Philosophy Now Forum

If one says that one must be mentally ill if one has no feelings (no pain,joy...etc in other words a zombie) it is insulting to someone that claims to have no feelings but it is proof that the person is delusional. Dennett is delusional in the sense that he believes that he has no feelings (qualia).

I found where Searle accuses Dennett of having an "intellectual pathology". I will post the link when I am off my tablet. I remember stronger words then that. However, accusing someone of being intellectually pathological is pretty serious!

Ginkgo wrote:
In terms of subjectivism, Dennett only looks at the observable behaviours associated with subjectivism. He dismisses any other explanation of subjectivism as not scientifically verifiable. In other words,Dennett approaches science from a third person perspective, as one would expect with any scientific account.

As I said before, I think it is the case that Dennett's reductionist account of consciousness, ends up being an elimination of consciousness.

Dennett denies that the subjective is real.
Yes! Many philosophers have said that Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained " would be more accurately titled "consciousness denied."

“Searle sees my position as “a form of intellectual pathology”; no one should be surprised to learn that the feeling is mutual.”
Dennett
FROM
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archive ... -exchange/
The entire article is great! Searle makes somewhat the same points as I did, that Dennett’s position is self-contradictory and downright silly. READ THIS ARTICLE!!! *
To see how this is the case, let me quote Dennett himself,
“"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia;...
At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I am not kidding.”
http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
* Here are some of the points Searle makes,
1. “The philosophical argument that underlies his view is fallacious. It is a fallacy to infer from the fact that science is objective, the conclusion that it cannot recognize the existence of subjective states of consciousness.”
2. “The distinction between appearance and reality, which arguments like his appeal to, does not apply to the very existence of conscious states, because in such cases the appearance is the reality.”
3. He thinks the conclusion that there are no conscious states follows from two axioms that he holds explicitly, the objectivity of science and verificationism. These are, first, that science uses objective or third-person methods, and second, that nothing exists which cannot be verified by scientific methods so construed. I argued at some length in my review that the objectivity of science does not have the consequence he thinks it does. The epistemic objectivity of method does not preclude ontological subjectivity of subject matter. To state this in less fancy jargon: the fact that many people have back pains, for example, is an objective fact of medical science. The existence of these pains is not a matter of anyone’s opinions or attitudes.”
4. Nor is it a matter of methodology. Rather it is just a plain fact about me—and every other normal human being—that we have sensations and other sorts of conscious states.”
In brief, Searle exposes Dennett for the charlatan he is.He ends the article by saying, " Here is the paradox of this exchange: I am a conscious reviewer consciously answering the objections of an author who gives every indication of being consciously and puzzlingly angry. I do this for a readership that I assume is conscious. How then can I take seriously his claim that consciousness does not really exist? "

From that same article,
"

Dennett resents the fact that I characterize his rhetorical style as “having a certain evasiveness” because he does not state his denial of the existence of conscious states clearly and unambiguously at the beginning of his book and then argue for it. He must have forgotten what he admitted in response to another critic who made a similar complaint, the psychologist Bruce Mangen. Here is what he said:

He [Mangen] accuses me of deliberately concealing my philosophical conclusions until late in the book, of creating a “presumptive mood,” of relying on “rhetorical devices” rather than stating my “anti-realist” positions at the outset and arguing for them. Exactly! That was my strategy…. Had I opened with a frank declaration of my final conclusions I would simply have provoked a chorus of ill-concealed outrage and that brouhaha would have postponed indefinitely any remotely even-handed exploration of the position I want to defend.
AND THIS WHICH IS VERY REVEALING ABOUT DENNETT'S POSITION
I think most readers, when first told this, would assume that I must be misunderstanding him. Surely no sane person could deny the existence of feelings. But in his reply he makes it clear that I have understood him exactly. He says, “How could anyone deny that!? Just watch…

Note that Dennett's position is materialism!

raw_thought wrote:"So you are saying above and beyond feeling a pain there is another feeling?"
Arising_uk
No. I am saying that there is a feeling of pain (a quale). Materialists deny that feelings (qualia) exist.

I don't think materialists deny feelings exist, the main claim of that materialist is that matter is the fundamental substance and all phenomena are the result of material interactions, including consciousness, Monism and not Dualism. You can argue what 'matter' is I suppose but I doubt most materialists would claim that they don't have feelings, just that these feelings will be explicable in terms of material interactions. Now given that we appear to be able to stimulate feelings and sensations by stimulating the CNS I'd say there's a fair chance that such things are the result of material interactions in the body and not some mysterious 'elsewhere'.

raw_thought wrote: I think most readers, when first told this, would assume that I must be misunderstanding him. Surely no sane person could deny the existence of feelings. But in his reply he makes it clear that I have understood him exactly. He says, “How could anyone deny that!? Just watch…

The above is a quote from Searle from my last post.
.........................................................................
I don't think materialists deny feelings exist,”
Arising_uk

Materialists do not believe in private subjective experiences. Since no one but me can feel my particular pain , it is private. Therefore, according to a materialist it does not exist. It does not feel like anything.
True, a materialist may use deception to avoid stating what he really believes ( like Dennett was shown to have) and would never say such an absurd thing as that feelings do not exist. For example, like Dennett he may redefine words. For Dennett , feelings = a brain state. he will then say that he believes in feelings because he believes in brain states. Similarly I ( an agnostic) may disingenuously redefine "God" as "my dog". Then I can disingenuously say that I believe in God because I believe that my dog exists.
Materialists cannot accept the reality of feelings because they are subjective and for them only objective reality is real.

“You can argue what 'matter' is I suppose but I doubt most materialists would claim that they don't have feelings, just that these feelings will be explicable in terms of material interactions. Now given that we appear to be able to stimulate feelings and sensations by stimulating the CNS I'd say there's a fair chance that such things are the result of material interactions in the body and not some mysterious 'elsewhere'.”
Arising_uk
I have repeatedly said that most likely my neurons firing cause me to be able to visualize a triangle. However, it would be absurd to take the materialist position that feelings are and only are brain states. That means that pain does not hurt etc. That there is a physical triangle in my brain etc.
You are confusing “cause” with “identity”. Something may cause something, for example my neurons firing may cause me to visualize a triangle. However, my neurons firing are not a visualized triangle.

Double post.

raw_thought wrote:I am using a tablet and cannot reply to a quote in the same space as that quote.
It is an ad hominum based on fact. Those that do not have feelings are mentally ill. Sociopaths for example have no feelings for others. As I said, I do not think that Dennett is psychotic. I think he is lying to himself. People do that all the time.
Dennett goes further then simply seeking a scientific meathod for understanding feelings (qualia) . He says that feelings (qualia) do not exist.
"Duelism" is treated like a swear word. However, since pain is a feeling and not just c-fibers firing (in other words pain hurts), then it is obvious that duelism is true. To say that pain is and only is c-fibers firing is to say that one cannot feel pain.

I'll leave the clinical diagnosis up to you. I was asking if you could please provide the quote whereby Searle claims Dennett is psychotic.

Read the NY times article I gave. True, Searle calls Dennett intellectually pathological " and not psychotic. However, he points out how pathological it is too believe that one has no feelings. I think you are being too anal and missing the point. To believe that one has no feelings is a mental illness.
I really do not want to waste my time trying to find a quote that will add nothing to the debate.
Fine, say that I just made it up that Searle said that Dennet was psychotic. It makes no difference to the debate.
PS: I specifically said that I do not think that Dennett is psychotic. He simply believes a lie he tells himself because it fits into his world view. "Normal" * peoplle do that everyday.
* My definition of "normal person" is someone that you do not know very well. I got that from Rodney Dangerfield's friend.

raw_thought wrote:Read the NY times article I gave. True, Searle calls Dennett intellectually pathological " and not psychotic. However, he points out how pathological it is too believe that one has no feelings. I think you are being too anal and missing the point. To believe that one has no feelings is a mental illness.
I really do not want to waste my time trying to find a quote that will add nothing to the debate.
Fine, say that I just made it up that Searle said that Dennet was psychotic. It makes no difference to the debate.
PS: I specifically said that I do not think that Dennett is psychotic. He simply believes a lie he tells himself because it fits into his world view. "Normal" * peoplle do that everyday.
* My definition of "normal person" is someone that you do not know very well. I got that from Rodney Dangerfield's friend.

Intellectual honesty is always a good think, don't you think?

Thanks for my clinical diagnosis. I thought your were again ad hominems?

Are you saying that someone that says he has no feelings (he claims that he cannot feel joy,pain,saddness pleasure or even physical sensations such as warmth, cold) is not mentally ill? Either he truly cannot and that is a pathological condition,or he thinks that he cannot and that is delusional.
I was not being dishonest. I simply do not want to take up at least half an hour to find an obscure quote that has no relevance to our debate.
Trust me! The debate between Searle and Dennett gets very heated!

raw_thought wrote:... Something may cause something, for example my neurons firing may cause me to visualize a triangle. However, my neurons firing are not a visualized triangle.

Yes they are, they are the pattern that produces the end-result, i.e. the 'image'. Is it that you are a dualist that you think not?