Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

P1 Empirical evidence is evidence of phenomena.

P2 There are only phenomena.

C Therefore, (at least methodological) realism is the rational default position. And philosophical anti-realism is irrational.

[Veritas Aequitas]

P1 Empirical evidence is evidence of phenomena.

P2 There are only phenomena.

C Therefore, (at least methodological) realism is the rational default position. And philosophical anti-realism is irrational.

Your syllogism it very crude; it is grounded on the mind-independence of philosophical realism which grounded on an illusion and to be dogmatic with it, is delusional.

Realistically,

1. Phenomena are real as conditioned upon a human-based specific FSR_FSK of which the scientific FSK is the most credible, reliable and objective.

2. Since the FSR-FSK is human-based, the resultant reality cannot be independent of the human body, brain and mind.

3. Philosophical Realism claim reality is independent of the human body, brain & mind.

4. Therefore philosophical-realism is not realistic [2, 3]

Philosophical Realism is a derivative ideology, an -ism from the evolution default of the very necessary sense external_ness that facilitate basic survival.
As such, philosophical realism is a very barbaric primitive ideology.

[Peter Holmes]

P1 Empirical evidence is evidence of phenomena.

P2 There are only phenomena.

C Therefore, (at least methodological) realism is the rational default position. And philosophical anti-realism is irrational.

Your syllogism it very crude; it is grounded on the mind-independence of philosophical realism which grounded on an illusion and to be dogmatic with it, is delusional.

Realistically,

1. Phenomena are real as conditioned upon a human-based specific FSR_FSK of which the scientific FSK is the most credible, reliable and objective.

2. Since the FSR-FSK is human-based, the resultant reality cannot be independent of the human body, brain and mind.

3. Philosophical Realism claim reality is independent of the human body, brain & mind.

4. Therefore philosophical-realism is not realistic [2, 3]

Philosophical Realism is a derivative ideology, an -ism from the evolution default of the very necessary sense external_ness that facilitate basic survival.
As such, philosophical realism is a very barbaric primitive ideology.

Rubbish.

1 A 'framework and system of reality' is your unexplained invention, as is a 'framework and system of knowledge'. You made these things up, and they don't do the explanatory job you think they do.

2 The claim that phenomena are real only if they are 'conditioned upon' a human-based FSR-FSK is unexplained mysticism. And it makes the 101 error of mistaking the description for the described.

3 Your argument is a non sequitur fallacy, as follows.

Premise: Humans have to perceive, know and describe reality in human ways.
Conclusion: Therefore, reality cannot be independent from humans - specifically, human bodies.

What utter codswallop. Stroll on.

[Veritas Aequitas]

P1 Empirical evidence is evidence of phenomena.

P2 There are only phenomena.

C Therefore, (at least methodological) realism is the rational default position. And philosophical anti-realism is irrational.

Your syllogism it very crude; it is grounded on the mind-independence of philosophical realism which grounded on an illusion and to be dogmatic with it, is delusional.

Realistically,

1. Phenomena are real as conditioned upon a human-based specific FSR_FSK of which the scientific FSK is the most credible, reliable and objective.

2. Since the FSR-FSK is human-based, the resultant reality cannot be independent of the human body, brain and mind.

3. Philosophical Realism claim reality is independent of the human body, brain & mind.

4. Therefore philosophical-realism is not realistic [2, 3]

Philosophical Realism is a derivative ideology, an -ism from the evolution default of the very necessary sense external_ness that facilitate basic survival.
As such, philosophical realism is a very barbaric primitive ideology.

Rubbish.

1 A 'framework and system of reality' is your unexplained invention, as is a 'framework and system of knowledge'. You made these things up, and they don't do the explanatory job you think they do.

2 The claim that phenomena are real only if they are 'conditioned upon' a human-based FSR-FSK is unexplained mysticism. And it makes the 101 error of mistaking the description for the described.

3 Your argument is a non sequitur fallacy, as follows.

Premise: Humans have to perceive, know and describe reality in human ways.
Conclusion: Therefore, reality cannot be independent from humans - specifically, human bodies.

What utter codswallop. Stroll on.

PH: "And it makes the 101 error of mistaking the description for the described."
Strawman again.

Note I have reminded you of this > a "million" times.
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

I anticipate you will strawman it again the next 2 million times because you just do not have the brain to comprehend it.

Note this;
What is a Moral Framework and System?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31603

There are already existing Moral Framework and Systems.
You cannot deny theists has their Theistic Moral Framework and Systems; it is just that their Moral FSK are not credible, reliable and objective.

[Peter Holmes]

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of supernatural or non-natural beings. So, for example, theology is not a framework and system of knowledge of supernatural or non-natural beings. They were all made up by our ancestors, and many of us still think they exist. Man hands on delusion to man. It deepens like a coastal shelf.

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of things-in-themselves (noumena). They were made up by Kant, who repackaged a teasing fantasy that stretches back to and beyond Plato. 'We can't experience things as they really are, but only their shadows on the wall of the cave. Kant's version is: 'all we can experience and know are phenomena, or 'appearances'. And our 'mode of intuition' dictates what they are.'

The fantasy of some unknowable thing beyond or behind or beneath what we perceive and know is vastly ancient, potent and pervasive. We're supposed to whisper the words - ultimate reality, absolute truth - then torture ourselves because we can never have them - cos religious leaders or philosophers are the only people who do.

Philosopher: You don't know what reality is, cos what you call reality is an illusion - a human invention.
Priest: You don't know what reality is, cos our team's god moves in mysterious ways, and you're in a test.

Iow - and I'm working this out en route - I think there's a relationship between religious and philosophical mysticism. 'The way it seems is not the way it is. But I/we know the way it is. Donations not only welcome, but, frankly, necessary. This way to salvation.'

[Veritas Aequitas]

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of supernatural or non-natural beings. So, for example, theology is not a framework and system of knowledge of supernatural or non-natural beings. They were all made up by our ancestors, and many of us still think they exist. Man hands on delusion to man. It deepens like a coastal shelf.

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of things-in-themselves (noumena). They were made up by Kant, who repackaged a teasing fantasy that stretches back to and beyond Plato. 'We can't experience things as they really are, but only their shadows on the wall of the cave. Kant's version is: 'all we can experience and know are phenomena, or 'appearances'. And our 'mode of intuition' dictates what they are.'

The fantasy of some unknowable thing beyond or behind or beneath what we perceive and know is vastly ancient, potent and pervasive. We're supposed to whisper the words - ultimate reality, absolute truth - then torture ourselves because we can never have them - cos religious leaders or philosophers are the only people who do.

Philosopher: You don't know what reality is, cos what you call reality is an illusion - a human invention.
Priest: You don't know what reality is, cos our team's god moves in mysterious ways, and you're in a test.

Iow - and I'm working this out en route - I think there's a relationship between religious and philosophical mysticism. 'The way it seems is not the way it is. But I/we know the way it is. Donations not only welcome, but, frankly, necessary. This way to salvation.'

PH is so ignorant of his own ignorance.
Your above are merely babblings.

1. Philosophical Realists like PH believe what is fact is a feature of reality that is just-is, being so, that is the case, states of affairs independent of humans, their body, brain and mind.
This mind-independence is to the extent, things-in-themselves will exist even there are no human at all.

2. This is exactly what Kant critiqued the p-realists' things as things-in-themselves [noumena], i.e. a feature of reality that is just-is, being so, that is the case, states of affairs absolutely independent of humans, their body, brain and mind.
For Kant is absolutely impossible for things to exist absolutely independent of humans, their body, brain and mind.
To insist things exist absolutely independent of humans, their body, brain and mind which are illusory, is delusional.

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of things-in-themselves (noumena).

That is why you are ignorant of your own ignorance.
Your belief in 1 is precisely believing things-in-themselves absolutely mind-independent.
Here you are condemning your own belief and confirming there is no evidence for the existence of things-in-themselves.

If you insist there are no things-in-themselves, then you should not believe your [1] above.

So far, you have not prove nor demonstrated your belief in 1 is true at all, i.e. there are things existing as real which are absolutely mind-independent.

You tried subtly by reference to natural science and its discoveries.
But the reality realized by the human-based scientific FSK can never be absolutely independent of humans, body, brain and mind.
Because it is human-based, it follows deductively, the resultant realization of scientific reality can never be independent of humans, body, brain and mind.
Therefore philosophical realism claims of mind-independent is false.

At most science can only ASSUME there is an external mind independent reality out there.
As we know what is ASSUMED cannot contribute to what is real.

Just in case, which is very likely, note this;
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

As a matter of fact you are driven by an evolutionary default of external-ness which you have habitualized as an ideology. This is primal, primitive, proto- and barbaric thinking.

[Iwannaplato]

To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of things-in-themselves (noumena). They were made up by Kant, who repackaged a teasing fantasy that stretches back to and beyond Plato. 'We can't experience things as they really are, but only their shadows on the wall of the cave. Kant's version is: 'all we can experience and know are phenomena, or 'appearances'. And our 'mode of intuition' dictates what they are.'

The fantasy of some unknowable thing beyond or behind or beneath what we perceive and know is vastly ancient, potent and pervasive. We're supposed to whisper the words - ultimate reality, absolute truth - then torture ourselves because we can never have them - cos religious leaders or philosophers are the only people who do.

This sounds quite a bit like antirealism and the second paragraphy parallels VA's ideas.

[Immanuel Can]

Something new for Peter Holmes.

For those of us who read PN the magazine, there's an interesting article by Justin Bartlett, on "The Cognitive Gap." It is an overview of moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.

For moral non-cognitivists, those who believe moral language only signals emotive states or subjective states of approval/disapproval and refer to no objective properties, Bartlett proposes a dilemma called "the Frege-Geach Problem." (See iss.156, p.9) In a nutshell, the problem is what happens when one tries to put a non-cognitivist kind of meaning into a moral claim. The example he uses is as follows.

P1: Killing is wrong.
P2: If killing is wrong, then getting your little brother to kill is wrong.
C: Therefore, getting your little brother to kill is wrong.

This version is the cognitivist version, and while it is logically sound, in that IF the first two premises were true, then the conclusion would necessarily follow. But Peter Holmes would have to argue that P1 or P2 are not objective claims, but rather only emotive ones, subjective claims.

The Frege-Geach problem appears, though, when we try to follow Peter Holmes's likely advice on that. What we get is a syllogism as follows:

P1: Boo to killing.
P2: If 'Boo to killing,' then getting your little brother to kill is wrong.
C: Therefore, getting your little brother to kill is wrong.

Now we can see that it's become rather comical. What can "Boo to killing" (or "I don't like killing," or "My society doesn't like killing") be adding, that would ever warrant the extension "it's also wrong"?

Now, an alert Peter might point out, in response to this, that we have not been fair in our second syllogism. The problem is not the "Boo to killing" part, which is as fair a summary of moral subjectivism as one can get, but rather the use of the term "wrong" as objective. Such an objector might say, "You can't render an cognitivist or moral objectivist term as a summary of the view of a subjectivist.

And I would concede that objection.

But now, look at what happens to the syllogism is we grant the objection:

P1: Boo to killing.
P2: If 'Boo to killing,' then getting your little brother to kill is boo.
C: Therefore, getting your little brother to kill is boo.

Now, the situation is immeasuably worse for the non-cognitivist. For now, not only is the syllogism redundant and circular (saying essentially no more than, "That which is boo is boo"), but it is also not communicating anything that resembles what we think of as a moral claim at all.

If we leave it there, then Peter Holmes would have to go all the way, and say there's no way to say that killing (or pedophilia, or slavery, or rape...pick your moral issue) is wrong. And "boo" has absolutely no moral force...it's merely descriptive of an individual's current state of feeling. It totally lacks any element of duty, of "oughtness" or of the rightness of a claim. It's pure emotion, from beginning to end...nothing more.

The upshot, then, is that Holmes's view, far from saving moral language or allowing us to say something meaningful about right and wrong in the absence of objective referents, is going to stultify utterly any moral talk at all. And unless one believes society can function with absolutely NO moral direction, one is going to have to pose the question to Peter, "What do you want us to do, in order to describe human moral experience, and how do you anticipate society can survive on your total prohibition on objective moral belief?"

The ball, I think, is in Peter Holmes's court. But maybe he has a response.

[FlashDangerpants]

cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.

Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.

[Immanuel Can]

cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.

Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.

Well, perhaps, you'd have to see the article first, to see what Bartlett is making of those terms. I think PH is fairly within the category as Bartlett stipulates it. But it doesn't much matter whether we accept or fight Bartlett's label really...the point is still that the absence of an objective referent for morality puts a person in a Frege-Geach kind of dilemma, if they try to translate their view into actual moral claims. And I'm interested in seeing if PH (or anybody here) has a way of reproducing a moral claim in plausible language, only using emotivist or subjectivist suppositions.

[FlashDangerpants]

cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.

Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.

Well, perhaps, you'd have to see the article first, to see what Bartlett is making of those terms. I think PH is fairly within the category as Bartlett stipulates it. But it doesn't much matter whether we accept or fight Bartlett's label really...the point is still that the absence of an objective referent for morality puts a person in a Frege-Geach kind of dilemma, if they try to translate their view into actual moral claims. And I'm interested in seeing if PH (or anybody here) has a way of reproducing a moral claim in plausible language, only using emotivist or subjectivist suppositions.

I've taken a look, it's extremely short so the author needed to save a whole lot of column inches by broad brushing some stuff so we'll just have to give him the benefit of the doubt. But it's not at all true to say, or perhaps it's more accurate to say it's easy to mis-read "Cognitivists, then, claim that moral sentences are truth-apt; they express truths (or falsehoods) about the world. Hence, when someone says ‘Killing is wrong’, then according to cognitivists the speaker is describing the act of killing as really having the objective, opinion-independent property of wrongness" because Mackie was a cognitivist and definitely didn't agree with that stuff, or at least didn't read such things the way you do.

You can accurately say that for the cognitivist, moral talk aims for such an opinion-independent property of wrongness, and then you are accounting for the likes of Mackie who agree that it does have that aim, but do not agree that there is any property to be found, and thus the search inevitably results in error. If Pete is an error theorist, then Frege-Geach has nothing to say to or about him.

So here's a clumsily photographed diagram taken from Geoffrey Sayre-McCord's essay The Many Moral Realisms which shows the idea...

error-vs-success-theory.JPG

So as you can see, the majority of "moral fact deniers" are not boo hurrah non-cogs. And I really don't think Pete is one either. That Astrocat is the only one you'll have met on this site that I know of.

[Immanuel Can]

So as you can see, the majority of "moral fact deniers" are not boo hurrah non-cogs. And I really don't think Pete is one either. That Astrocat is the only one you'll have met on this site that I know of.

Thanks for the explanation. Let's work with that in mind.

Then let's ask, how does Peter Holmes translate moral language? I'd like to see his version of the meaning of a statement like "Killing is wrong," even if by "wrong" he means something different than an objectivist means. Let's see what he DOES mean, rather than guessing at what he should mean.

But then, the whole question is also wrong, isn't it? I mean, our header says, "Is morality objective or subjective?" That's the non-cognitivist articulation, that PH is using there. If it's not, then what's the third option PH should have included: it should read, "Is morality objective, subjective or delusional?" perhaps. But we can wait to see what he would choose.

[Veritas Aequitas]

cognitivism and non-cognitivism -- Peter Holmes' view fitting into the latter category.

Is he a non-cognitivist? He doesn't strike me as any such thing.

Well, perhaps, you'd have to see the article first, to see what Bartlett is making of those terms. I think PH is fairly within the category as Bartlett stipulates it. But it doesn't much matter whether we accept or fight Bartlett's label really...the point is still that the absence of an objective referent for morality puts a person in a Frege-Geach kind of dilemma, if they try to translate their view into actual moral claims. And I'm interested in seeing if PH (or anybody here) has a way of reproducing a moral claim in plausible language, only using emotivist or subjectivist suppositions.

PH is obviously a non-cognitivist;

• Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt).
  A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world".[1]
  If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism

PH may not agree with 'proposition' [philosophical] but that is not critical in this case because statement of fact is sufficient.

PH has always claims that moral elements are a matter of opinions, beliefs, judgments which are subjective, thus are not truth-apt.

PH also believe in this;
"A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world"

PH also insists moral elements are a matter of opinions, beliefs, judgments which are subjective, not a matter of fact, thus moral knowledge is impossible.

To the above extent, PH is a non-cognitivist.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry - I constructed a response to this discussion - for which, thanks, btw - a few days ago, but it went awry. The best laid schemes o' mice and men gang aft agley. So here's another go. Some initial thoughts.

I dislike the 'cognitivist/non-cognitivist' label. Here's a dictionary definition of cognition: 'the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses:'

Leaving aside the mythicality of mentalist talk - 'mental action or process' - the implication that to be a moral non-cognitivist is to reject 'knowledge and understanding' of moral issues 'through thought, experience and the senses' is libellous nonsense. Labels and their baggage! What can you do?

Iow, to reject moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts, and, therefore, the claim that moral assertions have truth-value independent from opinion - is not to abandon 'knowledge and understanding through thought, experience and the senses' with regard to moral issues.

To be rational is to have or seek sound reasons for what we do and believe. What we count as a 'sound reason' is, of course, open to rational debate. But explanations come to an end. And, like the rest of us, moral objectivists have nothing 'at the end' except a moral opinion: this is morally right/wrong. (A theistic objectivist claim - this is morally right/wrong because my team's god says it is - is, obviously, ridiculous.)

More to be said, of course.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA has posted about the triune brain theory, with no overt reference to morality. Here's a response.

I suggest the triune brain theory is a nice example of reverse-theorising, as follows.

We have distinct mental faculties, within which perceiving, thinking, feeling, willing, intending, and so on, go on. But, given physicalism, these so-called mental processes must occur in discreet parts of the brain.

But the 'higher mental faculties' aren't present in the brains of pre-human life forms, from which humans evolved.

Therefore, part of the human brain is 'reptilian' (the basal ganglia, dealing with basic biological needs and primal instincts), part is 'paleo-mammalian' (the limbic system, dealing with emotions), and part is 'neo-mammalian' (the neocortex, dealing with objective or rational thoughts).

The attraction of this theory for VA is obvious: the human brain is organised physiologically to deal with different aspects of human life; therefore, 'morality' is programmed, somehow, into the human brain.

The conceptual influence of faculty psychology - and mentalism in general - on neuroscience is itself a fascinating issue. 'We have thoughts; therefore, this physical phenomenon is 'a thought'. '