Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Aug 15, 2021 8:08 pm
So no, identity isn't any kind of case or subset of causality at all. It's not a "special case of causation." It's a case of identity.
To avoid arguing about terminology, can we agree that continuity, if not a cause in itself, is a necessary part of causal explanation – as in explaining that you have a broken fishing rod in your cupboard because (a) you broke a fishing rod last year,
and (b) the fishing rod in your cupboard is the same fishing rod. And surely you agree that the mind is a meaningless concept unless some degree of continuity is assumed?
Please bear in mind that my references to causality/determinism do not assume discrete chains of causes – that is just how we simplify matters to understand them. What determinism means in practice is that the whole of the state of affairs at some time is determined by the
whole of the state of affairs at an earlier time. After all, the fact that I am typing this can only serve as a cause for your reading it later because it so happens that an undetected asteroid isn’t (I assume) about to destroy some vital part of the internet in the meantime – so this fact about the neighbouring part of space is also a contributory cause!
But what I'm pointing out is that it's misleading to say they "must have arisen out of something that was already in your mind." Because stuff that's "in a mind" is not "in material reality" the way that, say, neurochemicals are.
I do mean in a mental sense. Stuff like ideas, impressions, hunches, feelings. So how can that be misleading? I just don’t see that focussing on the mental gives any excuse for avoiding thinking about the possible logical relationships involved. Either some element of consciousness has a (present or earlier) cause or combination of any number of contributory causes, in which case each such cause is either something that was in the mind before or something external, or it arrives in consciousness for no reason at all. Each case has implications.
In creativity, for example, the creative mind imagines [1] something new, or [2] a new combination of things already known, but one that has not yet existed anywhere.
These are two significantly different cases [numbering added]. I am assuming for the sake of argument that case [1] doesn’t occur: that every apparently new idea is in fact an unconscious combination of ideas already known to the mind concerned, and asking what the implications would be. (First implication: there would still be room for creativity, as shown by case [2].
So to get back to the reason we are discussing this, I am saying, let us assume that dualism is correct, how can that rule out the possibility that the mind, together with its inputs from and actions upon the material world, acts in a deterministic way? Take Picasso as the example….
And this is why something like Guernica is so remarkable, in this connection. It is a conception of Picasso's, and we do not have any reason to suppose Braque or Cezanne, let alone any lesser or more distant artists, cold have produced it, even if we gave them a billion years. It would just never have come into their minds to do it.
Isn’t that exactly what I am saying? The whole of the nature & state of Picasso’s mind before the Spanish civil war plus the whole of his experience in the interim, such as his awareness of the events at Guernica, was a
necessary condition for the whole of the nature & state of his mind when he began his painting of it, and hence for his ability to come up with it, I think we agree. (That seems to be your point.) How can you rule out the possibility that it was also a sufficient condition? That exactly his mind in the light of those events would inevitably produce exactly that painting? I’m not saying that was the case, just that the world wouldn’t obviously look any different if it was, and we don’t know enough about how the mind works to rule this possibility out.
In fact, it seems to me that you are conceding exactly that when you say “There is a way of understanding the situation, and one I believe is right, that soap bubbles and everything else are indeed products of the Divine "imagination," or better, "creativity." ” If everything is part of the original Divine plan, isn’t that a different kind of predetermination?
How can free will then be possible? I can understand three possible answers: (a) It isn’t, divine pre-ordination and free will are alternatives; (b) God deliberately left gaps in his plan for self-determining human free will to fill in; (c) human free will is actually the experience of consciously participating in God’s will. Option (b) hits the usual problem of chasing its own tail: the state of one’s will cannot be both what is chosen and what is doing the choosing. What is unchosen cannot be willed. If it is chosen by some meta-will, that in turn is unchosen, and so on. Option (c) can be restated: free will is the fact that there are frequently outcomes that are determined by a mind’s current state of will [which in turn is
ex hypothesi occasioned by Divine pre-ordination] which is thereby free to be implemented. To believe (c) is to accept compatibilism between free will and pre-determination of the entire world, mental and physical together.
It seems to me that the rest of your post is more to do with dualism, and specifically theistic dualism, than with free will. There are important matters here that I hope we can get back to, because it seems to me that you are entirely misunderstanding what modern monists assume, but for the moment I want to stick to my claim that dualists should accept that free will is compatible with pre-determination of the entire dualistic world (e.g. divine pre-ordination), although not with pre-determination of the material world alone.
I’m sorry but I simply do not buy that theory of responsibility!
Then neither do you "buy" the theory of reward or praise. If you are not "responsible" for something good happening, then neither is it any credit to you when it does.
Yes, of course! I said I don’t buy THAT theory of responsibility, not ANY theory! I have recently outlined a theory of responsibility that makes far more sense to me over in the “ethics theory” section of this forum: "How Moral Responsibility arises from Consciousness".
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