There is no 'Matter of Fact' [Analytic].

[Skepdick]

What sort of tedious automaton can only discuss things which "exist"?

We call ourselves humans.

Certainly not ones with concepts such as fiction and imagination. And it's also hard to see what use they would have for the concept of 'existing' if they have no means to consider the concpet of not existing.

At least a creature who doesn't understand the difference between conceptual categories and their inhabitants. Say, a Philosopher who doesn't know what the sentence "non-existence is uninhabited" means.

Now it's equivalent to Skepdick depends on being an attention whore.

That's called an ad hominem, yeah?

Ahh, I forgot. Lets go back to pretending that the rules of the language game don't apply to you.

It's not about what you depend on if it's just a case of what you are.

Ohhh. We are down to deepities now.

I AM is a verb, not a noun. Retard. I am not anything in particular. I DO a bunch of stuff.

[FlashDangerpants]

What sort of tedious automaton can only discuss things which "exist"?

We call ourselves humans.

Humans discuss things that don't exist on a regular basis.

Certainly not ones with concepts such as fiction and imagination. And it's also hard to see what use they would have for the concept of 'existing' if they have no means to consider the concpet of not existing.

At least a creature who doesn't understand the difference between conceptual categories and their inhabitants. Say, a Philosopher who doesn't know what the sentence "non-existence is uninhabited" means.

Meh.

Now it's equivalent to Skepdick depends on being an attention whore.

That's called an ad hominem, yeah?

No.

It's not about what you depend on if it's just a case of what you are.

Ohhh. We are down to deepities now.

I AM is a verb, not a noun. Retard. I am not anything in particular. I DO a bunch of stuff.

Ok then, be a behaviourist if you want. It wouldn't make any difference to the quality of your output.

[Skepdick]

Humans discuss things that don't exist on a regular basis.

Weasel words. Every conceptual category you discuss is inhabited, except the non-existence category.

Which is why you don't talk about it or its inhabitants on regular basis.

It's uninhabited - there is nothing to talk about!

Ok then, be a behaviourist if you want. It wouldn't make any difference to the quality of your output.

I have never claimed or pretended to produce any quality output. I will happily admit that my output is total fucking shit!

My goal (as always) is to simply demonstrate that the quality of your output is worse than shit!

All your posturing is just striving to remain relevant, but it seems Philosophy, like Science progresses one funeral at a time.

[FlashDangerpants]

Humans discuss things that don't exist on a regular basis.

Weasel words. Everything you discuss exists AT LEAST as a concept.

And and all conceptual categories (except the non-existence category) are inhabited.

You mean some things exist only as concepts huh?

Ok then, be a behaviourist if you want. It wouldn't make any difference to the quality of your output.

I have never claimed or pretended to produce any quality output. I will happily admit that my output is total fucking shit!

My goal (as always) is to simply demonstrate that the quality of your output is worse than shit!

All your posturing is just striving to remain relevant, but it seems Philosophy, like Science progresses one funeral at a time.

meh

[Skepdick]

You mean some things exist only as concepts huh?

No, retard. Everything that exists, exists AT LEAST as a concept.

Non-existence as a concept is not inhabited. Which is why you can't and don't talk about it - it has no inhabitants to talk about!
Everything you are talking about is inhabited. If it wasn't, you couldn't talk about it!

[FlashDangerpants]

You mean some things exist only as concepts huh?

No, retard. Everything that exists, exists AT LEAST as a concept.

Non-existence as a concept is not inhabited. Which is why you can't and don't talk about it!
Everything you are talking about is inhabited. If it wasn't, you couldn't talk about it!

So when I wrote "Morality is the social linguistic framework that exists only as a category relating to such things as discussions about rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness and similar topics." That was fine then.

[Skepdick]

Morality is the social linguistic framework that exists only as a category relating to such things as discussions about rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness and similar topics[/color]." That was fine then.

Well, you are contradicting yourself given your previous statement: morality DEPENDS ON "right" and "wrong".

This necessitates that those categories exist a priori to the category of "morality" (relating to such things as discussions about rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness and similar topics).

What are the conceptual categories of "right" and "wrong" inhabited by, a priori any such things as (moral) discussions about them?

If the rules of the language game don't apply to you, then yeah - it's fine.

[FlashDangerpants]

Morality is the social linguistic framework that exists only as a category relating to such things as discussions about rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness and similar topics[/color]." That was fine then.

Well, you are contradicting yourself given your previous statement: morality DEPENDS ON "right" and "wrong".

This necessitates that those categories exist a priori to the category of "morality" (relating to such things as discussions about rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness and similar topics).

What are the conceptual categories of "right" and "wrong" inhabited by, a priori any such things as (moral) discussions about them?

If the rules of the language game don't apply to you, then yeah - it's fine.

I think you are overinterpreting my use of the word depends in that sentence. But I am fine to just jettison it because I give a flying one. For clarity, it can now be read as "Morality IS about right and wrong, they are what it is FOR as well as what it is ABOUT."

You can have another go at overinterpretation by complaining about something being 'for' and 'about' the same subject or whatnot if you like. The most profitable outcome for you will be that I just rephrase again if i can be bothered.

None of this waffle has any impact on my actual point which is that it is unintelligible to dissociate rightness and wrongness from morality.

By the by, this thing you have gotten into where you write 'a priori' for every instance where prior or before would suffice is pretentious, and causes people to assume you are referencing Kant in ways that make no sense. I recommend not bothering with that any more.

[Skepdick]

I think you are overinterpreting my use of the word depends in that sentence.

I am not "over"interpreting it. I am interpreting it.

I offered you the opportunity to correct my interpretation. Still waiting.

You can have another go at overinterpretation

Absolutely no need for that when I can ask you about your interpretation. Which is what I did.

I simply asked you if "right" and "wrong" are conceptual categories inhabited a priori any (moral)discussions about them.

None of this waffle has any impact on my actual point which is that it is unintelligible to dissociate rightness and wrongness from morality.

That's a prescriptive interpretation, but we shall let it pass.

By the by, this thing you have gotten into where you write 'a priori' for every instance where prior or before would suffice is pretentious, and causes people to assume you are referencing Kant in ways that make no sense. I recommend not bothering with that any more.

I suggest you stop overinterpreting my use of those terms, especially since I told you what I mean/how I use them in context of time (which has nothing to do with Kant). I can use prior, before, contingent upon or any of 100 synonyms if me aiming for consistency is getting your panties in a bunch.

What came first? The concepts, or the vocabularies to talk about them?

[FlashDangerpants]

None of this waffle has any impact on my actual point which is that it is unintelligible to dissociate rightness and wrongness from morality.

That's a prescriptive interpretation, but we shall let it pass.

It would be unintellgible to discuss an "art-proper" with no reference to dance or painting or any other actual expression of art. Art as a category is made out of that stuff is it not? The langauge games of art are certainly mostly about such things as far as I can see. The doesn't seem prescriptive, nor particularly contentious.

Our moral language games are similarly laden with rightness and wrongness through and through.

By the by, this thing you have gotten into where you write 'a priori' for every instance where prior or before would suffice is pretentious, and causes people to assume you are referencing Kant in ways that make no sense. I recommend not bothering with that any more.

I suggest you stop overinterpreting me. I told you what I mean/how I use that term in context of time.

What came first? The concepts, or the vocabularies to talk about them?

I worked out what you meant after a while. Before that I was a assuming you meant what the term typically means, barbaric of me I know, but I'm a simple man.

I don't see much to be gained by trying crack language and concepts apart that way other than confusion. Seems to me like two ways of describing the same thing in differing contexts.

[Sculptor]

Peter Holmes wrote:

If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, THAT IS NOT A MORAL FACT. It would just be a fact about human nature. And if instead we were programmed to kill humans, THAT WOULD ALSO NOT BE A MORAL FACT. It would not mean that we 'ought to kill humans'.

We ought to drink water and we are programmed to drink water.There are occasions when we ought not to drink water.

We are programmed to use our muscles and we ought to use our muscles. There are occasions when we ought not to use our muscles.

We are programmed not to steal from other people and we ought not to steal from other people. There are occasions when we ought to steal from other people.

We are programmed to cooperate with each other and we ought to cooperate with each other. There are occasions when we ought not to cooperate.

We are programmed not to kill other men and we ought not to kill other men. There are occasions when we ought to kill other men.

We are programmed to be Republicans and we ought to be Republicans. There are occasions when we ought not to be Republicans.

We are programmed to be Democrats and we ought to be Democrats, There are occasions when we ought not to be Democrats.

We are programmed to be Christians and we ought to be Christians. There are occasions when we ought not to be Christians.

We are programmed to be Platonists and we ought to be Platonists. Sometimes we ought not to be Platonists.

We are programmed to be racists and we ought to be racists. Sometimes we ought not to be racists.

Some of these examples are sillier than others and taken all together show it is impossible to pin down what human nature 'is'. I'd have to be able to define human nature to begin to make sense of Peter's thesis about facts of human nature.

___________________

I agree 'human nature' is a slippery thing - and I'm the last person to say it can be straightforwardly described. I use the term to characterise what VA calls our programming to behave in certain ways. VA says it's a fact that we're programmed not to kill humans. And I'm saying that, even if that's true, it isn't a moral fact. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent anyway.

VA's claim is this: we're programmed not to kill humans; therefore we ought not to kill humans. And that's patent nonsense.

We are not programmed to kill humans until we are programmed to kill humans.
VA is clueless.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Let's try again.

The claim 'this colour patch is red' is true or false, in context, given the way we English speakers use those words. And the truth or falsehood of the claim is independent from opinion, because there's a real thing that is or isn't what we call red. But if a colour patch is what we call blue, then the claim 'this colour patch is red' is false, because there's a real thing that is blue and not red.

This is how we English speakers use the words 'true' and 'false' to refer to factual assertions. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. For example, what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - such as a colour patch being red or blue.

Now, children, a moral assertion, such as 'abortion is morally wrong' doesn't function in the way that a factual assertion, such as 'this colour patch is red' functions. And why is that the case? Well, it's because moral rightness and wrongness aren't properties of things in the way that colours are. We can settle the question of what colour the patch is by checking if it's what we English speakers call red or blue. And given the way we use those words, there can be no argument: the patch is either red or not red, or blue or not blue - independent from opinion.

But we can't do the same with abortion. Its moral 'status' - whether it's morally right or wrong - isn't a property identifiable independent from opinion, in the way that the colour of the colour patch is. And this is why it's possible for one person to think abortion is morally wrong, and another person to think abortion is not morally wrong. There's nothing in the nature or abortion itself that can settle the matter.

So a moral assertion is different from a factual assertion. A moral assertion isn't factually true or false, because it has no truth-value at all. And for that reason, there can be no moral facts. So morality isn't and can't be what we call objective.

Creating your own strawmen again!

A moral assertion [e.g. whether killing humans is right or wrong] by any subject is not a fact itself, such a moral assertion is an opinion.

A moral fact within a moral FSK is that 'oughtness' [inhibition] "programmed" and existing as real in the brains of ALL humans via evolution and is represented by its physical referent, potentials and manifesting activities.

The truth of the existence of the above inhibition, i.e. 'no human ought to kill humans' as a moral fact within a moral FSK is supported by the fact that the majority of the 7+ billion do not have a loose and willy-nilly impulse to kill humans.

Where this inhibition is weakened or damaged as in malignant psychopaths, their inhibition 'no human ought to kill humans' failed, they evidently kill humans.

If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, THAT IS NOT A MORAL FACT. It would just be a fact about human nature. And if instead we were programmed to kill humans, THAT WOULD ALSO NOT BE A MORAL FACT. It would not mean that we 'ought to kill humans'. Now, would it? Have a good hard think about it. Try out the idea. Stretch your mind just a little. Never know, the penny may drop.

The point is 'the penny will never drop' for you due to your hardcore dogmatism.

I agree with this;
PH: If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, .....; It would just be a fact about human nature.

BUT.. THAT IS A MORAL FACT within human nature.
Human nature is all encompassing re human beings.

That we are programmed 'not to kill humans' is a definitely a biological fact, a neuroscientific fact, a psychological fact, an evolutionary psychological fact, and whatever is related to that "program" 'not to kill humans'.

But within humanity, there is an undenial pattern of activities and behavior recognized as 'morality' with different definitions by different people.
All these different definition of morality are merely pseudo-morality.

I defined morality-proper as follows;
viewtopic.php?p=469799#p469799

Morality-proper is conditioned upon the Moral FSK.

When the justified fact of 'ought not to kill humans' which is a biological fact, a neuroscientific fact, a psychological fact, an evolutionary psychological fact, etc., is input with other facts into the moral FSK,
the 'ought no to kill humans' is a justified true moral fact.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Peter Holmes wrote:

If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, THAT IS NOT A MORAL FACT. It would just be a fact about human nature. And if instead we were programmed to kill humans, THAT WOULD ALSO NOT BE A MORAL FACT. It would not mean that we 'ought to kill humans'.

We ought to drink water and we are programmed to drink water. There are occasions when we ought not to drink water.
...

One more..
We ought to breathe for normal air and we are programmed to breathe.
Are there any occasion when we ought not to breathe in general?

The general principle is, if we are programmed to do X, then there is an ought_ness to do X.
It is that 'oughtness' i.e. that existence of that state-of-oughtness that is a fact within a FSK.

If anyone do not agree with, don't want, do not comply with that oughtness that is their opinion which will not extirpate that fact of oughtness in their brain and physical self.
If they don't comply with the "programmed" ought_ness to breathe, then they will die very soon thus proving that ought_ness with its own force is very real.

Where the state-of-oughtness relate to morality-proper within a moral FSK, then that is a moral fact, e.g. the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans".

If normal people do not comply with the real moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans", their conscience will be triggered that will cause terrible mental pains to the extent that some murderers committed suicide. Such events validate that the moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans" is very real.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, THAT IS NOT A MORAL FACT. It would just be a fact about human nature. And if instead we were programmed to kill humans, THAT WOULD ALSO NOT BE A MORAL FACT. It would not mean that we 'ought to kill humans'.

We ought to drink water and we are programmed to drink water. There are occasions when we ought not to drink water.
...

One more..
We ought to breathe for normal air and we are programmed to breathe.
Are there any occasion when we ought not to breathe in general?

The general principle is, if we are programmed to do X, then there is an ought_ness to do X.
It is that 'oughtness' i.e. that existence of that state-of-oughtness that is a fact within a FSK.

If anyone do not agree with, don't want, do not comply with that oughtness that is their opinion which will not extirpate that fact of oughtness in their brain and physical self.
If they don't comply with the "programmed" ought_ness to breathe, then they will die very soon thus proving that ought_ness with its own force is very real.

Where the state-of-oughtness relate to morality-proper within a moral FSK, then that is a moral fact, e.g. the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans".

If normal people do not comply with the real moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans", their conscience will be triggered that will cause terrible mental pains to the extent that some murderers committed suicide. Such events validate that the moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans" is very real.

You seem not to understand the way English speakers use the word ought.

True factual assertion: if humans don't breathe, they die. This is a fact - an empirically demonstrated feature of reality that is the case.

Now, you mistakenly think this means that humans ought to breathe. You mistakenly think the two expressions - 'if humans don't breathe, they die' and 'humans ought to breathe or they die' are synonymous - that they're interchangeable.

But they're not. They mean different things. The modal verb ought implies an obligation of some kind, as does the modal verb should. And the modal verb must in this context doesn't usually imply an obligation. 'Humans must breathe or they die' merely indicates cause and effect.

If the word ought in 'humans ought to breathe or they die' doesn't imply an obligation - as you seem to think - then this is not a moral assertion, but merely a factual, practical assertion: if humans don't breathe, they die.

Morality isn't about factually demonstrable causes and effects. It's about the rightness and wrongness, propriety and impropriety, goodness and badness, of behaviour. The definition of morality you've repeatedly cited states this unequivocally.

So your whole attempt to ground morality on facts about what humans have to do, or are programmed to do, must fail.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Peter Holmes wrote:



We ought to drink water and we are programmed to drink water. There are occasions when we ought not to drink water.
...

One more..
We ought to breathe for normal air and we are programmed to breathe.
Are there any occasion when we ought not to breathe in general?

The general principle is, if we are programmed to do X, then there is an ought_ness to do X.
It is that 'oughtness' i.e. that existence of that state-of-oughtness that is a fact within a FSK.

If anyone do not agree with, don't want, do not comply with that oughtness that is their opinion which will not extirpate that fact of oughtness in their brain and physical self.
If they don't comply with the "programmed" ought_ness to breathe, then they will die very soon thus proving that ought_ness with its own force is very real.

Where the state-of-oughtness relate to morality-proper within a moral FSK, then that is a moral fact, e.g. the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans".

If normal people do not comply with the real moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans", their conscience will be triggered that will cause terrible mental pains to the extent that some murderers committed suicide. Such events validate that the moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans" is very real.

You seem not to understand the way English speakers use the word ought.

True factual assertion: if humans don't breathe, they die. This is a fact - an empirically demonstrated feature of reality that is the case.

Now, you mistakenly think this means that humans ought to breathe. You mistakenly think the two expressions - 'if humans don't breathe, they die' and 'humans ought to breathe or they die' are synonymous - that they're interchangeable.

But they're not. They mean different things. The modal verb ought implies an obligation of some kind, as does the modal verb should. And the modal verb must in this context doesn't usually imply an obligation. 'Humans must breathe or they die' merely indicates cause and effect.

If the word ought in 'humans ought to breathe or they die' doesn't imply an obligation - as you seem to think - then this is not a moral assertion, but merely a factual, practical assertion: if humans don't breathe, they die.

Morality isn't about factually demonstrable causes and effects. It's about the rightness and wrongness, propriety and impropriety, goodness and badness, of behaviour. The definition of morality you've repeatedly cited states this unequivocally.

So your whole attempt to ground morality on facts about what humans have to do, or are programmed to do, must fail.

When and where did I claim 'humans ought to breathe or they die' is a moral assertion.
That all human beings ought, should, must or imperative to breathe else they die is a biological fact.

What I claimed is,
'no human ought to kill humans' is a moral fact verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a moral FSK.
I have defined Morality-Proper basically as promoting good and avoiding evil [as defined].
The killing of another human is an evil act.

English is not my first language but I have researched into the meaning of 'ought' and modal verbs.
'Ought' as a model verb has a lower degree of force than 'MUST'.
Ought is not necessary a command on the individuals but rather 'what is proper' and 'what is correct' to be within the relevant context.

Obligation:
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/obligation?s=t
Within the context of morality, ought is an obligation.
Within the context of law, promise, and the likes, ought is also an obligation.

Morality isn't about factually demonstrable causes and effects. It's about the rightness and wrongness, propriety and impropriety, goodness and badness, of behaviour. The definition of morality you've repeatedly cited states this unequivocally.

I stated Morality is the promotion of good and avoidance of evil within a moral FSK.
Within the moral FSK there are moral facts.

The moral fact re 'no human ought to kill humans' refer to that real physical & non-physical state-of-ought_ness within the brain and self that is represented by neurons and neural algorithms which are subject to cause and effects. See the below;

One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=32564