Why hasn't Ethics made more progress in today's world?

[prof]

Ethics has made no progress because it cannot even agree on the most fundamental questions, such as the nature and authoritative weight of different value judgments. In the last three centuries, it has been unable to decide between issues of action and issues of character, between deontological imperatives and consequentialist ones, or between ethics of action or of rule. And it does not even admit of consensus about the basic arbiter or authority behind ethics, so there is no agreed-upon court of appeal for decisions.

Welcome back, Immanuel !!!! I missed you, young man. As you know I am nearly 85. I missed your profoundly-erudite commentary. Seriously. Permit me to take up those issues and problems you raised:

As to the weight of different value judgments, when you read Katz - BASIC ETHICS you were provided with tools enabling you to assign weights to those judgments, namely the S, E, and I dimensions of value. What serves as authority is common sense, and their ontological status as universal natural law as explained in paragraphs 4-8 HERE: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=13987 ...when given some study and reflection. It may be safe to assume that someone as bright as you in your reading of the Unified Theory of Ethics, and in your perusal of my earlier posts you learned (or had confirmed in the view you had already inferred) that issues of character trumped issues of action, for the simple reason that when one has a good character, one's actions would tend to be morally good. Character is more basic for purposes of ethical theory.

Yet why are we forced to choose between conduct and character; both have been central to ethics for more than three centuries, and both are important. A shining example of benevolence/compassion/authenticity speaks louder than any words, and of course one who presents such an example would justifiably be said to be of good character. We could truthfully describe that honest and empathic individual as possessing a good character. So why do you pose the question as if it has to be one or the other. It is both.

It is true that in the past writers on ethics, and teachers of moral philosophy on the university level, have not agreed on the topics you mention - but this does not so much apply to professional ethicists, such as, say, bioethicists and technological ethicists or business ethics consultants -- but today that lack of consensus is no longer necessary since now you have the Hartman/Katz paradigm for Ethics, the science under construction, which will aid in deciding such issues. [It will, that is, once it is taught to kindergarten teachers and writers of children's books. Maybe even pre-teens could still be reached if the concepts are taught in comic-book form.}

We would really love to have you on the team, Immanuel. You have so much to offer with your wide and deep comprehension of the history of ideas in the ethical realm, and because of your perceptive intelligence. You could contribute so much if only you cared enough to see the job through, to see the time when the new young science gains a reputation and becomes at least as respectable as Music Appreciation, Cultural Anthropology, or Geology is today. [Meteorology, though hundreds of years old, is gradually gaining some respect as it becomes more accurate: mayors rely on it to get snow-plows on alert status days before a big snowstorm hits town].

You say that ethics "has been unable to decide between deontological imperatives and consequentialist ones." Now it can! See viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9462 - The new paradigm incorporates the academic schools, measures them with the analytic tools, and shows how they follow from the Definition of "Ethics" and from the Axiom of Ethics. If the analysis is systematic, which it is, and if it is reasonable, which a lot of people think it is, then it can rationally serve to settle much of the controversy. Even Sam Harris, a militant advocate for consequentialism, if pressed would grant that he (implicitly) accepts Kant's imperative concept that persons are to be treated "as ends" not merely as a means to someone's ends. The latter concept of course follows from Dr. Hartman's definition of the very meaning of Ethics. Cf. his classic opus, The Structure of Value (1967).

You write that that ethics, or a nation, or a pragmatist "has been unable to decide between ethics of action or of rule." Ethics, the discipline, has its Normative facet, which is expected to derive or offer us some moral principles. These could, by stretching the language, be referred to as "rules." In a science of Ethics these would naturally be temporary (for when a better or more-comprehensive model comes along they will be replaced, superseded, or subsumed.) Ethics has long had its "rules", viz. The Golden Rule, which it turns out is a consequence or implication of the definition of Ethics: when we view individuals from the perspective of Intrinsic Value, we would do them no harm, hence we would of course not do to others what we don't want them to do to us. I prefer to focus on What are the rational principles that are derived by means of the system? I offered for your consideration some (in the second post down) here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=13696

You have not yet given feedback as to whether those principles are acceptable to you ....and if they are to you, a professor of ethics, then why not to any other intelligent moral philosopher??

Would you be so kind as to tell us precisely what you mean by "ontological grounding" or by a foundation for ethics that would command "authority"? I am genuinely curious to understand what foundation you would find to be acceptable. You have given in a subsequent post some concrete examples of how nations and/or cultures differ with regard to treatment-of-women, but wouldn't the proposed new paradigm offer a solution to this; when you studied BASIC ETHICS didn't you infer its orientation? It strongly suggests that we Intrinsically-value others, which includes women, and thus, logically, certain conduct with regard to them follows.

I look forward to your response.

[Ginkgo]

Would you be so kind as to tell us precisely what you mean by "ontological grounding" or by a foundation for ethics that would command "authority"? I am genuinely curious to understand what foundation you would find to be acceptable. You have given in a subsequent post some concrete examples of how nations and/or cultures differ with regard to treatment-of-women, but wouldn't the proposed new paradigm offer a solution to this; when you studied BASIC ETHICS didn't you infer its orientation? It strongly suggests that we Intrinsically-value others, which includes women, and thus, logically, certain conduct with regard to them follows.

I look forward to your response.

I think he is saying that most ethical theories have no basis in reality because they have no authority by which they can claim some sort of universality when it comes to ethics. The only ethical theory that commands such authority is the Divine Command Theory because it is grounded in God's existence as the supreme law giver. In other words, morality depends of God.

In my previous post I outlined some of the reasons why I thought this was a bad idea under certain circumstances.

[Immanuel Can]

issues of character trumped issues of action,

This can by no means be taken for granted. Not everybody is very happy about the idea that you would say you can specify the content of character. In fact, it's highly contentious. Imagine, for example, if the school system wanted to grade or even record the "moral standing" of your children, or the "character content" of the households from which they come...Such a thing was suggested but rejected by policy makers with horror in the region where I live. So it's nowhere so easy as you suggest.

It's not clear that "based on character" is the right way to go. For example, we punish criminals for their actions, not based on their character. If we punished them based on character, we'd lock people up for "bad thoughts and attitudes" or to put it in a more Virtue Ethics way, for "bad habits." But it seems grossly unjust to prefer condemnation of character to judgment of action, especially in a world in which we find it almost impossible to specify "character." Did not Solon himself say, as Aristotle quoted in the start of The Nicomachean Ethics, the cardinal text of Virtue Ethics, "Call no man blessed [i.e. morally approved of the gods] until he's dead."

If "an entire life" (pace Aristotle and MacIntyre) is the span it takes for us to judge character, and if judging actions is not the relevant or moral thing to do, then we are left without any functional ethics at all.

why are we forced to choose between conduct and character

It's very simple, as you must know from the literature: ethics of action focuses on the actions in question, and asks, what is the right thing to do now? Ethics of character focuses on the long-term and asks, what is a good person? But "good people" don't always do "good things," and "good things" are not done only by "good people." So the two don't reconcile at all, and we are stuck with the question of which one we ought to use to ground our ethics or our public institutions.

It is true that in the past writers on ethics, and teachers of moral philosophy on the university level, have not agreed on the topics you mention - but this does not so much apply to professional ethicists, such as, say, bioethicists and technological ethicists or business ethics consultants

The first statement you make above is true, but the second is incorrect. Widespread and intractable disagreement exists on every side. Read very long in Business Ethics or Bioethics, and you'll soon have no doubt about that. For example, in business there's an ongoing divide between "shareholder" ethics and "stakeholder" ethics, with no clear winner in sight, and not even a means to choose a winner in sight. I really can't imagine how anyone can think the situation is otherwise.

new young science

But ethics isn't a "science." For a "science," you need empirical measurement. You cannot measure values empirically or weigh them off in scales. You can pretend to, of course, but there isn't the ghost of a reason why anyone should believe you're right if you do. You simply can have no objective standard of arbitration, until you've already agreed on the primary ontology and the ensuing mechanism of discrimination. And those are contentious issues.

Even Sam Harris, a militant advocate for consequentialism, if pressed would grant that he (implicitly) accepts Kant's imperative concept that persons are to be treated "as ends" not merely as a means to someone's ends.

Then it is perhaps the only thing upon which Sam Harris and I agree -- that we owe to treat people as ends. But Sam Harris has no reason, given his ontology, for saying so. He's simply behaving irrationally. He should argue for Social Darwinism, which would square perfectly with his ontology. Any special status for humanity does not fit with his declared commitments, so he may be behaving better than his beliefs, but he's still irrational.

You have not yet given feedback as to whether those principles are acceptable to you ....and if they are to you, a professor of ethics,

Whether they are acceptable to me or not, the pressing question is, "Are they compulsory for rational human beings." In other words, is it possible to be a rational person, but yet doubt your precepts? And it's pretty clear it's very possible to do so. The Social Darwinist, the Pragmatist, the Nihilist...all can have accounts of ethics that *are* rationally consistent with their ontology and yet not at all compatible with yours. So you'd have to prove their ontology wrong first, or else they have no duty to perform your ethics.

Would you be so kind as to tell us precisely what you mean by "ontological grounding" or by a foundation for ethics that would command "authority"?

Gladly.

"ontology" = a set of beliefs about what objects, entities and concepts are included in the sphere of "the real." (For example, a Materialist thinks only material substances really exist, so things like "soul" or "values," which seem non-material, are either secretly material in some way we do not yet understand, or are figments of imagination. But they cannot be real in themselves. His ontology denies they can exist independent of substance.)

"ontological grounding" = a consonance between what a person believes to be real and the injunctions, precepts or subsequent postulates he/she draws. Rational moral agents are those whose ontology and ethics have this consonance.

"ethical authority" = a source of authority or warrant by which (potentially) all rational persons are rightly compelled to accept a particular ethical framework or judgment. (For example, if my axiom is "Do not steal," I must be able to specify to the satisfaction of a rational questioner why stealing is always wrong, especially when he/she is strongly inclined to steal something. For such cases are diurnal; and any ethics that falls at the first doubt or lack-of-motivation is not functional for moral judgment at all.) In short, "Sez who?" is the question behind the need for ethical authority.

You have given in a subsequent post some concrete examples of how nations and/or cultures differ with regard to treatment-of-women, but wouldn't the proposed new paradigm offer a solution to this

I cannot see how. Lacking any authoritative basis to choose your ethics over anything he wants to do, why should a person not be as kind or nasty to women as may please him at the moment? What is there in your ethics that compels him to say, "Gosh, I'm a bad person for hitting my wife." He does not have to accept Kant's precept on the doctrine of ends, which is by no means universal, and is easily evadable by simply declassifying women as fully "human." If his culture says that a woman's life is only worth half a man's (and, as you probably know, a number of cultures and a great part of the world believes this very thing), then by what line of reasoning can you prove to him he has a duty to follow your ethics rather than his own?

We cannot say he's simply irrational. ISIS, for example, is not an irrational organization, however wicked I may think them. What I mean by this is that while I find their ontology and their morality appalling, it is not true to say that their ontology does not square with their morality. In fact, they are brutally consistent. They are rational within the ontological terms they hold. That their ontology is severely messed up is the problem, not that they are not sufficiently rigorous in obeying the precepts that rationalize with that ontology.

So again, I must press the essential question: by what authority, and on what ontology do you advance your ethics?

[tbieter]

Much of what holds us back is our inability to give up past ways of doing things to consider new approaches. It all starts with an alert and questioning mind. In ETHICS AS SCIENCE, in ETHICS: A College Course, in A Unified Theory of Ethics, and in BASIC ETHICS; A Systematic Approach, Dr. M.C. Katz has proposed a new paradigm for Ethics, which – rather than compete with other theories – absorbs them into itself, integrates the best ideas it can discern from other theories of ethics into a synthesis which constitutes this new paradigm.

For example, the language that follows may be a way to talk about The Inclusivity Principle with people, be they philosophers or laymen, so that they will grasp it, and understand it.

“Let me introduce you to the concept: “zone of concern.” It starts with our own self. It extends to our inner circle of family, close friends and loved ones; then to our office mates, neighbors and acquaintances. Then we may extend it to strangers, if we have developed our character enough to be able to do that. A "great soul" will easily extend it to include the human family in its entirety. A narrow-minded constipated soul will have a small circle as their zone of concern, a circle with a short, stunted and blunted diameter.

It starts with oneself in the center of the zone. Most of the work has to be done here. Only when we have a better understanding do we get to expand the Zone.

So to the question, "Who is our neighbor?" becomes: Who is in our zone of concern?”


Comments? Questions? Improvements?

Stephen Toulmin would disagree fundamentally with prof's project.
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=14831

[Immanuel Can]

Stephen Toulmin would disagree fundamentally with prof's project.

Thanks for the article. I really do think he has a point. I've often enjoyed how writers like Thomas Hardy or Fyodor Dostoevsky could put profound philosophical or theological insight into the living framework of narrative. Cold propositions are indeed missing something. A fully-developed story can sometimes capture the nuances of lived experience and the ethical elements dwelling therein with greater sophistication than analysis can.

Virtue ethics, which prof insists are the controlling ethics, do have some place for such things, though I think they do so only in a diminished, moralizing way, not in the full complexity of a true narrative. Virtue ethicists are fond of Bowdlerized children's stories and valourizing myths about historical figures as ways of producing moral improvement in children, for example; but I don't think that's what Toulmin wanted.

And there's a further way in which I think prof's project is off the rails. He seems unaware of just how controversial the whole field really is, and how seriously vexed the issues associated with ethics really are. And the part you quote furnishes a good example. For he takes it as obvious that we ought to begin ethical concern from the self and move outward, with diminishing duties at each concentric level of distance from the self. And if that's true, then I have serious moral obligations to myself, less to my wife and children, less still to my neighbours, less to my countrymen, and then perhaps very little indeed to those in other countries. Not everyone would concede that that is true. Peter Singer, for example, would have serious questions; and he'd also want to know why even animals are not included for equal moral concern.

In any case, how can we justify what prof assumes about the concentric nature of our moral responsibility if, as he also says, people should be regarded as "ends-in-themselves," as Kant said? For surely the unknown girl in Mozambique is every bit as much an "end" as my own child. And if that's true, how can I send my child to private school and let the little Mozambican girl die in a ditch? How have I recognized her existence as an "end"?

So he's wildly controversial without having any sense that he's being controversial. And so far as I can see, his theorizing doesn't even square with its own suppositions. And yet he's touting this as a wondrous breakthrough in ethical understanding???

I'm simply missing the wonder of the thing.

[Ginkgo]

Immanuel,

Probably worth keeping in mind that Toulmin is also pointing out the weakness of moral theories that are grounded in some type of absolute truth.

[prof]

I like these words of Gary Morson, in that article to which Tom referred us, and for which I thank you, tbieter. Morson wrote: "...some positions are better than others. Doctors can offer no guarantees, but we do not therefore conclude that medical treatment is just a matter of taste." The same is true for ethics: some positions are better than others. We need to know, and to set as goals we strongly-intend to reach, our clearly-reasoned and Ethically-sound priorities, and then form the habit of living those values. {The paradigm alluded to in the o.p. of this thread upholds most of the valuable teachings in Kant's Grundlagen, so why fight against it and be }

The headline put on his essay, The Tyranny of Theory, over-dramatically emphasizes the fact shown in the axiological/ethical formula I > E > S, namely, that theories and systems give us the least value of the three major dimensions of value. So it summarizes and confirms what Hartman discovered independently. [Know also that in science a 'theory' is not the threat that some make it out to be. They don't understand it. It's not a mere guess or opinion, nor is it rigid and absolute.]

Also the article brings out that Anna Karenina, by Tolstoy, was Toulmin's favorite novel and that he taught a class in it twice. The author, Tolstoy, had a certain specific point of view when he wrote that story, and it is to be hoped that that view was given consideration in those classes. After a lifetime of deliberation Tolstoy arrived at the position that nonviolence is the way to go that works for human kind. This conclusion happens to follow, deductively, from the Definition of the term "ethics" in the new paradigm I have proposed, which a reader or member here is free to accept or reject.

People who want to commit violence, or who sanction the use of it, are naturally quick to reject the entire Ethics paradigm because they don't like one particular conclusion derived from it. They fear the Ethical discipline, that is becoming a full-blown science. That is one reason why I should probably speak only with kindergarten teachers, who have a willingness to learn, and a good sense of values already .... Once a sufficient number of people set a good example, whether they be in the East or West, the rest of the world will likely copy. So far, we in the USA have set a lousy example of ethical practice. {Our music, dancing styles, and art sure are culturally-transmitted rapidly we note )

I would ask you, Tom, do you find merit in this paradigm, this model of models? No matter what Toulmin thought, how do you feel about it? Do you respect the 'authority' of science? Do you believe that some day ethics can use scientific methods - as Anthony Apiah held it can in his book, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS - and that if it did that would be an improvement?

Evidently I failed to make clear that metaphor in re the concentric circles which is labled "zone of concern." It was, it seems, left open to misinterpretation. I did say it was intended as a way to teach The Principle of Inclusivity, but there are those who, perhaps through neglect to do some research, have no idea what I meant by this. There is even a whole section on this in Katz - Ethical Adventures, pp. 23-26. "Our ethical radius" See: http://tinyurl.com/38zfrh7 It argues by presenting the benefits of widening one's in-group, and explains the moral imperative to do so. The word "concern" in the bullseye-target metaphor is descriptive of what is, not normative as to what ought be: people do happen to care more for their immediate families, kin, local residents than they do for "strangers" or for those overseas. Yet moral Principle recommends extending this radius, becoming more inclusive. Highly relevant also to when I wrote "the most work needs to done on ourselves" is the original post in this thread: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=11548

I have no particular breach for Virtue Ethics, nor bias toward it; I merely, when I graded it, put it in its place relative to other ideologies. I stated time and again we need the best concepts from all the schools of thought which have something constructive to offer. If there is a conflict a careful application of our available tools of analysis will enable us to resolve it. Let's be constructive - not the opposite of it.

In contrast to some here, yours truly - that's me - is more solution-oriented than I am problem-oriented. Furthermore, when I read a passage, rather than seek to pick holes in it, or ferret out possible weaknesses in it, my aim is to see what I can learn from it, gain from it, find the best ideas from it that it has to offer, and eventually use those ideas for the benefit of human kind.

My position is that we should all share ideas freely, and keep ego out of it.

To say, "It's got to be this, or that !" is what we call in value-science 'dyssystemic thinking.' For example, "It's got to be character or action in ethics." Why can't it be both? And to shift, mid-discussion, from a genus, Ethics, to one of its species, Justice, and to a sub-species of that, namely, Penal justice, is to commit The Fallacy of Method, since each frame of reference has its own specific tools, methods of analysis, models, etc., even though the Principles of Ethics would apply to the various sub-branches. Ethics, the body of reliable knowledge, provides tools for use by jurists and trial judges in a court of law. In the Unified Theory of Ethics I recommended studying the findings of Dr. Karl Menninger, who wrote one of the better books on the topic of punishment.

When I wrote "character trumps action" I was speaking in terms of how valuable it is to us to develop and maintain a morally-good character relative to just performing actions without subjecting them to the criteria as to what makes an action morally-good, criteria offered in BASIC ETHICS, wherein I defined the phrase "a good action."

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel,

Actually, "Immanuel" is not my name. It means God-With-Us, and comes from the book of Isaiah in the Torah. See the first two lines of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel
And "Can" is a pun on "Kant," of course, but also my personal position on Who around here actually has the wisdom to answer questions. And it's not me who has that. "IC" will do, or else the entire pseudonym. But personally, I do not claim to be God.

Probably worth keeping in mind that Toulmin is also pointing out the weakness of moral theories that are grounded in some type of absolute truth.

No, I actually agree with him moral theories (i.e. secular ethics) has been a colossal failure from Aristotle to today. So I'll buy that part of what he's saying. But he thinks "Divine Command" is what is to be rightly understood by the idea of ethics grounded in absolute truth, so I think he's batting at a straw man there.

I prefer to take the good parts of what he says, but don't feel bound to take with that the parts in which his judgment seems hasty and ill-informed. Nor do I require him to agree with me totally in order to see value in much of what he says.

[Immanuel Can]

Thanks for your reply, prof. I'm still not convinced, and if it's not too irritating, I'll share why. I trust you understand I do not do so to be opposite, but rather because I assume we're both interested in seeing any ethics going forward on a good footing; and if that entails some back-and-forth debate then I suppose that is what it entails, right?

Morson wrote: "...some positions are better than others. Doctors can offer no guarantees, but we do not therefore conclude that medical treatment is just a matter of taste." The same is true for ethics: some positions are better than others. We need to know, and to set as goals we strongly-intend to reach, our clearly-reasoned and Ethically-sound priorities, and then form the habit of living those values.

This is an illustration of what I question when I said I was concerned that you seemed perhaps less unaware than you should be of how much you were taking for granted as settled, when in point of fact it was all still controversial. Note the bold font, indicating terms that assume a settled value judgment already existing.

Note that we do not know what "better" means until we have a teleology of human affairs. Yet the right teleology for human affairs is very much a matter of debate -- is it our own happiness, is it the well-being of others, is it the collective advantage, is it holy living in view of Judgment, is it survival of the fittest, is it transcendence, is it perpetuation of the species, is it reaching the Singularity...and on, and on, and on. Until we have one of these goals nailed down, we will not be able to tell when anything is "better," because "better" is always "better for... (goal X, Y, or Z)." That is, "better" is always relative to purpose -- and opinion on purposes varies widely.

The same lack of specificity could be said for "guarantees": you say that "guarantees" of what cannot be produced? Or for "goals": what are the appropriate "goals" of human action and life? Then, how do we know what "clearly reasoned" is in respect to ethics, when we have no singular established ethical perspective from which to start? Is Virtue Ethics "clearly-reasoned"? Or is it Kantianism that's "clearly reasoned"? The same goes for "ethically-sound": "sound" according to which ethic? To this we might add "priorities," although, as we've already seen we don't know what the "goals" are, so we have no way of setting "priorities" for achieving them. And "forming the habit"? That's straight from Virtue Ethics, but is not the concern of most other ethical projects. Then there's "values": people "value" all kinds of things, such as money, sex, status, drug trips, art, their neighbours' wives, and so on...how will ethics clear up what's worth "valuing"? What is the objective standard for good values, versus bad values?

You write as though these questions are all easy or answer themselves. But I do not see that they do. And we still have no authoritative warrant for choosing your ethics over everyone else's.

Now, the following was directed to "Tom," so I hope I'm not horning in. But maybe I can suggest a further problem evident in your response to him here:

I would ask you, Tom, do you find merit in this paradigm, this model of models? No matter what Toulmin thought, how do you feel about it? Do you respect the 'authority' of science? Do you believe that some day ethics can use scientific methods - as Anthony Apiah held it can in his book, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS - and that if it did that would be an improvement?

It seems to me that this passage acts like Hume's Ought-Is paradox has been solved, or has just magically disappeared. Yet so long as Hume is right, science will never, and can never, have anything to tell us about values, no matter how wonderful science gets. And it's not the fault of science; it's that we're asking science to do something for which it is simply not designed or intended...to address matters about which it has no pretensions at all. Science works descriptively; ethics are prescriptive. Science (meaning, I guess, a sociological or historical "science," since biology or physics tells us nothing about ethics) tells us how things have been done; it cannot tell us whether or not they've been done "rightly," nor can it tell us how they should be done from here on in. Science can make us more efficient in producing some goal we have already chosen; it cannot tell us which goal is moral to choose.

So science can't be blamed if it knows nothing about ethics; it never promised it would. And a "scientific" ethics would amount to nothing more than an attempt to brand the ethical biases of a person or group with an artificial cache of "scientific" respectability... Therefore, no, it would not be good to have such a thing, not unless "science" actually could tell us about ethics. Otherwise, it would be a dangerous propaganda move to grant "scientific" prestige to something that was inherently not "scientific" at all.

Science can tell us wonderful things about what "is" the case. It tells us nothing -- and indeed does not try to tell us anything -- about how things "ought" to be but are not. To know what "ought" to be done, you need a definite teleology -- a clear "end" of human life and a compass for ethics. And secularists disagree about what teleology, if any, is correct for the human race.

So what about that authority? How do we know your proposed ethical formulas (rather than those of, say Kantianism or Utilitarianism or Egoism or Nihilism) are morally obligatory for us?

[prof]

...so long as Hume is right, science will never, and can never, have anything to tell us about values, no matter how wonderful science gets.

I believe that in this matter Hume was wrong, and I explained why here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9669 See especially the 4th paragraph down, and what follows.

David Hume, however, turned out to be correct when, in his Treatise of human Nature he wrote in the 17770s to the effect that "humans are naturally moved by a moral sense" which is essentially a capacity to share the feelings of happiness or misery of others. Peter Singer argues that this capacity is what makes ethics possible; it is the heart of the matter. Robert Hartman calls it the capacity for Intrinsic valuation. Many today speak of it as "empathy."
I touched on the moral sense concept in my thread here at this forum "On Human Nature"


Yes, friend, it does get a bit frustrating when people who mean well miss the point so often. Could it be that they haven't done the background reading??

I know that nothing is settled in Philosophy; I said that this is so in my Introduction to ETHICS: A College Course. In science too nothing is settled but at least some tentative conclusions are reached, and held until they are superseded by superior perspectives. My major at Univ. of Chicago was Philosophy of Science, and I tend to think like a scientist. I am quite familiar with the history of science, and the structure of science. I wrote a chapter on the latter in the College Course booklet. My teachers in ethics at The University of Chicago were Mary Mothersill and Alan Gewirth. My mentor, a guest professor at M.I.T. at the time, was Robert S. Hartman. Here is a paper of his: - http://www.hartmaninstitute.org/axiologyasascience/ - After his death an Institute was set up in his honor.

I am well-aware that ethics professors have not reached a consensus; don't need to be told.... It is because they haven't that I offer some tentative resolutions for the contentions.
Yes, there is 'a consonance between what I believe to be real and the ...subsequent postulates I draw."

Your requirement for my system to have ethical authority, as you have defined the concept, namely: ""ethical authority" = a source of authority or warrant by which (potentially) all rational persons are rightly compelled to accept a particular ethical framework or judgment." is far too strict for me, or anyone else, to comply with!

Why do I say that? There will always be someone stubborn enough or 'onery, or a habitual critic of some sort who can't help but get into that mode (play devil's advocate) who will find a proposition unacceptable. Even though(to my mind) some axiom is eminently reasonable, someone with a quirk for disagreeableness will object, I predict.

The Axiom I proposed for Ethics is: Ethical individuals will tend to want and encourage developments that make things morally better.
I stated it in an imperative form: Make things (morally) better!!

I explained what I mean by 'morally' and by 'morality.' I defined "Ethics." What other system does this? I gave 15 criteria as to what folks might want to see in an ethical theory -- I believe it was a section in Ethical Explorations. What other system does that? In earlier blogs here at this Forum I described the HVP test, as, in more depth, in Appendix One of A College Course. Yet you keep insisting that it can't be done, that values can't be measured. See: http://www.brill.com/products/book/new- ... psychology - also http://www.amazon.com/Science-Axiologic ... on+pomeroy

The test measures how people think as compared with a standard that Hartman discovered that squares with reality, with what is really real ...with your experience and with mine. The test has been validated many, many times over. Sources have been given. If someone is ignorant about the content of a book, such as THE STRUCTURE OF VALUE, it is not the book's fault.

One does not need to wait until the end of a lifetime to talk about character. For example, I can strive to become a person of good character, a person with ethical and moral qualities, while I still am alive. This is what the discipline of Ethics recommends for everyone. Did you understand the section on Norms when you read BASIC ETHICS? Or did you stop reading before you got to that part?

Hartman published papers in Kant-Studien, a journal devoted to Kant. Yet in my doctoral thesis I argued that he was not a merely a kantian. My thesis was later published with the title Trends Toward Synthesis, by Axiopress in Michigan.

Since every end can be a means to a further end, some of us are not comfortable with the notion "ends in themselves." You seem to be. I don't fault you for that. Kant, as well as Toulmin, did the best he could with the tools they had on hand. Kant was very creative, and a great intellect. His values were excellent, for he advocated for World Peace. It is no wonder that you admire him. I'm glad you found an ethics with which you can be satisfied. I am not out to convert anyone to my models. I believe a good theory speaks for itself. I seek to advance ethical theory only with those with whom the new proposed approach resonates as good sense.

You tell us that philosophers like to argue, that they don't come to an agreement, and that is why ethics hasn't made progress. I am oriented toward what will be toward the future, toward progress. I ask "Why not?" You tell me there is no consensus. I knew that before I started! That was the motivation for developing a theory people could accept. Many already do.

Fortunately, nearly every day I see my views as to what is ethical being put into practice. I hear of people volunteering to do acts of kindness Non-profit agencies spring up to alleviate poverty, house the homeless, spread education, do social-conflict negotiating, etc. This bolsters my faith in the future.

Here is an example: - http://www.givesomethingbackfoundation.org/

Here is another: - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Give_Somet ... s_Products - describes how this business shares its profits and benefits its community - an ethical way to do business.
https://www.linkedin.com/company/give-something-back


Pardon the rambling. I am tired.

Comments?

[Ginkgo]

Actually, "Immanuel" is not my name. It means God-With-Us, and comes from the book of Isaiah in the Torah. See the first two lines of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel

Yes, believe it or not I did actually know this.

And "Can" is a pun on "Kant," of course, but also my personal position on Who around here actually has the wisdom to answer questions. And it's not me who has that. "IC" will do, or else the entire pseudonym. But personally, I do not claim to be God.

Of course. "IC" is is then.

No, I actually agree with him moral theories (i.e. secular ethics) has been a colossal failure from Aristotle to today. So I'll buy that part of what he's saying. But he thinks "Divine Command" is what is to be rightly understood by the idea of ethics grounded in absolute truth, so I think he's batting at a straw man there.

I don't think there is any need to portray divine commands as a straw-man argument. It's pretty straight forward and it obvious that it is just another ethical theory...no better or worse.

I prefer to take the good parts of what he says, but don't feel bound to take with that the parts in which his judgment seems hasty and ill-informed.

What parts do you have in mind?

[Immanuel Can]

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9669 See especially the 4th paragraph down,

Yes, I am familiar with this idea. However, I find it entirely unconvincing. It makes a very plain logical mistake...that is, the idea that the existence of moral language somehow legitimizes moral judgments. But rationally speaking, it does not.

To be jocular, we might say that the existence of language about leprechauns does nothing to validate the existence of leprechauns. But I shall say something more serious instead. That we humans tend to use language as if objective moral concepts were available will do nothing to show that such concepts actually are available and warranted.

David Hume, however, turned out to be correct when, in his Treatise of human Nature he wrote in the 17770s to the effect that "humans are naturally moved by a moral sense" which is essentially a capacity to share the feelings of happiness or misery of others. Peter Singer argues that this capacity is what makes ethics possible; it is the heart of the matter. Robert Hartman calls it the capacity for Intrinsic valuation. Many today speak of it as "empathy."

Yes, I know that Hume campaigned for Emotivism; yet the consensus of the majority of moral philosophers today on the matter is that he failed, and I quite agree. It will not do to argue that moral language and language of approval/disapproval are precisely the same thing: it will not do in the political, and it won't even do in the personal, for it fails to provide any objective grounds for differentiating good and bad moral views. It doesn't even give us enough, in that respect, to judge ourselves...let alone others.

As for "empathy," yes, that is the darling of Virtue Ethicists everywhere. However, it is a massively overrated faculty. For example, a few months ago, Rolling Stone magazine featured a cover with a prettified picture of a young terrorist on it. This sparked effusions of empathy from bubble-headed people everywhere, but right thinking people condemned that kind of misguided empathy. Or in a place nearby to me, a young gay man killed and ate his roommate. Now that he's in jail, young women are sending him love letters, empathizing with his "plight" and claiming they can "understand" him, "love" him, and perhaps even make him "straight."

That's how crazy empathy can be. It can take both worthy and unworthy objects with equal passion and fervor. So absent any means of differentiating between these types of empathy, empathy itself is simply inadequate to give us a moral compass.

Then finally, the "intrinsic valuation idea" is poor. For it is an "IS" observation (and hence, an empirical claim) that Hartman thinks gets him to an OUGHT judgment (that such valuations are somehow warranted or even right).

After his death an Institute was set up in his honor.

I trust this is because he did some great things in something other than the IS-OUGHT problem. If this was his greatest contribution, then I think perhaps they should get their money back.

Yes, friend, it does get a bit frustrating when people who mean well miss the point so often. Could it be that they haven't done the background reading??

Yes indeed. But it is perhaps more frustrating when people have done the background reading, and indeed, a lot of other relevant reading that illuminates the topic; and though other people say they have too, but the second people have not done enough to realize there is an inherent weakness in a view they happen prize.

That's catty. I withdraw that last remark. I find you likeable, even if I continue to doubt your ethics paradigm.

Your requirement for my system to have ethical authority, as you have defined the concept, namely: ""ethical authority" = a source of authority or warrant by which (potentially) all rational persons are rightly compelled to accept a particular ethical framework or judgment." is far too strict for me, or anyone else, to comply with!

On secular suppositions? Yes, I think it absolutely is. And that does indeed count against a secular ethics. It has no authority. Why must I be a Kantian, or a Utilitarian, or a Virtue Ethicist, or even a Pragmatist or Nihilist? No one can seem to tell me.

But then we're left in the hands of those who make ethical rules according to their own tastes, or just as bad, on their personal "empathies," and we have no push back to tell them they cannot. If they have the power, then they can; for then, morality is not any objective feature of the universe, and all our judgments are merely emotive, or at best, provisional sociological artifacts that need be taken as no more binding than yesterday's newspaper.

Yet you keep insisting that it can't be done, that values can't be measured.

You have me wrong. I do not insist we cannot *invent* a measurement and sell it passionately; rather I insist we have not yet found any such measurement that is not actually arbitrary and indefensible. Specious measurement is quite possible; justified measurement is not.

I further assert that absent a standard external to your own ethics, you have no metric for proving the adequacy of your ethics. And lacking an authority, you have no means of adding deontological weight (meaning "duty to perform act X or Y") to your own system. And you need that.

The test measures how people think as compared with a standard that Hartman discovered that squares with reality, with what is really real ...with your experience and with mine.

"How people think" does not answer the question of, "Do they think rightly?"

Your experience -- and mine -- is also not justification. We can genuinely "experience" and then interpret that experience erroneously, and in fact humans do so every day. Have you never "experienced" the feeling you were going to turn left at the end of the street, only to find when you arrived at the corner that left was a dead end, and you only could turn right? And yet you "experienced" the decision of knowing you were going to turn left. If you did so, you were just wrong, that's all. It happens all the time.

Kant was very creative, and a great intellect. His values were excellent, for he advocated for World Peace. It is no wonder that you admire him.

I'm no Kantian. And that he advocated for world peace does not tell in his favour unless we know already, by some code or authority prior to Kant himself, that world peace is a "good" goal.

That is also not self-evident. Ask PM Chamberlain about that, just prior to WWII; I'm sure he would have a retrospective rethink of his position. "Peace" that allows horrors to continue is not "peace" at all. I find the most peaceful places are often graveyards.

I might (emotively) "like" the idea of world peace. That empirical fact is, however, not morally informative in itself. You are not thereby obliged to do likewise.

You tell us that philosophers like to argue, that they don't come to an agreement, and that is why ethics hasn't made progress.

No, I don't. I merely would say that continued argument is necessary when a position has not been rationally established.

Deontology and Utilitarianism have both produced superficially plausible accounts of the moral landscape, and both have been revealed as faulty, primarily through the critiques launched by the other. This has been salutary for all of us, for it keeps us from accepting one or another of these flawed systems in bad faith.

Criticism is necessary, especially in the realm of ethics, which leads directly into things like social policy and international affairs, to say nothing of individual decision-making. Criticism is especially urgent when someone is advancing a project (like, say, the moral education of kindergarten teachers) based a version of ethics which remains badly flawed.

Unwarranted criticism is one thing; but warranted criticism is quite another. And it's necessary, however wearying that process may be.

Now, if only we finally had some Authority for settling these interminable debates...

Got one yet?

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think there is any need to portray divine commands as a straw-man argument. It's pretty straight forward and it obvious that it is just another ethical theory...no better or worse.

No, I wasn't saying that Divine Command itself is a "straw man." I should clarify that.

I was saying that Toulmin thinks essentially that Christianity = a form of Divine Command Ethics, and that in so doing he was not rightly representing Christianity...and hence the "straw man" in question was created by this superficial misinterpretation of Christianity.

I don't blame him too much: his is a very common "outsider" kind of error. Lots of people make it. He doesn't really know what we're about. The danger, though, is this leads to facile dismissal of a perspective that has much more to offer than he knows. Thus his critique fails to woo me, since in it I do not recognize Christianity but mere Legalism.

[Ginkgo]

I don't blame him too much: his is a very common "outsider" kind of error. Lots of people make it. He doesn't really know what we're about. The danger, though, is this leads to facile dismissal of a perspective that has much more to offer than he knows. Thus his critique fails to woo me, since in it I do not recognize Christianity but mere Legalism.

But you have already told us that ethics and legalism are the same.

[Immanuel Can]

But you have already told us that ethics and legalism are the same.

Absolutely not. I never said that. The most I've said is that ethics are required for laws, which has nothing whatsoever to do with legalism.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legalism_(theology) if you like Wiki.