Philosophy Now Forum

I weighed the Earth the other day by lifting it. Turns out to weigh almost a thousand Newtons. And they say things in freefall are weightless. Obvious nonsense...

Ideas actually have weight. Physicalism carries much more weight than dualism in fact, but it seems only the minority have the capacity to bear it. The more popular lightweight model sweeps all the heavy looking parts under a rug where they're safe from the labor of explanation.

In several posts you utter that the materialist must claim this or that (such as the idea with weight). Such comments are usually false, and thus require backing to justify why materialism must make said claim. In physics, not even matter has mass in isolation. It is a meaningless value in the absence of time, so mass is again partly a relationship sort of thing. Sure, objects have a property of mass, but that property merely relates to a mathematical description of its interaction with other objects over time. Mass does not have mass any more than velocity has velocity. Properties and relationships are not matter in themselves.

Immanuel Can wrote:How much does an idea weigh?

This strawman argument implies a materialist claims that an idea is an object with weight/mass. In that case, what is the mass of combustion, of your velocity, or of the sorting of a deck of cards? One is a process, a relation, and the result of a process respectively. But all are physical so they must have a mass according to your implication unless an immaterial velocity realm is required to have velocity. Marxism (as a held concept) is much like the sortedness of the cards, a product of process, a specific relationship of matter in this case.

This is incorrect. [The materialist is] not "describing" anything at all. He's arbitrarily attributing beliefs to material causes. He's not working from observations, because he cannot identify a "material" that composes ideas, and cannot empirically observe ideation. He is, in fact, stating his creed. That's all.

The beginning and end is pretty much correct. Monism attributes everything to the one cause, a statement of creed. Dualism does likewise. Neither view is in any way a statement of explanation.

The middle part I must disagree with. While combustion might not be a material itself, there is very much material identified which is capable of the process of combustion. Your view has seemingly not made a single step on this front. No identification, and especially no empirical difference in your favor. Surely if the dualist answer is so obvious, there would be some empirical difference. Without that, it is faith, and faith alone is not any sort of proof of the truth of it.

Heck, I'm an eternalist and there's no empirical evidence for that either. I chose it for the same reason: simpler model, elimination of needless complications that don't solve any problems. I can't prove the nonexistence of the posited extra thing, but I can point out the absolute lack of evidence for it. I've seem proof posted on both sides, but as usual, they're faulty.

Noax wrote:In several posts you utter that the materialist must claim this or that (such as the idea with weight). Such comments are usually false, and thus require backing to justify why materialism must make said claim. In physics, not even matter has mass in isolation. It is a meaningless value in the absence of time, so mass is again partly a relationship sort of thing. Sure, objects have a property of mass, but that property merely relates to a mathematical description of its interaction with other objects over time. Mass does not have mass any more than velocity has velocity. Properties and relationships are not matter in themselves.

Ha. This is merely an evasion. I think you see the point anyway. If ideas or consciousness were "materials," then they would have the physical properties of materials. They don't. You know they don't. You just don't want to recognize it as a problem for the facile view that Materialism can account for them, which is really just a credal position.

But I think the point's been well made, so we'll leave it there.

Monism attributes everything to the one cause, a statement of creed. Dualism does likewise. Neither view is in any way a statement of explanation.

This is, of course, incorrect as well. Dualism by definition, attributes everything to at least two "causes," though that term itself is inapt. Materialism, by definition, knows of only one....materials.

Heck, I'm an eternalist and there's no empirical evidence for that either.

If there's no evidence needed, you can believe anything you want. Of course, any person is free to do that. But any rational person is not. To be a rational person, you must go with logic and evidence, not wishes. That is more constricting, true: but it is also more rational. And far more likely to be correct.

Immanuel Can wrote:Ha. This is merely an evasion. I think you see the point anyway. If ideas or consciousness were "materials," then they would have the physical properties of materials. They don't. You know they don't.

So ideas are not objects. They are relationships or properties of materials, which have relationships and properties of their own perhaps, but mass not being one of them. Hence my asking the mass (or location) of your velocity for instance. Terapin would actually answer that since apparently relationships have location. Maybe they have mass as well. How is ideas not having mass an evasion or an inconsistency with the premise of the view?

Monism attributes everything to the one cause, a statement of creed. Dualism does likewise. Neither view is in any way a statement of explanation.

This is, of course, incorrect as well. Dualism by definition, attributes everything to at least two "causes," though that term itself is inapt. Materialism, by definition, knows of only one....materials.

Read what I wrote. Sure, two (or more) causes. I said it was also a statement of creed, and details are not part of the creed. Each is merely a starting point for the view. There are variants of each, but the variants are no more explanatory. I for instance don't hold to materials being fundamental, but that alteration makes no difference to explanations of how material things work.

Heck, I'm an eternalist and there's no empirical evidence for that either.

If there's no evidence needed, you can believe anything you want.[/quote]Didn't say it wasn't needed. I said it wasn't provided. Unclear if that debate might turn up a satisfactory empirical test.

Of course, any person is free to do that. But any rational person is not. To be a rational person, you must go with logic and evidence, not wishes. That is more constricting, true: but it is also more rational. And far more likely to be correct.

Wait... Barring any evidence one way or another, how is one choice more rational than one holding a complimentary view? I gave reasons for my choice of the eternalist view, and it was a rational one: Choose the less complicated model if it works just as well. Not evidence, but very much logic.

Is my view irrational? How so? A dozen posts later and the only evidence provided appears to be assertions from where I stand. The mind thing will never be solved, because it seems to be a difference in verbal description. All evidence can simply be denied. The causal thing I notice has gone ignored. You cannot describe how your mental intent to type your posts causes your physical fingers to press the desired keys, without violation of known physics. There is forever a reliance on physics that is yet to be discovered. And if we find it, then that mental stuff becomes not so immaterial after all.

Immanuel Can wrote:But since you're here, would you mind answering my earlier question: "How much does an idea weigh?"

Well, given that ideas are associated with brain states, an idea is, in part at least, a pattern in the electromagnetic field generated by the brain thinking it. According to quantum fields theories generally, mass is essentially distortions in whatever field is being hypothesised. That being so, ideas do have mass, but as Hobbes Choice points out, how much it weighs depends on where you weigh it. Wherever that may be though, the answer to your question is 'Not much.'
You have to get over this naive and archaic view you assume materialism implies, Immanuel Can. Few people think matter is simply solid blocks, bound and moved by magic, as the Greek atomists believed. You are fighting a straw man again.

(For those of you lucky enough not to be Immanuel Can; he and I had a bit of a falling out. Basically, I told Mr Can that his god could go fuck himself with a cheese grater, because something of that nature was in store for everyone who failed to kiss the immortal, omnipresent arse of said god, for ever and ever, amen. Mr Can is doing me the very great service of ignoring me, in case I do further damage to my immortal soul by saying god can go fuck himself again. Naturally, the temptation is there to say god can go fuck himself every time Mr Can fails to respond, but he is only fooling himself, if he thinks he is doing anything for my benefit. Mr Can's style is to try and manoeuvre his interlocutor into some naïve position, which he is cerebrally equipped to challenge. For example, to anyone who will listen, he will tell you that atheism is 'irrational', because, in his view, atheism requires proof that god does not exist. Since that proof cannot be shown, it is 'rational' to believe that god does exist. Yup; his logic really is that poor.)

Noax wrote:How is ideas not having mass an evasion or an inconsistency with the premise of the view?

Because you know, and I know, that ideas have NO physical properties...not mass, not volume, not temperature, not velocity...

What other "physical" entity do you know that has absolutely no physical properties of its own?

I for instance don't hold to materials being fundamental, but that alteration makes no difference to explanations of how material things work.

That's not the issue. The issue is what these things (like ideas, consciousness, selfhood) are that exist but have no physical properties.

Wait... Barring any evidence one way or another, how is one choice more rational than one holding a complimentary view?

Barring any evidence, neither would be rational. You need evidence and logic.

Choose the less complicated model if it works just as well. Not evidence, but very much logic.

This isn't logic. I think what you're trying to do is to appeal to something like Occam's Razor -- you seem to be repeating some sort of scaled-down, half-baked version of what he actually said.

He said that we ought not to multiply the means of explanation beyond necessity. In other words, he said that given two highly identical theories, one simple and one a bit more complex, and all things being equal, we ought to prefer the simpler version.

But two problems with this exist: 1) it's not always clear what "simple" entails. What makes one view "simpler" than another varies based on the means of assessment, and 2) Occam's Razor is only an all-things-being-equal-here's-what-to-choose kind of principle: but we can never be sure when things are truly "equal" in the necessary sense (i.e. when no additional factor we have not yet entertained is involved), and sometimes the more complicated explanation does indeed turn out the be the right one. So it can never be taken to rule out one view as against another, but is especially vulnerable to being wrong when the views under consideration are substantively dissimilar.

Here's what it can be used for: if I have two views that are highly similar (for example, that lightning is caused by thermal fronts, on the one hand, and another view that says lightning is caused by thermal fronts plus unicorn rage) I can rule out the view that has the unnecessary additional element (unicorn rage) unless it can be shown that that element actually accounts for something necessary.

This is why one cannot weigh of Monism and Dualism, and say Monism wins simply by virtue of being more simple. Its simplicity would only be a virtue if it succeeds in comprehensively describing the phenomenon in question (consciousness), and the additional element posed by Dualism were verifiably extraneous. The Materialist can meet neither of those challenges -- he's begging the question of what consciousness is, while we have every reason to doubt his explanation is comprehensive; and he cannot begin to show that the additional element posed by Dualism ("mind" for example) is truly extraneous. So in no way is Monism preferable to Dualism by way of Occam's Razor or anything else.

Is my view irrational? How so?

If, as you state, evidence and logic are not required in order for a person to hold you view, it doesn't necessarily say the view itself cannot be held rationally, provided a rationale is at least possible. But it does mean that your own belief in it would be irrational -- that is, a potentially rational view held on irrational grounds.

So, for example, you could believe the world was round, which would be correct; but if you believed it without evidence -- that is, not because you'd seen a picture or been given data showing it was so, but rather because you think circles are pretty, or because you just find the idea that the earth is round personally attractive -- then you would be believing something true, but on irrational grounds. The fact that it was true would be merely accidental, in your case: nothing in the way you were believing necessarily conduced to the right conclusion.

If you belief in Materialism were held without evidence or logic, then that belief would be irrational, by your own testimony. Even if it were right (though I think it's self-evidently wrong), you would only accidentally be believing the truth. In such a case, nothing would warrant calling your view "rational."

There is forever a reliance on physics that is yet to be discovered. And if we find it, then that mental stuff becomes not so immaterial after all.

This is a perfectly clear case of a faith statement of the least-founded kind... pure, gratuitous faith. For you confess that any physical answer to what consciousness is has "yet to be discovered," which is an acknowledgement it has NOT been discovered yet, and then you imagine us finding it anyway, and put your trust in that prospect-not-yet-realized.

You can do that, of course. But there's nothing rational in it.

Immanuel Can wrote:Because you know, and I know, that ideas have NO physical properties...not mass, not volume, not temperature, not velocity...

You don't actually read my posts do you? All the things listed above, like ideas themselves, are properties and relationships of matter. So what is the mass, volume, temperature, and velocity of an apple's mass, volume, temperature, and velocity?

What other "physical" entity do you know that has absolutely no physical properties of its own?

Funny, you gave a nice list there just then. Don't read your own posts then either.

Wait... Barring any evidence one way or another, how is one choice more rational than one holding a complimentary view?

Barring any evidence, neither would be rational. You need evidence and logic.[/quote]Your evidence so far is mere bafflement. You can't see how the simpler view can work. Also the denial of evidence to the contrary. I see plenty cherry picking going on. Good science that.

I think what you're trying to do is to appeal to something like Occam's Razor -- you seem to be repeating some sort of scaled-down, half-baked version of what he actually said.

He said that we ought not to multiply the means of explanation beyond necessity. In other words, he said that given two highly identical theories, one simple and one a bit more complex, and all things being equal, we ought to prefer the simpler version.

Adding an entire second ontology is considered multiplying the means. It is not a small additional complexity. No, I'm not offering that as proof, just a grounds for choice. You seem to be going for a disproof of my position, which thus takes on a burden.

Here's what it can be used for: if I have two views that are highly similar (for example, that lightning is caused by thermal fronts, on the one hand, and another view that says lightning is caused by thermal fronts plus unicorn rage) I can rule out the view that has the unnecessary additional element (unicorn rage) unless it can be shown that that element actually accounts for something necessary.

Unicorns make far more logical sense. I've argued for their existence. How is your separate ontology not naturalism plus a unicorn?

'Naturalism' is a good word for my stance on this point. It doesn't deny deeper levels the way 'materialism' does, and 'realism' isn't really a view, it is a modifier about something specific. I'm realistic about space, but idealistic about the X axis of space. You're a realist about immaterial mind. I dislike 'monism' because it is ambiguous, even though we've sort of said for this thread that nobody is talking about idealism with that word.

This is why one cannot weigh of Monism and Dualism, and say Monism wins simply by virtue of being more simple. Its simplicity would only be a virtue if it succeeds in comprehensively describing the phenomenon in question (consciousness), and the additional element posed by Dualism were verifiably extraneous.

Nonsense. This is only true if the dualistic view accomplished said comprehensive description. It does nothing of the sort. It just says it happens elsewhere. It's a cop out. It seems to be a necessity for the eternal life promised by some preists, so of course it is the assumed view, but that's not logical evidence. I think the priests gain benefit from a more aggressive telling of the story. Improbability of reward must be counterbalanced by ever more massive payoff. The lottery people know this. The average lottery ticket is worth about a tenth of what it costs, but that's not the part they advertise. I tell my children when I see tickets being sold: Those are people paying their stupid-tax. If you're not stupid, you don't have to pay it.

The Materialist can meet neither of those challenges -- he's begging the question of what consciousness is, while we have every reason to doubt his explanation is comprehensive; and he cannot begin to show that the additional element posed by Dualism ("mind" for example) is truly extraneous. So in no way is Monism preferable to Dualism by way of Occam's Razor or anything else.

It isn't begging if it is the premise. It becomes begging only if the material definition is used in a disproof of the immaterial view. That's what you did in the first post (#145) to which I responded. Tell me this is not begging:

Immanuel Can wrote:Yes, that's another good problem for Materialism: at what point does the "person," "life" or "soul," whatever we want to call the immaterial quality that distinguishes a mere body from a living being, enter a baby?

If, as you state, evidence and logic are not required in order for a person to hold you view, it doesn't necessarily say the view itself cannot be held rationally, provided a rationale is at least possible. But it does mean that your own belief in it would be irrational -- that is, a potentially rational view held on irrational grounds.

What means the belief is irrational? You didn't supply any violation of rational thinking.

So, for example, you could believe the world was round, which would be correct; but if you believed it without evidence -- that is, not because you'd seen a picture or been given data showing it was so, but rather because you think circles are pretty, or because you just find the idea that the earth is round personally attractive -- then you would be believing something true, but on irrational grounds.

Ah, difference in rational definition. I would say this is a lack of rational grounds. Irrational would be ignoring actual evidence to the contrary. The round Earth is inconsistent. How could it be true? It would fall if nothing held it up. That's rational evidence against it. That rational evidence must then be countered for the argument to hold (It is indeed falling).

If you belief in Materialism were held without evidence or logic, then that belief would be irrational, by your own testimony.

Great. I think your view is irrational then. I hadn't said it before, but incredulity does not seem a rational argument.

Even if it were right (though I think it's self-evidently wrong), you would only accidentally be believing the truth. In such a case, nothing would warrant calling your view "rational."

This is a perfectly clear case of a faith statement of the least-founded kind... pure, gratuitous faith. For you confess that any physical answer to what consciousness is has "yet to be discovered," which is an acknowledgement it has NOT been discovered yet, and then you imagine us finding it anyway, and put your trust in that prospect-not-yet-realized.

Physics is not searching for consciousness. Not their field. Those guys are looking in the other direction. I don't think there is anything left out by physics on this front. A unified field theory isn't going to make a scratch on mind philosophy. QM on the other hand really blows things out of the water. A dualist must pretty much deny QM, or buy into an interpretation that lets one cause changes to past events. Lots of physics to rewrite to keep your view consistent with empirical evidence.

Noax wrote:You don't actually read my posts do you? All the things listed above, like ideas themselves, are properties and relationships of matter. So what is the mass, volume, temperature, and velocity of an apple's mass, volume, temperature, and velocity?...Funny, you gave a nice list there just then.

Those are all physical attributes, indeed. Now, which one did you say belonged to "ideas," or which of the above did "consciousness" possess?

Unicorns make far more logical sense. I've argued for their existence. How is your separate ontology not naturalism plus a unicorn?

Unicorns have no evidence. But the fact that you are responding to me is evidence of things like "selfhood" and "consciousness." What we have to do now is explain what that evidence is telling us about those non-physical phenomena.

What means the belief is irrational? You didn't supply any violation of rational thinking.

Believing anything on no evidence or logic is not rational. Surely that's as simple as the definition of "rational."

Ah, difference in rational definition. I would say this is a lack of rational grounds.

Well, absent rational grounds, there is absolutely no way for anyone to say the belief itself is "rational" either. Somebody's got to be using reason and evidence. Or else nobody can ever be able to say, "That view is rational" -- whether they're talking about the conclusion or the thinking process that got them there.

Physics is not searching for consciousness. Not their field.

Quite right.

But then, "physics" is not being contemplated as a comprehensive answer anymore, because it's being admitted that there are existent things that are "not their field." Monist Physicalism or Materialism would then be contradicting itself.

Or are you meaning it's "not their field" because it doesn't exist, and physics doesn't look for things that don't exist? That might sound better, at first. But then you're going to get asked, "How did they find out that such things did not exist, since by their own admission they don't even look for such things?" The argument then again self-defeats.

Either way, the statement "physics is not searching for consciousness," if true, defeats any argument they may mount against the reality of consciousness. They've just decided not to look for it; and "not looking" means they know nothing about it.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:You don't actually read my posts do you? All the things listed above, like ideas themselves, are properties and relationships of matter. So what is the mass, volume, temperature, and velocity of an apple's mass, volume, temperature, and velocity?...Funny, you gave a nice list there just then.

Those are all physical attributes, indeed. Now, which one did you say belonged to "ideas," or which of the above did "consciousness" possess?

3rd (4th?) time: Read the post.

Unicorns have no evidence.

Why, because you don't see them? I'm not such an idealist. They are an inevitable byproduct of my interpretations of physics. Being interpretations, there is no direct evidence. But indirect evidence is not lack of evidence.

Believing anything on no evidence or logic is not rational. Surely that's as simple as the definition of "rational."

Not-rational is not the same as irrational in my book, but I'm willing to go with that definition. 'Irrational' had meaning of 'against evidence', not lack of it.

But then, "physics" is not being contemplated as a comprehensive answer anymore, because it's being admitted that there are existent things that are "not their field." Monist Physicalism or Materialism would then be contradicting itself.

Naturalism does not make any statement as to which studies are part of empirical physics, and physics is not claimed as a comprehensive answer to everything (economics for instance). Both our views must not contradict physics to remain rational.

Or are you meaning it's "not their field" because it doesn't exist, and physics doesn't look for things that don't exist? That might sound better, at first. But then you're going to get asked, "How did they find out that such things did not exist, since by their own admission they don't even look for such things?" The argument then again self-defeats.

Physicists don't go looking for the economy, not that the economy doesn't exist, but rather it is just not described in terms of particles, fields, and forces.

Either way, the statement "physics is not searching for consciousness," if true, defeats any argument they may mount against the reality of consciousness. They've just decided not to look for it; and "not looking" means they know nothing about it.

But you must not violate physics, and you do. Your typing is an effect with a cause, but no connection to the cause. You've repeatedly declined to account for that. Physics (combined with low level biology) says your view is impossible.

uwot wrote:Mr Can's style is to try and manoeuvre his interlocutor into some naïve position, which he is cerebrally equipped to challenge.

Noticed that. Latest is the mass-of-ideas thing, replies being repeatedly ignored since the naive position is not being accepted. Technically, ideas do have mass as you point out. Don't think that was the point.

On the other hand, many conversations on this particular site go by way of suggestions on how a cheese grater might be put to use. This one has for the most part not (yet) gone that way.

Noax wrote:Physicists don't go looking for the economy, not that the economy doesn't exist, but rather it is just not described in terms of particles, fields, and forces.

Wait: we'd better clear this up -- do you mean "physicists," as in, people who are paid work in a particular narrow subfield of science, or "physicists" as in people who assert that the physical world is all there is? It makes a big difference, because above you're only talking about the first, but it seems you're trying to use it to make an argument about the second...

If I'm wrong about that, then your mentioning of physicists would be correct, but wildly off topic. We're discussing Materialism, in the OP.

But you must not violate physics, and you do.

See, here it looks like you're using "physics" in the second way, as a general principle supposedly governing everything that qualifies as "real". (And, of course, the statement isn't true either way.) But you seem to be claiming a great deal for whatever you mean by "physics": perhaps equating it with the sum of all natural laws? It looks like that's what you're trying to do, anyway.

And yet here...

Physics (combined with low level biology) says your view is impossible.

...you reduce it to a mere subfield again, something that does not INCLUDE biology, but according to your comment, has need of being SUPPLEMENTED by biology in order to be complete.

Whatever else is true here, you need to pick a horse and ride it. Materialism is the topic, so I think you've got to go with the more ambitious definition. Describing what the members of a particular career path (physicists) which does not include things like biology and chemistry will not help you say anything about Materialism. Materialism is supposed to include all three.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:Physicists don't go looking for the economy, not that the economy doesn't exist, but rather it is just not described in terms of particles, fields, and forces.

Wait: we'd better clear this up -- do you mean "physicists," as in, people who are paid work in a particular narrow subfield of science, or "physicists" as in people who assert that the physical world is all there is? It makes a big difference, because above you're only talking about the first, but it seems you're trying to use it to make an argument about the second...

The former. The latter one is not physics at all. An explanation of mind is not going to come from the physicists. But an explanation of that or of the economy still had best not include violations of known physics.

But you must not violate physics, and you do.

See, here it looks like you're using "physics" in the second way, as a general principle supposedly governing everything that qualifies as "real". (And, of course, the statement isn't true either way.) But you seem to be claiming a great deal for whatever you mean by "physics": perhaps equating it with the sum of all natural laws? It looks like that's what you're trying to do, anyway.

I mean physics, not metaphysics. Your view violates natural law as it is currently known. You apparently know this since you've avoided attempts to describe the mental cause connection to a physical effect.

Physics (combined with low level biology) says your view is impossible.

...you reduce it to a mere subfield again, something that does not INCLUDE biology, but according to your comment, has need of being SUPPLEMENTED by biology in order to be complete.

Yes, you need explanations in two way. First, find some physical effect that has a supernatural cause: A cause that supplies information, not randomness. Second, from biology, find a structure somewhere in biology that leverages this currently undiscovered interaction and amplifies it to powerful enough signals to move muscles. The best place to put these receptors is directly in the muscles. Very efficient that way. If I was God, I'd have put them there where they belong. Likewise, the uplinks could be directly in the sense organs (if they're needed at all). The brain could be reduced to under 5% of its current size to save the massive expense of metabolism wasted on it, which has cumulatively killed millions. Humans have the least efficient brain of any animal. It could also be moved to somewhere more central and protected. The design is completely stupid. It is almost as if the output effectors needed to communicate with a common point which needed to be close to the high bandwidth input devices due to the wiring issues of that data stream. That suggests a purpose to the common point, like the information was being processed there instead of just offloaded, which is obviously complete nonsense. God is a crappy engineer.

Noax wrote:The former. The latter one is not physics at all.

Then "physics" as you are now defining it, is not Materialism. Thus there is no relevance to the present OP, so I can't imagine why you brought it up.

Your view violates natural law as it is currently known

.

Two problems with this:

1) You actually don't have the faintest clue what my actual view is, since we haven't talked about it at all; in fact, it's not the subject of the OP -- only the inadequacy of Materialism is, and

2) You don't know what so-called "Natural Laws" apply to the particular case of "consciousness." Nobody does. You surely cannot expect people to assume you do, and thus to dismiss "consciousness" as a violation of them.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Noax wrote:The former. The latter one is not physics at all.

Then "physics" as you are now defining it, is not Materialism. Thus there is no relevance to the present OP, so I can't imagine why you brought it up.

I never claimed it was. Physics and philosophy are not the same fields. I bring it up because of your nonsense about the weight of ideas.

Your view violates natural law as it is currently known

.

Two problems with this:

1) You actually don't have the faintest clue what my actual view is, since we haven't talked about it at all; in fact, it's not the subject of the OP -- only the inadequacy of Materialism is, and

I've been asking questions, and you've answered a few of them. Enough for that post. And no natural law applies to your view since natural law does not have any effects with outside causes. You have no full explanation and I'm not asking for one, but the link must exist somewhere. And the engineering analysis of a human with immaterial mind is accurate. The design as it stands would be torn to pieces in 5 minutes of engineering review. If this is God's work in designing a body for an immaterial mind, he's a child failing his minion-creation class and will have to redo it over the summer.

2) You don't know what so-called "Natural Laws" apply to the particular case of "consciousness." Nobody does.[/quote]Indeed nobody does because none of the methods available meet the requirements of the task. Something new must be invented. The flood-geology museum is full of cherry picked science of this sort, and even they don't have even a fake answer for this one.

You surely cannot expect people to assume you do, and thus to dismiss "consciousness" as a violation of them.

Descartes saw the problem and at least attempted a location for the mechanism (the biology half of the problem, but not the physics), somewhere sufficiently inaccessible at the time that analysis of the details was prevented. He was later proven incorrect. The brain does not get its shots called by a gland.

Noax wrote:I never claimed it was. Physics and philosophy are not the same fields. I bring it up because of your nonsense about the weight of ideas.

Physics has nothing to do with the evaluation of ideas, concepts, consciousness or "soul," unless you imagine one of those possesses physics-type properties, the kinds of properties physics can address. That's a problem for Materialism...it's no problem to me, since I don't hold that they possess any of these properties, and nobody so far has been able to show they can. Indeed, you have not suggested any "materials" that might be the basis of consciousness...instead, you've called those things "properties." But either these "properties" have to be materials themselves, or like velocity, mass, density, etc., they have to be descriptors of some aspect of physicality which can be measured.

But consciousness is neither, apparently: so, as you have rightly said, physics can't even begin to deal with it. But then, why are we talking about physics, since physics rules itself out of the game a priori -- as you said, it has no more to do with evaluation of these properties than economics does.

Descartes saw the problem and at least attempted a location for the mechanism (the biology half of the problem, but not the physics), somewhere sufficiently inaccessible at the time that analysis of the details was prevented. He was later proven incorrect. The brain does not get its shots called by a gland.

Well, in any case, this is not particularly relevant. If Descartes was wrong, that doesn't even begin to suggest that an alternate view couldn't be articulated that would be much better than his. So what's the point of mentioning Descartes at all? Do you suppose every Dualist must pass through Descartes, or that he/she must believe all that Descartes said about everything? I see no reason to think that.

But Materialism, unless it can specify the "materials" of consciousness, is simply wrong, if consciousness exists...and you and I, we both act like we think it does, no matter what Materialism may assert. In fact, we're acting like that right now, as I have pointed out previously.

Immanuel Can wrote:Physics has nothing to do with the evaluation of ideas, concepts, consciousness or "soul," unless you imagine one of those possesses physics-type properties, the kinds of properties physics can address. That's a problem for Materialism...it's no problem to me, since I don't hold that they possess any of these properties, and nobody so far has been able to show they can. Indeed, you have not suggested any "materials" that might be the basis of consciousness...instead, you've called those things "properties." But either these "properties" have to be materials themselves, or like velocity, mass, density, etc., they have to be descriptors of some aspect of physicality which can be measured.

All correct, but how does any of this attempt to sidetrack address what I asked? You know, the violation of physics part you need to explain....

Well, in any case, this is not particularly relevant. If Descartes was wrong, that doesn't even begin to suggest that an alternate view couldn't be articulated that would be much better than his.

So articulate one. What alternate solution do you propose for the problem?

But Materialism, unless it can specify the "materials" of consciousness, is simply wrong

There you go (similar to bahman actually) asserting that consiciousness is a material. There are materials responsible for it, the consciousness is not a material itself any more than combustion is a material.