What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

As read by whom? Who is the High Priest of reading Nature? Richard Attenborough? Richard Dawkins? Little Richard? Who tells us, and how, what Nature is saying to us?

Nature does. When it punches your plan/prediction in the face.

And by what hermeneutical method does he proceed? Science? But science has no moral information.

Science is a process - it has no content. Moral or otherwise. Science is process of acquiring information. Science is learning.

If moral knowledge/information exists - then you discover it with science. If there is no moral knowledge/information to be discovered - then no method will help you.

Where is the text and grand interpreter of this book called "Nature"?

Failure does not require interpretation.

For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled. --Richard Feynman

[Immanuel Can]

And as a subject, 'good' must be nominal - grammatically, a noun. And 'the good' is obviously nominal.

Not a problem. One can make "good" or "God" the subject noun in a sentence. That's the difference between active and passive voice constructions.

And that claim, if it's objective, has a burden of proof.

Then, as I asked, specify that burden, so it can be met.

If we ask why this is the case, your answer is that God's character, etc, is good by definition.

This isn't quite what I claimed. I did not say "good by definition." I claimed that God's character is the very origin point of any conception of "good" that is objective: thus it is the origin point for any rational definition. To think otherwise is to invoke some kind of Platonism, which both you and I find implausible to do.

This does not render the predication "without a truth value." That argument is like saying, "Nobody's allowed to be the first in a parade, but something can be later or the last." That's obviously not the case. God does not have to come "down the parade" is a sequence of things "in the parade" in order to be genuinely "in the parade of things that are good." He can, and in fact, is, not just the first but the prototype from which all the "paraders" take any justification for being called "good."

So to say "God is good" is, for us, a rational predication, since the case is that we are "down the parade" a considerable bit from that.

However, subjectivism has a huge problem with that: it has no "leader" at all for its "parade." It wants to use the word "good," but cannot refer that word to anything at all. It's a "parade" with nothing at all at the head, and thus without content in its use of the word, since it refers to precisely no real quality at all.

So with your fallible human judgement you presume to define your god as good - which is a performative contradiction.

It is not. I have a "colourblind" friend who can identify red. His vision is not so bad that he cannot sometimes detect it, even though his vision is fallible. Would you insist, then, that there can be no such thing as "red," for him or anybody? Of course not. He's not at all implicated in a "performative contradiction" -- just fallible detection.

The claim 'God has purposes and a will that are good' is quite separate, and has a separate analysis and burden of proof.

Specify that: what "burden of proof" do you suppose that claim bears? How would you go about "proving" it, if you could? And if you could not specify any burden of proof, then it cannot lack one. Rather, it would simply be something that exceeds your known tests...but you'd be unable to say, then, whether or not it was true.[/quote]
The burden of proof is with the claimant.[/quote]
No. The meeting of the burden of proof is with the claimant. The specifying of the burden of proof is with the objector. If no "burden" is specified, then the fact that it "is not met" is not the claimant's fault...it's the objectors. There literally is no "burden" that he will allow would be convincing.

Sorry. No way out.

Not seeking one. Seeking a way in.

What's my "in" to meeting your alleged burden? You should be able to say what it would be.

But now, you also have to keep in mind that to refer to any conception of good that is not already grounded in the character of God is to misrepresent the case and to deny subjectivism is true. As a subjectivist, you have absolutely no rational access to any objective conception of good and evil anyway -- at least if you're logically consistent (I suppose you can always pretend to have one, and then try to insist that we all should want to accept your definition, but good luck with that, since you won't have a basis to justify it to anyone). So you'll have to refer to some objective concept of good, to which you're not rationally entitled, to pose the question in the first place.

Ah, back to deflection.

Not at all. Simply pointing out that if there is any "burden" you can specify for me, the case is far, far more vexed for the subjectivist. For the subjectivist cannot win, as you propose, merely by default. For the subjectivist still wants to use moral terms. You, yourself, speak of "immorality." And I have asked you, "How can you, since you believe the term has no objective referent at all?"

And I note the complete lack of even an effort to grapple with your own burden of proof here, because of your claim that something is "immoral."

But I will do you the favour and specify your burden to you: you must show that "immorality" has a meaning more profound and universal than "Pete doesn't like," or Peter has said precisely no more than "Pete doesn't like"; but you have already set another bar to yourself, in that whatever Peter picks as his basis must not turn out to be universal or objective, or he has defeated his own OP.

So let's see you do what you claim I cannot: show that your claim "immoral" has content. But don't get "objectivist." Good luck.

As a rational secular humanist, I judge your god ...unworthy of worship by any half-decent person.

Not rational. You can't "judge" that for which no objective standards exist, and as a subjectivist, you have to believe they don't.

Not even subjectivist. It can't be rational to add "any half-decent person," however many epithets you may string together, because you're transgressing subjectivism, by invoking universal duty for all "half-decent persons," as you call them. But on the basis of what non-universal principle would you get to dictate to all "half-decent persons"?

Again, you can say no more than "Peter hates God." To say more, you need to invoke moral objectivism.

So is that where your claim ends?

[Belinda]

...it is the thing that is consonant with nature's character and wishes.

As read by whom? Who is the High Priest of reading Nature? Richard Attenborough? Richard Dawkins? Little Richard? Who tells us, and how, what Nature is saying to us?

And by what hermeneutical method does he proceed? Science? But science has no moral information. Your intuition? But what makes Belinda the definitive "reader" of Nature? By consensus? But consensus arguments are made that opposite things are "natural," so that's a wash...

Where is the text and grand interpreter of this book called "Nature"?

The interpreter of nature is the reasoning man. The more I understand my own reactions the more I am reasonable.The more knowledge and balanced judgement I have the more I am reasonable.

Such balanced judgement and knowledge I have sets me free to be sceptical with regard to all High Priests.
If you want to know how to understand nature you might start reading The Bible as literature not as revelation from God.

[gaffo]

reciprocity per prior actions.

i.e proportion reply to original offense evens the scales and is justice/just reply to original offence IMO.

Two wrongs make a right?

no sir, eye for an eye - reciprocity (Reciprocity) - is valid,

not valid to expand the original offense - nor valid if you made an offense and do not see it and others retaliate - in proportion to the offense you do not see (they have the right to retaliate to the offense you do not see - but not moreso - if they retaliate moreso than the original offense you do not see (out of your pride - being blind of the original offense) - your retaliation being greater than the original offese, via honour,they are allowed to offer retaleiation - not to escallated to your warped level - to even the score.

you are not morally allowed to reply greater than the offense, but if the offender is pigghead enough to deny they originally over-reached - act as the mirror - return the favor (you can't fix stupid of the offender - but you can return the favor and keep honur - and if stupid mandates escalation - you return the favor in kind!!!!!!!!!!!!

never "Start it" - but return the original offence! per your honor!

--per honor, allways offer the stanger food and shelter, always NEVER start the fight, and Never reply to an offense more than the offense.

if you reply more that the original offense, the you lost honor and the asshole that started it has the right to reply to YOUR Escallation(sp).


do you understand?????? what i say here?

[Immanuel Can]

The interpreter of nature is the reasoning man.

Well, one "reasoning man" says one thing, and one says another....so how do you choose which one to go with?

For example, is butchering babies in utero "natural" or "unnatural," and "moral" or "immoral"? What about "unnatural" forms of sexual expression...which "reading" of that wins, and why? Is being in cyberspace what "nature" tells you to do, or is virtual reality inherent not reality, and thus "unnatural"?

You are perhaps surmising that "rational" means whatever it is you already believe. But if so, there's no certainty of that at all.

[Belinda]

The interpreter of nature is the reasoning man.

Well, one "reasoning man" says one thing, and one says another....so how do you choose which one to go with?

For example, is butchering babies in utero "natural" or "unnatural," and "moral" or "immoral"? What about "unnatural" forms of sexual expression...which "reading" of that wins, and why? Is being in cyberspace what "nature" tells you to do, or is virtual reality inherent not reality, and thus "unnatural"?

You are perhaps surmising that "rational" means whatever it is you already believe. But if so, there's no certainty of that at all.

By reason I mean inductive reason, or prediction based upon probability. True there is no certainty. The certainty of many religious is their downfall.

Moral values are important and are safest in the care of individuals and societies where reason , not political or religious ideology, is the compass.

In your second paragraph your usage of 'natural' and 'unnatural' is nothing to do with nature and all to do with your bias.

[Immanuel Can]

By reason I mean inductive reason, or prediction based upon probability.

Well, let's try that out.

What does "inductive reason" tell us about the "naturalness" of actions like killing babies, or homosexuality, or virtual reality. Go ahead.

[Belinda]

By reason I mean inductive reason, or prediction based upon probability.

Well, let's try that out.

What does "inductive reason" tell us about the "naturalness" of actions like killing babies, or homosexuality, or virtual reality. Go ahead.

your usage of 'natural' and 'unnatural' is nothing to do with nature and all to do with your bias.

[Immanuel Can]

your usage of 'natural' and 'unnatural' is nothing to do with nature and all to do with your bias.

Heh. Hogwash. I'll let you take either side of any of those questions, without any bias at all. Call whichever side you want "natural." Just show me how "nature" tells us anything about them.

Just one. Go ahead.

[RCSaunders]

reciprocity per prior actions.

i.e proportion reply to original offense evens the scales and is justice/just reply to original offence IMO.

Two wrongs make a right?

no sir, eye for an eye - reciprocity (Reciprocity) - is valid,

not valid to expand the original offense - nor valid if you made an offense and do not see it and others retaliate - in proportion to the offense you do not see (they have the right to retaliate to the offense you do not see - but not moreso - if they retaliate moreso than the original offense you do not see (out of your pride - being blind of the original offense) - your retaliation being greater than the original offese, via honour,they are allowed to offer retaleiation - not to escallated to your warped level - to even the score.

you are not morally allowed to reply greater than the offense, but if the offender is pigghead enough to deny they originally over-reached - act as the mirror - return the favor (you can't fix stupid of the offender - but you can return the favor and keep honur - and if stupid mandates escalation - you return the favor in kind!!!!!!!!!!!!

never "Start it" - but return the original offence! per your honor!

--per honor, allways offer the stanger food and shelter, always NEVER start the fight, and Never reply to an offense more than the offense.

if you reply more that the original offense, the you lost honor and the asshole that started it has the right to reply to YOUR Escallation(sp).

do you understand?????? what i say here?

Oh yes! It's the same old tired argument that revenge or vengence in some way cancels evil. If it is wrong to harm another human being it is wrong. You are saying it is only wrong half the time.

Somehow, in your twisted mind, you believe if someone does something bad to you, doing something bad to him in some way fixes the bad thing done to you. But it won't, and will end by making you suffer more.

Two wrongs still do not make a right!

[And don't pretend you are talking about defense. If your defense is successful, it prevents the bad thing from happening and there is nothing to avenge.]

[gaffo]

Two wrongs make a right?

no sir, eye for an eye - reciprocity (Reciprocity) - is valid,

not valid to expand the original offense - nor valid if you made an offense and do not see it and others retaliate - in proportion to the offense you do not see (they have the right to retaliate to the offense you do not see - but not moreso - if they retaliate moreso than the original offense you do not see (out of your pride - being blind of the original offense) - your retaliation being greater than the original offese, via honour,they are allowed to offer retaleiation - not to escallated to your warped level - to even the score.

you are not morally allowed to reply greater than the offense, but if the offender is pigghead enough to deny they originally over-reached - act as the mirror - return the favor (you can't fix stupid of the offender - but you can return the favor and keep honur - and if stupid mandates escalation - you return the favor in kind!!!!!!!!!!!!

never "Start it" - but return the original offence! per your honor!

--per honor, allways offer the stanger food and shelter, always NEVER start the fight, and Never reply to an offense more than the offense.

if you reply more that the original offense, the you lost honor and the asshole that started it has the right to reply to YOUR Escallation(sp).

do you understand?????? what i say here?

Oh yes! It's the same old tired argument that revenge or vengence in some way cancels evil. If it is wrong to harm another human being it is wrong. You are saying it is only wrong half the time.

Somehow, in your twisted mind, you believe if someone does something bad to you, doing something bad to him in some way fixes the bad thing done to you. But it won't, and will end by making you suffer more.

Two wrongs still do not make a right!

[And don't pretend you are talking about defense. If your defense is successful, it prevents the bad thing from happening and there is nothing to avenge.]

Im saying if a slight is done to me - i may deserve if,,,,,,or not (if i am a dick i do...........- or maybe the other is the dick?) - i return the action


in proportion to the original offence,

i'm fine with reciprocity, you are not? if not why not?

[gaffo]

[
Two wrongs still do not make a right!

its not simple.

one needs to be centered as a person, and not retaliate out of the original offence.

[henry quirk]

What I know...

In the mornin' you go gunnin' for the man who stole your water

...cuz that bastid owes you compensation.

He steals your shit? Go get 'em.

He rapes your child? Go get 'em.

He profits offa you through lies? Go get 'em.

Turn the other cheek, my ass; eye for an eye, every damn time.

[Peter Holmes]

And as a subject, 'good' must be nominal - grammatically, a noun. And 'the good' is obviously nominal.

Not a problem. One can make "good" or "God" the subject noun in a sentence. That's the difference between active and passive voice constructions.

The linking verb 'be' can't take a direct object - the verb isn't transitive - so the voice isn't active and can't therefore be made passive by inverting the active subject and object. With a linking verb, the rest of the predicate is a complement. So 'God is good' and ''good is God' are saying completely different things. And, as I said earlier, the 'is' of predication has a different function from the 'is' of identity, which is, in effect, appositional, juxtaposing equivalent noun phrases. So God is good' either predicates the property 'good' of God, or identifies 'God' and 'good' as, in some way to be explained, the same thing. Which meaning do you intend - or is it both?

And that claim, if it's objective, has a burden of proof.

Then, as I asked, specify that burden, so it can be met.

No. If you claim 'God is good', that this assertion ascribes a property to God as a matter of fact - that 'God is good' is a true factual assertion - then yours is the burden of proof. And, as I said, if you can't or don't even know how to meet that burden of proof, the rest of us can draw our conclusions.

If we ask why this is the case, your answer is that God's character, etc, is good by definition.

This isn't quite what I claimed. I did not say "good by definition." I claimed that God's character is the very origin point of any conception of "good" that is objective: thus it is the origin point for any rational definition. To think otherwise is to invoke some kind of Platonism, which both you and I find implausible to do.

This assumes there is a 'conception' of 'good' that is objective - which is the moot point - and that that conception has an origin, which is a god. And these are all claims with no justification whatsoever. It amounts to this: 'morality is objective because the origin of the objective conception of 'good' is the character of God'.

Well, with reasoning of this calibre, it's a wonder we aren't all theist moral objectivists. Done and dusted.

This does not render the predication "without a truth value." That argument is like saying, "Nobody's allowed to be the first in a parade, but something can be later or the last." That's obviously not the case. God does not have to come "down the parade" is a sequence of things "in the parade" in order to be genuinely "in the parade of things that are good." He can, and in fact, is, not just the first but the prototype from which all the "paraders" take any justification for being called "good."

No, you miss the point. A definition has no truth-value. It's a stipulation, not a truth-claim. If you define 'good' or 'the good' as 'consonant with God's character', the rest of us are free to accept or reject your definition. But if you propose 'God is good' as a predication - a description of God with a truth-value - that claim then has a burden of proof. You can't then meet that burden of proof by citing your definition of 'good' as 'consonant with God's character': 'God is [consonant with God's character]' is gibberish.

So to say "God is good" is, for us, a rational predication, since the case is that we are "down the parade" a considerable bit from that.

However, subjectivism has a huge problem with that: it has no "leader" at all for its "parade." It wants to use the word "good," but cannot refer that word to anything at all. It's a "parade" with nothing at all at the head, and thus without content in its use of the word, since it refers to precisely no real quality at all.

But your 'reference' for the word 'good' is 'consonance with God's character' - which, as you agree, tells us absolutely nothing about either God's character or what constitutes good' or 'the good'. Your much-trumpeted foundation for goodness and therefore morality, is nothing but thin air. The claim 'if X is consonant with God's character, then X is morally right' says precisely nothing substantial about morality.

By contrast, we subjectivists have rational, evolved and evolving moral arguments, to do with the advantages of reciprocity, and so on, for each individual - with widening and developing scope. We don't falsely claim our moral judgements are facts - we recognise their historical, contingent nature and capacity for improvement. The fantasy of an objective goal is one we rationally dismiss as fantasy. And the irrationality of trying to ground morality on the invented character of one of our ancestors' invented gods is so ridiculous that, fortunately, many of us reject it utterly nowadays.

So with your fallible human judgement you presume to define your god as good - which is a performative contradiction.

It is not. I have a "colourblind" friend who can identify red. His vision is not so bad that he cannot sometimes detect it, even though his vision is fallible. Would you insist, then, that there can be no such thing as "red," for him or anybody? Of course not. He's not at all implicated in a "performative contradiction" -- just fallible detection.

Nonsense. You define your invented god as good. And yet you say humans are fallible. Do you not recognise a contradiction when it roars?

The claim 'God has purposes and a will that are good' is quite separate, and has a separate analysis and burden of proof.

Specify that: what "burden of proof" do you suppose that claim bears? How would you go about "proving" it, if you could? And if you could not specify any burden of proof, then it cannot lack one. Rather, it would simply be something that exceeds your known tests...but you'd be unable to say, then, whether or not it was true.

The burden of proof is with the claimant.

No. The meeting of the burden of proof is with the claimant. The specifying of the burden of proof is with the objector. If no "burden" is specified, then the fact that it "is not met" is not the claimant's fault...it's the objectors. There literally is no "burden" that he will allow would be convincing.

No, no and no. Claimant: 'X is the case'. Response: 'Prove it'. Claimant: 'How?' Response: 'I don't know. It's your claim. Why do you believe it?' Claimant: 'No, it's up to you to show how I can prove it. Not my problem.'

Are you serious?

Sorry. No way out.

Not seeking one. Seeking a way in.

What's my "in" to meeting your alleged burden? You should be able to say what it would be.

But now, you also have to keep in mind that to refer to any conception of good that is not already grounded in the character of God is to misrepresent the case and to deny subjectivism is true. As a subjectivist, you have absolutely no rational access to any objective conception of good and evil anyway -- at least if you're logically consistent (I suppose you can always pretend to have one, and then try to insist that we all should want to accept your definition, but good luck with that, since you won't have a basis to justify it to anyone). So you'll have to refer to some objective concept of good, to which you're not rationally entitled, to pose the question in the first place.

Ah, back to deflection.

Not at all. Simply pointing out that if there is any "burden" you can specify for me, the case is far, far more vexed for the subjectivist. For the subjectivist cannot win, as you propose, merely by default. For the subjectivist still wants to use moral terms. You, yourself, speak of "immorality." And I have asked you, "How can you, since you believe the term has no objective referent at all?"

And I note the complete lack of even an effort to grapple with your own burden of proof here, because of your claim that something is "immoral."

But I will do you the favour and specify your burden to you: you must show that "immorality" has a meaning more profound and universal than "Pete doesn't like," or Peter has said precisely no more than "Pete doesn't like"; but you have already set another bar to yourself, in that whatever Peter picks as his basis must not turn out to be universal or objective, or he has defeated his own OP.

So let's see you do what you claim I cannot: show that your claim "immoral" has content. But don't get "objectivist." Good luck.

As a rational secular humanist, I judge your god ...unworthy of worship by any half-decent person.

Not rational. You can't "judge" that for which no objective standards exist, and as a subjectivist, you have to believe they don't.

Not even subjectivist. It can't be rational to add "any half-decent person," however many epithets you may string together, because you're transgressing subjectivism, by invoking universal duty for all "half-decent persons," as you call them. But on the basis of what non-universal principle would you get to dictate to all "half-decent persons"?

Again, you can say no more than "Peter hates God." To say more, you need to invoke moral objectivism.

So is that where your claim ends?

Let me explain this once again, and perhaps this time you'll grasp the nub of it.

When I say 'your invented god is immoral', I'm not making a factual claim, with an independent truth-value, that therefore incurs a burden of proof. Instead, I'm expressing a moral judgement, just as you are when you say 'my 'God is good'. You claim this is a fact about your invented god, which is why I asked you to prove it. You then say you can't prove it and demand that I specify how it could be proved - unaware that in doing so, you're actually demonstrating how and why moral assertions aren't factual, and thus why morality isn't objective.

Now, the above paragraph seems to me to get to the heart of our disagreement - and I think it shows why you're wrong. For the sake of brevity, may I suggest you cut to addressing this paragraph?

[Immanuel Can]

Then, as I asked, specify that burden, so it can be met.

No.

Then there can be only one conclusion: there is no amount or kind of evidence you will accept. You can't even say what evidence would look like. It's the only conclusion you invite there.

This assumes there is a 'conception' of 'good' that is objective - which is the moot point -

I think you mean "contested point."

... and that that conception has an origin, which is a god. And these are all claims with no justification whatsoever. It amounts to this: 'morality is objective because the origin of the objective conception of 'good' is the character of God'.

Well, now you've begged the question. You say "there is no justification," but won't even say what a "justification" would look like.

A definition has no truth-value. It's a stipulation, not a truth-claim.

I disagree. A definition can be judged as to its quality by way of the level to which it reflects the facts. So it does indeed have truth value. If it has none, it's worse than "stipulative": it's actually wrong.

But I note that you don't address my objection regarding subjectivism. I had written it as follows:

However, subjectivism has a huge problem with that: it has no "leader" at all for its "parade." It wants to use the word "good," but cannot refer that word to anything at all. It's a "parade" with nothing at all at the head, and thus without content in its use of the word, since it refers to precisely no real quality at all.

It's as if you believe that if you can keep generating objections to objectivism, then subjectivism is going to win automatically. But even if you were right, it won't: what it will leave is TWO theories we can't trust -- objectivism, because you won't specify any "justification" for it, so it cannot be "justified to you by anyone," and subjectivism, because it has no basis for grounding any moral judgments at all.

So so far, your argument is not an argument for subjectivism. It's an argument for amorality, or more truthfully, for moral nihilism. No more.

Negating arguments can only take us so far as Nihilism. At some point, you have to produce credentials for subjectivism, or give it up, too.

But your 'reference' for the word 'good' is 'consonance with God's character' - which, as you agree, tells us absolutely nothing about either God's character or what constitutes good' or 'the good'.

No, I don't agree to that. I never agreed to that. I call, "straw man."

I have been arguing that God is the prototype, so to speak, the paragon, the "first in the parade" of things we can rightly, objectively identify as "good." Not that we cannot know anything about good. Rather, our concept of God as good is, in our experience, drawn by way of two things: one is comparison to that we know as good in the world, and the second is revelation, which clarifies what ultimate goodness looks like. So we have a lot of knowledge about objective goodness, and about why it applies as a predicate of God.

By contrast, we subjectivists have rational, evolved and evolving moral arguments, to do with the advantages of reciprocity, and so on, for each individual - with widening and developing scope.

You've got zippo. You don't know if reciprocity is "good" or not, nor what is "good for each individual." What you know is only what the subjective person happens to fancy at a given moment...no more. You've already, rightly, rejected the Neo-Platonic idea of goodness...well, that leaves you with nothing at all.

You define your invented god as good. And yet you say humans are fallible.

Of course. That's routine and demonstrable. If good is objective, it is not necessarily the case that every human being always has the right concept of the good at all times. Human beings are fallible.

It's like the Aristotelian concept of anatomy -- when all the "doctors" believed in the four humours, did that make Aristotelian medicine true? Of course not. Did it mean Aristotelians were not capable of learning better? Apparently not. Apparently, human physiology was what it was, whether any of them knew it or not.

The meeting of the burden of proof is with the claimant. The specifying of the burden of proof is with the objector. If no "burden" is specified, then the fact that it "is not met" is not the claimant's fault...it's the objectors. There literally is no "burden" that he will allow would be convincing.

No, no and no. Claimant: 'X is the case'. Response: 'Prove it'. Claimant: 'How?' Response: 'I don't know. It's your claim. Why do you believe it?' Claimant: 'No, it's up to you to show how I can prove it. Not my problem.'

I've told you exactly why I believe it. You insist you still don't. So all I'm asking you is, "Where is the bar?" What would it take to convince you of what you say you don't believe? In other words, what would it take to falsify your skepticism?

And you can't find anything that would do that. What does that tell you?

Not rational. You can't "judge" that for which no objective standards exist, and as a subjectivist, you have to believe they don't.

Not even subjectivist. It can't be rational to add "any half-decent person," however many epithets you may string together, because you're transgressing subjectivism, by invoking universal duty for all "half-decent persons," as you call them. But on the basis of what non-universal principle would you get to dictate to all "half-decent persons"?

Again, you can say no more than "Peter hates God." To say more, you need to invoke moral objectivism.

So is that where your claim ends?

Let me explain this once again, and perhaps this time you'll grasp the nub of it.

When I say 'your invented god is immoral', I'm not making a factual claim, with an independent truth-value, that therefore incurs a burden of proof. Instead, I'm expressing a moral judgement, just as you are when you say 'my 'God is good'.

Not "just as." Very differently, in fact.

For I, at least, have a basis for making such a judgment -- or, if you prefer to believe this way, that I "think" I do, even if you continue to deny I'm right about it. But you don't so much as "think" you do. If subjectivism is true, then by your own account, your value judgment can mean nothing stronger than "Peter doesn't happen to like (right now)..."

At least my view potentially could be objectively true, if as I suggest, "good" can be grounded in the character and will of God -- yours has not a ghost of a chance of being anything more than the aforesaid. At least, not on the basis of anything you've provided to show otherwise, so far.

But I'm happy to be contradicted on that: go ahead -- what's the full import of your subjective claim to God's "immorality," that exceeds your personal opinion of the moment yet invokes no objective standard?