Alexiev wrote: ↑Sat Apr 12, 2025 5:29 pm
BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Apr 12, 2025 4:06 pm
Alexiev wrote: ↑Sat Apr 12, 2025 3:30 pm
You are the one who dodges and deflects, Mike. I've answered your questions many times, but because you don't like my answers you misrepresent them and then repeat yourself.
One more try: whether "everything we think, feel, and do is caused" depends on what we mean be :caused". Your modernist world view (in which the whole is "explained" or "caused" by the parts) suggests that correlations between physical events in the parts (neurons firing in the brain, for example) constitute "causes". But in general English usage, a "cause" is a handle we can manipulate.
When a car goes around a curve in the road too fast and slides off the road and crashes, what causes the crash? To the driver, the crash is caused by driving too fast; to the road engineer, the cause is insufficient banking; to the tire manufacturer the cause is bad tread on the tires. Each seeks a handle he can manipulate. To say the cause is the chain reaction inevitable from the Big Bang is meaningless, whether or not it is correct.
Of course everything we think, feel and do is
correlated with neurons firing in our brains. So what? Where does an acknowledgement of that get us? Is it reasonable to use the word "cause" to describe that correlation?
To the Modernist, the whole is "explained" or "caused" by its parts. Fine. That's one way of looking at things. But although that perspective is sometimes valuable, sometimes it isn't. It doesn't help the driver who crashed the car avoid to another crash to think the Big Bang caused the crash. He's better off thinking he made a decision to drive too fast. It doesn't help a general to think battles are won or lost because of the Big Bang. He's better off looking at specific tactics, or the morale of the troops.
Correlation is not causation. What we mean by "cause" is not inevitable correlation, but a handle we can manipulate. The experimental scientist manipulates the variable, and calls it a "cause". He is correct in his use of language, even though infinite other conditions are necessary to the "effect".
The man who decides to go to the store thinks he went to the store because he freely decided to do so. He is correct, whatever the.preconditions that, for the lat 13 billion years, may have (we don't and can't kniw) made his decision inevitable.
Alexiev, thank you for trying again—but let’s get something clear:
Your entire response hinges on conflating
language conventions with
ontological claims. When you say “cause” is just a “handle we can manipulate,” you’re talking about
pragmatic language, not the
structure of reality. You're describing how humans talk about things—not what actually makes those things happen.
Let me unpack it.
You say “the cause” of a crash depends on who you ask—the driver, the engineer, the tire company. But that’s not because causality is vague or subjective. It’s because
humans are storytelling creatures, slicing causal chains at the most convenient node. It’s shorthand. Not metaphysics.
The car crash had a
real chain of causes: friction coefficients, velocity, tire composition, steering angle, and yes—every atom and interaction involved. The subjective “handle” someone grabs—“I was going too fast”—is a linguistic overlay we slap on top of a vastly more complex web of causes.
And here’s where you dodge:
When I say “everything we think, feel, and do is caused,” I’m not talking about whether it’s helpful to tell a soldier “the Big Bang made you do it.” I’m saying:
ontologically, from a physics perspective, there is no uncaused node in the system. There is no free-floating chooser standing outside the laws of nature. There is no “you” operating as a first cause. Every “decision” is an
output of a system whose inputs you didn’t select.
That’s not “modernism.” That’s just the science of systems and brains and physical law.
So you ask, “Where does acknowledging that get us?” It gets us honesty. It gets us humility. It gets us a framework where we stop blaming people for being born into systems that shaped them like clay. It gets us closer to
truth, even if it’s inconvenient.
Let’s not pretend this is about the usefulness of language. This is about whether you accept that
every single thought you have is the result of prior causes.
So once again:

Yes, people can act.

Yes, we can identify local causes and call them “decisions.”

But no, those decisions are not metaphysically free.
And no amount of poetic hand-waving or semantic sidestepping will change that.
So if you’re arguing that we shouldn’t say “everything is caused” just because it makes people uncomfortable or because it isn’t “useful” in everyday speech—then what you’re rejecting isn’t science.
You’re rejecting
truth because it’s inconvenient.
And if that’s the hill you want to die on, fine. But don’t pretend it's a high one.
I have no desire to die on any hill. Nor am I "rejecting" anything. You are forgetting (or ignoring) what I've written previously. Science works as I suggest. Experimental scientists list the variable as a "cause", not the Big Bang. That's because the variable is the handle we can manipulate.
As I've repeated many times, we must (and do) act as if we have free choices whether these choices have been "destined" from the time of the Big Bang or not. That's why the normal use of "cause" is not a conflating of language conventions with ontological claims. Instead, it is an attempt to make science useful. What good does it do to claim the Big Bang "causes" bubonic plague? Isn't it more reasonable to look for a handle we can manipulate? After all, we have antibiotics that cure the disease, developed because we know bacteria "cause" disease. (Of course we also know that infection with bacteria makes some people ill, but not other people. So many factors are necessary and sufficient to cause disease. We say bacteria is the cause because it is the handle we can manipulate.)
I've repeated over over and over again that I agree that every thought we have may very well have a prior cause. Why you keep repeating that point is incomprehensible. I agree, but I don't care. Science works by identifying proximate causes; justice works by blaming people for some of their decisions. Whether these decisions were inevitable is completely and utterly irrelevant. There's no need for you to repeat yourself one more time; nor is there any need for you to misrepresent my clearly stated position one more time.
Alexiev, I appreciate the clarification—and I think we’re getting closer to the real distinction here: you're talking about
functional causality, and I’m talking about
ontological causality.
You’re right: scientists, engineers, and doctors seek
useful handles—proximate, manipulable variables that can be tested, modified, and applied to produce results. You call these “causes,” and rightly so within the
pragmatic framework of human utility. If bacteria make us sick and we can kill them with antibiotics, it’s absolutely sensible to call bacteria the “cause” of the disease in practical terms. That’s how we survive.
But that doesn’t invalidate the
deeper reality—that everything, including the bacterium, the immune response, the antibiotic, the doctor’s decision to prescribe it, and the invention of antibiotics themselves, is part of an
unbroken causal continuum stretching back to the formation of the elements. That’s not pedantic. It’s the
foundation beneath every system we build.
You say:
“We must act as if we have free choices.”
I agree—to a point. But that
as if comes at a price. When we pretend choices are freely authored, we preserve narratives that
blame people for what they never chose to become. That’s not just a philosophical quibble. It has real consequences—for justice, education, policy, and empathy.
So yes, in courts and clinics and classrooms, we use proximate language. We say “you made a bad choice” because it’s efficient and intuitive. But if we stop there—if we mistake that shortcut for the full picture—we risk
upholding moral fictions that justify cruelty, punishment, and self-righteousness.
Here’s the cleanest way I can put it:

“Cause” as a practical handle =
science’s tool

“Cause” as a deep physical chain =
reality’s structure

Pretending the first erases the second =
confusion or convenience
You’re not wrong to speak of manipulable variables as “causes.” That’s what science does. But
science also never claims those are the
only causes—or even the whole story. It’s a map, not the territory.
And when we talk about
what people are—not just what they did—we’re obligated to zoom out. To ask why they are who they are. And that requires abandoning the myth of an uncaused, autonomous chooser.
If you agree that everything has a prior cause, then we agree on the physics. But where we part ways is in the
courage to follow that insight all the way down—past convenience, past convention, past old narratives of blame.
That’s not rejection of science.
That’s a
commitment to its full implications.