Philosophy Now Forum

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:No positive evidence,,,

My evidence is the patient absurdity of the claim of Materialism. That is, that whatever "consciousness" is, it must be composed of some sort of material.

You've forgotten the OP. We're not arguing about what I think. We're not arguing alternatives to Materialism. We're discussing what's evidently true of Materialism itself. The requisite evidence is made up of the precepts and implications of Materialism itself. If those precepts and implications are absurd, then QED.

To summarize, the Materialist's claim has to be as follows: "consciousness" is a material entity that has no material properties at all -- not just mass or volume, but measurability of any kind by anyone, using any method. Yet it exists."

Really? And they say religious people are credulous....

There is one alternative. His claim could be "consciousness" it not a material entity, and as such, does not actually exist. It's an illusion. And if that's what he means, then there is no "consciousness" to say any such thing, no "consciousnesses" to receive it. That's even funnier.

The materialist would argue that conscious is composed of material stuff. That is to say, neurons firing and creating millivolts. Basically, neurons in the brain communicate using electricity. This is what the materialist means when he talks about 'material'.

The materialist uses two main approaches to explain consciousness. Firstly, there is the claim by people such as Dennett that there is nothing called consciousness. Neurons firing in certain patterns is all there is to it, and there is nothing further to add, except a more detailed knowledge of how the brain works in physical terms some time in the future. Dennett's main claim is that consciousness is an illusion.

The second approach acknowledges there is this thing called 'consciousness', and there is an explanatory gap between how the brain works in physical terms and how consciousness is produced. This type of materialist would claim this is just a problem we have at the moment because of our lack of knowledge. In the future we will have better understandings of how the brain and consciousness are one and the same.

There is a third approach, but I won't go into that at the moment.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

bahman wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote: True
It seems to me that rejecting materialism on the basis that we do not yet have a perfect understanding of consciousness is absurd, when so far it have provided us with more answers than anything else.
Spitits, souls, ghosties and ghoulies have not offered anything but confusion.

I am not questioning whether it is possible to explain consciousness under materialism or not. My question is about the relation between what happen, moving your hand, and what you expect to happen, expecting moving your hand.

How can you "expect" movement without calling into question consciousness.

Movement is done based on laws of nature, L, by which initial state, S, evolves to final state, S', so there is no use for consciousness when it come to movement.

Immanuel Can wrote:To summarize, the Materialist's claim has to be as follows: "consciousness" is a material entity that has no material properties at all -- not just mass or volume, but measurability of any kind by anyone, using any method. Yet it exists."

As I pointed out in this thread: viewtopic.php?f=20&t=19699
IC: Here's what you believe...

Immanuel Can wrote:Really? And they say religious people are credulous....

...and you are a fool to believe it.
Materialism is simply the process of trying to understand a universe that appears to be made of some stuff, as if it were actually made of some stuff. There is a general and cautious drift towards an understanding of 'matter' being composed of excitations, knots, waves or something in one or more quantum fields. The processes by which we receive information about the universe through our senses are well described by simple mechanics. It is a mystery how that information and the way a brain analyses it becomes 'consciousness', but there are no examples of anything we could describe as consciousness, that are not associated with, albeit very complicated, electrochemical configurations of matter. Given that 'matter' itself is excitations in one or more fields, it is at least plausible that consciousness too is pattern generated in that or those fields. In other words, matter is not fundamentally different to consciousness.
So no, materialism, as it is understood by anyone who knows what they are talking about, is not logically impossible.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:No positive evidence,,,

My evidence is the patient absurdity of the claim of Materialism. That is, that whatever "consciousness" is, it must be composed of some sort of material.
:

If you seriously reject the idea that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then I ask you, if you have a brain, what is it for?

Take the blunt spoon challenge and remove some of your brain, then ask yourself if this has changed your consciousness!

Ginkgo wrote:The materialist uses two main approaches to explain consciousness. Firstly, there is the claim by people such as Dennett that there is nothing called consciousness. Neurons firing in certain patterns is all there is to it, and there is nothing further to add, except a more detailed knowledge of how the brain works in physical terms some time in the future. Dennett's main claim is that consciousness is an illusion.

The second approach acknowledges there is this thing called 'consciousness', and there is an explanatory gap between how the brain works in physical terms and how consciousness is produced. This type of materialist would claim this is just a problem we have at the moment because of our lack of knowledge. In the future we will have better understandings of how the brain and consciousness are one and the same.

What's the difference aside from a language difference? Both views deny an object or construct that is 'the consciousness' which exhibits numeric identity that the dualist often seems to need. And I don't think Dennett asserts that he is not conscious, just that he doesn't have "a consciousness". Correct me if I'm wrong. I notice IC immediately twists Dennett's denial of consciousness to a denial that one can be conscious.

I guess it depends on the definition of the words, which nobody has given, and which are not standard. IC refuses a definition since his argument seems to revolve around a moving target for the definition, and thus maintaining the wall of denial of counterargument.

I have, in my posts, likened consciousness to the process of combustion. A candle can combust (be conscious), and one can say there is combustion (consciousness) there, but one cannot put the combustion in a box, leaving the candle behind. One cannot take the mass of the process of combustion.

Ginkgo wrote: The materialist would argue that conscious is composed of material stuff. That is to say, neurons firing and creating electron volts. Basically, neurons in the brain communicate using electricity. This is what the materialist means when he talks about 'material'.

Do you personally find that plausible? After all, "electricity" is indeed something measurable and, in a certain sense, "material": but it' is not of itself about anything. Electricity does not care if it's running a toaster or a blender. Electricity has no opinions, and imparts no meaning. It certainly does not imbue things with consciousness.

The physiological components of the brain we can measure: but none account for consciousness, reasoning, selfhood, values, perceptions, identity...and so on. These things are so different from the materials that even the Materialists have to brand them as some weird kind of "epiphenomenon." Which is a polite way of them saying, "We've got no idea what this strange "emergent" quality is, or how it "emerges."

The materialist uses two main approaches to explain consciousness. Firstly, there is the claim by people such as Dennett that there is nothing called consciousness. Neurons firing in certain patterns is all there is to it, and there is nothing further to add, except a more detailed knowledge of how the brain works in physical terms some time in the future. Dennett's main claim is that consciousness is an illusion.

From what I've read from Dennett, I do believe that his consciousness may well be an illusion. And if he says it is, why not? His reasoning certainly is.

The second approach acknowledges there is this thing called 'consciousness', and there is an explanatory gap between how the brain works in physical terms and how consciousness is produced. This type of materialist would claim this is just a problem we have at the moment because of our lack of knowledge. In the future we will have better understandings of how the brain and consciousness are one and the same.

Which is called "Eliminativism." The idea is that science will eventually "eliminate" the remaining questions, and everything will be accounted for. But that's a wondrous statement of faith, since Eliminativists only float that idea because they have to admit they haven't got any answers yet and are making claims about the future.

When one is utterly perplexed but fanatically devoted to an inadequate paradigm, I understand the impulse to issue promissory notes of future achievement: but reliance on that hardly commends Eliminativism to the rational mind.

Maybe we could suggest that they should opt instead for astrology: it's just as reasonable as the view they espouse, and a little more poetic.

Immanuel Can wrote:...I understand the impulse to issue promissory notes of future achievement...

Of course you do; it's called religion.

Immanuel Can wrote:To summarize, the Materialist's claim has to be as follows: "consciousness" is a material entity that has no material properties at all -- not just mass or volume, but measurability of any kind by anyone, using any method. Yet it exists."

Yeah, straw men help.

Noax wrote:What's the difference aside from a language difference? Both views deny an object or construct that is 'the consciousness' which exhibits numeric identity that the dualist often seems to need.

i think you are almost right. When it comes to dualism you probably mean "qualitative identity." In relation to philosophy of mind the preferred position of most materialists is numerical identity. Meaning "being the same thing as."

Noax wrote: And I don't think Dennett asserts that he is not conscious, just that he doesn't have "a consciousness". Correct me if I'm wrong. I notice IC immediately twists Dennett's denial of consciousness to a denial that one can be conscious.

Dennett uses "consciousness" as a technical term, he is not say we are unconscious.

Noax wrote: I guess it depends on the definition of the words, which nobody has given, and which are not standard. IC refuses a definition since his argument seems to revolve around a moving target for the definition, and thus maintaining the wall of denial of counterargument.

I haven't read all of his posts but I will do so when I get the chance.

Noax wrote: I have, in my posts, likened consciousness to the process of combustion. A candle can combust (be conscious), and one can say there is combustion (consciousness) there, but one cannot put the combustion in a box, leaving the candle behind. One cannot take the mass of the process of combustion.

Sounds a bit like epiphenomenalism

Immanuel Can wrote: Do you personally find that plausible? After all, "electricity" is indeed something measurable and, in a certain sense, "material": but it' is not of itself about anything. Electricity does not care if it's running a toaster or a blender. Electricity has no opinions, and imparts no meaning. It certainly does not imbue things with consciousness.

in relation to philosophy of mind I don't find materialism plausible. I was just trying to clear up a misconception in relation to materialism.

Immanuel Can wrote: The physiological components of the brain we can measure: but none account for consciousness, reasoning, selfhood, values, perceptions, identity...and so on. These things are so different from the materials that even the Materialists have to brand them as some weird kind of "epiphenomenon." Which is a polite way of them saying, "We've got no idea what this strange "emergent" quality is, or how it "emerges."

Epiphenomenalism if often confused with materialism

Immanuel Can wrote: From what I've read from Dennett, I do believe that his consciousness may well be an illusion. And if he says it is, why not? His reasoning certainly is.

I'm not a fan of Dennett

Immanuel Can wrote: Which is called "Eliminativism." The idea is that science will eventually "eliminate" the remaining questions, and everything will be accounted for. But that's a wondrous statement of faith, since Eliminativists only float that idea because they have to admit they haven't got any answers yet and are making claims about the future.

When one is utterly perplexed but fanatically devoted to an inadequate paradigm, I understand the impulse to issue promissory notes of future achievement: but reliance on that hardly commends Eliminativism to the rational mind.

Maybe we could suggest that they should opt instead for astrology: it's just as reasonable as the view they espouse, and a little more poetic.

It has work well for science in the past so there is no reason to think it won't continue to work well in the future. Science can only work within the paradigm it has at the moment.

Ginkgo wrote:i think you are almost right. When it comes to dualism you probably mean "qualitative identity." In relation to philosophy of mind the preferred position of most materialists is numerical identity. Meaning "being the same thing as."

Qualitative identity just means is-similar-to, right? Nobody has that over a long time. I don't look, feel, or act much like my five year old self. As a naturalist, I have a subjective sense of self just like the dualist does. I share legal identity (as used by the law, not defined by) with Noax of August, meaning I carry subjective responsibility for acts done by Noax of August, but that identity is subject to being put into question by certain acts that the one assumes will not occur. There is more on the list, like genetic identity that says my twin is part of me.

But I am talking about numeric identity here, about "being the same thing as", which seems required for little more than objective responsibility of a soul, and hence a dualist notion. Almost all religions depend on this, but nothing else does. I don't think (as a naturalist) that I am necessarily the same thing as Noax of August.

Dennett uses "consciousness" as a technical term, he is not say we are unconscious.

I was asking what he defines that technical term to be, since he asserts its nonexistence. It seems to be a central control point, the Cartesian Theater, a place or construct that is actually in control, utiliziing the rest as tools and input. This seems to be that of which the existence is denied. I don't think Mr. Can refers to this any more than I refer to his definition of consciousness. The thing denied by Dennett already presumes a naturalist definition of mind, so while it seems very explanatory for the naturalist position, it seems begging in the monist/dualist debate. Such a debate must agree on a common definition of what exists or doesn't exist. So I continue to assert that since I am conscious, I have consciousness, even if I agree with Dennett that it is not a thing in a particular place, or one unified process in control of the others.

I haven't read all of his posts but I will do so when I get the chance.

I wonder if a common definition of consciousness (a non-begging one) could ever be agreed upon.

Noax wrote:I have, in my posts, likened consciousness to the process of combustion. A candle can combust (be conscious), and one can say there is combustion (consciousness) there, but one cannot put the combustion in a box, leaving the candle behind. One cannot take the mass of the process of combustion.

Sounds a bit like epiphenomenalism

??? An observation that process is not matter itself, since it cannot be isolated from the matter implementing the process, is epiphenomenalism?

bahman wrote:Materialism is a system of belief which claims that everything is constituted of matter and any motion of matter can be described by laws of nature. In close form, S'=L(S), where S is the initial state, S' is final state and L is laws of nature. There is however an anomaly in this system of view so called consciousness, C, which is simply the awareness of surrounding. C is simply the expectation of what S' should be. Materialist believe that C can be derived from S by the following equation C=P(S) where P is the act of experience. There is however no reason to believe that there exist a relation between C and S' in this framework. We however always observe a fantastic correlation between what we expect to happen, C, and what happens, S'. This means that we are dealing with a logically impossible situation since C could be anything.

Your thought?

My thought? I am near your title, but since mainstream logic is a synonym for impossible, "materialism is logic" would be sufficient (to mean it is not satisfactory).
I knew that there was no way to extirpate true from false - and I just showed that Zeno d'Elee made an invalid proposition for it (third case of the implication). (See: http://www.courvoisier-thevenaz.ch/logic/logic.php).

What I do not understand, is: How Newton and Einstein themselves have they been so easily mistaken!!!

But I know what your want to mean. A set canNOT return on itself to justify itself, and I agree with this. But nowadays physicists come near to make believe such a catch.

Although there is no way for it, no matter how many levels or structures you insert in this way.

Terrapin Station wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote:To summarize, the Materialist's claim has to be as follows: "consciousness" is a material entity that has no material properties at all -- not just mass or volume, but measurability of any kind by anyone, using any method. Yet it exists."

Yeah, straw men help.

Explain...what makes this a "straw man"?

Are you asserting that Materialists do not actually believe that all real entities are substantially or dynamically "material"? Or are you asserting that I'm wrong to represent them as denying the real existence of consciousness?

Since that's the dichotomy as I've characterized it, the fault has to be one or the other. Which one is it?

Ginkgo wrote:It has work well for science in the past so there is no reason to think it won't continue to work well in the future. Science can only work within the paradigm it has at the moment.

Eliminativism, you mean? Or science? What's the "it" in your sentence?

I agree that science has "worked well in the past," and would add that it is likely to work similarly well in the future. But there are things for which it has not at all worked well in the past: and what reason have we to suppose it will suddenly start to do better?

For example, science has been totally unable to ground values. It has literally contributed nothing to justifying any particular morality at all. In matters of existential meaning, it actually seems (if the Po-Mo or Existentialist sets are right) to drain the world of that. Once the human volitional element is substituted for the material, science loses purchase and certainty. Even Psychology is at best considered a "border" science by the "pure scientists.

In Aesthetics, the scientific contribution is very poor, and equivocal at best. In brain physiology, we're doing remarkable work today. But in the area of consciousness, identity, reason and the soul, there has been no notable scientific contribution at all so far...we still have no idea what those dratted things are, scientifically speaking. And not one method or instrument has yet been invented that can provide us with the data we so urgently need in that area, to ground the claim we are doing "science" with them.

So what gives the Eliminativist this overweening confidence that somehow science -- which (modestly enough) voluntarily limits itself to the empirical -- will suddenly and magically convert into an powerful existential tool? Perhaps only a false analogy from science's achievements in the material realm to a blind hope of equal success in the immaterial. But even the most ardent Eliminativist freely admits that it has not happened. The empirical data to bolster such a hope just does not currently exist.

They just want gratuitously to throw in the word "yet."

I lack their faith.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Terrapin Station wrote:

Immanuel Can wrote:To summarize, the Materialist's claim has to be as follows: "consciousness" is a material entity that has no material properties at all -- not just mass or volume, but measurability of any kind by anyone, using any method. Yet it exists."

Yeah, straw men help.

Explain...what makes this a "straw man"?

Are you asserting that Materialists do not actually believe that all real entities are substantially or dynamically "material"? Or are you asserting that I'm wrong to represent them as denying the real existence of consciousness?

Since that's the dichotomy as I've characterized it, the fault has to be one or the other. Which one is it?

No materialist thinks "Consciousness' is a material entity that has no material properties at all." In fact, under materialism, consciousness IS a material property.