Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
So I expect you mean your objection to the idea of objectivity comes from the actual nature of knowledge. But that's a metaphysical delusion.
Language/Logic/Mathematics is metaphysics. Because we USE language as representational instrument for our perception.
If metaphysics is a "delusion" then stop speaking.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
Knowledge isn't a thing of some kind with a nature that can be described. And talk of its 'fundamental limits' is incoherent.
OBVIOUSLY my position is incoherent to you because you are interpreting it from your view-point, not mine.
Your
frame of reference is different to mine!
It's coherent to me. Which comes as no surprise to me, since I am in fact arguing for coherentism.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
But if everything is subjective (whatever that means), then each of us does have a choice in the matter.
Exactly! You are currently exercising your choice.
You are interpreting my meaning from your view-point. And to you my meaning is incoherent.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
If what we call reality and facts are merely a matter of opinion, then, in my opinion, reality is real
And in my opinion reality isn't real. How do we decide whose opinion is right or wrong?
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
there are facts, and we can make true factual assertions. And you can shove your useless subjectivist opinion where the sun don't shine.
^^^^ practice what you preach and shove the above opinion where the sun don't shine.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
(Your position is completely incoherent.)
EXACTLY! The fact that MY epistemic position is incoherent to YOU defeats the very notion of objectivism.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
Now, this really is a bald idealist claim, for which you have the burden of proof.
It's not an idealist claim. I am merely using the CONCEPT of an "ideal epistemology" as a point of reference. IF an idealist epistemology is perceptual, then a non-idealist epistemology (such as mine) is ALSO perceptual.
You misunderstand me. AGAIN. Q.E.D
I notice a trend here, you sure like burdening others with proof, while you skilfully dodge proving anything.
Just so there's no further misunderstanding going forward - much like yourself, I don't burden myself with proof either.
If I don't burden myself with proof and you don't burden yourself with proof, I guess we are going to have to figure out another way to move forward?
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
that is knowable depends on perception'. Is that a fact - a true factual assertion? And is it perception that makes it knowable? What sort of perception would that be?
Your question is incoherent to me. Naturally - because I don't understand your subjective, conceptual model where you use words like "facts" and "factual assertions"
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
I don't understand your grammar here - how the consequent is supposed to follow from the condition. And, having rejected the objective/subjective distinction as made-up, you then rely on the idea of subjectivity. This is a mess.
To you. It's perfectly coherent. Once you understand it.
What is preventing you from understanding me?
You can SAY that something is objective, and I can point out that you (the subject) are bestowing objectivity.
Distinctions are instrumental. You still haven't answered the question: What is the purpose of the objective/subjective distinction?
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Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
Of course. All our linguistic practices are instrumental - for a purpose. Who has ever denied that? We use the words 'knowledge', 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity' for a purpose - and they're not names of abstract things that may or may not exist, with natures - let alone fundamental natures - that can be described.
What is the purpose for which you use your distinctions?
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
We use those words to talk about real things - features of reality - whose existence and properties are not a matter of opinion - though we can describe them in different ways for different purposes. And that's the function of the objective/subjective distinction.
Affirming the consequent.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:40 pm
My OP argument is that moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality in the way that rocks and stones and trees are features of reality. And I think the burden of proof is with moral realists and objectivists who claim that they are.
Your argument is incoherent to me.
I guess we are both coherentists, eh?