Re: Derrida’s Performance
Posted: Sun May 10, 2015 7:38 pm
While I sympathize with your question, Majoram, I think you are imposing analytic criteria on a continental approach which can only end up badly for the continental. You want direct concrete answers (meaning (to a given problem while the continental tends to work in the oblique. You want philosophy to act like a science when Yoni treats it like a poetic engagement with the world. He knows what he means even if he is struggling with articulating it under the operational criteria (based on common doxa (that you are imposing on him.
That said, the following is about Deleuze and Guattarri's What is Philosophy. But hopefully it will shine a little light on the issue:
Before I get into this: just to show you how slow on the uptake I can be, after years of dealing with the phrase "the plane of immanence", I finally got a clear understanding of the term "immanence" in my recent reading of What is Philosophy as the opposite of the transcendent.
Duh!!!!! right? Anyway:
"But it is important to distinguish philosophical from scientific problems. Little is gained by saying that philosophy asks "questions", because question is merely a word for problems that are irreducible to those of science. Since concepts are not propositional, they cannot refer to problems concerning the extensional conditions of propositions assimilable to those of science. If, all the same, we continue to translate their philosophical concept into propositions, this can only be in the form of more-or-less plausible opinions without scientific value." -D&G, What is Philosophy, pg. 79
The main point to be noted here is that philosophy, if it is to be distinguished from science (otherwise, why not just call it science? (must embrace its position as an armchair discipline which lacks the resources of science and therefore must settle for achieving something that seems like more than opinion. Once again: Derrida’s performance and Yoni’s assertion that it is a matter of arguing “as if” what we are saying is true or “the truth” when there is no real way of demonstrating such things in the same way that we can demonstrate that water, at atmospheric pressure, boils at 212 degrees.
Now the analytics might see this as some kind of concession to them. This, of course, is the point of Majoram harping Yoni on what is basically a gotcha moment. While Yoni may instinctively see Performance as a solution to our modern problems (and may well be right in doing so (Majoram has to account for the fact that the analytic approach has been no more useful to science than the continental one has. I mean how many scientists actually make mention of the discoveries of logic? In other words, the analytic approach, for all its fantasies about being so, is no more a science than the continental approach.
As D&G go on to say:
“Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure…. We will not say of many books of philosophy that they are false, for that is to say nothing, but rather that they lack importance or interest, precisely because they do not create any concept or contribute an image of thought or beget a persona worth the effort. Only teachers can write “false” in the margins, perhaps; but readers doubt the importance and interest, that is to say the novelty of what they are given to read.”
Thinking about it now, Majoram, the answer to your question may well lay in a point that Rorty made: that books are things that change people’s lives. This may have been at the foundation of Yoni’s point. And how do you argue that books written by more analytic approaches are more likely to change lives than continental approaches?
Still, you are perfectly free to think of writers like Derrida as literature. What would it change? You are perfectly free to question if it is actually philosophy. But I am equally free to question if Dennett is philosophy when it feels more like science writing to me. I mean Searle can dismiss Derrida as for people who know nothing about philosophy all he wants. But I’m not sure the same thing can’t be said about Dennett or Searle.
That said, the following is about Deleuze and Guattarri's What is Philosophy. But hopefully it will shine a little light on the issue:
Before I get into this: just to show you how slow on the uptake I can be, after years of dealing with the phrase "the plane of immanence", I finally got a clear understanding of the term "immanence" in my recent reading of What is Philosophy as the opposite of the transcendent.
Duh!!!!! right? Anyway:
"But it is important to distinguish philosophical from scientific problems. Little is gained by saying that philosophy asks "questions", because question is merely a word for problems that are irreducible to those of science. Since concepts are not propositional, they cannot refer to problems concerning the extensional conditions of propositions assimilable to those of science. If, all the same, we continue to translate their philosophical concept into propositions, this can only be in the form of more-or-less plausible opinions without scientific value." -D&G, What is Philosophy, pg. 79
The main point to be noted here is that philosophy, if it is to be distinguished from science (otherwise, why not just call it science? (must embrace its position as an armchair discipline which lacks the resources of science and therefore must settle for achieving something that seems like more than opinion. Once again: Derrida’s performance and Yoni’s assertion that it is a matter of arguing “as if” what we are saying is true or “the truth” when there is no real way of demonstrating such things in the same way that we can demonstrate that water, at atmospheric pressure, boils at 212 degrees.
Now the analytics might see this as some kind of concession to them. This, of course, is the point of Majoram harping Yoni on what is basically a gotcha moment. While Yoni may instinctively see Performance as a solution to our modern problems (and may well be right in doing so (Majoram has to account for the fact that the analytic approach has been no more useful to science than the continental one has. I mean how many scientists actually make mention of the discoveries of logic? In other words, the analytic approach, for all its fantasies about being so, is no more a science than the continental approach.
As D&G go on to say:
“Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure…. We will not say of many books of philosophy that they are false, for that is to say nothing, but rather that they lack importance or interest, precisely because they do not create any concept or contribute an image of thought or beget a persona worth the effort. Only teachers can write “false” in the margins, perhaps; but readers doubt the importance and interest, that is to say the novelty of what they are given to read.”
Thinking about it now, Majoram, the answer to your question may well lay in a point that Rorty made: that books are things that change people’s lives. This may have been at the foundation of Yoni’s point. And how do you argue that books written by more analytic approaches are more likely to change lives than continental approaches?
Still, you are perfectly free to think of writers like Derrida as literature. What would it change? You are perfectly free to question if it is actually philosophy. But I am equally free to question if Dennett is philosophy when it feels more like science writing to me. I mean Searle can dismiss Derrida as for people who know nothing about philosophy all he wants. But I’m not sure the same thing can’t be said about Dennett or Searle.