FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue Mar 12, 2024 10:24 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 12, 2024 10:10 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Tue Mar 12, 2024 9:18 am
The wider context in which Wittgenstein lived is the context for language games and for the Tractatus and for the PI, the grean and brown books and this book too.
No I don't.
I have many secondary texts re 'On Certainty' which is very contentious.
You think you are a God in terms of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, but note this;
Why would I indulge in such extravagance? I don't need to be a God to be better than you at any subject which involves reading and comprehension? I can just be average and pretty much win before the contest starts.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 12, 2024 10:10 am
Wittgenstein’s philosophical purpose vis-a`-vis the skeptic in On Certainty is a matter for dispute. He has variously been held
- 1. to refute skepticism by showing that it is self-defeating;1
2. to reveal the truth in skepticism and to offer an accommodation with it;2 and
3. to diagnose the misconceptions that underlie skeptical doubt, which does not itself constitute a refutation of skepticism but opens the way to our liberating ourselves from its philosophical grip.3
These three approaches to interpreting the remarks collected in On Certainty
do not, I am sure,
amount to an exhaustive classification of the interpretations put forward in the secondary literature.
WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY
Marie Mcginn
in
Chapter 17
in Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
Hopefully you already picked up that I tend towards the third option, but I get the other two.
My point above is to highlight that there is a wide range of interpretations of W's On Certainty.
The three interpretations are still limited.
As such, your interpretation is limited and not thorough.
Hard hope on that bullshit. You are the only person in the world who believes in your weird hiearchy of KFCs. Even if you could get somebody to take the most basic part of the KFC idea seriously at first, once you tell them about credibility and the meta-kfc-bucket-of-comparing they will start to look for the exit because that nonsense is quite mad. IWP tried too hard to work with you on that for a long time, that's probably why he's so pissed at you now.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Mar 12, 2024 10:10 am
Everytime I cornered you as in On Certainty you will give all sort of excuses, i.e. On Certainty is just a good book, Rorty only to show the mirror, etc.
Basically you have nothing of substance, except complains [rude ones].
I am confident [it is a matter of time as long as you don't cracked] I can checkmate all your moves in the context of your limited philosophy of reality.
Have you thought that maybe I am not wasting effort on some mind game against you? I am never concerned that you will checkmate me or even outwit me. I only like the opening of the mirror, I think the book falls apart a little bit soon afterwards (which is not to say its all bad).
If you had read Berlin instead of being an obnoxious fool about it, you would have found that he's a Kantian in many regards, and a moral realist (not in a Kantian way though). None of that bothers me, he's my favourite philosopher but I don't worry about not agreeing with his work where I don't think he's right. Likewise, if I don't think there is a significant languistic aspect to a particular philosophical issue, I don't invoke Wittgenstein, there's no need to.
This assumption you make that I think the way you do, even though I show often that I don't, will lead to your failure in this latest weird endeavour.
Here is one interpretation of 'On Certainty' which aligns with my FSRC.
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism
Martin Kusch
I shall give my own interpretation of On Certainty in relation to epistemic relativism.
I now shall try to give a brief summary of these arguments.
I begin with the “pro” case and shall focus on three authors, Paul Boghossian, Anthony Grayling and Rudolf Haller.
Features of an Epistemic System or Practice
(1) Dependence: A belief has an epistemic status (as epistemically justified or unjustified) only relative to an epistemic system or practice (=SP). (Cf. Williams 2007, p. 94).
(2) Plurality: There are, have been, or could be, more than one such epistemic system or practice.
(3) Exclusiveness: SPs are exclusive of one another.
SP is not exactly the same with my FSRC, but the fundamental is the same, i.e. there is the Framework and System underlying it.
Likewise, if I don't think there is a significant linguistic aspect to a particular philosophical issue, I don't invoke Wittgenstein, there's no need to.
You asked me to refer to A C Grayling video re Wittgenstein, but according to Kusch, Grayling is in the pro Epistemic Relativism and Practice camp which I argue aligns with my FSRC;
Grayling and Haller cite the following paragraphs in evidence:
65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.
99. And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
256. On the other hand a language game does change with time.
336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable changes.
§§65, 99, 256, and 336 all emphasize the occurrence of fundamental change: in language-games, concepts, word meaning, and rationality.
This for Grayling is “classically strong relativism” since it “constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either” (2001, p. 308).
§§94, 95, and 166 in turn raise the question “what if the background—e.g. your picture of the world—[were] different?” (Haller 1995, p. 229)
Does not Wittgenstein imply that there is nothing that can be said about such a scenario?
At least nothing evaluative?
It appears that “we remain without any ground for the decision between conflicting judgements based on different world pictures.” (Haller 1995, p. 230)
Boghossian suggests that it is first and foremost paragraphs §§609-612 that express a commitment to epistemic relativism (2006, p. 107):
609 Suppose we met people who … instead of the physicist … consult an oracle.
610 … —If we call this ‘wrong’ aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
611 Are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.
612 Where two principles clash that cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.
613 I said I would ‘combat’ the other man,—but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but … at the end of reasons comes persuasion.
614 (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)
If you are into OLP, then language is fundamental to all philosophical issues.
You seem to be evasive. This is why I still trying to establish the full extent of the philosophies you align with.
Say if we list down all the full range of Western philosophical ideas from 800 BCE to the present [2024], which is the ones you align with the most with its relevant weightages [not the useful of weightages you condemned]?
I can easily summarized mine which is those of the antirealists of the Kantian kind and I can extent that to Eastern Philosophies as well.
When I use realists vs antirealist in this case, it make simplification so easy, I don't have to list the individual philosophy on first take.
