How to Derive "Ought" From "Is" J. Searle

[Belinda]

We can derive an 'ought' from anything we like, including an 'is'. But an 'is' can never entail an 'ought', so that to negate the 'ought' produces a logical contradiction. The claim that honesty is essential for human society is factual. But the claim that we should be honest is not factual - not true or false.

All moral claims are constructed conditionally . E.g." If you love God then you will obey Him."

(If everybody obeys God then everybody will cooperate.)

Not so. The claim 'slavery is morally wrong' is unconditional.
And anyway, these are not moral claims. They don't mention right or wrong, good or bad.

E.g. "You should not murder because if murder were legal nobody would be safe."

But why should everyone be safe? That's an opinion - not a fact.

(If murder is forbidden then everybody is a little safer.)

Same point. 'Everyone should be safer' is an opinion - with which I agree - not a fact.

E.g. " You should give to the refugees charity because refugees need your help"

(If everybody helps everybody else when they are in need then we have more safety and happiness within and among communities).

Again, that we should aim for more safety and happiness - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g." I should be vegetarian".
( If I am vegetarian then there will be a little less animal suffering, and a little less waste of natural resources.)

That we should reduce animal suffering and the waste of resources - with which i agree - is an opinion, not a fact.

E.g. "You should join ISIS."

(If you join ISIS then you will help to bring the Caliphate.)

NB If p then q does not imply if q then p , applies to all cases.
An ought implies an is.

Sorry, not following. I agree a conditional isn't a biconditional. But how can an ought in any way entail an is? Or what does 'imply' mean?

By 'imply ' I mean imply or implies a criterion. The criterion may or may not be acceptable to the receiver of the message. All conditionals are, like turtles, criteria all the way down.

[Immanuel Can]

I expect it you will just brush it off without reading and tracing it to its essential arguments.

Well, you know that the main thing I want to do with my life is live up to your expectations.

I've done much better. I've actually read and understood Searle. So, based on your own comments, it's my guess that that puts me one ahead of where you are right now.

If you have read Searle's article how is that you are unable to argue precisely against his points.

I have done so already. And the article's critique of that is quite correct, I think you'll find, if you think about it.

This is why I'm answering only briefly, and not engaging very long. You don't listen or consider any critique of your views. You just recycle the same erroneous arguments, even when somebody's torn them to tatters in front of you. Eventually, people just go away.

As I do now.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Well, you know that the main thing I want to do with my life is live up to your expectations.

I've done much better. I've actually read and understood Searle. So, based on your own comments, it's my guess that that puts me one ahead of where you are right now.

If you have read Searle's article how is that you are unable to argue precisely against his points.

I have done so already. And the article's critique of that is quite correct, I think you'll find, if you think about it.

This is why I'm answering only briefly, and not engaging very long. You don't listen or consider any critique of your views. You just recycle the same erroneous arguments, even when somebody's torn them to tatters in front of you. Eventually, people just go away.

As I do now.

Torn to tatters??
That is arrogance based on stupidity and ignorance.
Show me some more solid counter arguments.

I have read of a few critique of Searle's argument and they presented their counter and justification in more than 20 pages.

What your Anderson did is merely superficial and presented in a few lines; i.e.

Searle thinks that promising is a specific case in which ‘ought’ is both a description of what has been done and a prescription of moral duty for whomever did the promising: it is an ‘ought’ bundled together with an ‘is.’
If you promise, you place at least an ‘institutional’ duty upon yourself to keep that promise, he thinks.

But is that right?
It’s hard to see why it is.
If promising depends for its integrity upon a person believing in the institution or ‘word-game’ in which it is embedded, then surely its reach goes no further than the game itself.

If I decide that the best way to ‘win the game’ is to be the one person left free to break my word while others think they remain bound, then there isn’t a larger set of moral rules outside of the ‘promising game’ to show that I am doing anything wrong, objectively speaking.

So Searle cannot show that it is objectively wrong to break a promise.
He can show it messes up the game of promising, but this is short of showing it’s wrong in a wider sense.

The above is a very dumb way to counter the argument.
If one break one's promise, then one is not in the the 'game of promising' anymore and there is no real-win within the rules of the game.

Say if one were to play chess and decide to break the rules using to move the Knight in a straight line all the time [or shift it when the opponent is not looking] instead of "L" movement, then one is not playing the game of chess anymore, there no case of real 'winning' is such a move.
If one is cheating with the rules in any game without the other party knowing, the reality and truth is one is still not in reality playing the said game and if one win by cheating it is not a real win per se.
In any case, cheating ["as justified"] is itself morally wrong.

In the game of promising and based on the English Language [or any language], the rules of the game of promising is well established, i.e. when a promisor made a promise, he is obligated [ought invoked] to the promisee to carry out the promise.
There are loads of justifications how the moral 'ought' is invoked by default in the game [constitution] of promising. [not going into this].

So Searle cannot show that it is objectively wrong to break a promise.

In any game, the rules are very specific, so is the game of promising.
If one breaks the rules in any recognized game, e.g. tennis, football, baseball, etc., then it is objectively wrong, independent of anyone's opinion or beliefs.

He can show it messes up the game of promising, but this is short of showing it’s wrong in a wider sense.

As far as the game is concern there is no wider sense than the specified rules agreed by the participants before they participated.
If they break the rules, the wider is sense is 'cheating'* is morally wrong.
* as justified within a Moral Framework and System.

Anderson argument is not an effective counter.
In addition, his resorting to an illusory god to ground his alternative argument is fallacious.

[Immanuel Can]

Torn to tatters??

Devastated.

Show me some more solid counter arguments.

Done already.

But I can't make you read them or think about them....or understand them, if you're determined not to. And it seems to me you like Searle, and that's your choice. I don't think its a rational choice, but I leave it up to you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Torn to tatters??

Devastated.

Show me some more solid counter arguments.

Done already.

But I can't make you read them or think about them....or understand them, if you're determined not to. And it seems to me you like Searle, and that's your choice. I don't think its a rational choice, but I leave it up to you.

You're talking nonsense.

Done already?? where.
The only one on the subject is that Stephen Anderson's article.

I have already read your mentioned Anderson's article a few times and quoted all his full counters argument to topic, i.e. against Searle's.

Btw, it is you who need to reread Anderson's article above where I have provided the link from Philosophy Now.