Philosophy Now Forum

pure consciousness is beond mind.mind is local

Gee wrote:...
So most of these theories are just a game of trying to prove "Who's the Boss?" between science and religion. The motivations behind these theories make me distrust them, and beside that, religion is talking about "God", science is talking about the brain, and no one is discussing consciousness.

Your distrust is well-considered. Ultimately the motivations behind both S & R come down to money. Scientists are dependent upon universities for both salaries, credentials, and project funding, so they do not dare to step outside the box of agreement. That box is controlled by liberal-progressive (i.e. modern-day Darwinist/Marxist) believers who continue to demonstrate their intolerance for contrary beliefs.

A few good thinkers are discussing consciousness. Roger Penrose's "Consciousness and the Universe" is an example, but I do not recommend it for you because it is a physically difficult read, weighing in at 4.6 pounds. You might appreciate Rupert Sheldrake's video lectures. There are a few others.

Gee wrote:But Imp is wrong for the following reason: All life is sentient. This is not disputed by science or philosophy. Sentient means that life can sense it's surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment.

The statement I've highlighted appears to be a tautology. The statement structure implies that awareness differs from consciousness, whereas if you check out your dictionary, you'll find that the common definition of awareness implies consciousness.

That being the case, your statement is meaningless. You've said only that A = A. Given my foreknowledge about the quality of your mind, you must have thought that you were deriving a useful conclusion. This can only come from a misunderstanding of the word "aware," or your personal attribution of a different meaning to it.

An example might clarify the terminology, and the differences between various terms that are commonly applied to intelligent behavior.

Decades ago I wrote a computer program to autonomously control a small telescope located remotely from the computer. If the program was fired up and the computer kept running, the instrument could be left unattended for days. Now and then someone would show up at the observatory just to check it and gather printouts of the collected data.

In order to operate as it did, the instrument was linked to various detectors. A photocell told it when night fell, thus when it was safe to open its dome and get to work. A moisture detector told it when to shut down and wait out the rain. A pair of position sensors told it exactly where in the night sky it was pointing. (These worked like the position sensors in your body, independently of vision.) And of course the telescope itself could detect (i.e. "see") the stars whose light it was measuring.

To deal with any possible mechanical interference with the instrument, I wrote some code that can be loosely translated as a sense of touch-- in the presence of physical interference, its motors stopped to avoid burnout. The device had no sense of smell, but did have something that humans do not-- a precise clock capable of keeping accurate sidereal time within a tenth-second. (Sidereal time is, essentially, sun-time, with the earth's rotation compensated for.)

Regarded as a complete system (computer, control programs, clock, sensors, motors, telescope, and printer) the instrument was clearly sentient. However, I guarantee that it was not alive and not conscious. I packed a lot of logic and mathematics into that machine's tiny (8K) memory, but none of it made the machine itself intelligent or conscious. But was it aware?

It was certainly aware of those parts of its environment that its sensors could detect (position, time, weather, and little points of starlight) but it was not aware of itself.

Describing this instrument (or any other such device) as "aware" is, I think, part of common speech. "Aware" is an imprecise word. In some cases it applies to machines (bacteria included). The human body is a biological machine, and so is aware of its surroundings, like your cat.

Sentient devices can only be aware of events to which their detectors are attuned. My telescope could "see" ultraviolet light, which humans cannot detect. It could not "see" me when I walked into its shed. It could not detect or be aware of itself.

But awareness is not the same thing as self-awareness, and I think that your confusions comes about from a conflation of those two terms. It is possible to be aware without being self-aware.

Gee wrote:If you want some circular thinking, consider this: The human brain produces consciousness; our consciousness then anthropomorphises "God"; "God" then creates the heavens and the Earth; life evolves on the Earth and eventually produces humans; then our brains produce consciousness so we can create "God". It's a cycle!! (chuckle)

Am I reading Gee here, or Gee and a few martinis? What started the cycle? Clearly not the human brain.

Gee wrote:I don't often agree with Henry Quirk, but his following statement was the first to "nail" the issue in this thread.

Henry wrote:Seems to me: mind (a recursive process) only happens in material of a particular composition and complexity (a brain embedded in a body).

As Henry notes, we are talking about "mind", not consciousness. So aren't mind and consciousness the same things? Well, I don't know, are you willing to state that daffodils and crabgrass have minds? They are conscious.

You might reconsider your agreement w/HQ until after you learn what "recursion" is, and how to logically construct a recursive process. His claim that the mind is a recursive process needs something better than his unfounded assertion to back it up. What happened to your normally thoughtful skepticism? Were you snowed by his abuse of jargon?

Gee wrote:The immune system in your body has the ability to recognize an alien intruder, remember past intruders, compare the past experiences to the new intruder, and plan an attack to dispose of the new intruder. This is why vaccines work. So the immune system is aware, knows, remembers, and learns -- does this mean that it has a mind? Every cell in our bodies is aware, so do they all have mind?

No. They have memory. So do mindless computers and other machines.

Again, I think that you are misusing the word "aware," which often implies a measure of consciousness because uncritical people conflate it with "self-aware." "Sentient" is a more precise term. It applies to bacteria, my telescope, and complex biological machines, but does not imply consciousness.

Gee wrote:Either we agree that mind and consciousness are the same thing, which means that every cell in every life form possesses mind; or we say that mind and consciousness are different things, which means that consciousness is not produced by the brain -- the conscious rational aspect of mind may be produced by the brain. Any other explanation leads to the circular thinking that I noted above.

Did this one come after a 3rd martini? Comparing mind and consciousness is logically impossible. Mind is a mechanism. Consciousness is a property. It might be a property of mind, but need not be. After all, our notion of mind, whether materialist or dualist, involves brain. OBE evidence shows that properties of mind can manifest independently of the brain/body.

The best way to escape circular-thinking patterns that you seem to have become fond of lately is to finish perusing Digital Universe, one martini at a time. Good luck with that!

Gee wrote:So I don't think that the above theories are about consciousness at all. They are mostly designed to prove "Who's the Boss?" Science's ideas of mind, or religion's ideas of soul. same same.

Your conclusion is right on target. However, the preceding "So" does not relate it to anything else you've written in this post.

Gee wrote:

Wyman wrote:From here, I get confused. Do they think consciousness is 'not physical' or 'physical'? What does 'physical' mean here? Are they dualists?

No idea of what they think. I think that consciousness has properties and reacts to temperature, water, chemistry, and something to do with magnetic fields (I don't understand magnetic fields, but there have been studies). So I am voting that it is physical, or at least some degrees of it are physical.

G

Beon Theory claims that consciousness first appeared in an unstructured universe at a temperature of Absolute Zero-- about -459 degrees Fahrenheit. That universe did not contain matter, and therefore no water, no chemistry, and no electromagnetic fields.

Remember please that consciousness is a property or phenomenon, not a thing in itself. It's like motion, which is a property of matter but is not itself matter. So, in the context of physics, it makes no sense to refer to either consciousness or motion as physical.

Nonetheless, both are properties derived from the actions of physical entities-- kind of physical derivatives. How's your Greek and Latin? We need a new word here, and I need a shot of Vodka.

Greylorn

Ginkgo wrote:

Wyman wrote:
As for Epiphenominalism, I see the distinguishing characteristic of ep(it's such an obnoxious word, it needs abbreviation) is not so much that the brain causes consciousness, but that consciousness, in turn, has no causal efficacy whatsoever. The causation is a one way street.

I'll go along with that.

Wyman wrote:
From here, I get confused. Do they think consciousness is 'not physical' or 'physical'? What does 'physical' mean here? Are they dualists?

Definitely not dualists. They are monists, everything derived about consciousness is derived from one single physical substance.

Closely related to this idea is property dualism. They seems similar but they are not the same. Property dualism claims ( like monism) there is one physical substance, but consists of two kinds of properties. A physical property and a mental property. Dennett feels as though he has to keep making the point that he is not a property dualist.

Wyman wrote:
I can't help but think of Plato's analogy of the soul to the harmony produced by the lyre in the Pheado. When the lyre is destroyed, so is the music it produces.

But music can be thought of as physical sound waves which are certainly causally efficacious. Or, it can be thought of as the 'qualia' - or finished product - of the interpretive, percipient listener.

And then round the circle we go - for then do the sound waves 'cause' the listener to hum along and think happy thoughts, or does the qualia? In the brain/qualia context, do the neural firings tell the whole causal story?

Does ep break this circle, or even attempt to?

Consider this though experiment as a possible answer:

Jane is a brilliant scientist, she specializes in acoustics. There is absolutely nothing she doesn't know about sounds; how they are produced, frequency, pitch, the lot. The only problem is that Jane is as deaf as a post, she was born deaf, so she has never heard a single sound in her life. All Jane can do is analyze sound by looking at the data- like a computer does.

One morning a miracle happens, Jane wakes up to the sound of her husband rattling pots and pans in the kitchen trying to prepare breakfast. She rushes into the kitchen to tell him the good news. Her husband turns around knocking a glass to the floor and smashing it. Upon seeing the glass hit the floor Jane immediately recalls all the relevant data that goes with such an event, but the difference this time is she actually hears the sound of smashing glass.

The important question can be divided into two possible outcomes. Firstly, the sound of smashing glass is nothing new to Jane, she knew it would make that sound all along. Secondly, is the belief that Jane actually learns something new about sound that she didn't know before.

(a) If you belief the former than you are a physicalist who believes that a materialist explanation for sound is all that is necessary.

(b) If you believe the latter then you believe in qualia and reject physicalism, because there exists something over and above the physical.

Materialists and physicalists believe in (a), while property dualists would argue for (b)

Arbitrarily restricted arguments like this remind me of the wisdom in my choice to study physics and engineering, ideas grounded in reality; rather than bullshit like philosophy that is comprised of ideas that a gang of perfessers made up.

While the distinctions between intellectual and sensory information are valid, it is their integration that leads to consciousness. Jane's experience of sound augments her formal study of it, exactly like my formal study of the physics of sound connected with and augmented my experience of it.

There is no a "or" b; the connecting function is "and."

These phony distinctions are exactly what we get by awarding "philosophy" degrees to nitwits who cannot understand elementary physics.

Greylorn Ell wrote:

While the distinctions between intellectual and sensory information are valid, it is their integration that leads to consciousness. Jane's experience of sound augments her formal study of it, exactly like my formal study of the physics of sound connected with and augmented my experience of it.

Yes, that is what the science tells us so that would be the end of the argument for many. However, some philosophers are not happy with the scientific account so they try to point out its weakness by using an (a) and (b) distinction. That's just what people like Nagel and Jackson do for a living. A bit like scientists doing physics for a living.

Wyman wrote:That's actually better than the Mary/sight scenerio in my opinion.

I was thinking that ep was an attempt to admit that there are qualia, but that they are physical, just not 'effective/efficacious.' An attempt to bridge a) and b).

Yes, there is a category of epiphen. qualia.

Wyman wrote:
In that case, Jane gains something after she gains her hearing. But this something is inert. Philosophers like to talk about it, but science can ignore it without loss.

True.

Wyman wrote:
Why would this lead to the conclusion that 'there exists something over and above the physical?' She just acquired a new physical experience due to regaining a sense organ.

I think the problem here is with 'There is absolutely nothing she doesn't know about sounds.' And I think I remember Dennett saying the same thing (that this is where the experiment breaks down.)

My use of "over and above" was probably not the best choice of words. It would be more accurate to say the physical substance (brain) has two properties. The extra property of that particular type of dualism is the mental . The mental property being different from the physical property. This is what separates materialists from property dualists. It is the mental aspect that is an additional property of the physical. It is also what separates the substance dualists (Descartes) from the property dualists. Substance dualists talk about mental stuff and physical stuff, while property dualists talk about mental properties and physical properties belonging to the same thing. Apologies if I am telling you something you already know.

Wyman wrote:
What in the world could it mean to 'know absolutely everything about sound?' If it is supposed that it includes experiencing sound first hand (a physical process to the materialist), then Jane obviously does not know everything about sound, and never can due to her disability. Thus, the thought experiment is circular.

It just means that she has all the information about hearing. Her problem is she cannot use this information in any experiential type of way until she regains her hearing.

Impenitent wrote:

Gee wrote:But Imp is wrong for the following reason: All life is sentient. This is not disputed by science or philosophy. Sentient means that life can sense it's surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, that means trees and crabgrass. All life forms do not have a brain.

your anthropomorphic fallacy goes both ways...

but the motion detector sensed movement in its surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, the motion detector is alive.

-Imp

Imp;

Your above statement is a generalization of mismatched fact, what I believe is religious interpretation, and misunderstood concepts. It is simply not true.

A motion detector detects movement -- that is all. We know that it does this, and we know how it does this, because we designed it. It is not "aware" of it's environment, it does not recognize things in it's environment, it does not promote it's own continuance because it has no "self", it is not conscious.

Life, on the other hand, does do these things. All life forms possess knowledge of what environment is good for their continuance, they are aware of and recognize what is suitable to eat to survive, they recognize danger and will either try to protect themselves or flee the danger. They recognize the need to reproduce in order to protect the continuance of their life form. So they will do anything and everything that they can in order to continue their "self". We do not know how they do this, but we call this ability consciousness and note that it exists in all life. When a motion detector can and will do this, then we will call a motion detector conscious and alive.

Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy wrote:2.1 Creature Consciousness
An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious in a number of different senses.

Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world (Armstrong 1981). Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees?

If one accepts the Theory of Evolution, then it is difficult to explain how all life forms would not have consciousness until evolution reaches humans. There is no evidence that supports this opinion, and a lot of evidence that denies it, yet it persists. It is my thought that the only explanation is that we are either talking about the human ego, which insists on it's own superiority, or we are accepting the Christian interpretation, which states that we are made in "God's" image, have a "soul", and are therefore conscious. Lower life forms are not.

The materialistic idea that when we can produce something complex enough, awareness will simply appear, is in my opinion ridiculous. It is like saying that computers, the internet, and Google are not as complex as a slug or a worm. Complexity is not the answer.

G

Ginkgo wrote:

Greylorn Ell wrote:

While the distinctions between intellectual and sensory information are valid, it is their integration that leads to consciousness. Jane's experience of sound augments her formal study of it, exactly like my formal study of the physics of sound connected with and augmented my experience of it.

Yes, that is what the science tells us so that would be the end of the argument for many. However, some philosophers are not happy with the scientific account so they try to point out its weakness by using an (a) and (b) distinction. That's just what people like Nagel and Jackson do for a living. A bit like scientists doing physics for a living.

We're not out of agreement here. My observations are:

1.) Every competent physicist, astronomer, and electrical engineer I've encountered has a natural curiosity about and propensity for philosophy.

2.) Their focus is on practical, or metaphysical philosophy-- ideas about the core beginnings of things. They do not care much for abstract or formal philosophy, regarding it as irrelevant bullshit.

3.) Marginally competent physicists have no philosophical intelligence. Likewise mechanical, chemical, biochemical, and civil engineers.

4.) From these observations I conclude that the scientists and engineers with a philosophical bent naturally focus their studies upon the more abstract edges of their study fields.

5.) Growing up I was naturally curious about philosophy, which back then was mostly presented in the form of theological issues. My thoughts were ridiculed by the priests and nuns, so I avoided the subject. Physics re-engaged my curiosity, and I soon developed a simple (and incorrect) theory that integrated my religious beliefs and my early understanding of physics.

6.) With the passage of time and accumulation of information, my ideas developed and changed, but the connections between philosophy, theology, and physics never left my mind. Rather, they intensified, to the point where I am certain that philosophy and physics are forever entangled, in this sense:

7a.) Given that we live in a universe governed by the principles of physics, understanding any part of it, however small, demands some knowledge and conceptual understanding of physics.

7b.) A physicist who has no philosophical curiosity is doomed forever to be a well-paid technician or boring teacher.

7c.) A philosopher who does not understand basic physics and cannot integrate that understanding into his ideas is limited to his teaching duties (the resuscitation of other men's ideas), and on a good day, the generation of minor ideas.

Summarizing by analogy, trying to comprehend the universe without knowledge of physics is like trying to understand women without having ever slept with one.

Ginkgo wrote:

Greylorn Ell wrote:

While the distinctions between intellectual and sensory information are valid, it is their integration that leads to consciousness. Jane's experience of sound augments her formal study of it, exactly like my formal study of the physics of sound connected with and augmented my experience of it.

Yes, that is what the science tells us so that would be the end of the argument for many. However, some philosophers are not happy with the scientific account so they try to point out its weakness by using an (a) and (b) distinction. That's just what people like Nagel and Jackson do for a living. A bit like scientists doing physics for a living.

Ginkgo,

There are quite a variety of individuals who are scientists, including botanists, psychologists, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc. Most of these are "soft" scientists, meaning that they are essentially ignorant of any physics principles except what they might learn from documentary TV, or from studying gravity by falling off the back of a turnip truck.

They are easily identified because they insist upon being called "Doctor" whoever. (Watch the snarky women on "Bones" and compare them to the men who pull guns and put their (television) lives on the line. You'll get the picture; the series is successful because it reflects real life.) There are some incompetent physicists who also insist upon the title, but real physicists eschew it. Have you ever heard of Big Al referred to as "Doctor" Einstein?

For the fun of it, look up Richard Feynman's books or use this link: https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=ri ... nman+books See if you can find the title "Dr." or "Ph.D" anywhere. He earned a Nobel Prize for his development of "Quantum ElectroDynamics," or QED, but eschewed formal titles because he did not want to be associated with the unimaginative professors who dominated his workplaces.

Soft scientists do not do physics for a living. That's a job for real physicists.

My statement was not a reiteration of some scientist's opinion. It came from my understanding of science and philosophy. Perhaps you misunderstood what I wrote. Let me put it more clearly. Any distinction between (a) and (b) (referring to prior conversations) is utter bullshit invented by philosophers who are viewing reality through spray-painted glasses.

I do not know who "Nagel and Jackson" are, or what ideas they might have generated. For all that I know they could be a comedy act, and I hope that the Nagel component is not the ex-mayor of New Orleans. I'm not a formally trained philosopher, having taken my first university course while my first philosophy book was at the printers.) If N & G are typical philosophers, as seems likely, they will not have produced useful ideas. If you believe that they have generated ideas that are constructively related to the question of consciousness, kindly give me enough information (e.g. first names, publications) to check them out. Thank you.

Gee wrote:...but we call this ability consciousness and note that it exists in all life.

Quoting Tonto's reply to the Lone Ranger's parting comment, "Looks like this is it, old friend. We seem to be surrounded by Indians."

"What you mean we, Kemosaby?"

Gee wrote:

Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy wrote:2.1 Creature Consciousness
An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious in a number of different senses....

Are you angling for a job as Obama's press secretary, fishing the internet for whatever bullshit you can find that makes your point?

Gee wrote:The materialistic idea that when we can produce something complex enough, awareness will simply appear, is in my opinion ridiculous...

G

This comment is right on, but inconsistent with your previous comments.

Discussing ideas with a woman is a lot like trying to live with one, where the loving lady you shared a bed with Monday night awakens Tuesday morning as the woman who is pissed off because you left your underwear on the floor and woke up with halitosis nastier than hers.

In one paragraph you reflect conventional beliefs, and in the next you offer your own intelligent opinions. One thing that a woman can usefully learn from men is consistency. That doesn't mean that you or any person should remain a constant throughout life. However, constancy throughout a short dialogue would facilitate a coherent conversation.

Gee wrote:

Impenitent wrote:

Gee wrote:But Imp is wrong for the following reason: All life is sentient. This is not disputed by science or philosophy. Sentient means that life can sense it's surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, that means trees and crabgrass. All life forms do not have a brain.

your anthropomorphic fallacy goes both ways...

but the motion detector sensed movement in its surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, the motion detector is alive.

-Imp

Imp;

Your above statement is a generalization of mismatched fact, what I believe is religious interpretation, and misunderstood concepts. It is simply not true.

A motion detector detects movement -- that is all. We know that it does this, and we know how it does this, because we designed it. It is not "aware" of it's environment, it does not recognize things in it's environment, it does not promote it's own continuance because it has no "self", it is not conscious.

Life, on the other hand, does do these things. All life forms possess knowledge of what environment is good for their continuance, they are aware of and recognize what is suitable to eat to survive, they recognize danger and will either try to protect themselves or flee the danger. They recognize the need to reproduce in order to protect the continuance of their life form. So they will do anything and everything that they can in order to continue their "self". We do not know how they do this, but we call this ability consciousness and note that it exists in all life. When a motion detector can and will do this, then we will call a motion detector conscious and alive.

Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy wrote:2.1 Creature Consciousness
An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious in a number of different senses.

Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world (Armstrong 1981). Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees?

If one accepts the Theory of Evolution, then it is difficult to explain how all life forms would not have consciousness until evolution reaches humans. There is no evidence that supports this opinion, and a lot of evidence that denies it, yet it persists. It is my thought that the only explanation is that we are either talking about the human ego, which insists on it's own superiority, or we are accepting the Christian interpretation, which states that we are made in "God's" image, have a "soul", and are therefore conscious. Lower life forms are not.

The materialistic idea that when we can produce something complex enough, awareness will simply appear, is in my opinion ridiculous. It is like saying that computers, the internet, and Google are not as complex as a slug or a worm. Complexity is not the answer.

G

Here you are walking the tightrope that leads from your programmed beliefs to Beon Theory.

The best that I can do here is wish you a windless passage.
Greylorn

Gee wrote:

Impenitent wrote:

Gee wrote:But Imp is wrong for the following reason: All life is sentient. This is not disputed by science or philosophy. Sentient means that life can sense it's surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, that means trees and crabgrass. All life forms do not have a brain.

your anthropomorphic fallacy goes both ways...

but the motion detector sensed movement in its surroundings, so it is aware of it's environment. Being aware of it's environment means that it is conscious of it's environment. All life possesses some consciousness -- yes, the motion detector is alive.

-Imp

Imp;

Your above statement is a generalization of mismatched fact, what I believe is religious interpretation, and misunderstood concepts. It is simply not true.

A motion detector detects movement -- that is all. We know that it does this, and we know how it does this, because we designed it. It is not "aware" of it's environment, it does not recognize things in it's environment, it does not promote it's own continuance because it has no "self", it is not conscious.

it merely demonstrates your anthropomorphic reasoning... giving human qualities to non human entities (mechanical or organic)... sentience and consciousness...

-Imp

Wyman wrote:

Gee wrote:So most of these theories are just a game of trying to prove "Who's the Boss?" between science and religion. The motivations behind these theories make me distrust them, and beside that, religion is talking about "God", science is talking about the brain, and no one is discussing consciousness.

I agree with all of this. I am particularly interested in the consciousness as illusion theory.

That theory makes no sense to me. How does one have an illusion that they are conscious? Illusion is a mental phenomenon, so I would think that in order to have an illusion that you are conscious, you would first have to be conscious. I am pretty sure that my table does not have illusions. I could be wrong. It is possible the my table dreams of doing nefarious things with the chairs when I am not looking.

Wyman wrote:I think talk of mental and physical properties doesn't pass the straight face test.

Maybe not in the theories mentioned above, but we know that physical things have properties -- so do mental things. This is how I study consciousness, by breaking it down into it's different aspects and studying how these different aspects influence each other and the physical. I don't think that anyone would dispute that thought and emotion are very different, but they are both aspects of consciousness.

Consider: Emotion can split mind into minds with each having a separate "self", as in multiple personality disorders. Emotion can permanently remove mind from the body, as in emotional trauma induced shock. Emotion can temporarily bond minds into thinking in a "herd" mentality, as in the riot or mob mentality. Emotion can permanently bond minds when the bonds are formed in love, hate, fear, or strong emotion, as in family bonds, captive/victim bonds, or bonds forged between soldiers in war. These bonds can cause people to "know" things about their bonded partner when there is no physical way of knowing.

Thought can not split mind into minds; it can not cause the mind to separate from the body and cause death. You can not think at a crowd of people and cause them to act in a group mentality, and you can not think a bond between people -- this requires emotion. Emotion seems to have a lot of power and influence over mind, and I suspect that it is instrumental in the formation of mind. Consider that emotion works through chemistry and hormones, and the brain is saturated in chemistry and hormones.

The different mental aspects have different properties, but I don't know of anyone else who is studying them by comparing and analyzing their influences on each other.

Wyman wrote:I like your point that (and tell me if I paraphrase incorrectly) consciousness as awareness is different from mind.

Consciousness and awareness are exactly the same thing. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy refers one to the other, as they have the same meaning. I have learned to make a distinction between them because if I say the word "consciousness", people will assume that I am referring to the medical definition of conscious. This medical definition refers to states of consciousness, as in conscious, unconscious, comatose, etc., and is more about the self-directed rational aspect of mind, than it is about consciousness or awareness.

So if I state that crabgrass is conscious, people will assume that I mean that crabgrass thinks, and maybe plots to trip up the next person, who steps on it. (chuckle) So I generally use 'consciousness' as an umbrella term for all of the mental aspects, and use 'awareness' to explain simple awareness.

Wyman wrote:Worms are aware, motion detectors, as Imp says, are aware in a way. So not all 'conscious' things have brains.

Agreed. But consider that awareness is dependent upon the thing that it is aware of.

If you were in a room where there was absolutely no light, but your eyes were quite functional and open, could it be said that you possess vision? No, because you can not see anything. Awareness works the same way, so if you possess awareness but are aware of nothing, do you possess awareness? Awareness must be aware of something and seems to require focus in order to exist, so it is dependent upon the physical for it's existence. imo

I suspect that this is the reason for so many different levels of consciousness, as different species have the capacity to be aware of different things in different degrees.

Wyman wrote:Therefore, consciousness does not depend upon the brain, meaning it does not necessarily reside in the brain.

Well, that depends upon what level of consciousness you are referring to. There have been great debates on whether or not to "pull the plug" on patients who are 'brain dead' and in a vegetative state. They seem to have no conscious mind, but the body still is aware of it's need to function in order to stay alive. There seems to be multiple levels and types of consciousness and multiple levels of mind.

I suspect that thinking and self-directed thought as in the rational aspect of mind, the Ego, is very much dependent upon a brain.

Wyman wrote:It could still be said to reside in the organism as a whole, no?

Well, you can say anything you want, but I don't think so. I divided the aspects of consciousness into two divisions. The first division, knowledge, memory, and thought, seems to be private and internal. The second division, awareness, feeling, and emotion, seems to be shared and external. I suspect that these divisions are why science does not like to deal with emotion, and religion is all over it.

Wyman wrote:Aside from consciousness as awareness, there are higher functions that include conceptualization, self awareness, will/desire, belief (noninclusive list). I would be willing to basically accept a Rylean notion that most of these things can be explained as material 'processes' - per Quirk - or dispositions - per Ryle.

What Ryle would that be? I looked in Wiki, but there are a few Ryles. Are we talking Gilbert? It might be interesting to see what other people see as "higher functions" in light of my studies.

Wyman wrote:However, the one area where my materialist intuition pauses is at conceptualization and inductive knowledge. I'll stop here, because I doubt you would agree with my 'higher functions' analysis and conversations are only productive, when at all, when the parties agree or reach understanding at each step.

And recognition.

I apologize for taking so long to respond, but I think slow and move slower. I owe Greylorn a response, and he will be irritated about some things that I posted here, so take your time reviewing this post.

G

Impenitent wrote: it merely demonstrates your anthropomorphic reasoning... giving human qualities to non human entities (mechanical or organic)... sentience and consciousness...

-Imp

This is nonsense. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is well respected and peer reviewed. It is accepted as a reference in all forums, even science forums.

If you want to study consciousness, the first thing you must do is to remove the religious dogma from your thinking.

G

What a great thread! Here's my summary, for what it's worth (not much, really, I'm afraid, but here goes anyway).

I think we all follow materialism to its logical conclusion and recognize that there is no special place in it reserved for mind. Some of us are dissatisfied with this and some just accept it.

I am reminded of a quote from Victor Hugo (and am in a rhetorical mood today):

'He would probably have hesitated to delve too deeply into certain problems reserved in some sense for great and terrible minds. A sacred horror hovers near the approaches to mysticism; somber openings lie gaping there, but something tells you, as you near the brink - Do not enter. Woe to him who does! There are geniuses who, in the fathomless depths of abstraction and pure speculation - situated, so to speak, above all dogmas - present their ideas to God. Their prayer audaciously offers an argument. Their worship questions. This is direct religion, filled with anxiety and responsibility for those who would scale its walls.'

I think that Nagel and Jackson and their kind have to be classified as mystics. Their real argument for something over and above the physical is: it's right there, I can see it and if you can't see it, too bad for you. But they're small, timid little mystics who present their ideas to heads of philosophy departments, wrapped up in philosophical jargon. If I wanted to go in that direction, I'd take Buddha or Zoroaster or someone with a little more pizzazz.

I agree completely with Greylorn's analysis of Jackson's 'thought experiment.' It's almost as facile as Descartes' proof for the existence of God in the Meditations and gives philosophy a bad reputation. And I agree that physics (a part of it) and philosophy should merge into a new 'meta-physical' conversation. I do enjoy reading Hawkings, Penrose, Krauss and other scientists who delve into these subjects. I doubt they're taken seriously by the philosophical community though. Come to think of it, I agree with almost everything Greylorn said in this thread (but I'm not going to read his book).

Gee wrote: ...we know that physical things have properties -- so do mental things. This is how I study consciousness, by breaking it down into it's different aspects and studying how these different aspects influence each other and the physical. I don't think that anyone would dispute that thought and emotion are very different, but they are both aspects of consciousness.
G

Gee,
Before breaking a thing down, it seems fair to first define the thing.

I request your clear definition of "mental things." I'd like this definition to include their properties.
Greylorn