Philosophy Now Forum

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Feb 19, 2021 4:58 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Feb 18, 2021 8:25 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 8:21 pm
Note that the issue isn't whether you agree with this. The issue is whether this is what Gewirth's argument is.

I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument.

Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

Holy moly. I'm not saying he used that term.

I'm saying, that re Gewirth's argument, re "When we act (morally), we do X for purpose P"

Either it's going to be the case that he's saying that P can be identical to X

OR

It's going to be the case that he's saying that P is not (in any case) identical to X.

Do you agree with this simple dichotomy? Yes or no.

If no, then what would you say is a third option?

I have already stated in my earlier post;
"I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument."

Anyway I do not agree with your simple dichotomy.

I had already suggested the third option above, i.e. revert to what Stilley stated in her thesis, i.e.

In my earlier posts I suggested the following;

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 7:11 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Feb 19, 2021 4:58 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Feb 18, 2021 8:25 am
I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument.

Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

Holy moly. I'm not saying he used that term.

I'm saying, that re Gewirth's argument, re "When we act (morally), we do X for purpose P"

Either it's going to be the case that he's saying that P can be identical to X

OR

It's going to be the case that he's saying that P is not (in any case) identical to X.

Do you agree with this simple dichotomy? Yes or no.

If no, then what would you say is a third option?

I have already stated in my earlier post;
"I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument."

Anyway I do not agree with your simple dichotomy.

I had already suggested the third option above, i.e. revert to what Stilley stated in her thesis, i.e.

In my earlier posts I suggested the following;

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

That an intention, an action or a consequence are morally good or bad is a matter of opinion, not an independent property of the intention, action or consequence. And that's why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of any of them. It's subjectivity all the way.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 8:44 am That an intention, an action or a consequence are morally good or bad is a matter of opinion, not an independent property of the intention, action or consequence. And that's why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of any of them. It's subjectivity all the way.

In your naive world-view facts are what settle rational disagreements. If we had facts - nobody would disagree!

Lol. Moron.

There's rational disagreement about the shape of the Earth... where is the fact to settle the matter?

Outside language, there are no linguistic categories, because reality is not linguistic. Der.

There's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices. Der.

Any description - any truth-claim - is contextual and conventional. There's no such thing as a context-free description. Der.

A description doesn't create or change the thing being described. And a thing can be described in many different ways. Der.

What we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are. Signs such as words can mean only what we use them to mean. Der.

The claim that there are no such things as what we call truth, facts and objectivity detonates itself at the moment it's expressed. Der.

Yawn.

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=497678 time=1613807081 user_id=15099]
That an intention, an action or a consequence are morally good or bad is a matter of opinion, not an independent property of the intention, action or consequence. And that's why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of any of them. It's subjectivity all the way.
[/quote]

Subjective is not arbitrary, it's contingent. When you account for salience, perspective, and priority, either an agreement can be found or the point of disagreement may be explored.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 7:11 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Feb 19, 2021 4:58 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Feb 18, 2021 8:25 am
I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument.

Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

Holy moly. I'm not saying he used that term.

I'm saying, that re Gewirth's argument, re "When we act (morally), we do X for purpose P"

Either it's going to be the case that he's saying that P can be identical to X

OR

It's going to be the case that he's saying that P is not (in any case) identical to X.

Do you agree with this simple dichotomy? Yes or no.

If no, then what would you say is a third option?

I have already stated in my earlier post;
"I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument."

Anyway I do not agree with your simple dichotomy.

I had already suggested the third option above, i.e. revert to what Stilley stated in her thesis, i.e.

In my earlier posts I suggested the following;

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

If you don't agree with that dichotomy you need to say what a third option would be.
"P can be identical to X" and "P is never identical to X" don't exhaust the possibilities, because there's a third possibility re the identity relation between P and X, namely ________?

What goes in the blank there?

(Again, this was ALL I'm interested in. Answer yes/no, which you did (thank you), and if no, tell me a third option (which you didn't do).)

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 8:44 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 7:11 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Feb 19, 2021 4:58 pm

Holy moly. I'm not saying he used that term.

I'm saying, that re Gewirth's argument, re "When we act (morally), we do X for purpose P"

Either it's going to be the case that he's saying that P can be identical to X

OR

It's going to be the case that he's saying that P is not (in any case) identical to X.

Do you agree with this simple dichotomy? Yes or no.

If no, then what would you say is a third option?

I have already stated in my earlier post;
"I do not agree with your using strawman for Gewirth's argument."

Anyway I do not agree with your simple dichotomy.

I had already suggested the third option above, i.e. revert to what Stilley stated in her thesis, i.e.

In my earlier posts I suggested the following;

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

That an intention, an action or a consequence are morally good or bad is a matter of opinion, not an independent property of the intention, action or consequence. And that's why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of any of them. It's subjectivity all the way.

I keep repeating this;

Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615
Personal judgments and decisions made by individuals [in real life or from thought experiments] related to moral elements are not Morality Per se.
These are subjective opinions and beliefs of the individual[s] and they are not moral facts.

Note my explanation here;

• viewtopic.php?p=497899#p497899
  Ought_ness [e.g. moral] within the human psyche can be studied like anger and other emotions with their respective mental process and physical referent of neurons

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:00 pm If you don't agree with that dichotomy you need to say what a third option would be.
"P can be identical to X" and "P is never identical to X" don't exhaust the possibilities, because there's a third possibility re the identity relation between P and X, namely ________?

What goes in the blank there?

(Again, this was ALL I'm interested in. Answer yes/no, which you did (thank you), and if no, tell me a third option (which you didn't do).)

Why do you keep insisting on "the identity relation between P and X,"

I have already provided you the answer to the third alternative earlier;

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Feb 17, 2021 6:30 am The above is a strawman.
Gewirth did not use the term 'identical'.

In my earlier posts I suggested why don't you state something like,

• When S act, S do so for a purpose.
  when S act (morally), doing X for purpose P entails that both X and P are [morally] good in at least some sense.

which is directly in alignments with Gewirth's intention.
Note Stilley stated 'both X and P' are morally good, not just P.

Note 'purpose P' is not merely "helping an elderly person across the road" [which is of value to the elderly person]
but also include the inherent purpose [ moral obligation] of S to take the action which is related to morality's core maxim, i.e. 'no humans ought to be killed by another or prematuredly*'
* non-natural death.

Thus "helping an elderly person across the road" is an obvious purpose to S, but there is also a subliminally triggered moral purpose that S is achieving and has value to S but he may or may not reflect upon.
Where S feels very happy with his action and for other non-moral reasons, that is not relevant to this point.

Therefore all cases of actions qualified as benevolent are reducible to morality, moral facts and its physical referents in the brain.
Note Gewirth identified 'actions' which do not qualify for the above considerations.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 5:19 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:00 pm If you don't agree with that dichotomy you need to say what a third option would be.
"P can be identical to X" and "P is never identical to X" don't exhaust the possibilities, because there's a third possibility re the identity relation between P and X, namely ________?

What goes in the blank there?

(Again, this was ALL I'm interested in. Answer yes/no, which you did (thank you), and if no, tell me a third option (which you didn't do).)

Why do you keep insisting on "the identity relation between P and X,"

I have already provided you the answer to the third alternative earlier;

No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?

I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.

[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=498012 time=1613923029 user_id=12582]
[quote="Veritas Aequitas" post_id=497908 time=1613881197 user_id=7896]
[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=497724 time=1613829630 user_id=12582]
If you don't agree with that dichotomy you need to say what a third option would be.
"P can be identical to X" and "P is never identical to X" don't exhaust the possibilities, because there's a third possibility re the identity relation between P and X, namely ________?

What goes in the blank there?

(Again, this was ALL I'm interested in. Answer yes/no, which you did (thank you), and if no, tell me a third option (which you didn't do).)
[/quote]
Why do you keep insisting on "the [b]identity[/b] relation between P and X,"

I have already provided you the answer to the third alternative earlier;

[/quote]

No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?

I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.
[/quote]

P can never be identical to X. If they were identical there could be no X or there could be no P. P is never identical to X is the only possibility. P is sometimes equivalent to X is the closest possible alternative.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 4:57 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 5:19 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:00 pm If you don't agree with that dichotomy you need to say what a third option would be.
"P can be identical to X" and "P is never identical to X" don't exhaust the possibilities, because there's a third possibility re the identity relation between P and X, namely ________?

What goes in the blank there?

(Again, this was ALL I'm interested in. Answer yes/no, which you did (thank you), and if no, tell me a third option (which you didn't do).)

Why do you keep insisting on "the identity relation between P and X,"

I have already provided you the answer to the third alternative earlier;

No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?

I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.

The OP is about Gewirth's argument.
Gewirth never mentioned 'identity'.
If you insist that is a strawman.
I have already explained Gewirth's position on the issue.

Are you referring to the Law of Identity?
If that is the case, note Rorty's critic of Mirroring as in his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 10:36 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 4:57 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 5:19 am
Why do you keep insisting on "the identity relation between P and X,"

I have already provided you the answer to the third alternative earlier;

No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?

I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.

The OP is about Gewirth's argument.
Gewirth never mentioned 'identity'.
If you insist that is a strawman.
I have already explained Gewirth's position on the issue.

Are you referring to the Law of Identity?
If that is the case, note Rorty's critic of Mirroring as in his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

Right, so you don't understand what I'm asking, because you're just now trying to clarify what I'm even referring to via "identity."

Instead of arguing about something and continually responding in a situation like this, clarify what the person is referring to, so you can be talking about the same thing, addressing the same thing.

What I'm referring to isn't a "law" of identity per se, but it's the idea that the "law" of identity is addressing: simply, whether x and y are exactly one and the same thing.

Again, I'm not saying that Gewirth used the term identity. I'm saying that per his argument, there are only two logical possibilities re the relationship between P and X. Either he's saying they can be one and the same thing, or he's talking about situations where they are never one and the same thing.

Do you agree with this?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 2:48 pm there are only two logical possibilities re the relationship between P and X. Either he's saying they can be one and the same thing, or he's talking about situations where they are never one and the same thing.

That necessarily prescribes a logical system in which that assumption holds. It's a semantic choice.

It doesn't hold in type theory: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/identity+type

The identity type ID(P,X) requires one enumerate all the different reasons/proofs why P might be identical to X, whether there's one or infinitely meany identity-relations between P and X.

This should follow intuitively from our past discussion. Everything is different to everything by default.

Sameness requires justification.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 3:42 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 2:48 pm there are only two logical possibilities re the relationship between P and X. Either he's saying they can be one and the same thing, or he's talking about situations where they are never one and the same thing.

That necessarily prescribes a logical system in which that assumption holds. It's a semantic choice.

It doesn't hold in type theory: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/identity+type

The identity type ID(P,X) requires one enumerate all the different reasons/proofs why P might be identical to X.

It's nothing that complicated. It's simply that either P and X can be "one and the same" thing or not. It's not about semantics, and it's nothing to do with reasons or proofs or anything. It's just whether they can be literally the same thing or not.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 3:47 pm It's nothing that complicated. It's simply that either P and X can be "one and the same" thing or not.

I have no idea what that means.

P is one and the same thing as itself.
X is one and the same thing as itself.

P is not X (identity) , but P may be the same as X (equality)

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 3:47 pm It's not about semantics, and it's nothing to do with reasons or proofs or anything. It's just whether they can be literally the same thing or not.

It is always about semantics. Relations

You are confusing Logic with Mathematics.