compatibilism

[Iwannaplato]

I believe it is this very phrasing which he is getting tripped up on. He hears "not constrained by external factors", and precisely here is where he makes the leap to "So determinism applies externally, so determinism doesn't apply internally inside human brains". This phrasing, and phrasing like it, is the very source of his confusion.

Right, and by this I mean, some people certainly react this way. I claim no expertise about Imbiguous's stance on C. But we could discuss this. In a sense to me this sounds more like traditional freedom, even political freedom. You are not a slave. You can buy coke or pepsi (just to give the capitalist sense of freedom). Your wants are still determined by you can, to whatever degree get what you want or choose to do something you want. Or to not answer your phone. Yes, this choice was determined by your temperment, mood, reaction to your headache, fear of a stalker. But you wanted to not answer and you didn't answer.

[iambiguous]

On the other hand, if, say, you believe in God and God installed free will in your soul the very moment you were conceived, then you'd have the capacity to freely listen to your friend's argument and decide that no, now you don't want to abort the baby/clump of cells in your womb.

Unless, perhaps, this God of yours is omniscient? Then you'd have to figure how to reconcile free will with an all-knowing God. Call it a miracle?

God can be left out of it for the time being.

On the contrary, for someone -- anyone -- who does believe in God, either his or her God did impart free will in them at the point of conception or He did not. As with morality, the existence of God changes everything.

And maybe, just maybe one day, in regard to both, you will be willing to encompass your own convictions here.

Given particular contexts, of course.

That's because given the manner in which I understand determinism, if Mary is talked out of it in a wholly determined universe where the human brain is itself, like all other matter, in thrall to the laws of matter, her friend was no less compelled to talk her out of it. The unborn baby joins the rest of us out of the womb. But in a free will world where the friend was able of her own volition to think up the argument, and the argument failed to convince Mary, the baby is aborted.

Okay, so you now agree that Mary could have an abortion in a free-will world and Mary could avoid an abortion in a determined world.
That's progress.

Again, you have your distinction here and I have been. I'd just love to be around when you explain to Jane that had her mother been compelled to abort her, well, what's the difference?

Also, I am willing to admit that your own distinction here may well be more reasonable than mine...going back to how the human condition itself fits into the definitive explanation for why anything exists at all. Are you willing to say the same regarding my own distinction.

Flannel Jesus and iwannaplato: same question.

No, I think that whatever is said to Mary, if it is said to her because there was no possibility of it not being said to her then that is in sync with a world where there was never the possibility of her not having the abortion.

What??
So you don't agree with the above??

No, again, I make a different distinction between Jane in a world where her mother's brain compels her to abort her and Jane in a world where her mother's friend, of her own volition, was successful in convincing Mary to, of her own volition, not abort Jane.

Again, under determinism as some understand it, she does what she wants but she could not want what she wanted. Her brain was wholly in command there.

You repeat this again.

Yeah, and that's because "here and now" -- click -- it still makes sense to me.

You repeat it as if someone is disagreeing with it. As if it's something remarkable.

Again, let's discuss this with Jane. Her mother wanted to abort her in a world where her mother was never able not to want to abort her. But here she is. Why? Because in a free will world her mother of her own volition was convinced to give birth to her.

Note to others:

Again, all I can say is that his argument here is to me nothing short of preposterous. But maybe not. So, in your own words, in regard to Mary and Jane, try to explain his point in another way.

In a free will world as I understand it, Mary can of her own volition come into a forum like this and explore all of the different -- and ofttimes conflicting -- assessments of human autonomy. Like me, she might end up changing her mind about it. In a determined world as I understand it, however, from the cradle to the grave everything that we think, feel say or do in regard to this "going-back-to-the-pre-Socratics" philosophical quandary unfolds in the only possible reality.

That's not a dichotomy.

In a determined world, Mary might come into a forum and read something that makes her change her mind.

In a free-will world, once something happens it becomes the "only possible reality". There are no do-overs.

Back to the "stuck" part again. In a determined world as i understand it [perhaps incorrectly], there is no "might" here. Mary is either wholly determined to come here or she is wholly determined not to come here. Whereas in a free will world as I understand it [perhaps incorrectly], Mary might opt to come here having opted up until that point to abort Jane. But then she comes upon an argument from another member who opted of her own free will to come here that convinces Mary not to abort Jane. Jane comes of age and discovers philosophy. She thinks, "hmm, only in a free will world am I even around at all!"

Unless, of course, I'm wrong. So, going back to the manner in which ontologically -- and teleologically? -- the human condition does fit into a definitive understanding of the existence of existence itself, how do we go about pinning that down? How about you, Mr. Objectivist? How about you, Mr. Serious Philosopher?

From my frame of mind there is an enormous difference between having and not having free will. Between wanting the things we do because we opted to want them and our brains compelling us to want only what we are ever able to want.

So how does someone with free-will "opt to want" something if they have the same experiences as someone who has no libertarian free-will?

My point is that in a wholly determined universe where human brains compel human beings -- all of them -- to think, feel, say and do only that which they were ever able to think, feel, say and do, their experiences will become just so many dominoes in thrall to the laws of matter. Whereas in a free will universe those personal experiences are, instead, rooted existentially in ever evolving historical and cultural and experiential contexts in a world awash in contingency, chance and change. And factoring in the profoundly problematic implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome.

Surely to opt for something different than the non-free person, they would have to have some extra knowledge or experience. They would need another reason for picking a different want. Otherwise they would have the same wants.

The wholly determined individuals may appear to be opting to those aliens hovering above Earth in the free will sector of the universe, but they know that what they "opt" for they were never able not to opt for. All of their knowledge and experiences are but inherent, necessary components of the only possible reality.

The autonomous individuals....? Well, their options are the real deal. I merely make a distinction between opting in the either/or world and opting in the is/ought world. The role that dasein plays here.

What you're saying is that a non-free person has experiences A,B and C. As a result, his brain makes him want X.

And a free-will person has experiences A,B and C. But he wants Z.

Why would that happen?

(These people are identical except one has free-will and the other doesn't, for the sake of argument.)

Why?!

Yo, Jane! You explain it to him!!

[iambiguous]

It should be pretty obvious that he doesn't want to discuss it.

Huh?

Hell, you and I are discussing it here, aren't we?

No, what I don't want to discuss is all of this up in the intellectual contraption clouds. A discussion that revolves around defining compatibilism in a technically correct manner. Then exchanging deductions about it given the technically correct definition.

Instead, I am willing to concede that I don't grasp compatibilism as the APA, Wikipedia and Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy folks do.

As Flannel Jesus and iwannaplato do.

I'm asking them instead to "for all practical purposes" intertwine their much more philosophically sophisticated understanding of compatibilism into this...

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

[Flannel Jesus]

Also, I am willing to admit that your own distinction here may well be more reasonable than mine...going back to how the human condition itself fits into the definitive explanation for why anything exists at all. Are you willing to say the same regarding my own distinction.

Flannel Jesus and iwannaplato: same question.

I don't understand the question. What specifically may be right?

[iambiguous]

Okay, so you now agree that Mary could have an abortion in a free-will world and Mary could avoid an abortion in a determined world.
That's progress.

Again, you have your distinction here and I have been. I'd just love to be around when you explain to Jane that had her mother been compelled to abort her, well, what's the difference?

Also, I am willing to admit that your own distinction here may well be more reasonable than mine...going back to how the human condition itself fits into the definitive explanation for why anything exists at all. Are you willing to say the same regarding my own distinction.

Flannel Jesus and iwannaplato: same question.

I don't understand the question. What specifically may be right?

Back to Jane. Given a free will world, her mother, of her own volition, opts not to abort her after her friend, of her own volition, provides her with a convincing argument to give birth.

Whereas in a wholly determined world, where Mary not only wanted to abort Jane but was never able not to want to abort her, Jane is a goner.

The question I'd have for the compatibilist, a compatibilist as understood in a philosophically and technically correct manner, is this, "for Jane, what's the difference?"

[phyllo]

Huh?

Hell, you and I are discussing it here, aren't we?

You don't want to discuss the bifurcated brain with FJ.

As for what you're doing with me ...

It's the usual. You're just repeating your ideas about determinism, compatibilism and free-will. Free-will Mary has some sort of magic "volition" which lets her do things which determined Mary can't do. You don't explain it in any rational way.

I give you opportunities to make it clear and I get this in response:

Why?!

Yo, Jane! You explain it to him!!

[Flannel Jesus]

The question I'd have for the compatibilist, a compatibilist as understood in a philosophically and technically correct manner, is this, "for Jane, what's the difference?"

Didn't you already say the difference? You've manufactured a scenario where Jane is alive in one scenario and not in another. The difference between not being alive and being alive is a pretty big difference. It doesn't really have anything to do with free will in general though, it's just an arbitrarily manufactured example.

[phyllo]

Back to Jane. Given a free will world, her mother, of her own volition, opts not to abort her after her friend, of her own volition, provides her with a convincing argument to give birth.

Whereas in a wholly determined world, where Mary not only wanted to abort Jane but was never able not to want to abort her, Jane is a goner.

The question I'd have for the compatibilist, a compatibilist as understood in a philosophically and technically correct manner, is this, "for Jane, what's the difference?"

The answer from the compatibilist is : Who says it happens this way, that free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts?

You just wrote it as if it's a fact. It's not.

You write a statement without any reasoning behind it and we are supposed to respond without questioning the validity of the statement??

[iambiguous]

The question I'd have for the compatibilist, a compatibilist as understood in a philosophically and technically correct manner, is this, "for Jane, what's the difference?"

Didn't you already say the difference? You've manufactured a scenario where Jane is alive in one scenario and not in another. The difference between not being alive and being alive is a pretty big difference. It doesn't really have anything to do with free will in general though, it's just an arbitrarily manufactured example.

Again, from my frame of mind [perhaps incorrect], this is as utterly preposterous as Phyllo's own reaction. Given free will, what may not be wholly manufactured by nature and its material laws, is a shredded Jane. Given that "somehow" -- God or No God -- human brains did acquire some measure of autonomy, there's at least the possibility that Jane herself is around to discuss this with the compatibilist.

It's just that none of us really have the capacity to know for sure which it is. Even the scientific community itself is still stumped. But at least they are not just "thinking up" ways to define or to deduce free will into existence.

[Flannel Jesus]

What's preposterous specifically? I don't understand which bit you're responding to like that.

[Flannel Jesus]

Also, the post you made is assuming incompatibilism is the case, I can't tell if you're doing that deliberately or not.

Given a free will world, her mother, of her own volition, opts not to abort her after her friend, of her own volition, provides her with a convincing argument to give birth.

Whereas in a wholly determined world, where Mary not only wanted to abort Jane but was never able not to want to abort her, Jane is a goner.

Not only does this arbitrarily decide that her death happens in the determined world, rather than the free will world - in addition to that, you're also presupposing that the type of free will in the free will world is NOT a compatibilist form of free will. Perhaps you're doing that on purpose, but you haven't explicitly stated you were doing that so it's hard to tell.

[iambiguous]

Back to Jane. Given a free will world, her mother, of her own volition, opts not to abort her after her friend, of her own volition, provides her with a convincing argument to give birth.

Whereas in a wholly determined world, where Mary not only wanted to abort Jane but was never able not to want to abort her, Jane is a goner.

The question I'd have for the compatibilist, a compatibilist as understood in a philosophically and technically correct manner, is this, "for Jane, what's the difference?"

The answer from the compatibilist is : Who says it happens this way, that free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts?

You just wrote it as if it's a fact. It's not.

You write a statement without any reasoning behind it and we are supposed to respond without questioning the validity of the statement??

No, it's whether whatever the compatibilists themselves say, they either were or were not able to opt to say otherwise. Same with what I post here. Same with what you post here. You have your distinction here [or lack thereof] and I have mine.

And it's not that my statements lack reasoning but that my reasoning is not wholly in sync with your reasoning.

Right, Mr. Objectivist?

[iambiguous]

What's preposterous specifically? I don't understand which bit you're responding to like that.

I have noted my "bits" above over and again.

Instead, my point revolves around connecting the dots between my bits and your bits pertaining to this, Mr. Wiggle:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

[Flannel Jesus]

You have not said specifically which bit of my post is preposterous. You quoted my entire post and said "this is preposterous". I can't tell which bit you're saying is preposterous. Please be specific, I cannot know what you mean if you are not specific

[phyllo]

And it's not that my statements lack reasoning but that my reasoning is not wholly in sync with your reasoning.

Right, Mr. Objectivist?

No, that's not it.

You don't back up your statements with reasoning. They're just assertions.