Philosophy Now Forum

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 9:33 am Here's the really annoying quote..

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9).

This idea does not even appear in the enitire section I,2.
Nothing of the kind can be found there.
It's like VA's source is just picking numbers at random.
All Hume is doing in this section is deciding the best way to divide the topic to explain the roles of ideas and impressions..

I quote

SECTION II.: Division of the subject.
Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflexion. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, ’twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.

At no point does Hume question or assert validity.

Hume T 1.2.6.9 wrote:The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.
That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.
Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is derived, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent.
This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.

VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR.
BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART I OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION,
ABSTRACTION, ETC.
SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.
SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
SECT. IV. OF THE CONNECTION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
SECT. V. OF RELATIONS.
SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES
SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,

SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE

Atla wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 10:39 am

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9).

It's in Book 1 Part 2 Chapter 6

Hume wrote:Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind ; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.

The furthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when supposed specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connections, and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.

Keeping in mind that he was a pre-Kantian empiricist so he only relied on perceptions (which is incorrect), to me this looks like an OK early take on the inherent unknowability of the external world, if there is one (which unknowability is probably not entirely correct either).

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 5:02 am "an OK early take"?
There is no 'take' [reality] of an inherent unknowability of the external world or an absolutely mind-independent external world.

According to Hume, then Kant, one is being deluded to insist there is an absolutely mind-independent external world.
This is why one need to understand critically one's own psychology on insisting on such a belief of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things.

That is why Kant persisted with Hume's point and insisted;
"Mind-Independent Things" is a Scandal [Insult] to Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=40182
which philosophical realists like you are unable to prove it is real at all.

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 5:51 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 5:02 am "an OK early take"?
There is no 'take' [reality] of an inherent unknowability of the external world or an absolutely mind-independent external world.

According to Hume, then Kant, one is being deluded to insist there is an absolutely mind-independent external world.
This is why one need to understand critically one's own psychology on insisting on such a belief of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things.

That is why Kant persisted with Hume's point and insisted;
"Mind-Independent Things" is a Scandal [Insult] to Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=40182
which philosophical realists like you are unable to prove it is real at all.

This is the part where you would need to have a minimal intelligence to understand my position, but you don't have that. Look:

The default philosophical stance is that if there is a mind-independent external world, that world is continuous with the mind, because they are two parts of one and the same world. And that is exactly the picture that science and indirect realism have arrived at as well. And because of this, it may be possible to have some kind of "residue" about the structure of the mind-external world after all. Let's say it's 1% knowable 99% unknowable.

You, and maybe Hume and Kant (I'm not entirely convinced), don't take the default stance, but take an unlikely position that absolutely nothing can be known about the mind-external world, if there is one.

In the 18th century you could still get away with claiming that the mind-external world is 100% unknowable. Today no, you either adopt a philosophy similar to mine or you become a plant. Or you drop science. That's why I've shown that your philosophy doesn't work, you are relying on noumena left and right, you just pretend not to.

Model-dependent realism is a view of scientific inquiry that focuses on the role of scientific models of phenomena.[1] It claims reality should be interpreted based upon these models, and where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist.
It claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 6:50 am Are you up to date with Modern Science??
I have quoted this more than a '1000' times.

Model-dependent realism is a view of scientific inquiry that focuses on the role of scientific models of phenomena.[1] It claims reality should be interpreted based upon these models, and where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist.
It claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model.

The above supports Hume, Kant and the modern ANTI-philosophical_realists, and your insistence on your absolute mind-independent position even if 1% is delusional.

Atla wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 5:51 am That's why I've shown that your philosophy doesn't work, you are relying on noumena left and right, you just pretend not to.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 7:04 am Another one that doesn't go away is that mind-dependent theory is conflated with mind-dependent everything else.
If you know something, then you know it via an FSK.
FSKs are mind-dependent.
So, whatever I know something about is also mind-dependent.

X is considered real by scientific FSK Y.
FSK Y was made up by humans.
Therefore X was made up by humans or dependent on human minds.

He doesn't argue the latter so openly, but has argued it implicitly again and again.

In his latest foray with me he argued that science is anti-realist because the theories in it are mind-dependent.

Which is a category error.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 4:39 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 9:33 am Here's the really annoying quote..

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9).

This idea does not even appear in the enitire section I,2.
Nothing of the kind can be found there.
It's like VA's source is just picking numbers at random.
All Hume is doing in this section is deciding the best way to divide the topic to explain the roles of ideas and impressions..

I quote

SECTION II.: Division of the subject.
Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflexion. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, ’twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.

At no point does Hume question or assert validity.

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d
Note the article is from IEP
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly, peer-reviewed information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy.

The author of the article:
James Fieser
Email: jfieser@utm.edu
University of Tennessee at Martin
U. S. A.

You think you are smarter than the author from the IEP article?
You should write to them to complain.

Here is 1.2.6.9 from Hume's Treatise.

Hume T 1.2.6.9 wrote:The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.
That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.
Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is derived, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent.
This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.

Note also Atla's reference;
viewtopic.php?p=667736#p667736

If you read the above 1.2.6.9 in the context of the whole Section VI and the whole Treatise, it support the point that to Hume, an absolutely mind-independent External World is a fabrication.

You should not hastily shoot from the hips.
What you arrogantly quoted above [wrongly] is from Book 1.1.6 not Book 1.2.6

VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR.
BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART I OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION,
ABSTRACTION, ETC.
SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.
SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
SECT. IV. OF THE CONNECTION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
SECT. V. OF RELATIONS.
SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES
SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,

SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 10:07 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Sep 17, 2023 4:39 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 9:33 am Here's the really annoying quote..


This idea does not even appear in the enitire section I,2.
Nothing of the kind can be found there.
It's like VA's source is just picking numbers at random.
All Hume is doing in this section is deciding the best way to divide the topic to explain the roles of ideas and impressions..

I quote



At no point does Hume question or assert validity.

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d
Note the article is from IEP
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly, peer-reviewed information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy.

The author of the article:
James Fieser
Email: jfieser@utm.edu
University of Tennessee at Martin
U. S. A.

You think you are smarter than the author from the IEP article?
You should write to them to complain.

Here is 1.2.6.9 from Hume's Treatise.

Hume T 1.2.6.9 wrote:The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.
That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.
Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is derived, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent.
This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.

Note also Atla's reference;
viewtopic.php?p=667736#p667736

If you read the above 1.2.6.9 in the context of the whole Section VI and the whole Treatise, it support the point that to Hume, an absolutely mind-independent External World is a fabrication.

You should not hastily shoot from the hips.
What you arrogantly quoted above [wrongly] is from Book 1.1.6 not Book 1.2.6

VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR.
BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART I OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION,
ABSTRACTION, ETC.
SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.
SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
SECT. IV. OF THE CONNECTION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
SECT. V. OF RELATIONS.
SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES
SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,

SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE

Clearly I ahve shown that I am smarter than the article, since the guy can't even use quotes properly.
I suggest that ,rather than rely on someone else, try and do your own thinking.
Whilst you do that pleas look up

Fallacy:Ad Vericundium.

I suggest that the author of the text may well be a Realist with no sympathies with empiricism or idealism. Since he has chosen adjectives, not present in Hume, which reflect his own interpretation.

You have the things backwards..
It is not the independant world that is the fabrication, though Berkeley might has said so.
THe fabrication happens in the brain. We fabriciate the world of our understanding. We ihave an ideation of out sensoiry inputs and the real world for us can only be a concept, but exists to stimulate our sesnes with which we mentally fabriciate our worlds.

As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Sep 18, 2023 3:23 am

As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;

Not that Hume does not weigh in on the evolutiony default. And I think it's safe to say that basing the denial of a part before humans existed is not supported well by a theory (the evolutionary theory) that assumes and concludes that there is a past existing planet/solar system pre-homosapiens
is something Hume would have seen was problematic, had he come in post-Darwinism.

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Note that Hume is writing about things external to himself: all other people's minds and the contents of those minds. He has, according to his own ideas, fabricated ideas about things external to him. Fine, not a problem in itself, except that it's realism.
He has, presumably, examined his own mind/experiencing/perception and drawn conclusions about what is happening in everyone's mind. Other people are external to him, yet he presumes they exist. His own argument could lead to the conclusion that they only exist when he perceive them. He does not claim this. Further he claims to be able to ACCURATELY fabricate an idea that all people's minds are like X and all their thoughts and perceptiosn are like Y.

So, he, somehow, knows that their experiencing must be like his: mere fabrication and having nothing to do with external reality. And yet this knowledge is about what is part of external reality to him (other people and the internal processes of their minds)

If he is right about his own fabrication process and how there is no ongoing external reality we can know anything about, why does he grant himself the ability to know things about people who are external to him.

Obviously he makes the assumption: everyone's mind is like my mind. It's not an absurd assumption, but why should we grant him this assumption as a valid axiom when he is being so extremely parsimonious. Further it should apply to everything? Unless he thinks they are part of his mind or dependent on his mind for their existence.

There is an implicit dualist ontology: things (objects like rocks and chairs) and humans exist in very different ways. Somehow he knows this even though both things and humans are not part of him and thus any hypothesis about them would be fabrication, mere fabrication.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Sep 18, 2023 4:43 am I'm ignoring you VA. In my estimation you generally don't respond directly to points made and so don't really engage with them.
I am sure you view our discussion differently from this, given what you have said many times.
But there it is. I can see no point in pretending that what is happening is an actualy dialogue.
I think your threads are interesting and I think it's great that you bring up the topics and positions that you do.

So, I will engage with the topics in your threads, but I will not be responding to your posts to me or reading them anymore. Any dialogues I engage in in these threads will be with other people posting here.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 7:53 am As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Views?