Haven’t those who reject morality just because of its religious roots ended up constructing another belief system

[Martin Peter Clarke]

I know no Gods exist. As any less than best case transcendent Love as the ground of being are utter crap. As bad as Mother in King's ghastly homage, Revival, to Lovecraft. And They certainly don't. Exist. They would be obvious if They did.

[Ben JS]

One can redefine 'god' to mean anything.

God = existence.

Does god exist?

God = non-existence.

Does god exist?

Some definitions of 'God' are self contradictory,
and thus, can be recognized as non-existent.

-

It's a loaded, divisionary, & problematic term.
There are better, more precise terms in most situations.

But when examining the quality of one's claims,
the contents of any other person's beliefs are irrelevant.
To make accusations regarding another's beliefs,
is to redirect the examination away from one's claims.

It's rhetoric - not seeking to establish truth.

[Immanuel Can]

Blocked.

What Atheists do, when they run out of answers.

[Immanuel Can]

I know no Gods exist.

You know?

You wish. The non-existence of the Supreme Being is not the kind of thing a finite mind can "know." It can "think" it, it can "hope" it, it can even "desire" it. But it cannot sanely claim to "know" any such thing. If it "knew" it, it would have to provide evidence concommitant with that claim of knowlege; and what sort of grounds would be sufficient to such a claim?

[Martin Peter Clarke]

No, one cannot, actually. One can only say either "No gods exist," or "I don't know whether or not gods exist." If one doesn't know, one has no firm claim to make; if one does know, then how does one know?

Another for the wrong tally.

One can say they are absent of a belief in gods.
This is neither claiming no gods exist, nor is it claiming it is unknowable whether gods exist.

One can do all three - or any combination of the three (including none).

It is very common for atheists to also claim that they believe no gods exist -
but this isn't a fundamental, defining criteria to meet the standards of atheism.

Thus, to critique those who declare no gods exist - is not to critique atheism,
it is to critique a (likely) subcategory of atheists.

I'm not interested in arguing the credibility of any particular god claim,
instead, I'm rebutting your gross misrepresentations & generalizations.
Not here to express any of my beliefs beyond that your claims are wrong.
To answer other questions is a diversion/distraction/red herring.

-

But it's starting to feel like beating a dead horse,
so even though I anticipate you will respond with another flawed argument,
I'm not planning to be dragged further into your bullshit.

So I'll leave on the core criticism:

No, that's agnosticism. "A-" plus "theos," literally translates to "no + Gods". That's its meaning. If you didn't know, you know now. And "a-" plus "gnosis" is "not + know."

Agnosticism: is the philosophical view that the existence of God, the divine, or the supernatural is ultimately unknowable, either in principle or in fact

Theism = belief in the existence of a god or gods

One can be both an atheist, and agnostic. They are not mutually exclusive concepts.
To be an atheist, is to be absent of belief in the existence of gods.
To be agnostic, is to believe it is unknowable whether gods exist.

One can be absent of a belief in god, and furthermore, believe that whether gods exist is unknowable.

So you're wrong twice.
I'm shocked!

If you "lack belief," you don't know anything about it.

Wrong again.

One can be aware of a belief without holding said belief.
If they don't hold the belief, they lack a belief in it.

I know what the description of a unicorn is -
I know what the concept entails.
I do not believe instances of actual unicorns exist in reality -
there are many representations of unicorns (such as toys),
but these artificial representations are not equivalent to the concept described.

I am aware of what the belief in unicorns entails [knowledge].
I do not not hold the belief that unicorns exist. [absent of a belief]

This is very simple.
Your claims are tired.
I've little interest in engaging with you -
only as much as to reveal your poor arguments.

===
===

"Lack of belief" takes nobody anywhere. You can't know anything or do anything or live a life without believing things, because it's impossible in practice.

This is where the deceptive fool conflates absence of a particular belief with absence of any belief.

We must have empathy for the old bugger - dribbles so much that they can't remember what's left their mouth.

===

He believes many, many things, but claims to believe nothing at all.

"Lack of belief" takes nobody anywhere. You can't know anything or do anything or live a life without believing things, because it's impossible in

Casually conflating lack of a specific belief with lack of any belief.

At first glance, I'd have to say that's a silly thing to say. But maybe you'll explain it, so it makes some sense.

I was pointing out your transparent strawman.
Not for your benefit,
but for those who think you communicate in good faith.

Atheism is the attribute of being absent of a belief in deities.
Inanimate matter and most life forms are presumably atheistic.
A lack of a specific belief: that of deities.

One can lack a specific belief, without lacking all belief.
You conflated these two positions so you could provide your strawman argument.

Disappointing stuff.

IC does a full circle.
Demonstrating closed mind.
I'm a fool the longer I walk alongside his spiraling madness.

Blocked.

Well done Ben. Don't feed the trolls. They are the Nietzschean abyss.

[Belinda]

(i) I'm sure mine was. I don't impute bad faith to any indoctrinator. I was taught to know, thinking came after. I could never have escaped cultism until the cult deconstructed itself. I had no beliefs. Only certainties. Dogmata. That eroded, mainly by the principle of parsimony. But I had to be led in deconstruction. My reason was enslaved by my passion for certainty. Until error was exposed, against my will. For some here, on this very thread, from its OP, that never happens. How sad, How human. I got lucky. I should have more sympathy for the still benighted.

(ii) It wasn't logos. He said it. Of 'the Father'. All that happens necessarily also intrinsically happens by chance. But yes, embrace the other. All others no matter how repulsive. There is no hope until liberals can do that. 65. The last of my religious certainties fell away. In the lifelong process of epicyclically de/re/constructing dogma.

(iii) Me too!

I really needed to look up the following info about Logos:-

1. Greek Concept of Logos
In Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus, Stoicism, and later Hellenistic thought, Logos had several meanings:

Heraclitus (6th century BCE): Logos referred to the rational principle governing the cosmos. It was the underlying order and reason in the universe.

Stoicism: The Stoics developed this further. For them, Logos was the divine rationality that permeates and structures all reality. It was impersonal but essential to the coherence of existence.

Philo of Alexandria (1st century BCE/CE): A Hellenistic Jewish philosopher who synthesized Jewish theology with Greek philosophy, Logos became a mediating divine being—the intermediary between God and the world.

2. Christian Logos (Gospel of John)
In John 1:1, the famous passage begins:

"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God."

This is a direct borrowing of the term Logos but with significant reinterpretation:

The Logos is not an impersonal force but a person—Jesus Christ.

The Logos is eternal, divine, and incarnate ("The Word became flesh and dwelt among us" – John 1:14).

It bridges Greek philosophical ideas of rationality and order with Jewish concepts of God's creative and revelatory word (e.g., in Genesis 1, where God creates by speaking).

ChatGPT

Yep, knew that a lonnnng time before ChatGPT. Glad it agrees with me.

The Johannine school logos isn't known for transcendent Love. A cosmic Father who notes the death of a sparrow is a beautiful hint of that.

You did it again! Now I have to look up 'Johannine school'.
I am really glad you enjoy the Greek philosophical Logos .

I feel the Greek Logos is true. My difficulty remains of how to combine the Greek Logos with present need to break the Gaza blockade. Our hearts are with the crew of that brave little ship Greta Thunberg sails on to breaK Israel's blockade. Jesus would be aboard .

Edited a few hours later.
I put to ChatGPT a lot of questions and objections stemming from 'Joahannine Christianity ' which led to Philo of Alexandria.

Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – 50 CE) was a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher who lived in Alexandria, Egypt — a hub of Greek philosophy and Diaspora Judaism.

He attempted to harmonize the Hebrew Scriptures with Greek (especially Platonic and Stoic) philosophy.

He wrote in Greek, and his works aimed at interpreting the Hebrew Bible allegorically in terms of philosophical categories — especially logos, nous, and virtue.

[henry quirk]

Like the vast majority.

That's how it works, doesn't it? A few bad eggs ruin it for everyone. You do right (or, don't do wrong), but the other guy does wrong and you end up gettin' jabbed in the keister for it with regulation and law, stuff that's supposed to keep him down but just leashes you.

You might say all we need is love. Me, I say what we need are shotguns and let's break some eggs.

My eyes glitter at the thought of bathing in the blood of the ruling class.

I got you figured as more of a politburo-type so, no, no blood bathin' for you. Your tools are love and compassion and rehabilitation. Your revolution is in gun barrels. Hippy.

I find the concept oxymoronic.

As you like. Keep in mind, though: without natural rights, you got no warrant to object to being commodified. Even if natural rights are a fiction (they're not) only good can come from acknowledging and respecting 'em.

Well you will do if you won't have social justice.

You don't need social justice: you need recognition and respect of natural rights. No politburo required.

Behind which is a mind like a steel trap.

You mock me, sir.

Um sorry, my eyes are too dim.

Your eyes are fine, I'm sure. It's the rosy glasses: take 'em off.

We have so much in common. Infinitely more than our mere polar opposite worldviews.

As I say: friendly enemies.

I know no Gods exist.

There's just one Creator, and, of course you don't.

[Immanuel Can]

Well done Ben. Don't feed the trolls. They are the Nietzschean abyss.

You admire the side that cuts and runs? Well, it's your side, and you did the same, so...yeah, I understand that.

And as for Nietzsche, he played for your team, not mine.

[Belinda]

Like the vast majority.

That's how it works, doesn't it? A few bad eggs ruin it for everyone. You do right (or, don't do wrong), but the other guy does wrong and you end up gettin' jabbed in the keister for it with regulation and law, stuff that's supposed to keep him down but just leashes you.

You might say all we need is love. Me, I say what we need are shotguns and let's break some eggs.

My eyes glitter at the thought of bathing in the blood of the ruling class.

I got you figured as more of a politburo-type so, no, no blood bathin' for you. Your tools are love and compassion and rehabilitation. Your revolution is in gun barrels. Hippy.

I find the concept oxymoronic.

As you like. Keep in mind, though: without natural rights, you got no warrant to object to being commodified. Even if natural rights are a fiction (they're not) only good can come from acknowledging and respecting 'em.

Well you will do if you won't have social justice.

You don't need social justice: you need recognition and respect of natural rights. No politburo required.

Behind which is a mind like a steel trap.

You mock me, sir.

Um sorry, my eyes are too dim.

Your eyes are fine, I'm sure. It's the rosy glasses: take 'em off.

We have so much in common. Infinitely more than our mere polar opposite worldviews.

As I say: friendly enemies.

I know no Gods exist.

There's just one Creator, and, of course you don't.

But Henry, how can you know what rights are natural? I bet somewhere there is some really horrible murderer who thinks his rights are natural.

[henry quirk]

But Henry, how can you know what rights are natural?

Same way you do: I know, in my bones, my life is mine. My right to my life, myself, my liberty, my property, is exclusively mine. This is the common, the universal, intuition every person has. You see the line, the fence, between us, yes? You have all the say over your life and none over mine, and vice versa. So: murder, rape, slavery, theft, fraud, and all the nasty permutations and iterations of those, are wrong, all the time, everywhere, for everyone.

Now: ask me about self-defense and defense of the other.

I bet somewhere there is some really horrible murderer who thinks his rights are natural.

No doubt. Pretty damn sure, though, that guy, and all the others like him, would take a dim view about being murdered. As much as we good folks (HA!) these animals each know, without exception, I am my own...I am not a commodity for use, abuse, direction, destruction, and discard even as they use, abuse, direct, destroy, and discard other people.

Now: ask me where we get compassion and altruism from natural rights.

[CIN2]

I define 'bad' as 'providing sufficient reason for an anti-response',

That's a thoroughly unhelpful "definition." If fails to specify what those "reasons" would be, what the "anti-response" would entail, and what would justify calling "reasons" "sufficient." In other words, it says absolutely nothing specific.

I infer that unpleasantness has the property of being bad, which is not the same as saying that 'unpleasant' means the same as 'bad'.

Then it also makes unclear what the real connection between "unpleasant" and "bad" would be. Many things that are "unpleasant" are good...like cough medicine. And things which some people find "pleasant," like theft or adultery, could be "bad."

So you've given nothing that informs us of anything.

There might be grounds for a moral claim against God, if he created childbirth and child-rearing in such a way that they involve unpleasantness.

Only if "unpleasant" and "bad" turn out to be the same, which even you now admit they are not...though even your claim that "unpleasantness" is involved with "badness" remains unclear.

All I am claiming is that unpleasantness is unavoidably disliked.

That's just circular. Being "unpleasant" simply means being "disliked." The "avoidably" is also gratuitous: what would "avoidance" have to do with either?

Secondly, "anti-response." If I have an "anti-response" to something, it's just a feeling I have. Some people have an "anti-response" to homosexuality, and some have a strongly "pro-response" to it: can we solve the question of homosexuality's moral status with reference to how these people feel, when they feel the dead opposite?

Well, to begin with, the question is not whether people have pro- or anti-responses to homosexuality; the question is whether homosexuality provides sufficient reason for either of these responses.The only things that intrinsically provide sufficient reason for pro- or anti-responses are pleasantness and unpleasantness;

Wait.

If "unpleasantness" "intrinsically provides sufficient reason" for an "anti-response," and that is also your definition of "bad" (see above), then you are saying homosexuality is bad, and "intrinsically" so. And the basis for that would be no more than that some people "unavoidably" feel an "unpleasantness" about it.

So what is "bad"? Here, we come to the proposed first conclusion in the chain syllogism you've suggested:

What does "bad" mean, in this context now? "Unpleasant"? "Evoking an anti-reaction"?

It means exactly what I say it means in premise 1, i.e. 'provides sufficient reason for an anti-response.'

Which is not informative of anything, since all of the terms you use remain undefined. You've said nothing, essentially. We're no closer to knowing what you mean by "bad" than before, since we can't know what "provides sufficient reason" or "anti-reaction" or "unpleasantness" entail.

It looks like you're plugging for a very weak form of Emotivism, in which your own personal emotions determine whether things are "good" or "bad," and your own sense of "sufficient reasons" is all that's available for us to use in moral reflection: and that's just not good enough for anybody else, is it?

Well, since "pain" is an effect, not a thing-in-itself, we really can't do that, can we? "Pain" is always the product of definite causes and actions, even when we don't happen to know what that cause is (as in the case of a mysterious disease or an unknown malevolence). So how can we say that we have a clear case of "pain" being " bad" in a "pain" that is divorced from all circumstances, since that never happens in real life?

You're suggesting here that my argument needs cases where the pain (or unpleasantness) actually occurs separately from other festures of the experience.

No. I'm saying the opposite. I'm saying that that is what YOU might need in order to make your case, but you can't have it. Pain is an effect, but it doesn't tell us the moral quality of the thing with which it comes packaged. Some painful things are good, and some painless things are bad. Pain actually has no ability to tell us anything about the moral situation, or goodness or badness, or justification.

Is not the business of morals to weigh off, in fact, whether the pain incurred in a heroic act or a criminal one is "worth it" morally speaking, in that it's still moral/immoral for us to do, regardless of what pain is entailed?

This proves my previous point. You are asking whether the pain, considered as a distinct property, is morally worth it.

No, I am definitely doing no such thing.

I'm pointing out, rather, that the presence of pain tells us nothing, morally speaking. And that in ethics, we aren't at all concerned with whether or not people happen to like or feel pleasantness about what they're doing; we're only concerned with whether or not what we're asking them to do is RIGHT, even if it causes them pain, or even if it offers any pleasure.

So be it.

Here's just a start:
Utilitarianism, a moral philosophy focused on maximizing overall happiness, faces several criticisms.

I am only defending hedonism, not utilitarianism,

The same critiques still work. You can see that.

And the anaesthetic heals nothing. Making something painless doesn't make it "right" or "good." A person taking fentanyl will stop feeling pain, but is that morally good? Surely not. And it is likely to end up increasing his pain later, as well.

It is morally good to give someone fentanyl if (a) the giver does so freely and intentionally, and (b) it is the giver's judgment that this will lead to greater net pleasantness.

Are you asking a question? It needs a question mark, then.

I'd be interested in how you think your moral theory would answer this. That's why I asked.

Of course this judgment may be mistaken, and the fentanyl may lead to net unpleasantness, in which case giving the fentanyl will be morally good (because it was done with a good intention) but instrumentally bad (because it has bad consequences).

So you haven't done anything to resolve the conflict between the theories that hold that "good" means "good intentions," as in Kant, and "good" means "pleasant outcomes or consequences," as per Mill et al. So we can't know whether or not dosing somebody with fentanyl is good or bad. This is what I mean about your theory being totally morally uninformative: we're no more clear on the situation than we were at the start, and your theory has added no useful information to our moral judgment at all.

By the way, that's a further criticism of the "pleasure-pain" view of ethics: the timeframe. How long do we wait, in order to judge the goodness or badness of something, since there are long-term and short-term pleasures and pains?

You cannot finally judge the goodness or badness of something until it itself and all its after-effects have ceased. That is no criticism of the theory. It's just how things are.

Then it would mean you can't tell anything about goodness or badness until after all the participants are dead. And yes, that would be a very serious -- even terminal -- fault in any such theory. It literally could not inform any living person about the moral status of his/her situation. And it sure won't inform the dead.

We're back to the old Is-ought controversy here: and to understand that, I can recommend a look at Hume's point about this. We can't get a moral conclusion from a merely factual premise.

I don't think Hume actually said this,

Then you need to read Hume. He did. And I linked you an article that quoted not only him but a bunch of other authors reacting to Hume.

Again, sorry...you're just not understanding the Is-Ought controversy, perhaps. Here's a PN article that will help https://philosophynow.org/issues/99/Thoughts_on_Oughts

I have said nothing about 'ought', so Hume's thoughts about the relation between 'is' and 'ought' are not relevant to my argument. I have talked only about 'good' and 'bad', not about 'ought'.

Are you not even aware that the word "ought" is essential to moral thinking? Ethics is not about what you feel you want to do, or what you can be able to do, or what you find convenient to do. You can know all three without knowing anything about morals or ethics at all...just by consulting your gut or your momentary disposition. But if ethics/morals are real things, then they have to do with what one should or ought to do, regardless of one's feelings in the moment.

If we say "It is moral to die for one's family," we are not asking, "Do you want to die?" We aren't asking, "Would you find it pleasant?" We aren't even asking, "Do you want to?" We're saying, instead, that it would be good/noble/courageous/admirable and right to do it, especially if you find it something you'd rather not do, and will be painful and hard, and you wouldn't otherwise do. In other words, something you "ought" to do, not something you feel like doing.

You seem to be assuming that my argument entails a position on 'ought' that I have not stated.

In that, all philosophers of ethics agree. It's you that has no ally on that. "Ought" is the essential term of all ethical/moral reflection...as also suggested by the OP here.

Did you even read the article?

Done, above.

No. Getting to grips with my argument means doing the following:
1. Checking it for internal validity.
2. Seriously considering whether premise 1 is true or likely to be true, i.e. whether my account of the meaning of 'good' is plausible.
3. If you decide premise 1 is likely to be true, then seriously considering whether premise 2 is true or likely to be true, i.e. whether it is plausible that unpleasantness is an example of what premise 1 is talking about.
You haven't done any of these.

I did them all. And you ignored all I did. If that's what you do, I can't stop you.

...when you say '"pleasant" isn't "good"', you are implying that I claimed that "pleasant" and "good" are synonyms.

No. I'm pointing out that you can't even use "pleasant" as a mere indicator of goodness. The two are utterly unrelated, and only ever occur in each other's company by accident. That's what I'm pointing out.

Well, I can see you have a firm commitment to your view, though I think it's highly counterintuitive. Most people would not agree to so much, I think, as to believe that a sadist or masochist could be doing "good" to himself or others, simply if he is experiencing "pleasure" in the pain he causes himself or others.

I think that we all instantly recognize the masochist is doing evil to himself (say, carving his wrists with sharp objects, which is one of the things they're known to do), and the sadist is doing evil to others, regardless of the delight he's taking in doing it. And if we think otherwise, I suggest we've voided the words "good" and "bad" of any specific meaning at all...ANYTHING could be "good" or "bad"; and hence, nothing can be specifically either one.

Yes, of course the masochist is doing evil to himself, if we consider the TOTAL value of his action.

Justify that claim. why is he "doing evil"? He likes it. He wants it. He can do it. And he finds it pleasant.

And of course the sadist is doing evil to others,

But he knows exactly what he's doing. And he finds it fun. How do you convince him he ought not to do it?

Yes, that's its definition. It's the very essence of the good.

This isn't plausible, for three reasons.
1. It would mean that when an atheist says, 'That was a good meal,' he means 'That meal was consonant and harmonious with the nature and purposes of God.'

Are you actually suggesting that when an Atheist says, "That was a good meal," he means it was morally good? I'll bet he doesn't. He means by "good" something like "tasty" or "gustatorially fulfilling," or "aesthetically pleasing." He doesn't mean anything moral at all. So there's no such conflict. It's not a morality-implicating situation. The Atheist can have his "good meal" without even involving himself in ethics.

2. If the nature of God changes tonight at midnight, so that torture, rape and murder are then consonant with it and being kind to others is opposed to it, it would mean that tomorrow we would wake up to find that torture, rape and murder had become good overnight, and being kind to others had become bad. But that is not what we would say. We would say that God had become bad overnight — and we would be right.

this is answered simply by the fact that God does not change His nature. You needed an "if" to get your argument off the ground; but it was an "if" even less possible than, "If I could flap my arms hard enough, I could fly." It's outright impossible. So no, it's not a live criticism. It's not even one that the imagination can fabricate without misunderstanding what the word "God" (in reference to the only God that actually exists) means.

3. If your theory were true, there would be no reason for us to seek what is good. On your theory, seeking what is good would be equivalent to seeking what is consistent with the nature of God. But if I then ask you, 'Why should I seek what is consistent with the nature of God?', either you can give me no reason at all, or, if you say, 'Because the nature of God is good', you are guilty of circularity.

Oh, that's easy to answer. Because the ultimate good of man is fellowship with God. It's both the thing best for man, and the thing for which he was designed. It's good in every possible way, in fact. So you should seek what is consistent with the nature of God so as to be a fit companion for God. And if you seek anything else, you'll only be seeking that which is evil -- that which is all three of, hurtful to you, damaging to your relationship with your Creator, and ultimately defeating of your own whole reason for being in existence.

I had prepared a detailed reply to this, but there seems little point in posting it, because it's clear that neither of us will ever convince the other.

I'm withdrawing from the debate.

[Immanuel Can]

I had prepared a detailed reply to this, but there seems little point in posting it, because it's clear that neither of us will ever convince the other.

I'm withdrawing from the debate.

Thanks for your time.

[Martin Peter Clarke]

I define 'bad' as 'providing sufficient reason for an anti-response',

That's a thoroughly unhelpful "definition." If fails to specify what those "reasons" would be, what the "anti-response" would entail, and what would justify calling "reasons" "sufficient." In other words, it says absolutely nothing specific.

I infer that unpleasantness has the property of being bad, which is not the same as saying that 'unpleasant' means the same as 'bad'.

Then it also makes unclear what the real connection between "unpleasant" and "bad" would be. Many things that are "unpleasant" are good...like cough medicine. And things which some people find "pleasant," like theft or adultery, could be "bad."

So you've given nothing that informs us of anything.

There might be grounds for a moral claim against God, if he created childbirth and child-rearing in such a way that they involve unpleasantness.

Only if "unpleasant" and "bad" turn out to be the same, which even you now admit they are not...though even your claim that "unpleasantness" is involved with "badness" remains unclear.

All I am claiming is that unpleasantness is unavoidably disliked.

That's just circular. Being "unpleasant" simply means being "disliked." The "avoidably" is also gratuitous: what would "avoidance" have to do with either?

Well, to begin with, the question is not whether people have pro- or anti-responses to homosexuality; the question is whether homosexuality provides sufficient reason for either of these responses.The only things that intrinsically provide sufficient reason for pro- or anti-responses are pleasantness and unpleasantness;

Wait.

If "unpleasantness" "intrinsically provides sufficient reason" for an "anti-response," and that is also your definition of "bad" (see above), then you are saying homosexuality is bad, and "intrinsically" so. And the basis for that would be no more than that some people "unavoidably" feel an "unpleasantness" about it.

It means exactly what I say it means in premise 1, i.e. 'provides sufficient reason for an anti-response.'

Which is not informative of anything, since all of the terms you use remain undefined. You've said nothing, essentially. We're no closer to knowing what you mean by "bad" than before, since we can't know what "provides sufficient reason" or "anti-reaction" or "unpleasantness" entail.

It looks like you're plugging for a very weak form of Emotivism, in which your own personal emotions determine whether things are "good" or "bad," and your own sense of "sufficient reasons" is all that's available for us to use in moral reflection: and that's just not good enough for anybody else, is it?

You're suggesting here that my argument needs cases where the pain (or unpleasantness) actually occurs separately from other festures of the experience.

No. I'm saying the opposite. I'm saying that that is what YOU might need in order to make your case, but you can't have it. Pain is an effect, but it doesn't tell us the moral quality of the thing with which it comes packaged. Some painful things are good, and some painless things are bad. Pain actually has no ability to tell us anything about the moral situation, or goodness or badness, or justification.

This proves my previous point. You are asking whether the pain, considered as a distinct property, is morally worth it.

No, I am definitely doing no such thing.

I'm pointing out, rather, that the presence of pain tells us nothing, morally speaking. And that in ethics, we aren't at all concerned with whether or not people happen to like or feel pleasantness about what they're doing; we're only concerned with whether or not what we're asking them to do is RIGHT, even if it causes them pain, or even if it offers any pleasure.

I am only defending hedonism, not utilitarianism,

The same critiques still work. You can see that.

It is morally good to give someone fentanyl if (a) the giver does so freely and intentionally, and (b) it is the giver's judgment that this will lead to greater net pleasantness.

Are you asking a question? It needs a question mark, then.

I'd be interested in how you think your moral theory would answer this. That's why I asked.

Of course this judgment may be mistaken, and the fentanyl may lead to net unpleasantness, in which case giving the fentanyl will be morally good (because it was done with a good intention) but instrumentally bad (because it has bad consequences).

So you haven't done anything to resolve the conflict between the theories that hold that "good" means "good intentions," as in Kant, and "good" means "pleasant outcomes or consequences," as per Mill et al. So we can't know whether or not dosing somebody with fentanyl is good or bad. This is what I mean about your theory being totally morally uninformative: we're no more clear on the situation than we were at the start, and your theory has added no useful information to our moral judgment at all.

You cannot finally judge the goodness or badness of something until it itself and all its after-effects have ceased. That is no criticism of the theory. It's just how things are.

Then it would mean you can't tell anything about goodness or badness until after all the participants are dead. And yes, that would be a very serious -- even terminal -- fault in any such theory. It literally could not inform any living person about the moral status of his/her situation. And it sure won't inform the dead.

I don't think Hume actually said this,

Then you need to read Hume. He did. And I linked you an article that quoted not only him but a bunch of other authors reacting to Hume.

I have said nothing about 'ought', so Hume's thoughts about the relation between 'is' and 'ought' are not relevant to my argument. I have talked only about 'good' and 'bad', not about 'ought'.

Are you not even aware that the word "ought" is essential to moral thinking? Ethics is not about what you feel you want to do, or what you can be able to do, or what you find convenient to do. You can know all three without knowing anything about morals or ethics at all...just by consulting your gut or your momentary disposition. But if ethics/morals are real things, then they have to do with what one should or ought to do, regardless of one's feelings in the moment.

If we say "It is moral to die for one's family," we are not asking, "Do you want to die?" We aren't asking, "Would you find it pleasant?" We aren't even asking, "Do you want to?" We're saying, instead, that it would be good/noble/courageous/admirable and right to do it, especially if you find it something you'd rather not do, and will be painful and hard, and you wouldn't otherwise do. In other words, something you "ought" to do, not something you feel like doing.

You seem to be assuming that my argument entails a position on 'ought' that I have not stated.

In that, all philosophers of ethics agree. It's you that has no ally on that. "Ought" is the essential term of all ethical/moral reflection...as also suggested by the OP here.

Did you even read the article?

No. Getting to grips with my argument means doing the following:
1. Checking it for internal validity.
2. Seriously considering whether premise 1 is true or likely to be true, i.e. whether my account of the meaning of 'good' is plausible.
3. If you decide premise 1 is likely to be true, then seriously considering whether premise 2 is true or likely to be true, i.e. whether it is plausible that unpleasantness is an example of what premise 1 is talking about.
You haven't done any of these.

I did them all. And you ignored all I did. If that's what you do, I can't stop you.

...when you say '"pleasant" isn't "good"', you are implying that I claimed that "pleasant" and "good" are synonyms.

No. I'm pointing out that you can't even use "pleasant" as a mere indicator of goodness. The two are utterly unrelated, and only ever occur in each other's company by accident. That's what I'm pointing out.

Yes, of course the masochist is doing evil to himself, if we consider the TOTAL value of his action.

Justify that claim. why is he "doing evil"? He likes it. He wants it. He can do it. And he finds it pleasant.

And of course the sadist is doing evil to others,

But he knows exactly what he's doing. And he finds it fun. How do you convince him he ought not to do it?

This isn't plausible, for three reasons.
1. It would mean that when an atheist says, 'That was a good meal,' he means 'That meal was consonant and harmonious with the nature and purposes of God.'

Are you actually suggesting that when an Atheist says, "That was a good meal," he means it was morally good? I'll bet he doesn't. He means by "good" something like "tasty" or "gustatorially fulfilling," or "aesthetically pleasing." He doesn't mean anything moral at all. So there's no such conflict. It's not a morality-implicating situation. The Atheist can have his "good meal" without even involving himself in ethics.

2. If the nature of God changes tonight at midnight, so that torture, rape and murder are then consonant with it and being kind to others is opposed to it, it would mean that tomorrow we would wake up to find that torture, rape and murder had become good overnight, and being kind to others had become bad. But that is not what we would say. We would say that God had become bad overnight — and we would be right.

this is answered simply by the fact that God does not change His nature. You needed an "if" to get your argument off the ground; but it was an "if" even less possible than, "If I could flap my arms hard enough, I could fly." It's outright impossible. So no, it's not a live criticism. It's not even one that the imagination can fabricate without misunderstanding what the word "God" (in reference to the only God that actually exists) means.

3. If your theory were true, there would be no reason for us to seek what is good. On your theory, seeking what is good would be equivalent to seeking what is consistent with the nature of God. But if I then ask you, 'Why should I seek what is consistent with the nature of God?', either you can give me no reason at all, or, if you say, 'Because the nature of God is good', you are guilty of circularity.

Oh, that's easy to answer. Because the ultimate good of man is fellowship with God. It's both the thing best for man, and the thing for which he was designed. It's good in every possible way, in fact. So you should seek what is consistent with the nature of God so as to be a fit companion for God. And if you seek anything else, you'll only be seeking that which is evil -- that which is all three of, hurtful to you, damaging to your relationship with your Creator, and ultimately defeating of your own whole reason for being in existence.

I had prepared a detailed reply to this, but there seems little point in posting it, because it's clear that neither of us will ever convince the other.

I'm withdrawing from the debate.

Bravo.

[Martin Peter Clarke]

Like the vast majority.

(i) That's how it works, doesn't it? A few bad eggs ruin it for everyone. You do right (or, don't do wrong), but the other guy does wrong and you end up gettin' jabbed in the keister for it with regulation and law, stuff that's supposed to keep him down but just leashes you.

You might say all we need is love. Me, I say what we need are shotguns and let's break some eggs.

My eyes glitter at the thought of bathing in the blood of the ruling class.

(ii) I got you figured as more of a politburo-type so, no, no blood bathin' for you. Your tools are love and compassion and rehabilitation. Your revolution is in gun barrels. Hippy.

I find the concept oxymoronic.

(iii) As you like. Keep in mind, though: without natural rights, you got no warrant to object to being commodified. Even if natural rights are a fiction (they're not) only good can come from acknowledging and respecting 'em.

Well you will do if you won't have social justice.

(iv) You don't need social justice: you need recognition and respect of natural rights. No politburo required.

Behind which is a mind like a steel trap.

(v) You mock me, sir.

Um sorry, my eyes are too dim.

(vi) Your eyes are fine, I'm sure. It's the rosy glasses: take 'em off.

We have so much in common. Infinitely more than our mere polar opposite worldviews.

(vii) As I say: friendly enemies.

I know no Gods exist.

(viii) There's just one Creator, and, of course you don't.

(i) I don't feel leashed by the law, due to my privilege, which shows how light the yoke can be, and no, it can't protect me from determined predators. But I've got to be 70 and kept my looks. Tho' not the contents of my shed recently. And I have encountered lawlessness at, on the edge. More than most as I've chosen to go out on it, as well as it being unavoidable if one goes out at all. Memorably so. Therefore not that often. I've encountered civilians with guns twice. Disconcerting. In a high density population we don't need them. Farmers and grouse hunters have shotguns obviously. I only object to the latter on moral grounds.

(ii) I'm an Imagine type: A hopeless idealist type. ... No politburos. No guns. Just people. People of the land. It starts with land. That cannot be owned. Period. Loaned at rent. Paid to the community chest, social fund. Social bank. Co-op bank. Don't worry, democracy is such a joke, it will never happen. Natural 'rights' (what's yours is mine and what's mine's me own, as they say in Yorkshire. They also say 'ear all, see all, say nowt; drink all, sup all, pay nowt), guarantee it.

(iii) I can object all I like, I, all of us, apart from the truly independently rich, and even then, are commodified already. One cannot escape being traded.

(iv) For social justice you need public luxury; in health (no guns, a major high mortality health issue in the US), care, education; and private sufficiency. They would overlap in the provision of housing. No politburo. No plutocrats. Fully participative democracy and an unregressable, unpoliticized, revenue service.

(v) Not . at . all. You are iron to my iron. That's what parliament - taking - should be.

(vi) OK, I see that as a libertarian you reject anything but mutual autonomy, like Michael Shermer, I was astounded to read, in his otherwise peerless The Believing Brain https://michaelshermer.com/the-believing-brain/. The UK is the 6th biggest economy on Earth. 21st population. We achieved this with slavery and conquest. The blood never dried on the British Empire for 300 years. We survivors stand on mountains of suffering and death, including our own peasantry, working class and Celtic minorities. We have 30% child poverty. The worst in NW. Europe. And that's with a mixed economy. In a libertarian one it would be at least 80%. The autonomous, by definition, do not give a shit. We had a prime minister who tried to achieve that. She lasted 49 days. The establishment knew they'd get a revolution. We had one 400 years ago, that was more than enough, thank you very much! My city of Leicester was literally decimated in one night.

A tad polemical perhaps? Got muh blood up!

(vii) After your return of serve to (vi).

(viii) No Sir. If there were one creator, for which there is no warrant that can be known (until Love shows itself as always having grounded being, which if it could have, it always would have), but desire, there would be infinite. Just as there are infinite multiverses. This I know. As coherent, justified, warranted, true belief.

[Belinda]

But Henry, how can you know what rights are natural?

Same way you do: I know, in my bones, my life is mine. My right to my life, myself, my liberty, my property, is exclusively mine. This is the common, the universal, intuition every person has. You see the line, the fence, between us, yes? You have all the say over your life and none over mine, and vice versa. So: murder, rape, slavery, theft, fraud, and all the nasty permutations and iterations of those, are wrong, all the time, everywhere, for everyone.

Now: ask me about self-defense and defense of the other.

I bet somewhere there is some really horrible murderer who thinks his rights are natural.

No doubt. Pretty damn sure, though, that guy, and all the others like him, would take a dim view about being murdered. As much as we good folks (HA!) these animals each know, without exception, I am my own...I am not a commodity for use, abuse, direction, destruction, and discard even as they use, abuse, direct, destroy, and discard other people.

Now: ask me where we get compassion and altruism from natural rights.

I think you get the idea of natural rights from your own psychology. The interface between one's natural rights and one's natural responsibilities to the other is a moving interface , it moves between persons and between cultures. So from your own psychology you get compassion and altruism and also need to protect your own interests and your own virtues. Also you like everyone else are indoctrinated to some extent by your culture which was probably mediated through your parents and peer group, and maybe also your school.

Pretty damn sure, though, that guy, and all the others like him, would take a dim view about being murdered. As much as we good folks (HA!) these animals each know, without exception, I am my own...I am not a commodity for use, abuse, direction, destruction, and discard even as they use, abuse, direct, destroy, and discard other people.(Henry Quirk)

The Golden Rule ,which you articulate , is common to societies but does not apply to mere aggregates of people. I understand that insofar as the Golden Rule is natural, very young children even before they can talk, have the notion of fairness. I must look it up.

_--------------------
I looked up ChatGPT and it seems you are right and
there are signs of natural rights:-
So, while very young children don’t articulate the Golden Rule explicitly, they do show early signs of moral intuition and social expectations that form its basis.
also in the reply from ChatGPT
Scientific studies show that babies of 6 to 9 months show signs of recognising and feeling fairness, although babies can't of course articulate.

So it seems that even within aggregates of unsocialised people there is natural tendency to fairness.