compatibilism

[iambiguous]

It looks like he's finally accepted that the definition of compatibilism doesn't involve bifurcated brains... maybe. That's fantastic progress, if that's what has actually happened then his future writings about compatibilism will improve. Positive result.

How about this...

Again, why don't you and iwannaplato share your own definitions and deductions regarding compatibilism with us. And then commence an exchange in which compatibilism is pinned down philosophically; and without ever even having to connect the dots between the words and the actual is/ought world that we live in.

Only -- click -- I dare you to include an actual "human all too human" context like Mary's abortion.

[Flannel Jesus]

There was a moment where it looked like you were accepting that the actual definition and beliefs of compatibilism don't line up with your "bifurcated brain" line. I don't think it would be wise of me to go into specific contexts prior to you understanding the meaning of compatibilism, so I want to ask first that you clarify explicitly: do you now realise that the bifurcated brain idea that you were previously attributing to compatibilists is not in fact a compatibilist belief?

[iambiguous]

And around and around we go. Cue Schopenhauer: Mary wants to have an abortion but Mary can't want what she wants. Instead, she wants only what her brain compels her to want.

Then the brain in dreamland.

In a dream, Mary has an abortion. And, while in the dream, it's like she wasn't dreaming at all. She "experiences" having the abortion just as though it were the wide awake world. In fact, she wakes up in the morning marveling at how her brain itself concocted this "reality"! Given that she wasn't even pregnant!!

Her brain is the source of her wants. Obviously she can't want something else.

Yep, that's how many, many determinists will put it alright.

On the other hand, if, say, you believe in God and God installed free will in your soul the very moment you were conceived, then you'd have the capacity to freely listen to your friend's argument and decide that no, now you don't want to abort the baby/clump of cells in your womb.

Unless, perhaps, this God of yours is omniscient? Then you'd have to figure how to reconcile free will with an all-knowing God. Call it a miracle?

And, in a free will world, Mary wants to have an abortion and Jane is toast. But a friend of hers, of her own volition, talks her out of it and Jane is now among us.

You keep repeating this as if Mary can't be talked out of her abortion in a determined world. That's simply not true.

That's because given the manner in which I understand determinism, if Mary is talked out of it in a wholly determined universe where the human brain is itself, like all other matter, in thrall to the laws of matter, her friend was no less compelled to talk her out of it. The unborn baby joins the rest of us out of the womb. But in a free will world where the friend was able of her own volition to think up the argument, and the argument failed to convince Mary, the baby is aborted.

Though again, sure, I'm just not understanding your point correctly and in fact your point is entirely reasonable. But here we are.

You seem to think that no matter what is said to determined Mary, she will ignore them and still have an abortion. That's not how determinism works. Determined Mary will respond in some way and one possible response is changing her mind about the abortion.

No, I think that whatever is said to Mary, if it is said to her because there was no possibility of it not being said to her then that is in sync with a world where there was never the possibility of her not having the abortion.

But if "somehow" [God or No God] the human brain did acquire the capacity to think through things like abortion, the unborn may be shredded or it may be delivierd.

But this is the part I root existentially in dasein. And not in God or ideology or deontology or biological imperatives.

Again, under determinism as some understand it, she does what she wants but she could not want what she wanted. Her brain was wholly in command there.

You repeat this again.

Yeah, and that's because "here and now" -- click -- it still makes sense to me.

In a free-will world Mary does not get to chose her wants, either. Her wants are the product of her experiences. She doesn't have some set of wants which is independent of the state of her brain.

Compelled to or not, we think about this differently. In a free will world as I understand it, Mary can of her own volition come into a forum like this and explore all of the different -- and ofttimes conflicting -- assessments of human autonomy. Like me, she might end up changing her mind about it. In a determined world as I understand it, however, from the cradle to the grave everything that we think, feel say or do in regard to this "going-back-to-the-pre-Socratics" philosophical quandary unfolds in the only possible reality.

From my frame of mind there is an enormous difference between having and not having free will. Between wanting the things we do becasue we opted to want them and our brains compelling us want only what we are ever able to want.

You say that, "free-willers have no more control over their wants than do determinists", and this makes sense to you.

But it is nothing short of preposterous from my frame of mind. Well, if I do have the capacity to come to that conclusion of my own free will.

[iambiguous]

There was a moment where it looked like you were accepting that the actual definition and beliefs of compatibilism don't line up with your "bifurcated brain" line. I don't think it would be wise of me to go into specific contexts prior to you understanding the meaning of compatibilism, so I want to ask first that you clarify explicitly: do you now realise that the bifurcated brain idea that you were previously attributing to compatibilists is not in fact a compatibilist belief?

Absolutely shameless!!



Well, unless, of course, I'm wrong.

[Flannel Jesus]

No, not shameless. I just want to make sure you're understanding the topic you're so passionate about.

[phyllo]

On the other hand, if, say, you believe in God and God installed free will in your soul the very moment you were conceived, then you'd have the capacity to freely listen to your friend's argument and decide that no, now you don't want to abort the baby/clump of cells in your womb.

Unless, perhaps, this God of yours is omniscient? Then you'd have to figure how to reconcile free will with an all-knowing God. Call it a miracle?

God can be left out of it for the time being.

That's because given the manner in which I understand determinism, if Mary is talked out of it in a wholly determined universe where the human brain is itself, like all other matter, in thrall to the laws of matter, her friend was no less compelled to talk her out of it. The unborn baby joins the rest of us out of the womb. But in a free will world where the friend was able of her own volition to think up the argument, and the argument failed to convince Mary, the baby is aborted.

Okay, so you now agree that Mary could have an abortion in a free-will world and Mary could avoid an abortion in a determined world.
That's progress.

No, I think that whatever is said to Mary, if it is said to her because there was no possibility of it not being said to her then that is in sync with a world where there was never the possibility of her not having the abortion.

What??
So you don't agree with the above??

Again, under determinism as some understand it, she does what she wants but she could not want what she wanted. Her brain was wholly in command there.

You repeat this again.

Yeah, and that's because "here and now" -- click -- it still makes sense to me.

You repeat it as if someone is disagreeing with it. As if it's something remarkable.

In a free will world as I understand it, Mary can of her own volition come into a forum like this and explore all of the different -- and ofttimes conflicting -- assessments of human autonomy. Like me, she might end up changing her mind about it. In a determined world as I understand it, however, from the cradle to the grave everything that we think, feel say or do in regard to this "going-back-to-the-pre-Socratics" philosophical quandary unfolds in the only possible reality.

That's not a dichotomy.

In a determined world, Mary might come into a forum and read something that makes her change her mind.

In a free-will world, once something happens it becomes the "only possible reality". There are no do-overs.

From my frame of mind there is an enormous difference between having and not having free will. Between wanting the things we do becasue we opted to want them and our brains compelling us want only what we are ever able to want.

So how does someone with free-will "opt to want" something if they have the same experiences as someone who has no libertarian free-will?

Surely to opt for something different than the non-free person, they would have to have some extra knowledge or experience. They would need another reason for picking a different want. Otherwise they would have the same wants.

What you're saying is that a non-free person has experiences A,B and C. As a result, his brain makes him want X.

And a free-will person has experiences A,B and C. But he wants Z.

Why would that happen?

(These people are identical except one has free-will and the other doesn't, for the sake of argument.)

[iambiguous]

No, not shameless. I just want to make sure you're understanding the topic you're so passionate about.

And I want to make sure that your own understanding of the topic is relevant to the world of actual human interactions.

See, stuck.

[Flannel Jesus]

Stuck how? There's no stuck. Perhaps you don't want to move, perhaps that's what you mean by stuck.

You say you want to understand what compatibilism means. I want that too, and I'm telling you. I certainly think it's within your capacity to understand: it's not about bifurcated brains with exceptions for determinism, it's about a complete compatibility between free will and determinism. No exception needed.

Perhaps you don't want to move, but that doesn't make anybody stuck.

[iambiguous]

Stuck how? There's no stuck. Perhaps you don't want to move, perhaps that's what you mean by stuck.

You say you want to understand what compatibilism means. I want that too, and I'm telling you. I certainly think it's within your capacity to understand: it's not about bifurcated brains with exceptions for determinism, it's about a complete compatibility between free will and determinism. No exception needed.

Perhaps you don't want to move, but that doesn't make anybody stuck.

Okay, sure, drag your embarrassment out all the more!




Note to others:

Uh, right?

[Flannel Jesus]

There's nothing to be embarrassed about. I'm here to help you understand a philosophical position that you've written hundreds of pages of content about. It's in the interest of you, me, and everyone else that you achieve this very achievable goal of having that basic level of understanding.

Compatibilism doesn't involve making exceptions to determinism in bifurcated brains. Compatibilists believe determinism and free will are compatible. That's it.

[phyllo]

It should be pretty obvious that he doesn't want to discuss it.

[Flannel Jesus]

221 pages says otherwise. I've never seen someone want to talk about compatibilism more.

[phyllo]

At this point, he seems only interested in posting a quote and commenting on it.

[Iwannaplato]

There's nothing to be embarrassed about. I'm here to help you understand a philosophical position that you've written hundreds of pages of content about. It's in the interest of you, me, and everyone else that you achieve this very achievable goal of having that basic level of understanding.

Compatibilism doesn't involve making exceptions to determinism in bifurcated brains. Compatibilists believe determinism and free will are compatible. That's it.

For what it's worth, and you may have already tried this, it might be good to talk specifically about how they are compatible in your version of compatibilism.

For example, some compatibilists frame freedom in terms of not being constrained by external factors.
Internal factors are determined. Our desires, goal, wants, compulsions, beliefs all lead to those actions they will lead to and they are determined.
External factors are determined.

However if we can manage to do what we want, then this is considered freedom.

For some, and I would guess Iambigious falls into this group, this is not freedom. Because he didn't choose what he wants. Or he is still determined. Only one thing will happen.

On the other hand if you are free to do as you want, what is missing? The freedom to do what one doesn't want?

I think the objection he may have and some of the people he has quoted have is that they don't actually identify with their wants and goals, etc.

So, they feel compelled by the internal and the external. Or think they are.

If I just threw the cat in the washing machine, ignore me.

[Flannel Jesus]

For what it's worth, and you may have already tried this, it might be good to talk specifically about how they are compatible in your version of compatibilism.

For example, some compatibilists frame freedom in terms of not being constrained by external factors.
Internal factors are determined.

I believe it is this very phrasing which he is getting tripped up on. He hears "not constrained by external factors", and precisely here is where he makes the leap to "So determinism applies externally, so determinism doesn't apply internally inside human brains". This phrasing, and phrasing like it, is the very source of his confusion.

There are many different ways of conceptualising compatibilism, but they all pretty much entail the same thing: determinism and free will are compatible, there's no need to make an exception to determinism inside human brains. I'm trying to keep it general because the confusion is generated by that specific phrasing - even though the person who wrote that phrase undoubtedly did not mean to make an exception to determinism with it.