Re: Morality: Philosophical Realism's Dilemma
Posted: Wed Jul 05, 2023 9:21 am
Got any examples of those exceptions you speak about; or are you feeling all kinds of libelous today?
For the discussion of all things philosophical.
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Where I raise an argument in an OP, I will have to defend it until I am convinced I am wrong, then I will have to admit and concede my argument is false.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Jul 05, 2023 9:09 amviewtopic.php?t=40197Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jul 05, 2023 8:49 am
This is a serious claim;
FJ: "So far the arguments are mainly non sequiturs, fallacies, or just plain bad."
If not all, give at least a few examples which you think are obvious in supporting your above.
This one is particularly egregious. In trying to prove that realists are solipsists, you have to include premises which realists don't accept - thus not actually proving anything about what realists think at all.
Certainly, Sir, what colour would you like. I have them in blue, red, blue and red. Or yellow, but I have to order those in.
The [Model-Theoretic] Argument purports to show that the Representation Problem—
to explain how our mental symbols and words get hooked up to mind-independent objects and
how our sentences and thoughts target mind-independent states of affairs—
is insoluble.
According to the Model-Theoretic Argument, there are simply too many ways in which our mental symbols can be mapped onto items in the world.
The consequence of this is a dilemma for the realist.
The first horn of the dilemma is that s/he must accept that what our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate.
The second horn is that s/he must insist that
even an ideal theory, whose terms and predicates can demonstrably be mapped veridically onto objects and properties in the world
might still be false, i.e., that such a mapping might not be the right one, the one ‘intended’.
Neither alternative can be defended, according to anti-realists.
Concerning the first alternative, massive indeterminacy for perfectly determinate terms is absurd.
As for the second, for realists to contend that even an ideal theory could be false is to resort to unmotivated dogmatism, since on their own admission we cannot tell which mapping the world has set up for us.
Such dogmatism leaves the realist with no answer to a skepticism which undermines any capacity to reliably represent the world, anti-realists maintain.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#3.5
And, of course, you did not mention or quote that the article you link to above goes on to give realist responses to these arguments.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Jul 05, 2023 11:46 amThe [Model-Theoretic] Argument purports to show that the Representation Problem—
to explain how our mental symbols and words get hooked up to mind-independent objects and
how our sentences and thoughts target mind-independent states of affairs—
is insoluble.
According to the Model-Theoretic Argument, there are simply too many ways in which our mental symbols can be mapped onto items in the world.
The consequence of this is a dilemma for the realist.
The first horn of the dilemma is that s/he must accept that what our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate.
The second horn is that s/he must insist that
even an ideal theory, whose terms and predicates can demonstrably be mapped veridically onto objects and properties in the world
might still be false, i.e., that such a mapping might not be the right one, the one ‘intended’.
Neither alternative can be defended, according to anti-realists.
Concerning the first alternative, massive indeterminacy for perfectly determinate terms is absurd.
As for the second, for realists to contend that even an ideal theory could be false is to resort to unmotivated dogmatism, since on their own admission we cannot tell which mapping the world has set up for us.
Such dogmatism leaves the realist with no answer to a skepticism which undermines any capacity to reliably represent the world, anti-realists maintain.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#3.5