Philosophy Now Forum

There's only one issue that I've been focused on since I rejoined this conversation. I haven't strayed from it. We're not stuck, there is a clear path forward. I cannot address any issue you bring up about compatibilism until you make an effort to understand compatibilism first. That has to come first, since valid criticisms of compatibilism can only come from people who understand what compatibilism is. I'll be quite happy to look at issues you raise about compatibilism after you correct your misunderstandings about what compatibilism is.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 10:11 pm

iambiguous wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 10:09 pm
On the other hand...

"Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered-down version of one or both of the two concepts." Quora

Just Google "why compatibilism is wrong": https://www.google.com/search?source=hp ... gle+Search

Click on a couple links and then get back to us.

Well, assuming of course that you do have at least some measure of free will.

I do not see how that's related to what I've been saying. I'm not trying to convince you of compatibilism, so links that argue against compatibilism are not relevant to what I'm saying here.

Pick one:

1] we might be stuck
2] we're probably stuck
3] we're really stuck
4] we're hopelessly stuck

Again, why don't you and iwannaplato share your own definitions and deductions regarding compatibilism with us. And then commence an exchange in which compatibilism is pinned down philosophically; and without ever even having to connect the dots between the words and the actual is/ought world that we live in.

Again, why don't you...share your own definitions...

I have shared that. I shared that Wikipedia article that talks about compatibility between determinism and free will. That's the definition of compatibilism. That they are compatible. Not that there needs to be exceptions to determinism inside brains - they are compatible, and so there is no need for exceptions.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Aug 04, 2023 7:47 pm Let's look at Wikipedia, see if we can get any hints. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1]

Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] In other words, that causal determinism does not exclude the truth of possible future outcomes.[3] Because free will is seen as a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility, compatibilism is often used to support compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Compatibilism is the belief that determinism and free will are compatible. Not that the universe needs an exception to determinism in order for free will to exist - it doesn't say anything about exceptions there. The two things are compatible.

There's the post where I said that, quoted for your ease of access.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 10:48 pm

Again, why don't you...share your own definitions...

I have shared that. I shared that Wikipedia article that talks about compatibility between determinism and free will. That's the definition of compatibilism. That they are compatible. Not that there needs to be exceptions to determinism inside brains - they are compatible, and so there is no need for exceptions.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 10:49 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Fri Aug 04, 2023 7:47 pm Let's look at Wikipedia, see if we can get any hints. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.[1]

Compatibilists believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.[2] In other words, that causal determinism does not exclude the truth of possible future outcomes.[3] Because free will is seen as a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility, compatibilism is often used to support compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Compatibilism is the belief that determinism and free will are compatible. Not that the universe needs an exception to determinism in order for free will to exist - it doesn't say anything about exceptions there. The two things are compatible.

There's the post where I said that, quoted for your ease of access.

Of course, this is the part where I ask him to bring those definitions and deductions down out of the intellectual/philosophical clouds and note their applicability to this...

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

Then, apparently, both of us shamelessly wiggling out of accepting the other's aim here.

Stuck I call it.

We're not stuck. There's one issue - the issue of you understanding compatibilism. That's it. You believe that compatibilism is about making exceptions to determinism. I've provided a number of compelling reasons why that isn't what compatibilism is about. All I'm awaiting now is for an explicit reason why you disagree, or alternatively, for you to agree. For you to agree that compatibilism does not involve those exceptions, because the need for exceptions implies that the two things are not compatible.

Do you agree? If not, why not?

We're not stuck, there is a clear step to take. Perhaps you don't want to take it. It's that what it is? Is that why you keep saying we're stuck? Because you do not want to take the clear next step?

Reconciling Determinism and Free Will: A Compatibilist Perspective
Innocent Ociti

Incompatibilists argue that if our actions are predetermined, then we cannot be said to act freely, as we have no control over them. They argue that free will requires that our actions be undetermined so that we can choose to act in one way or another. This view has been defended by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill.

An interesting point here is that Kant was religious and Mill was not. And that's important because from a religious frame of mind, of course we have free will! After all, God includes that in our very "soul".

On the other hand, if you are "an agnostic and a skeptic"? If so, then, beyond defining or deducing free will into existence, how did Mill himself actually go about demonstrating that we have it?

As for incompatibilism itself, that gets tricky:

"Incompatibilism is the thesis that free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. Incompatibilists divide into libertarianians, who deny that determinism is true and hard determinists who deny that we have free will." philpapers

So, those at both ends of the debate here can describe themselves as incompatibilists.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, argue that free will and causal determinism can coexist. They argue that even if our actions are determined by prior causes, we can still act freely and take responsibility for our actions. They argue that free will is not the ability to act in a way that is completely independent of prior causes, but rather the ability to act on our desires and motivations. This view has been defended by philosophers such as David Hume and Daniel Dennett.

Again, way, way, way up in the philosophical clouds, words can be strung together into arguments such that depending on how you define the words, we either do or do not have free will. Like the words above.

Now, explain this to me...

How are our "desires and motivations" able to "escape" a brain that is wholly in sync with the laws of matter? How "for all practical purposes" are we not back to Schopenhauer's "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants"?

Though, again, I admit that I am simply not understand his point correctly. That somehow for all practical purposes we can want what we want.

On the other hand, my argument in regard to the assumption that we do have free will here is that what we come to want is rooted existentially in dasein. And that philosophically in the is/ought world there does not appear to be a way for ethicists to establish what all rational and virtuous men and women ought to want.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 11:14 pm We're not stuck. There's one issue - the issue of you understanding compatibilism. That's it. You believe that compatibilism is about making exceptions to determinism. I've provided a number of compelling reasons why that isn't what compatibilism is about. All I'm awaiting now is for an explicit reason why you disagree, or alternatively, for you to agree. For you to agree that compatibilism does not involve those exceptions, because the need for exceptions implies that the two things are not compatible.

Do you agree? If not, why not?

We're not stuck, there is a clear step to take. Perhaps you don't want to take it. It's that what it is? Is that why you keep saying we're stuck? Because you do not want to take the clear next step?

Again, and for the last time, what does the above have to do with this...

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

How are our "desires and motivations" able to "escape" a brain that is wholly in sync with the laws of matter?

Mebbe becuz mind is not a product of brain? A conclusion one might draw if one were familiar with the wholly on-the-ground-not-up-in-the-clouds results of split brain surgeries, hemispherectomies, and hands on, in the brain itself, surgical epilepsy treatments and research.

If mind is just brain product one might ask: how is it that severing the corpus callosum or removing half a brain, while physically debilitating, never affects identity or self or mind or I-ness? If mind is just brain product, how is the product is never touched by radical changes to, or subtractions from, the supposed source? If mind is just just brain product, how it is only physical seizures occur? If mind is just brain product why does no one have creativity seizures or mathematics seizures or desire seizures?

Further, if mind is just brain product, one would be justified in asking how does my brain generate "desires and motivations"? Where in my brain does my obstinacy live? What brain parts are involved? Where are my memories stored? How exactly does my brain make me?

-----

Incidentally, as I say, compatibilism, as a reconciliation between libertarian free will and necessitarianism is hooey. There is no reconciliation, only a redefining of free will to make it fit within the deterministic scheme. Compatibilism is the philo-equivalent of *Helena boxed.

*there's a for the one who gets the reference...no cheating!

henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Aug 06, 2023 1:15 am

How are our "desires and motivations" able to "escape" a brain that is wholly in sync with the laws of matter?

Mebbe becuz mind is not a product of brain? A conclusion one might draw if one were familiar with the wholly on-the-ground-not-up-in-the-clouds results of split brain surgeries, hemispherectomies, and hands on, in the brain itself, surgical epilepsy treatments and research.

If mind is just brain product one might ask: how is it that severing the corpus callosum or removing half a brain, while physically debilitating, never affects identity or self or mind or I-ness? If mind is just brain product, how is the product is never touched by radical changes to, or subtractions from, the supposed source? If mind is just just brain product, how it is only physical seizures occur? If mind is just brain product why does no one have creativity seizures or mathematics seizures or desire seizures?

Further, if mind is just brain product, one would be justified in asking how does my brain generate "desires and motivations"? Where in my brain does my obstinacy live? What brain parts are involved? Where are my memories stored? How exactly does my brain make me?

-----

Incidentally, as I say, compatibilism, as a reconciliation between libertarian free will and necessitarianism is hooey. There is no reconciliation, only a redefining of free will to make it fit within the deterministic scheme. Compatibilism is the philo-equivalent of *Helena boxed.

*there's a for the one who gets the reference...no cheating!

Again, with henry it's not so much what he posts, but the manner in which he invariably communicates a flagrantly arrogant "this is the way it is and if you don't agree with me, you're flat out wrong!" inflection. Same with his take on life and liberty and property. There's his own God given assessment of them and all the idiots who disagree.

Only here it is in regard to the human brain itself!!!

As for the entangled nature of mind, there are any number of afflictions -- from tumors to brain diseases -- that can have a profound impact on the manner in which the self is grasped by any particular individual. And then pertaining to the behaviors he or she chooses.

And, again, that's assuming that we have free will at all.

But, of course, henry has his own sneering and insufferably pompous "my way or the highway" bumptiousness about him here too.

Go ahead, ask him.





On the other hand, unless he watches those 17 YouTube videos IC swears by and accepts Jesus Christ as his personal savior, his very own mind will burn in Hell for all of eternity.

Right, IC?

As for the entangled nature of mind, there are any number of afflictions -- from tumors to brain diseases -- that can have a profound impact on the manner in which the self is grasped by any particular individual. And then pertaining to the behaviors he or she chooses.

One who pays attention to what's actually going on in the wholly on-the-ground-not-up-in-the-clouds research knows tumors to brain diseases often have devastating physical effects but none at all on the coherence and continuity of the I behind the eyes.

Stella's dementia is confusing and frustrating for her becuz she, the person, the mind, the I, is trapped in it. Stella hasn't become a different person, only a trapped one who acts accordingly.

Joe's brain tumor affects his sight, his mobility, his continence. He's angry about it. He's trapped, not changed.

Lucinda's Tourettes embarrasses her. The tics, the vocalizations, trap her, not turn her into a different person.

The topper is Phineas P. Gage. A large iron rod was driven completely through his head, destroying much of his brain's left frontal lobe. Supposedly the injury effected his personality and behavior over the remaining 12 years of his life. Gage is often held up as an evidence mind is brain product.

How else can you explain his personality change, Henry?

I reckon having a disfiguring, debilitating injury would sour me too. I wouldn't be a different person, just an awfully disgruntled one.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 10:31 pm As for definitions, my "thing" here is more about asking those who believe that their own definition of compatibilism is the correct one to bring that definition out of the dictionary

That's the issue, you are on a philosophy forum, why don't you start acting like you are. You don't get to re-define key philosophical concepts such as "compatibilism", clear communication is quite necessary here. Unless you can show that compatibilism also includes bifurcating brains, which you haven't done so far.

If you want to investigate the possibility of bifurcating brains, and how it's not really relevant to moral responsibility, that's perfectly fine with everyone here. What they are saying is, just don't call that compatibilism.

iambiguous wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 11:50 pm

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Sat Aug 05, 2023 11:14 pm We're not stuck. There's one issue - the issue of you understanding compatibilism. That's it. You believe that compatibilism is about making exceptions to determinism. I've provided a number of compelling reasons why that isn't what compatibilism is about. All I'm awaiting now is for an explicit reason why you disagree, or alternatively, for you to agree. For you to agree that compatibilism does not involve those exceptions, because the need for exceptions implies that the two things are not compatible.

Do you agree? If not, why not?

We're not stuck, there is a clear step to take. Perhaps you don't want to take it. It's that what it is? Is that why you keep saying we're stuck? Because you do not want to take the clear next step?

Again, and for the last time, what does the above have to do with this...

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

It has everything to do with it - you want to talk about compatibilism, so it's important to understand what compatibilism is. So first thing's first, understanding what it is and what it's not.

It's not about making exceptions inside human brains.

You said understanding compatibilism properly was of interest to you. That makes sense, it would be quite strange for someone to write as much about compatibilism as you have without even attempting to understand it. So, I'm here to help you understand it.

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so.

That phrase "Mary was unable to not abort" suggests that Mary wants not to abort but is prevented from not aborting by her brain or "the laws of matter".

But that's not the case. Mary wants to have an abortion. If she didn't want to have an abortion, then she wouldn't have an abortion.

There is no Mary here who wants to give birth but is prevented from doing so.

If Mary had libertarian free-will, then she would do what she wants about the pregnancy. Notice that under determinism, Mary also does what she wants.

Mary acts the same whether she has free-will or not. Therefore, compatibilists say that free-will is compatible with determinism.

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it.

Same thing applies here.

This statement suggests that compatibilists want to believe something else but are prevented from believing it.

But compatibilists believe what their experience leads them to believe.

They would have the same beliefs in a free-will world and in a determined world.

Why? Because they would have had the same experiences. They would have been exposed to the same evidence. And they would have reached the same conclusions.

Anyway, my main argument revolves around the fact that given what mere mortals here on planet Earth don't grasp regarding this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...how on Earth would we go about pinning down which of us here actually is either right or wrong?

As for definitions, my "thing" here is more about asking those who believe that their own definition of compatibilism is the correct one to bring that definition out of the dictionary and note its applicability to Mary aborting her unborn baby/clump of cells.

She could never have not "chosen" to abort her unborn baby/clump of cells, but others can still choose to hold her morally responsible for doing so?

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Aug 06, 2023 6:46 am
That's the issue, you are on a philosophy forum, why don't you start acting like you are. You don't get to re-define key philosophical concepts such as "compatibilism", clear communication is quite necessary here. Unless you can show that compatibilism also includes bifurcating brains, which you haven't done so far.

If you want to investigate the possibility of bifurcating brains, and how it's not really relevant to moral responsibility, that's perfectly fine with everyone here. What they are saying is, just don't call that compatibilism.

Okay, there really is an official APA, Wikipedia, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Definition of compatibilism.

So, take that definition down out of the technical, philosophical contraption clouds and note its applicability to the point I make here:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.