Philosophy Now Forum

raw_thought wrote:What is materialism? That matter is the only reality. One must then define matter. Modern physics' definition of matter is more mind like then Newtonian.
Massless particles, particles with no volume, a particle can violate the law of the excluded middle...A and not A.

No materialist I know holds this position. He demands also that that reality is not only matter but time, space and most importantly energy. Newton especially asserted the existence of forces that move matter.

I am not talking about realists. I am talking about materialists.
What then do you disagree with?
1. Materialists cannot believe in qualia.
2. Appearances are qualia.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:What is materialism? That matter is the only reality. One must then define matter. Modern physics' definition of matter is more mind like then Newtonian.
Massless particles, particles with no volume, a particle can violate the law of the excluded middle...A and not A.

No materialist I know holds this position. He demands also that that reality is not only matter but time, space and most importantly energy. Newton especially asserted the existence of forces that move matter.

Agreed! I actually thought about including energy, empty space etc. However, that I thought would only confuse the issue superficially.

Actually, time, space and energy are more mind like then matter.
Curved nothingness ( gravity) etc. Note that I am not saying that matter is mind. I am saying that it has more in common with mind like properties then what most materialists think of when they (ironically ) use the concept "matter".

raw_thought wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:
There is no tautology, except definition. What we have is the same thing described different ways.

If you say that brain state cause concepts - you are making the mistake. The concept is the brain state. There is no other way to express it.

I agree! For a materialist there are no concepts, only brain states. For a materialist "concept" is just a clumsy way of saying "this particular brain state".
For a materialist concepts do not exist. For a materialist the signifier "concept " is defined as "a particular brain state."
In other words the answer to the thread's question is there is no such thing as a concept. Only electrical impules in a bag of protoplasm exists. Unfortunately, materialists must use language to express their view, language requires concepts and they think concepts do not exist!

I think we are drifting off topic. Perhaps the above will get our debate back on track.

raw_thought wrote: I think we are drifting off topic. Perhaps the above will get our debate back on track.

I don't think that is the case. In fact I think we are right on target.
Without a clear understanding of how humans render their experience to derive concepts, we cannot begin to answer the question.
I note that above you launch into a claim that space and energy are more "mind-like". But how on earth can you begin to say a thing like that? What you seem to be saying is that matter is hard, and resists touch, whereas space and energy are not like matter so must be like mind because you can't touch it.
In truth all three are categories of experience which are all unique in their own way, and share are much as they differ.

raw_thought wrote:I am not talking about realists. I am talking about materialists.
What then do you disagree with?
1. Materialists cannot believe in qualia.
2. Appearances are qualia.

A realist would not care about a qualium. His concern is that regardless of appearances, a thing is what a thing is.
The problem with this approach is that a realist does not care, and proceeds as if the study of qualia is of no importance. The quality of redness becomes the wavelength of light reflected from a surface. And a rock is a hard place because you can kick it.

Qualia are more than appearances, they are the unique and personal aspects of appearance that no objective analysis can verify or describe. Rather than the objective information of colour, such as the energy measured, frequency, wavelength, it is the subjective experience of that appearance.

Whilst an idealist recognises that unavoidable truth that we can only know the world through our senses, he if free to conclude the materialist position that we live in a world of matter and energy and are free to describe it thus. Many scientists accept Kant's thoughts on this matter, and are perfectly happy with a qualified materialism.

If I can conclude, as a Idealist, that we share a material world. I can understand that qualia provide and explanation of appearances in that material world. Whilst I know that my experience of the qualium of the colour red is different from yours, that does not change the fact that the objects you and I see are the same. As an Idealist it is important to know that we all experience the world differently. But there is nothing, except, in radical Idealism (of Berkeley) that the world is wholly mental. Whilst I accept that we can only know the world mentally, I don't see a contradiction to the idea that I can understand it with materialism.

As an Idealist I am perfectly happy to assert that much of my experience of the world is full of qualia, that give me a unique view of the world; that my entire apprehension of the world is, I accept, wholly moderated by my sensations. That I can only know anything about the world as a mental construct. But as an Idealist I can also appreciate the extent to which a materialist positions is a pragmatic and successful way of working out what is the nature of what he would call "the thing in itself". That we can never exactly determine what that thing is, but we can best describe it using a materialist assumption. Idealism also furnishes me with the insight that what I might see, hear, or touch, is not the same as the object, but an interpretation of it. It can be useful to explain how and why people disagree; what illusions are; the nature of delusion - and how important these intercultural and intersocial differences are, as they are fully part of a person's experience. It also helps me reflect above my own experience, and tells me that despite living in the same material world, I have to expect that my apprehension of it will differ from another's.

The differences are not trivial, as I can also tell that for many experiences, materialism has nothing to say, and nothing to offer. Because what the combination of materialism and idealism give me in an appreciation of existentialism.

Qualia are what something feels like or looks like. How can one see red and not have it appear?
I find the anti-qualia people silly.
If pain is only c fibers firing ( that one doesnt feel pain), there is nothing wrong with torture.
I will start a thread about qualia.

raw_thought wrote:Qualia are what something feels like or looks like. How can one see red and not have it appear?
I find the anti-qualia people silly.
If pain is only c fibers firing ( that one doesnt feel pain), there is nothing wrong with torture.
I will start a thread about qualia.

Good, but find me a materialist that doesn't think it is a problem that it is impossible to show a blind man what's the difference between red and green.
Even a materialist knows his limits.

raw_thought wrote:Do materialists believe that concepts are physical and tangible?

In the sense that they are realised in thought and thought appears to be realised in a body then yes they are physical. But no you cannot touch them unless they have been realised in a material form.

If I understood everything about Einstein's brain,would I understand Relativity?

If you mean his 'brains' physical structure then no.

Does a light switch in the "on" position know that the light is on?

Depends what you mean by 'know' but on the whole no, it doesn't know the light is on.

The concept "book" does not refer to an object that has a specific size,shape,weight,language,title or any quantified property. * If only physical objects exist,then the concept "book" is meaningless because it does not refer to a physical object.

Define what you mean by "book"? As I take it as an abstraction from the physical objects we call books.

If knowledge is only a physical pattern, does that mean that a book that no one ever reads knows something?
* In other words a book can be any size,weight...etc.

It doesn't know anything and you can't have a book that no-one has ever read, as who wrote it?

So you agree with me?
You agreed with all my arguments.

There are no such things as abstractions according to the materialist. An abstraction is only a brain state. There is nothing universal * about an abstraction.
* Universal in the philosophical sense. As in universals vs particulars.

Isn't an absolute idealist someone who believes that ideas are the only things that exist? Then I think a materialist would disregard concepts altogether, if matter is the only thing that exists to them.

Agreed! That is what this thread proves. That a materialist cannot believe in concepts. Ironically, materialism is a concept. Therefore a materialist cannot believe in materialism!!

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Qualia are what something feels like or looks like. How can one see red and not have it appear?
I find the anti-qualia people silly.
If pain is only c fibers firing ( that one doesnt feel pain), there is nothing wrong with torture.
I will start a thread about qualia.

Good, but find me a materialist that doesn't think it is a problem that it is impossible to show a blind man what's the difference between red and green.
Even a materialist knows his limits.

Dennett.
Ironically, I was talking to a prof in NC. Dennett had visited. The prof said that Dennett admitted (in private ) that he takes such an extreme position (that there is no such thing as qualia etc) to be in the public eye. For example, Dennett actually said that an on light switch knows that the light is on.
Of course he must believe such things because they fit his weltanschauung. If they are false, eliminative materialism must be false.
I do not expect anyone's acceptance of that story because it is hearsay. However, my experiences with that prof have convinced me that he is honest.