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Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:58 am
by Iwannaplato
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then....
Well, not so fast....
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/arch ... al/597736/
https://mindmatters.ai/2020/03/how-libe ... presented/

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 9:30 am
by Agent Smith
Iwannaplato wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:58 am
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then....
Well, not so fast....
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/arch ... al/597736/
https://mindmatters.ai/2020/03/how-libe ... presented/
Okie dokie. Stay informed is going to be my mantra.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:26 am
by Flannel Jesus
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am
Iwannaplato wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:34 am
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 4:33 am Compatibilism is an intriguing stance to adopt.

Also what about the now-famous neuroscientific experiment in which it was found that the body moves milliseconds before one wills to do so. If anyone has any idea what I'm talking about, please provide some links. I seem to have forgotten the scientist's name.
Libet was one of the first...
Vhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet´
but there's also more recent research...
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... we-know-it
The interesting thing for philosophers is that this stuff challenges not only free will but also our sense about why we make decisions.
IOW we may think we made them for rational reasons, but......
Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then - we don't have free will. Intriguing is it not? What are the other ramifications I wonder.
I don't think it means that. It at best means we don't use conscious thought to make many, possibly most of our decisions. Some people may maintain that conscious thought isn't a requirement for an action to be one of free will, and others can still maintain that, even if many or most actions aren't the result of conscious thought, others are.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:36 am
by Agent Smith
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:26 am
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am
Iwannaplato wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:34 am
Libet was one of the first...
Vhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet´
but there's also more recent research...
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... we-know-it
The interesting thing for philosophers is that this stuff challenges not only free will but also our sense about why we make decisions.
IOW we may think we made them for rational reasons, but......
Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then - we don't have free will. Intriguing is it not? What are the other ramifications I wonder.
I don't think it means that. It at best means we don't use conscious thought to make many, possibly most of our decisions. Some people may maintain that conscious thought isn't a requirement for an action to be one of free will, and others can still maintain that, even if many or most actions aren't the result of conscious thought, others are.
How many milliseconds is the delay between the movement of the arm and the will to move it?

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:44 am
by Iwannaplato
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:26 am
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am
Iwannaplato wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:34 am
Libet was one of the first...
Vhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet´
but there's also more recent research...
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... we-know-it
The interesting thing for philosophers is that this stuff challenges not only free will but also our sense about why we make decisions.
IOW we may think we made them for rational reasons, but......
Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then - we don't have free will. Intriguing is it not? What are the other ramifications I wonder.
I don't think it means that. It at best means we don't use conscious thought to make many, possibly most of our decisions. Some people may maintain that conscious thought isn't a requirement for an action to be one of free will, and others can still maintain that, even if many or most actions aren't the result of conscious thought, others are.
Yes, we could be leaving the free part for new things, exceptions, special focus. Sort of like we put some stuff on automatic pilot because we can handle it. So, driving we don't decide to make all those adjustments that keep us from hitting other things and making nice turns, but we might taking over if we decide to cross three lanes and exit. Something that requires something tricky. Or when we are guiding the whole organism in new directions. I think I will ask her out, mull, mull. Plan.

Note: not arguing for free will, just saying that different kinds of cognitive processes may (somehow) have ontological differences.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 11:46 am
by Flannel Jesus
Iwannaplato wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:44 am
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 10:26 am
Agent Smith wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:46 am
Danke! Libet's experiment proves it then - we don't have free will. Intriguing is it not? What are the other ramifications I wonder.
I don't think it means that. It at best means we don't use conscious thought to make many, possibly most of our decisions. Some people may maintain that conscious thought isn't a requirement for an action to be one of free will, and others can still maintain that, even if many or most actions aren't the result of conscious thought, others are.
Yes, we could be leaving the free part for new things, exceptions, special focus. Sort of like we put some stuff on automatic pilot because we can handle it. So, driving we don't decide to make all those adjustments that keep us from hitting other things and making nice turns, but we might taking over if we decide to cross three lanes and exit. Something that requires something tricky. Or when we are guiding the whole organism in new directions. I think I will ask her out, mull, mull. Plan.

Note: not arguing for free will, just saying that different kinds of cognitive processes may (somehow) have ontological differences.
Yes, idk about ontologically differences but differences in general, absolutely.

It was recently brought to my attention that some people hypothesize the reason for conscious awareness of decisions is because we had a need in our evolutionary history to distinguish between "actions my body is taking because of my own brain" compared to "actions my body is taking despite what my brain wants".

Eg the difference between "I'm jumping off this rock" compared to "I'm being pushed off this rock by another being".

The awareness of when you're being forced may have survival benefits, so that's a hypothesised reason for why we're consciously aware of decisions - even of decisions we don't necessarily consciously make

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 2:32 pm
by BigMike
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 11:46 am It was recently brought to my attention that some people hypothesize the reason for conscious awareness of decisions is because we had a need in our evolutionary history to distinguish between "actions my body is taking because of my own brain" compared to "actions my body is taking despite what my brain wants".

Eg the difference between "I'm jumping off this rock" compared to "I'm being pushed off this rock by another being".
The hypothesis you mentioned is one of the theories proposed to explain why we have a subjective experience of making decisions and taking actions. This idea is known as the "corollary discharge theory" or "efference copy theory" and suggests that the brain generates an internal copy of motor commands (efference copy) that is compared to the actual sensory feedback from the body.

According to this theory, the brain uses the efference copy to predict the expected sensory consequences of a movement, and if the predicted and actual sensory feedbacks match, the brain assumes that the movement was self-generated. However, if there is a mismatch between the predicted and actual sensory feedbacks, the brain infers that the movement was externally caused.

This theory has been supported by studies in both humans and animals. For example, studies have shown that the brain areas responsible for generating the efference copy are also active during the preparation and execution of movements. Additionally, studies on patients with certain neurological disorders have shown that a disruption in the ability to generate or process efference copies can result in a difficulty in distinguishing self-generated from externally caused movements.

While the corollary discharge theory is a promising explanation for conscious awareness of decisions, it is not the only one. Other theories propose that conscious awareness arises from the integration of multiple sources of sensory information, the comparison between different possible actions, or the need to selectively attend to relevant stimuli. Ultimately, the question of why we have a subjective experience of decision-making and action remains an active area of research in neuroscience and philosophy.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 2:48 pm
by Flannel Jesus
BigMike wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 2:32 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 11:46 am It was recently brought to my attention that some people hypothesize the reason for conscious awareness of decisions is because we had a need in our evolutionary history to distinguish between "actions my body is taking because of my own brain" compared to "actions my body is taking despite what my brain wants".

Eg the difference between "I'm jumping off this rock" compared to "I'm being pushed off this rock by another being".
The hypothesis you mentioned is one of the theories proposed to explain why we have a subjective experience of making decisions and taking actions. This idea is known as the "corollary discharge theory" or "efference copy theory" and suggests that the brain generates an internal copy of motor commands (efference copy) that is compared to the actual sensory feedback from the body.

According to this theory, the brain uses the efference copy to predict the expected sensory consequences of a movement, and if the predicted and actual sensory feedbacks match, the brain assumes that the movement was self-generated. However, if there is a mismatch between the predicted and actual sensory feedbacks, the brain infers that the movement was externally caused.

This theory has been supported by studies in both humans and animals. For example, studies have shown that the brain areas responsible for generating the efference copy are also active during the preparation and execution of movements. Additionally, studies on patients with certain neurological disorders have shown that a disruption in the ability to generate or process efference copies can result in a difficulty in distinguishing self-generated from externally caused movements.

While the corollary discharge theory is a promising explanation for conscious awareness of decisions, it is not the only one. Other theories propose that conscious awareness arises from the integration of multiple sources of sensory information, the comparison between different possible actions, or the need to selectively attend to relevant stimuli. Ultimately, the question of why we have a subjective experience of decision-making and action remains an active area of research in neuroscience and philosophy.
Thanks, I love discharge theories

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm
by iambiguous
Flannel Jesus wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:05 pm
iambiguous wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:01 pm But: though she was never not going to be toast, can someone still hold Mary morally responsible for killing her?
Assume determinism isn't true. Do you hold Mary responsible? If so, why and to what end?
Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:36 pm
by Flannel Jesus
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:05 pm
iambiguous wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:01 pm But: though she was never not going to be toast, can someone still hold Mary morally responsible for killing her?
Assume determinism isn't true. Do you hold Mary responsible? If so, why and to what end?
Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.
I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:44 pm
by iambiguous
Flannel Jesus wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:37 pm
iambiguous wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:33 pm Back to that again. I'm clearly not interested in not thinking about it. I merely point out the "for all practical purposes" limitations of thoughts emanating from a human brain that is not even capable of explaining how or why human brains themselves came to evolve into existence in the first place.
Pointing it out is one thing. Point it out, it's a great thing to point out! Fantastic!

But you bring it up every other post you make. It's past the point of pointing it out.
I bring it up because eventually everything that we think we know regarding the human condition comes back to everything that we do not know regarding how matter itself evolved from the Big Bang into us.

Thus, as always, my chief aim is to focus on the "arrogant, autocratic, authoritarian" objectivists among us who just sweep that part under the rug and scoff at all those who dare not to accept their own assessment.

That and the part where "intellectual contraptions" about compatibilism are exchanged without actually bringing them out into the world of human interactions. In particular human interactions that come into conflict over value judgments. The part that preoccupies me. The existential parameters of moral responsibility in a free will world.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:45 pm
by BigMike
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:36 pm
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:05 pm
Assume determinism isn't true. Do you hold Mary responsible? If so, why and to what end?
Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.
I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.
I must concur with you on this point. This appears to be iambiguous's favorite subject, and he appears incapable of ever progressing beyond repeatedly posing the same irrelevant question. Fortunately for me, he addressed this question to philosophers and ethicists, excluding me from consideration.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:12 pm
by iambiguous
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:36 pm
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Tue Feb 21, 2023 6:05 pm
Assume determinism isn't true. Do you hold Mary responsible? If so, why and to what end?
Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.
I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.
You ask me if I would hold Mary morally responsible in a free will world. I responded to that above.

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?


Note to others:

Do you agree that my post above does not adequately answer his question? If so, in what way?



As for this...

https://youtu.be/mTDs0lvFuMc

...the point is to connect the dots between all of the variables in Daisy's life that she was either oblivious to or were beyond her control; resulting in her life changing forever.

What, you don't see how that can be applicable to our moral values pertaining to abortion?

Well, with respect to myself, I delved into that in the OP here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382

What's not to get about how these profoundly complex and convoluted interactions can predispose us to any number of conflicting value judgments?

You really don't grasp the "for all practical purposes" implications of this in your life?!!

Well, not to worry. None the objectivists here are likely to either. After all the more it comes to sink in, the more likely one is to [perhaps] become "fractured and fragmented" as "I" am in regard to abortion.

And for the objectivists, in my view, it's all about the "psychology of objectivism". What they are right about [for or against abortion] pales next to the comfort and the consolation they sustain in "just knowing" that they are right.

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:16 pm
by iambiguous
BigMike wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:45 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:36 pm
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm

Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.
I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.
I must concur with you on this point. This appears to be iambiguous's favorite subject, and he appears incapable of ever progressing beyond repeatedly posing the same irrelevant question. Fortunately for me, he addressed this question to philosophers and ethicists, excluding me from consideration.
Back to this:
Click.

Again, with BigMike, my main interest lies in grasping whether, given how he understands a "no free will determined universe", he either does or does not opt freely to post this. Instead, compelled or not, he produces yet another "general description intellectual/philosophical contraption" in which the explanation revolves around words defining and then defending yet more words still. And, apparently, his aim/"aim" here seems to be that of the objectivist: to convey to others that it is his explanation or they are wrong.

Unless of course he can offer us a definitive/demonstrable account of how lifeless matter did evolve into biological matter here on earth billions of years ago evolving further into conscious biological matter millions of years ago evolving into philosophers a few thousand years ago.

Using, I suppose, the scientific method to establish this?

Re: compatibilism

Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:22 pm
by Flannel Jesus
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 7:12 pm
Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:36 pm
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 22, 2023 6:30 pm

Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.
I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.
You ask me if I would hold Mary morally responsible in a free will world. I responded to that above.

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?
Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is. Big Mike apparently also does not.