science. There are very few of what I construe to be "fiercely fanatic objectivists" and "pinheads" there.

I've just decided to post more there. So, I will no longer exchange posts with those here like henry quirk, IC and AJ...those that, while in some cases I do respect their intelligence, I believe we are wasting each other's time. I'm off the polemicist path.

There are those here that strike me as committed to objectivism all the way to the grave. In my view, it's not what they believe that matters nearly as much as that they must believe in something -- God or No God -- to keep a "fractured and fragmented" frame of mind at bay. I'm only interested now in exchanging points of view with those I believe might engender the possibility of a real communication between us.

[Flannel Jesus]

But people have tried to explain why they think compatibilism is reasonable to you before, and instead of listening to them and trying to understand, you just interrupted them and went on your own little tirade. That doesn't seem like the actions of someone who wants to understand why compatibilists think it's reasonable

And how do your dismissive literature reviews further your goal of getting someone to explain it to you? That seems like a remarkably inefficient way of achieving your stated goal.

[Iwannaplato]

But people have tried to explain why they think compatibilism is reasonable to you before, and instead of listening to them and trying to understand, you just interrupted them and went on your own little tirade. That doesn't seem like the actions of someone who wants to understand why compatibilists think it's reasonable

And how do your dismissive literature reviews further your goal of getting someone to explain it to you? That seems like a remarkably inefficient way of achieving your stated goal.

This raises issues related to compatiblism. Is one free if one does not know one's own motives, but at the same time, you are not constricted (by external forces) from achieving either your conscious, official goal nor your unstated goal that you are not aware of or unwilling to state.

I made that a bit more complex than necessary. So, let's take a person who says they want to meet a nice woman and eventually get married. But every time they meet a women they start pointing out their faults and engage in other dismissive behavior, before they can really find out if this is a nice woman. They reject and/or get rejected by all women they meet.

One might start to at least consider that such a person doesn't really want to, yeah, get close to a nice woman and eventually get married. that they are afraid of intimacy or perhaps gay but can't face it or.....in any case have some goal or motivation they are not aware of or they are not honest.

Let's take the first scenarion where they are unaware of what they really want: Are they free in the compatibilist sense if they are not aware of their real motivations and goals?

[Flannel Jesus]

Let's take the first scenarion where they are unaware of what they really want: Are they free in the compatibilist sense if they are not aware of their real motivations and goals?

I think compatibilism doesn't necessarily have a different answer to this type of freedom than libertarian free will. I don't necessarily think there's only one standard answer to the question from compatibilism or the libertarian point of view. Both approaches to free will have many, many flavours within them.

So, no single canonical answer from libertarians or compatibilists I think.

[Iwannaplato]

Let's take the first scenarion where they are unaware of what they really want: Are they free in the compatibilist sense if they are not aware of their real motivations and goals?

I think compatibilism doesn't necessarily have a different answer to this type of freedom than libertarian free will. I don't necessarily think there's only one standard answer to the question from compatibilism or the libertarian point of view. Both approaches to free will have many, many flavours within them.

So, no single canonical answer from libertarians or compatibilists I think.

Fair enough.
I suppose another way to look at the issue I raised is: can one remove one's own freedom. IOW I don't think the situation I presented is binary. YOu know what you really want OR you don't know what you really want. I think you have to avoid the glimpses you get about what is really going on in/for you.

I suppose this means that I weigh in on the person being responsible (to some degree) for not learning more about themselves.

So, in some sense I don't think you can (fully at least) remove your own freedom, in the compatiblist sense.

This is more psychology, perhaps, rather than ontology.

But it's a situation I encounter all the time.

Today I dealth with two people who create obstacles for themselves in learning. It's amazing to watch, but also irritating alternatinve with sad.

[iambiguous]

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

Libertarianism and compatibilism

Libertarianism and compatibilism are two philosophical positions that offer different perspectives on the question of free will and determinism.

Okay, but don't they both argue that we are morally responsible for what we do? The Libertarians by flat out rejecting a wholly determined universe. And, for many, God too. Instead, one by one, they take one or another leap of faith to a "human condition" that "somehow" resulted in autonomy given the evolution of biological life on planet Earth.

Libertarianism is the position that free will exists and that our actions are not predetermined by prior causes. According to libertarianism, we can act freely and make choices that are not determined by any external factors. This view is often associated with the belief in the existence of a non-physical soul or mind that is not subject to the laws of causality.

Again, in my view, there is not a Libertarian around who can actually go beyond defining and deducing human autonomy into existence. Or none that I am aware of. And, since many Libertarians are in fact also atheists, this autonomy [to them] is just "somehow" an inherent component of the evolution of life itself on planet Earth. Then that crucial speculation about the possibility of teleology in a No God universe.

Then this particular assumption again...

Compatibilism, on the other hand, argues that free will and determinism can coexist. According to compatibilists, even if our actions are determined by prior causes, we can still act freely and take responsibility for our actions. This position is often based on the idea that free will is not the ability to act in a way that is completely independent of prior causes, but rather the ability to act on our desires and motivations.

After all, what else is there? If our desires and motivations are in turn wholly compelled by brains wholly in sync with the laws of matter, what difference does it make what you actually desire and are motivated by?

[phyllo]

All animals, birds, fish, insects have autonomy. No assumption. Observe that they act on their own.

There is nothing special about human autonomy.

Humans just have bigger brains than most animals so they can think up a larger range of possible actions.

[Iwannaplato]

All animals, birds, fish, insects have autonomy. No assumption. Observe that they act on their own.

There is nothing special about human autonomy.

Humans just have bigger brains than most animals so they can think up a larger range of possible actions.

Which also leaves them vulnerable to outside influences in ways other animals are not. Try to guilt trip a wolf into being a vegetarian.

[phyllo]

Which also leaves them vulnerable to outside influences in ways other animals are not. Try to guilt trip a wolf into being a vegetarian.

Yes

[iambiguous]

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

In terms of their implications for ethics and moral responsibility, libertarianism and compatibilism offer different perspectives. Libertarianism places a strong emphasis on individual responsibility and the idea that we are responsible for our actions because we freely choose them. Compatibilism, on the other hand, places a greater emphasis on the idea that we are responsible for our actions because they are in line with our desires and motivations, even if those desires and motivations are themselves determined by prior causes.

On the other "other hand", however, compatibilism still makes absolutely no sense to me. Well, other than because my brain, wholly in sync with the laws of matter, compels me to be flummoxed when contemplating it only as [up until now] I only ever could have been.

Now, the libertarians may well be right here. But they are no less just like all the rest of us in being unable to explain "scientifically" or "philosophically" [other than up in the intellectual clouds] how, when, biologically, life began to evolve here on planet Earth, it "somehow" evolved into autonomous human beings. It just...happened.

And most libertarians that I have met simply shrug off the points I raise regarding the role that dasein plays in predisposing mere mortals in a No God world to embrace particular sets of political prejudices. Biases rooted existentially in particular historical, cultural and personal interactions.

Overall, while libertarianism and compatibilism offer different perspectives on free will and determinism, they both provide frameworks for thinking about the relationship between our actions and our moral responsibility. The specific approach that is taken will depend on a range of factors, including one's philosophical beliefs, the nature of the ethical dilemma, and the cultural context.

Yes, this and the arguments that I note in the OPs here:

https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

Finally, back to this...

"Compatibilism, on the other hand, places a greater emphasis on the idea that we are responsible for our actions because they are in line with our desires and motivations, even if those desires and motivations are themselves determined by prior causes."

Those "internal" -- intuitive -- factors that come into play for human beings that "deep down inside" convince them [including me] that they have free will. Even though these desires and motivations are themselves determined by prior causes?