Re: The Case For Panpsychism
Posted: Sun Sep 03, 2017 6:42 pm
"On a commonsense conception, colors are resolutely non-mental properties that reside on the surfaces and also permeate the hidden insides of physical objects – like red apples with white interiors. Although the colors of objects are perceivable by minds, common sense does not make it a condition of an object’s being colored that someone be currently experiencing it, nor that anyone ever will. Colours, on this view, do not depend on conscious awareness, or mentality of any sort. Quite the contrary: if we inquire further into the nature of colors under the commonsense conception, we are most likely to equate them with objectively measurable physical properties – wavelengths, for example. Conceived of in this way, colors exist whether anyone is looking or not. Your favorite shirt is no less loud for being in the wardrobe.
On a second conception, which we might call more philosophically informed (or misinformed, depending on your perspective – for there are philosophers who vigorously defend the commonsense conception), colors are paradigmatically mental properties. After all, we dream, and can hallucinate, colors just like those we see. People with Charles Bonnet Syndrome experience especially vivid color hallucinations. For homemade color hallucinations rub your eyelids for ten seconds, or stare at a bright light for half a minute and look around. When dreaming of an apple, no light rays are hitting your retinas, nor are you in sight of a real apple. So whatever is red and white about a dream apple is only within your mind. Colors under this second conception do require the touch of consciousness. This would mean that there can be no such thing as an unexperienced color; colors exist only when some mind’s eye sees them. And what goes for the colors of sleep is also true of the colors we experience when awake: right now the colours you are seeing are in your mind (so waves of light are not intrinsically colored, since light waves evidently exist when no-one sees them). We could label this the ‘Cartesian’ conception of colors, since René Descartes is usually blamed for this line of thought, although (like every other Western philosopher) he’s only following Plato, who forcefully chipped away at the objectivity of colors." -from Sam Coleman's article Neutral Monism: A Saner Solution to the Mind/Body Problem
This particular quote is problematic for me in that it undermines a point I was out to make in support of Phillip Goff's argument for Panpsychism. Still, I believe I have reason for going on as planned. Granted, it may well be that colors are "out there". But we are talking about light waves that bounce off of surfaces that then register in the eyes: data fully dependent on the sensors involved. For instance, you have to account for how these colors register to organisms that are colorblind or how colors become brighter when on psychedelics. "Cartoonsville" as we called it back in the 70's.
But more important here is how sound was left out of the issue. If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it, it doesn't make a sound as much as it makes soundwaves. Sound, unlike (possibly (color, clearly requires something to register it. This is scientifically backed. And we have to consider the possibility that color (or rather light (suffers a similar limitation.
That said, I would ask the reader to consider something. We can easily imagine a universe of form without a perceiving thing to register it. We can easily imagine primary qualities doing so. But it gets a little more precarious when you consider secondary qualities such as color and sound. It gets harder to imagine them existing without something to register them. They simply make no sense without being perceived. And here we arrive at a legitimate argument for the anthropic principle: the notion that the universe exists primarily for purpose of being perceived. And once we accept this, it isn't a far reach to trace this back to the possibility that consciousness (at some level or other (is a fundamental element of the universe: panpsychism. We, as perceiving things, may well be what existence created in order to look back at itself.
On a second conception, which we might call more philosophically informed (or misinformed, depending on your perspective – for there are philosophers who vigorously defend the commonsense conception), colors are paradigmatically mental properties. After all, we dream, and can hallucinate, colors just like those we see. People with Charles Bonnet Syndrome experience especially vivid color hallucinations. For homemade color hallucinations rub your eyelids for ten seconds, or stare at a bright light for half a minute and look around. When dreaming of an apple, no light rays are hitting your retinas, nor are you in sight of a real apple. So whatever is red and white about a dream apple is only within your mind. Colors under this second conception do require the touch of consciousness. This would mean that there can be no such thing as an unexperienced color; colors exist only when some mind’s eye sees them. And what goes for the colors of sleep is also true of the colors we experience when awake: right now the colours you are seeing are in your mind (so waves of light are not intrinsically colored, since light waves evidently exist when no-one sees them). We could label this the ‘Cartesian’ conception of colors, since René Descartes is usually blamed for this line of thought, although (like every other Western philosopher) he’s only following Plato, who forcefully chipped away at the objectivity of colors." -from Sam Coleman's article Neutral Monism: A Saner Solution to the Mind/Body Problem
This particular quote is problematic for me in that it undermines a point I was out to make in support of Phillip Goff's argument for Panpsychism. Still, I believe I have reason for going on as planned. Granted, it may well be that colors are "out there". But we are talking about light waves that bounce off of surfaces that then register in the eyes: data fully dependent on the sensors involved. For instance, you have to account for how these colors register to organisms that are colorblind or how colors become brighter when on psychedelics. "Cartoonsville" as we called it back in the 70's.
But more important here is how sound was left out of the issue. If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it, it doesn't make a sound as much as it makes soundwaves. Sound, unlike (possibly (color, clearly requires something to register it. This is scientifically backed. And we have to consider the possibility that color (or rather light (suffers a similar limitation.
That said, I would ask the reader to consider something. We can easily imagine a universe of form without a perceiving thing to register it. We can easily imagine primary qualities doing so. But it gets a little more precarious when you consider secondary qualities such as color and sound. It gets harder to imagine them existing without something to register them. They simply make no sense without being perceived. And here we arrive at a legitimate argument for the anthropic principle: the notion that the universe exists primarily for purpose of being perceived. And once we accept this, it isn't a far reach to trace this back to the possibility that consciousness (at some level or other (is a fundamental element of the universe: panpsychism. We, as perceiving things, may well be what existence created in order to look back at itself.
