Theism - better to believe a lie?

[uwot]

I don't think either of these are examples of people believing things they know to be untrue, rather than desperately hoping so. Your initial premise is unsound until you can demonstrate a belief in something known to be false. You might try closer to home: do you really believe the examples support your thesis?

[Immanuel Can]

I think your controversy is with Marsh, then; for it was Marsh who created this thread, and it was his/her supposition that such things as believing something you know isn't true can actually happen.

If you believe he/she was wrong even to posit such a circumstance, I do believe he/she will have noted your disgruntlement with his/her premise.

[uwot]

You're still doing it, Immanuel Can. There is no disgruntlement on my part, nonetheless, you have taken this premise and, this is conjecture, woven into a narrative according to which your failure to address my, actually serious, points is justified by your belief that I am driven by emotion, rather than reason. See? Even I make up stories on flimsy evidence. The difference between us is that I suspect I would be much more likely to abandon a plot line if the facts fitted a better one.
I have no idea if Marsh still has any interest in this thread, (Hi, Marsh, if you are there) but it is your posts and your arguments that I have been responding to of late. There is no compulsion to engage, but don't kid yourself that anything you have posted recently has met any challenges. (We both, and everyone else, knows you will though.)

[Immanuel Can]

I'm genuinely not sure what the "it" of your reference is, uwot. Nor have I alleged here anything about your personal motives in the way you describe. That you were discontent with the idea of "self-deception" seemed to me apparent from your protestations, and were an extrapolation from that source. If it was an unwarranted extrapolation, I apologize. But in that case, I think we are not discussing a difference at all, if you are content with Marsh's premise.

I think the ideas here have merit. I prefer to discuss those ideas. To be distracted by the personalities involved would be really irrelevant at best, and irrational and ad hominem at worst. So my advice would be that we engage Marsh's (or Mcthink's) ideas.

[uwot]

I'm genuinely not sure what the "it" of your reference is, uwot.

'It' is this:

I think what you have done, Immanuel Can is the usual casual and uncritical appropriation of a few premises which don't really refer to anything and created a coherent, and quite possibly logically valid story. That's how religions start, and for their adherents, that sort of sloppy thinking becomes a habit.

You keep doing it.

Nor have I alleged here anything about your personal motives in the way you describe.

Actually...

...I do believe he/she will have noted your disgruntlement with his/her premise.

My gruntlement, or otherwise, is neither here nor there.

That you were discontent with the idea of "self-deception" seemed to me apparent from your protestations, and were an extrapolation from that source.

Which is further confirmation of the point I am making.

If it was an unwarranted extrapolation, I apologize. But in that case, I think we are not discussing a difference at all, if you are content with Marsh's premise.

I have readily conceded that people deceive themselves, what I am challenging is your contention that there are some people who believe things they know to be false.

I think the ideas here have merit. I prefer to discuss those ideas. To be distracted by the personalities involved would be really irrelevant at best, and irrational and ad hominem at worst. So my advice would be that we engage Marsh's (or Mcthink's) ideas.

I don't remember them claiming that people believe things they know are false. What Marsh said, very early was: "What if you're not aware of the lie. Is it better for a society to live in ignorance if it's known for a fact that the overall well being of the society is better off not knowing?" It's an interesting question, but, as I remember, it was you that introduced the idea of wilful self deception, without providing compelling examples.

[henry quirk]

"If it were...proven...it's best for...an individual, a society...to have a belief in god, then is it best to have a belief in god regardless if it is true?"

I might be wrong (I'm certain someone will correct me if I am), but I recall research indicating exactly that...that is: believers get along better, generally, than non-believers.

Me: not giving a damn. Insofar as I can tell, there is no designer/creator/sustainer of reality and I'll not pretend there is one just because I might have a better time of it.

#

"can the value of believing a lie outweigh the value of knowing the truth?"

I don't see how it's possible to believe a lie, knowing it's a lie, without being utterly bugfuck crazy.

I prefer sanity and facts to insanity and lies.

[Immanuel Can]

Hi, Henry:

Do you think that Marsh maybe means "...believe a lie that OTHERS might know to be wrong," rather than "...believe a lie YOU know to be wrong"?

In other words, could his concern be more with what we politically allow to happen in respect to people's beliefs than with what the individual does or does not know about a belief he/she holds?

In that case, would not his question be, "Given that we atheists 'know' that the G hypothesis is not true, ought we to allow people still to believe G if we think it will produce some sort of 'better' result?"

And would the same question on the flip side be, "Given that we Theists know that Materialism does not provide a basis for the M hypothesis, should we tell atheists the truth or let them persist in behaving as if M really does exist if it is 'better' for us and them if they do?"

Note: For the sake of harmony and focusing on Marsh's concern, please feel free to disregard which of the above actually may have truth on its side, and to regard them both as mere thought experiments.

In either case, the key question then would be, "As [supposed] makers of political decisions, should we allow within our polity the perpetuation of delusions for what we conceive as being 'good' political or sociological purposes?"

Marsh?

[henry quirk]

Mannie,

I can only go by what Marsh posted. No profit in my guessin’ at his meanings.


As for your questions...

"Given that we atheists 'know' that the G hypothesis is not true, ought we to allow people still to believe G if we think it will produce some sort of 'better' result?"

As an indifferent atheist I don't even need the thin reasoning of 'producing a better result" to leave the theists be. If Joe identifies as a Christian then Joe should go and be the best damned Christian he can be. I only ask he leave me be to do otherwise (and -- should he decline to honor my request -- I'll hurt him badly).


"Given that we Theists know that Materialism does not provide a basis for the M hypothesis, should we tell atheists the truth or let them persist in behaving as if M really does exist if it is 'better' for us and them if they do?"

The theist is free to say and write anything he or she likes to 'open my eyes'. I am free to ignore him or her. The only conflict is when theist won't get outta my face (and vice versa, I presume).

If I, the atheist, am wrong, then God (as it likes) will correct me in good time.

If Joe, the theist, is wrong, then death will correct him.

Not seein' any friggin' point to the perpetual conflict between believers and non-believers.

Go tend to your garden and leave the other fella to his.


"As [supposed] makers of political decisions, should we allow within our polity the perpetuation of delusions for what we conceive as being 'good' political or sociological purposes?"

Policy makers should act as the proxies they are. This means levy taxes (to pay for roads and such) and butt out of how a man or woman (the employer of the proxy) orders his or her life.

As I posted elsewhere...

"There are just two rules of governance in a free society: Mind your own business. Keep your hands to yourself." --P. J. O'Rourke

That so many (often with the best of intentions) cannot just leave other folks alone is irksome.

[Immanuel Can]

Henry, you never fail to entertain. And illuminate, of course.

I know you're quite the...what's the term? Conservative? Libertarian? Randian? Anarchist, almost? Hermit, maybe? So I'm not surprised you're not down with the idea of political solutions of the proposed sort. And believe me, I'm sympathetic to that. Small government suits me too. No complaints there.

Acknowledging that, though, I have to admit that we do live in societies. And unless we want to stop doing that, we're always going to be faced with questions about how we treat / fail to treat our neighbours. It would only be in that limited sense that I would want to speak of "the political" here -- of rules of governance made by common consent and for the common good.

And if that's okay with you, then I think the question is still a pretty good one: should we allow neighbours to be deluded in ways we consider 'good,' or is the right thing to tell them the truth?

[henry quirk]

"we're always going to be faced with questions about how we treat / fail to treat our neighbours"

I've offered my opinion/an option when it comes to that.

#

"should we allow neighbours to be deluded in ways we consider 'good,' or is the right thing to tell them the truth?"

I've answered the question.

Curious what other folks have to say.

[Lev Muishkin]

If it were ever proven scientifically that it's best for the well being of an individual, a society, and evolution to have a belief in god, then is it best to have a belief in god regardless if it is true? Or put another way can the value of believing a lie outweigh the value of knowing the truth?

No, if god were in fact real, it would be much better to ignore the fact. It seems to me that people who disbelieve seem to lead clearer and more free lives than Theists.

Theists live in angst and denial. They suffer from guilt and pain, and usually transfer their disquiet and make their children's lives a misery by imposing the threat of eternal punishment on them and themselves.
Theists have resisted social and political change. Historically they have justified war, poverty and slavery. They have slowed down scientific progress and persecuted those that believed in things differently - especially other Theists.

It is not a co-incidence that the growth of technical, medical and scientific progress have gone hand-in-hand with a growing secularisation, over the last 150 years.

So, no. Whatever the truth it would be better to keep on the path of atheistic secularisation and reject religion and any belief in god.

[uwot]

Hi, Henry:

Do you think that Marsh maybe means "...believe a lie that OTHERS might know to be wrong," rather than "...believe a lie YOU know to be wrong"?

In Henry Quirk's post, the one you are responding to, he says:

I don't see how it's possible to believe a lie, knowing it's a lie, without being utterly bugfuck crazy.

That seems fairly unambiguous. Being able to create a coherent narrative is a skill in itself, and I'm not questioning your ability to do so, but it doesn't bode well for the soundness of your premises if your research skills allow you to overlook something said two sentences prior.
Story telling of itself is harmless, but people who have no particular affiliation should be wary of things like this:

... should we allow neighbours to be deluded in ways we consider 'good,' or is the right thing to tell them the truth?

You note that we live in societies, and I personally think we should give our children the best education that we can achieve, but it is not the business of a modern democratic society to tell it's members what to believe.

[Immanuel Can]

I wonder if we're not losing Marsh's point a bit here.

He's / she's offering us a hypothetical: He's saying, "If there were story X that you knew, and it was (in some sense) 'better' or 'good' for people to believe in it, but you knew story X was not factually true, should you allow that?"

I think he's / she's not offering us the case wherein story X is thought NOT to be "better" or "good" in any sense (pace Lev).

Now, it's fair for us to say, "No such situation happens in reality," in which case we've dismissed Marsh's premise rather than entertaining the possibility he posits. But he is assuming, and in framing the question asking us to assume, that such a situation *may* be conceivable.

If so, it would seem apparent that we are begging the question at the moment.

Is that right, Marsh? Have we done right by your question?

[uwot]

I wonder if we're not losing Marsh's point a bit here.

He's / she's offering us a hypothetical: He's saying, "If there were story X that you knew, and it was (in some sense) 'better' or 'good' for people to believe in it, but you knew story X was not factually true, should you allow that?"

It happens all the time. In science there is no real harm in believing that things like time, space, energy, mass 'exist'; maybe they do, maybe they don't; but they are 'good' in that they are useful concepts that can be manipulated mathematically. The problem arises in other fields; disagreements about what constitutes good in aesthetics don't get cartoonists shot, for example; whereas differing views about 'good' in ethics, politics and religion can be very damaging. If you don't oppose people's versions of 'good', they will impose it on you.
Anyway, having had it pointed out by myself and Henry Quirk that it is nonsensical to believe that people believe things they know to be untrue, I take it you no longer believe it.

[Immanuel Can]

In science there is no real harm in believing that things like time, space, energy, mass 'exist'; maybe they do, maybe they don't; but they are 'good' in that they are useful concepts that can be manipulated mathematically.

Now, that's a very useful observation. You're right: in science, we make provisional theories about what might or might not be the right description of a phenomenon, and we don't feel we are betraying our conception of truth if they turn out to be not-quite-right in some way. In fact, if science could not generate and discard theories (or elements thereof) it could not make any progress, but would become static.

differing views about 'good' in ethics, politics and religion can be very damaging.

Yes indeed. And so can bad theories in science, if the believer in question happens to be one of the people who is wielding the scientific tools in question. No end of people were bled to death in the middle ages because of the post-Aristotelian ideas about fluids and balance in the human body, for example: and that was in the name of science -- of medicine, not politics, ethics or religion. But I,a and you, I suspect, freely recognize that that does not make science, even provisional science, a bad thing, on the whole.

Anyway, having had it pointed out by myself and Henry Quirk that it is nonsensical to believe that people believe things they know to be untrue, I take it you no longer believe it.

No. But Henry has declared his disbelief, and so have you, so there wouldn't be any point in pressing that. In my thought that it could be a real phenomenon for interesting philosophical debate, I've got lots of philosophers on my side. (See, for example, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-deception/) So it's not necessary that we agree on that point; we can let it be for now.

What's important is really not the secondary issue of *how* people become deceived, but Marsh's primary point about whether allowing deception (of any kind) for 'good' purposes is warranted. I'm content to return to that main point.

So your observation about science is correct: it not only allows for hypotheses we now know to be untrue to be used for heuristic purposes, it actually requires that.

The question then becomes, "Supposing it were good for strict Materialists to continue to believe that morality is a real and morally or deontologically binding thing, but as Materialists we know that morality is at most a psychological or sociological phenomenon, but nothing that refers to reality or truth in any objective sense.

Suppose we know morality is, then, nothing but one of these convenient deceptions that produces some "better" or "good" result, such as preventing children from breaking into my car ( See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME77DsLu2wI).

Is there then any way to justify allowing people to continue believing in a binding morality? Or ought we to tell them the truth: namely, that as soon as they are unobserved, or if they are convinced their society won't catch them, or the police are not watching, or if they are more powerful than those who object and are reasonable sure they can force their will, or if even if they fear punishment they are willing to take the risks of being detected, or if they happen to move to a different culture with different mores, then they should realize they are perfectly free to break into anyone's car, or to do any other 'good', 'bad', noble, bloody-minded or generous or underhanded thing they please?