Re: compatibilism
Posted: Mon Feb 20, 2023 12:41 pm
This was nicely put and it is similar to conclusions I have in a more general way. I'm fairly pluralist. I notice that I have different models for the same things in different situations (and different moods, likely also). The desire to have the one perfect model, I think, is problematic because is entails the idea that we can put into words (notice the conduit metaphor http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf) something that will work all the time and is the way we should view things all the time in all contexts. I think there are several problems with this one practical - I don't think language can do this, nor can we - and one philosophical - see the Reddy. I am not sure language is primarily a conduit for truth (and other stuff). I think that's a limited model.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Mon Feb 20, 2023 12:32 pm I think part of the struggle for Biggy - and it's a worth while thing to struggle with - is the conflict between reductionism and emergent causality. Because this is what keeps coming up in my brain every time I read a post of his.
Like, how could it be true that my thoughts are the cause of the words in typing, if it's true that the laws of physics governing all the matter in my brain is the cause of the words in typing?
This conversation has actually had a lot of value for me because it has forced me to really deeply think about emergence, and if it makes sense to call weekly emergent phenomena "causal".
I've been thinking about emergence a lot, both because of this conservation about human minds in a deterministic system AND because of Veritas threads on the moon and truth, and I've come to the following tentative beliefs:
1. As I've always believed, there's most likely only weak emergence (at least in this universe), never strong emergence
2. Weak emergence of course implies that lower levels of causality are the root "explanation" for any physical event - even if we don't know how that lower level of casualty works. Lower meaning, less emergent, more fundamental
3. That despite 2 being the case, and despite the fact that any emergent phenomena existing in any given specific circumstance could also be "explained" fully, in principle, by a complete understanding of the low level phenomena, that it still makes sense to talk about high level emergent phenomena being causal, or "having causal power" - not as an exception to the lower level description of reality, but simultaneously to that
There's a certain tension between #2 and #3, and I believe it's this tension that's the source of a lot of the problems people have with the ideas at hand here. In particular I think that, though he hasn't and might not word it this way, it's what's at the center of Biggy's problems here.
How could WE be causing something, as thinking human beings, if humans are fully reducible to the matter that makes us up?