Philosophy Now Forum

marjoramblues wrote:

That, however, doesn't invalidate design inferences within nature.

M: What is gained by this?

What is gained by the design inference? Understanding.

If you think metaphysical reasoning is a waste of time, you're not the first, but ID as we're discussing it in this thread, and as I explained it in the article referenced by the OP, is not a metaphysical thesis. It's an empirical thesis.

M: This form of ID as an empirical thesis, what does it add to our understanding?

If it's a sound inference it adds knowledge that certain aspects of life did not arise by the spontaneous interplay of natural causes. To anyone who seeks understanding of such things, that's worth knowing.

It may have metaphysical implications,

M: Is this where it is leading? Then we are back at the beginning, aren't we? The question of origin...

Is there a problem with that? The point here is that the scientific trail of evidence can only take you as far as design, but no further. If you want to continue to the question of ultimate origins, you'll need other modes of reasoning that are indeed not scientific. Not everybody is interested in this sort of thing, but that doesn't invalidate the design inference itself.

Ginkgo wrote: In the case of structure X. it is possible to demonstrate by way of empirical procedures that it was made by an intelligent agent. Probably some type of humans, but the reality in terms of who actually designed and built it will probably remain a mystery. Suffice to say that it was an intelligent agent. This much I think we agree upon.

The analogy breaks down when we assume that we can apply the say type of inductive reasoning to the intelligent designer who gave us the butterfly and the amoeba. No amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved. I am aware that you are not interested in who the intelligent designer is because it to may well remain a mystery. I also see the parallel here in terms of the mystery agent who designed and built Structure X.

I don't think it works because we can't avoid the theistic implications. Quite rightly we can start out talking in terms of scientific naturalism, but there is a 'slide to theism' evident here. And I don't think we can avoid such a slide by simply saying we are actually talking about arguments "to" design, rather than arguments "from" design.

What is the argument for the claim that no amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved? I'm just not seeing it.

Perhaps you think the mere design argument that I presented leads inexorably to something like this.

1. If X was designed, then its designer was either a human being or God.
2. X was designed.
3. X's designer was either a human being or God.
4. X's designer wasn't a human being.
5. Therefore X's designer was God.

Is that it? Are you claiming that the design inference commits one to this argument (a true argument from design)? As far as I can see, it only commits one to premise 2. It's true that a person trying to make a case for God in natural theology might well choose to use the design argument in tandem with the above argument, but that person has surely left science behind, with premise 1. Indeed, premise 1 is open to a number of philosophical objections, but these have nothing to do with the findings of science.

Incidentally, I would flesh out my sketch of the design argument by supporting premise 1.

1. The probability that structure X was formed by natural causes is very low.

Argument:
1.1 Structure X is irreducibly complex.
1.2 All irreducibly complex structures of whose origin we have certain knowledge are the result of intelligent design.

But let me ask a question to all those who are critical of ID:

Is it, in your view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design? I'm here referring to living things that existed before human beings, thus ruling out domesticated species and GMO. If your answer is no, I'd like to know why you think it's not possible.

tmoody wrote:Is it, in your view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design?

Isn't it all or nothing? Why do you claim that just some parts are designed? Are there holes in nature that some designer goes around filling?

uwot wrote:

tmoody wrote:Is it, in your view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design?

Isn't it all or nothing? Why do you claim that just some parts are designed? Are there holes in nature that some designer goes around filling?

No, it isn't all or nothing. If you have an argument that shows it must be, I'd like to know about it. But I'd also like to know what your answer to my question is.

tmoody wrote:No, it isn't all or nothing. If you have an argument that shows it must be, I'd like to know about it. But I'd also like to know what your answer to my question is.

You are quite right, there is no logical reason why there must not exist an agency for the design of bits and pieces that it can slot into nature, to fulfil a need, or just for the hell of it. Therefore, in answer to your question: Yes, it is, in my view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design. However, I think your entire argument rests on your assertion, as I understand it, that it is possible to prove that at least one feature of the universe is designed by an agency that we wouldn't accept as a humdrum intelligent being. No it isn't; all you can prove is that you don't know of any natural mechanism that could produce such a thing.

tmoody wrote:What is the argument for the claim that no amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved? I'm just not seeing it.

It's called the problem of induction. it means that although your argument may be valid, it isn't sound, because even fleshed out, this:

tmoody wrote:1.1 Structure X is irreducibly complex.

is only an assumption.

uwot wrote:You are quite right, there is no logical reason why there must not exist an agency for the design of bits and pieces that it can slot into nature, to fulfil a need, or just for the hell of it. Therefore, in answer to your question: Yes, it is, in my view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design.

Thank you for your answer. Now let me ask this: Given that this is possible, what would count as evidence for it, in your view?

However, I think your entire argument rests on your assertion, as I understand it, that it is possible to prove that at least one feature of the universe is designed by an agency that we wouldn't accept as a humdrum intelligent being. No it isn't; all you can prove is that you don't know of any natural mechanism that could produce such a thing.

First, I never used the word "prove" for this, so you shouldn't attribute it to me. I do, however, claim that there can be evidence of design even in the total absence of any and all knowledge about the designer and whether that designer is humdrum or exotic. The absence of a plausible natural mechanism is part of the evidence, but not all of it. The other part is inductive: All observed instances of irreducible complexity whose provenance is empirically known are the result of the actions of intelligent agents.

My argument does not warrant a design inference in any case where a natural causal mechanism is missing. It only warrants it in those cases where there is clear similarity to known designed things. Irreducible complexity is one mark of such things.

tmoody wrote:What is the argument for the claim that no amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved? I'm just not seeing it.

It's called the problem of induction. it means that although your argument may be valid, it isn't sound, because even fleshed out, this:

tmoody wrote:1.1 Structure X is irreducibly complex.

is only an assumption.

The problem of induction is a general problem for all inductive inference; it isn't specific to ID. If the problem of induction is an argument against ID, it's also an argument against all science.

That some structure is irreducibly complex is not an assumption. It is a testable empirical claim.

The problem of induction is a general problem for all inductive inference; it isn't specific to ID. If the problem of induction is an argument against ID, it's also an argument against all science.

Indeed it is. Science itself is probabilistic only, and does not yield certitude. We have certitude only in pure mathematics. Science just does a set of experiments, or observes a limited selection of data, and then generalizes on probability to future cases that are relevantly similar to the experiment or data it has. That's it.

That doesn't mean science is flawed/bad/misguided or whatever, but it does mean that we have to have a reasonable grasp of the limits of what it claims, and to claim no more than its methods warrant. At most, it aims at very high probability, but never at certitude. A lot of people fail to understand that. Thinking that science is about facts and other ideologies are about mere guesses, they use the word "science" to be equivalent to "truth," and everything else as some sort of "delusion," or at best "random guesses." But that's a very naive view of the scientific method and its claims. It's just a way of increasing probability in our guesses (theories), ideally to a very high level -- but something short of certainty always.

Mind you, high probability is much better than low probability; but sometimes low probability wins. Consider the fact that while it is very improbable for any one person to win the lottery, somebody still does.

Now, to shift the focus somewhat, in this connection has anyone read Thomas Nagel's new book, "Mind and Cosmos"? I'm reading it right now. Nagel (an avowed Atheist himself) claims that ID has done science a huge favour by pointing out serious and apparently intractable flaws in Atheism's sponsoring worldview, identified variously as "Naturalism" or "Materialism." He claims that this has given science the best opportunity to revise its basic assumptions so as to make them yield a full account of the "real," including such things as "consciousness" and "rationality," and "mind," which the former two worldviews could not describe non-reductionally.

Nagel's still hopeful that a non-Theistic explanation will eventually prove possible; but he is glad for the contribution of ID to exposing the inadequacies of the existing paradigm, and thus contributing a hugely helpful critique to the history of science.

So if Nagel's right, ID seems to have done something very good, one way or the other.

tmoody wrote:

Ginkgo wrote: In the case of structure X. it is possible to demonstrate by way of empirical procedures that it was made by an intelligent agent. Probably some type of humans, but the reality in terms of who actually designed and built it will probably remain a mystery. Suffice to say that it was an intelligent agent. This much I think we agree upon.

The analogy breaks down when we assume that we can apply the say type of inductive reasoning to the intelligent designer who gave us the butterfly and the amoeba. No amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved. I am aware that you are not interested in who the intelligent designer is because it to may well remain a mystery. I also see the parallel here in terms of the mystery agent who designed and built Structure X.

I don't think it works because we can't avoid the theistic implications. Quite rightly we can start out talking in terms of scientific naturalism, but there is a 'slide to theism' evident here. And I don't think we can avoid such a slide by simply saying we are actually talking about arguments "to" design, rather than arguments "from" design.

What is the argument for the claim that no amount of empirical investigation will ever tell us that an intelligent designer was involved? I'm just not seeing it.

Perhaps you think the mere design argument that I presented leads inexorably to something like this.

1. If X was designed, then its designer was either a human being or God.
2. X was designed.
3. X's designer was either a human being or God.
4. X's designer wasn't a human being.
5. Therefore X's designer was God.

Is that it? Are you claiming that the design inference commits one to this argument (a true argument from design)? As far as I can see, it only commits one to premise 2. It's true that a person trying to make a case for God in natural theology might well choose to use the design argument in tandem with the above argument, but that person has surely left science behind, with premise 1. Indeed, premise 1 is open to a number of philosophical objections, but these have nothing to do with the findings of science.

Incidentally, I would flesh out my sketch of the design argument by supporting premise 1.

1. The probability that structure X was formed by natural causes is very low.

Argument:
1.1 Structure X is irreducibly complex.
1.2 All irreducibly complex structures of whose origin we have certain knowledge are the result of intelligent design.

But let me ask a question to all those who are critical of ID:

Is it, in your view, at least possible that some features of living things are the result of intelligent design? I'm here referring to living things that existed before human beings, thus ruling out domesticated species and GMO. If your answer is no, I'd like to know why you think it's not possible.

The argument is that no one can show a scientific experiment or hypothesis supported by scientific evidence that an amoeba is the product of an intelligent design. Everything discovered through science is by way of empiricism. Yes, there is empirical evidence for human like design in the world when it comes to nature, but this is where the investigation must end. We can go on further and claim that the inference leads us to an argument for an intelligent designer for living things. Ok I'll go along with this as well. But the important point as far as science is concerned is that it doesn't accept the validity of such an argument because it is teleological. Science doesn't deal with teleological arguments because teleology isn't science.

Todd, I don't think is misread you design propositions. I disagree that that the choice must boil down to either man made, or God made. Science doesn't deal with either or statements such as these because one must always be true and one must always be false. As far as contingency is concerned, both choices could be wrong. Science cannot lock itself into such a dichotomy.

tmoody wrote:
If you want to claim that no candidate for X has yet been found, that's okay. That's an empirical question, and has to be settled in the usual way, by generating various hypotheses and testing them. If you claim that no candidate for X could ever be found, I'd like to know why not.

Sorry, I forgot to address your last question. I was thinking that if a pyramid was found on Mars we might determine by archaeological investigation that some type of intelligent creatures used tools to construct the pyramid. I was just putting forward the possibility that if these creatures no longer exist or left the planet then we may never know anything about them- other than they were intelligent and used tools.

My overall position on this is that we can't apply the same type of scientific investigation and determine that the evidence shows that living things in nature are the result of an intelligent designer, unless of course we want to do teleology. The empirical evidence attempts to demonstrate that 'design' is actually the result natural selection and mutations.

It am definitely not saying that science is correct on this and I am sure science is also not saying this. I am also not saying that intelligent design is not possible or indeed the actuality. Like any scientific hypothesis all that is being said is that the observations at the moment fit the hypothesis.

Immanuel Can wrote: Now, to shift the focus somewhat, in this connection has anyone read Thomas Nagel's new book, "Mind and Cosmos"? I'm reading it right now.

I read it as soon as it was published. I regard it as one of the most important books published in philosophy in my lifetime (I'm 60).

Nagel (an avowed Atheist himself) claims that ID has done science a huge favour by pointing out serious and apparently intractable flaws in Atheism's sponsoring worldview, identified variously as "Naturalism" or "Materialism." He claims that this has given science the best opportunity to revise its basic assumptions so as to make them yield a full account of the "real," including such things as "consciousness" and "rationality," and "mind," which the former two worldviews could not describe non-reductionally.

Note that Nagel's "avowed" atheism is based on what he calls an "ungrounded intellectual preference." He made this point more explicitly in The Last Word:

It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.

It's to his credit that he is open about this.

Nagel's still hopeful that a non-Theistic explanation will eventually prove possible; but he is glad for the contribution of ID to exposing the inadequacies of the existing paradigm, and thus contributing a hugely helpful critique to the history of science.

So if Nagel's right, ID seems to have done something very good, one way or the other.

Spoiler alert: Nagel eventually decides that science needs to return to something like an Aristotelian natural teleology. This, at least, is what he sees as the only alternative to both naturalism and theism, since he finds naturalism untenable (the primary thesis of the book) and theism unacceptable. Personally, I read the book as an extended but reluctant defense of theism.

In fact, Nagel's book perfectly illustrates how ID alone does not get you to theism. That added step requires the kind of sophisticated metaphysical analysis that this book exemplifies.

Ginkgo wrote: The argument is that no one can show a scientific experiment or hypothesis supported by scientific evidence that an amoeba is the product of an intelligent design. Everything discovered through science is by way of empiricism. Yes, there is empirical evidence for human like design in the world when it comes to nature, but this is where the investigation must end. We can go on further and claim that the inference leads us to an argument for an intelligent designer for living things. Ok I'll go along with this as well.

So far, so good.

But the importat point as far as science is concerned is that it doesn't accept the validity of such an argument because it is teleological. Science doesn't deal with teleological arguments because teleology isn't science.

The sense in which "teleology isn't science" is this: Science assumes that natural causes operate without goals, purposes, or intentions. Science rejects the view that the natural order "tries" to do anything. But since, as you already pointed out, science can and does discern the teleological activity of intelligent agents (archeology is a science), it's false to claim that science can't say anything at all about teleology.

Again, science is perfectly capable of attempting to discern the activity of intelligent agents, even when the identity and nature of those agents is completely unknown. SETI is a scientific search for ID under exactly those conditions. We don't know whether ETI exists, and if it does we know nothing at all about it, but we know enough about intelligence in general to know what to look for. That is, we know what kinds of effects are peculiarly associated with intelligent causes. That knowledge is enough to give science a foothold.

This, incidentally, is the core argument of Stephen Meyer's book, Signature in the Cell. Interestingly, that book is one of the sources that Nagel uses in Mind and Cosmos, mentioned above. But that's for another discussion.

tmoody wrote:Thank you for your answer. Now let me ask this: Given that this is possible, what would count as evidence for it, in your view?

The standard analogy is; bloke walks along the beach, sees a gold watch, looks at the bits and pieces inside, decides they couldn't have happened naturally, concludes it has been designed by an intelligent agent. So the evidence that would persuade me would be if the gold watch scuttled off, had some food, found a mate and made some baby gold watches. A gold watch crab, or something, would seal it for me.

However, I think your entire argument rests on your assertion, as I understand it, that it is possible to prove that at least one feature of the universe is designed by an agency that we wouldn't accept as a humdrum intelligent being. No it isn't; all you can prove is that you don't know of any natural mechanism that could produce such a thing.

tmoody wrote:First, I never used the word "prove" for this, so you shouldn't attribute it to me.

Sorry.

tmoody wrote:I do, however, claim that there can be evidence of design even in the total absence of any and all knowledge about the designer and whether that designer is humdrum or exotic. The absence of a plausible natural mechanism is part of the evidence, but not all of it.

Yes and as I said a few posts back, there can be evidence for any metaphysical or scientific hypothesis.

tmoody wrote:The other part is inductive: All observed instances of irreducible complexity whose provenance is empirically known are the result of the actions of intelligent agents.

So your argument is that if ever we find an example of something that looks like it was designed by someone, but we have reason to believe it wasn't designed by someone, it might be evidence that it was designed by something.

tmoody wrote:My argument does not warrant a design inference in any case where a natural causal mechanism is missing. It only warrants it in those cases where there is clear similarity to known designed things. Irreducible complexity is one mark of such things.

Right. So you have your hypothesis, now show us the supporting evidence.

tmoody wrote:The problem of induction is a general problem for all inductive inference; it isn't specific to ID. If the problem of induction is an argument against ID, it's also an argument against all science.

It's not an argument against science, that's how science works. As Kuhn observed, you have a paradigm, be it a metaphysical belief, a theory an equation or whatever, and as long as it provides the goods you use it. When it starts to fail, in the light of evidence, you patch it up until a better model comes along, which is more or less what I understand Immanuel Can to be saying.

tmoody wrote:That some structure is irreducibly complex is not an assumption. It is a testable empirical claim.

I think that is a very stretched notion of testable empirical claim; as far as I can see, all such a test would involve is comparing two objects, one of which you know the provenance. If ever you find something that looks like it was created by a human, but you can't work out who, you will infer that it could be made by a supernatural agency. It may be, but I don't see how you can eliminate any possible human intervention, except by arguing that it couldn't possibly be designed by a human, in which case, you have no basis for claiming that it looks like something that was designed by a human.
You may not have used the word proof, but unless you can prove that some structure is irreducibly complex, you only have the possibility that it might be, which has always been the case. I think even the most hard nosed scientist would accept that if there were overwhelming evidence for IC, they would be bound to accept it, but the evidence, although logically possible, isn't there.

uwot wrote: The standard analogy is; bloke walks along the beach, sees a gold watch, looks at the bits and pieces inside, decides they couldn't have happened naturally, concludes it has been designed by an intelligent agent. So the evidence that would persuade me would be if the gold watch scuttled off, had some food, found a mate and made some baby gold watches. A gold watch crab, or something, would seal it for me.

I asked what, if anything, could count as evidence for ID in actual living things, not imaginary objects.

So your argument is that if ever we find an example of something that looks like it was designed by someone, but we have reason to believe it wasn't designed by someone, it might be evidence that it was designed by something.

No, that's not my argument. I've actually stated my argument, so why not reply to that, instead of inventing a new argument and attributing it to me?

You may not have used the word proof, but unless you can prove that some structure is irreducibly complex, you only have the possibility that it might be, which has always been the case. I think even the most hard nosed scientist would accept that if there were overwhelming evidence for IC, they would be bound to accept it, but the evidence, although logically possible, isn't there.

Then you agree with me. My claim in this thread hasn't been that there is overwhelming evidence for IC. It has been, rather, that such evidence falls within the range of scientific methods. Your claim concedes that this is the case, and contradicts those who claim that ID isn't science.

It's one thing to claim that ID is a scientific theory for which there isn't enough evidence. It's another to claim it's not a scientific theory at all, because it somehow runs afoul of the methods of science. It's only the latter claim that I disputed in the article, and which I dispute now.

Personally, I read the book as an extended but reluctant defense of theism.

Yes, that is well-put. I think that's what's angered so many of his Atheist peers...he's provided really important reasons why Naturalism cannot deal with things like reason, values and consciousness in a non-reductive way.

If we assume, as he does, that these are real and important factors in the way the world really is, then Naturalism is a dead-end, scientifically speaking.

His continued Atheism is, in that light, mere wish-fulfillment rather than a reasoned stand. But I give him a great deal of credit for having spoken so plainly and intelligently on a subject that is likely to lose him friends among the Atheist set.

One cannot help but admire anyone who is more dedicated to telling the truth than to being popular, even if he chooses for reasons of preference, to remain opposed to the implications of that truth.

For the present discussion, Nagel's book also clearly shows that certain of the critiques raised by ID proponents cannot merely be dismissed as partisan rattling -- an honest Atheist has to face up to them too, and in view of them must revise his or her thinking -- that is, if he or she is really dedicated to science, and not merely to visceral Atheism.

tmoody wrote:
The sense in which "teleology isn't science" is this: Science assumes that natural causes operate without goals, purposes, or intentions. Science rejects the view that the natural order "tries" to do anything. But since, as you already pointed out, science can and does discern the teleological activity of intelligent agents (archeology is a science), it's false to claim that science can't say anything at all about teleology.

There appears to be a a reasonable amount of common ground in terms of agreement. However, your above quote represents the nub of the problem and also represents the place where we depart.

I would argue that archeology is not teleological in the most important aspect. Yes, science does discern the purpose of human activity,and perhaps acknowledges the goals of human activity when it comes to archeology. For example, the purpose of the pyramids was to provide burial chambers, with a goal set towards the Pharaoh successfully reaching the afterlife.Clearly these activities were carried out by many intelligent agents.

I agree that it is clear these 'teleological' explanations are explanations that explain human activity and purpose. But all of these explanations can be empirically verified. In other words, they come with supporting physical evidence. For example, a Pharaoh being buried with servants, food and money for use in the next life.

The question I am asking is where does the supporting physical evidence come from that supports the claim that God like intelligence is somehow found in, is similar to, or is representative of human, or human like intelligence? There is only the assumption that if it works in explaining human activity then it works explaining the activities and creations found in living organism. If it actually works the same way then another question I would ask is, "Where is the physical evidence to show that it works in the same way?

Where in the examination of living organisms is there physical evidence that these creatures are the product of an intelligent agent? Can you put the data in front of me?