compatibilism

[Iwannaplato]

I think part of the struggle for Biggy - and it's a worth while thing to struggle with - is the conflict between reductionism and emergent causality. Because this is what keeps coming up in my brain every time I read a post of his.

Like, how could it be true that my thoughts are the cause of the words in typing, if it's true that the laws of physics governing all the matter in my brain is the cause of the words in typing?

This conversation has actually had a lot of value for me because it has forced me to really deeply think about emergence, and if it makes sense to call weekly emergent phenomena "causal".

I've been thinking about emergence a lot, both because of this conservation about human minds in a deterministic system AND because of Veritas threads on the moon and truth, and I've come to the following tentative beliefs:

1. As I've always believed, there's most likely only weak emergence (at least in this universe), never strong emergence
2. Weak emergence of course implies that lower levels of causality are the root "explanation" for any physical event - even if we don't know how that lower level of casualty works. Lower meaning, less emergent, more fundamental
3. That despite 2 being the case, and despite the fact that any emergent phenomena existing in any given specific circumstance could also be "explained" fully, in principle, by a complete understanding of the low level phenomena, that it still makes sense to talk about high level emergent phenomena being causal, or "having causal power" - not as an exception to the lower level description of reality, but simultaneously to that

There's a certain tension between #2 and #3, and I believe it's this tension that's the source of a lot of the problems people have with the ideas at hand here. In particular I think that, though he hasn't and might not word it this way, it's what's at the center of Biggy's problems here.

How could WE be causing something, as thinking human beings, if humans are fully reducible to the matter that makes us up?

This was nicely put and it is similar to conclusions I have in a more general way. I'm fairly pluralist. I notice that I have different models for the same things in different situations (and different moods, likely also). The desire to have the one perfect model, I think, is problematic because is entails the idea that we can put into words (notice the conduit metaphor http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf) something that will work all the time and is the way we should view things all the time in all contexts. I think there are several problems with this one practical - I don't think language can do this, nor can we - and one philosophical - see the Reddy. I am not sure language is primarily a conduit for truth (and other stuff). I think that's a limited model.

[BigMike]

I don't see us saying or implying these things and I know I'm not.

I think part of the struggle for Biggy - and it's a worth while thing to struggle with - is the conflict between reductionism and emergent causality. Because this is what keeps coming up in my brain every time I read a post of his.

Like, how could it be true that my thoughts are the cause of the words in typing, if it's true that the laws of physics governing all the matter in my brain is the cause of the words in typing?

This conversation has actually had a lot of value for me because it has forced me to really deeply think about emergence, and if it makes sense to call weekly emergent phenomena "causal".

I've been thinking about emergence a lot, both because of this conservation about human minds in a deterministic system AND because of Veritas threads on the moon and truth, and I've come to the following tentative beliefs:

1. As I've always believed, there's most likely only weak emergence (at least in this universe), never strong emergence
2. Weak emergence of course implies that lower levels of causality are the root "explanation" for any physical event - even if we don't know how that lower level of casualty works. Lower meaning, less emergent, more fundamental
3. That despite 2 being the case, and despite the fact that any emergent phenomena existing in any given specific circumstance could also be "explained" fully, in principle, by a complete understanding of the low level phenomena, that it still makes sense to talk about high level emergent phenomena being causal, or "having causal power" - not as an exception to the lower level description of reality, but simultaneously to that

There's a certain tension between #2 and #3, and I believe it's this tension that's the source of a lot of the problems people have with the ideas at hand here. In particular I think that, though he hasn't and might not word it this way, it's what's at the center of Biggy's problems here.

How could WE be causing something, as thinking human beings, if humans are fully reducible to the matter that makes us up?

To me, "weak emergence" sounds a bit like "slightly pregnant." It either is or it is not.

Emergence refers to the phenomenon where complex systems exhibit behaviors or properties that cannot be predicted or explained by analyzing their individual components in isolation. Instead, these emergent properties arise from the interactions between the individual components of the system.

While emergence can be described as a phenomenon that arises from the interactions of individual components, it is mainly a statistical effect because emergent properties are only apparent when we analyze the system as a whole, using statistical methods. These statistical methods allow us to identify patterns and regularities that arise from the interactions between the individual components of the system.

For example, consider a flock of birds flying together in formation. The emergent behavior of the flock, such as the ability to quickly change direction as a cohesive unit, cannot be explained by analyzing the behavior of individual birds in isolation. Instead, it arises from the interactions between the birds in the flock. By analyzing the patterns of movement of the birds using statistical methods, we can identify emergent properties of the flock.

Similarly, emergence is also seen in many other complex systems, such as the behavior of ant colonies, the formation of traffic patterns, and the functioning of the brain. In all of these cases, emergent properties can only be identified and studied using statistical methods that allow us to understand the patterns that arise from the interactions between the individual components of the system.

In summary, emergence is mainly a statistical effect because emergent properties arise from the interactions between individual components of a system and can only be identified and understood through statistical analysis of the system as a whole.

[Flannel Jesus]

I think part of the struggle for Biggy - and it's a worth while thing to struggle with - is the conflict between reductionism and emergent causality. Because this is what keeps coming up in my brain every time I read a post of his.

Like, how could it be true that my thoughts are the cause of the words in typing, if it's true that the laws of physics governing all the matter in my brain is the cause of the words in typing?

This conversation has actually had a lot of value for me because it has forced me to really deeply think about emergence, and if it makes sense to call weekly emergent phenomena "causal".

I've been thinking about emergence a lot, both because of this conservation about human minds in a deterministic system AND because of Veritas threads on the moon and truth, and I've come to the following tentative beliefs:

1. As I've always believed, there's most likely only weak emergence (at least in this universe), never strong emergence
2. Weak emergence of course implies that lower levels of causality are the root "explanation" for any physical event - even if we don't know how that lower level of casualty works. Lower meaning, less emergent, more fundamental
3. That despite 2 being the case, and despite the fact that any emergent phenomena existing in any given specific circumstance could also be "explained" fully, in principle, by a complete understanding of the low level phenomena, that it still makes sense to talk about high level emergent phenomena being causal, or "having causal power" - not as an exception to the lower level description of reality, but simultaneously to that

There's a certain tension between #2 and #3, and I believe it's this tension that's the source of a lot of the problems people have with the ideas at hand here. In particular I think that, though he hasn't and might not word it this way, it's what's at the center of Biggy's problems here.

How could WE be causing something, as thinking human beings, if humans are fully reducible to the matter that makes us up?

This was nicely put and it is similar to conclusions I have in a more general way. I'm fairly pluralist. I notice that I have different models for the same things in different situations (and different moods, likely also). The desire to have the one perfect model, I think, is problematic because is entails the idea that we can put into words (notice the conduit metaphor http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf) something that will work all the time and is the way we should view things all the time in all contexts. I think there are several problems with this one practical - I don't think language can do this, nor can we - and one philosophical - see the Reddy. I am not sure language is primarily a conduit for truth (and other stuff). I think that's a limited model.

Your link is not working for me unfortunately.

I think you're right though, one model might encapsulate all of physics but it will never satisfactorily encapsulate all of the things human beings want to model - which is paradoxical, because everything we want to model in our world is ostensibly the direct result of physics...

[phyllo]

I think part of the struggle for Biggy - and it's a worth while thing to struggle with - is the conflict between reductionism and emergent causality. Because this is what keeps coming up in my brain every time I read a post of his.

Like, how could it be true that my thoughts are the cause of the words in typing, if it's true that the laws of physics governing all the matter in my brain is the cause of the words in typing?

This conversation has actually had a lot of value for me because it has forced me to really deeply think about emergence, and if it makes sense to call weekly emergent phenomena "causal".

I've been thinking about emergence a lot, both because of this conservation about human minds in a deterministic system AND because of Veritas threads on the moon and truth, and I've come to the following tentative beliefs:

1. As I've always believed, there's most likely only weak emergence (at least in this universe), never strong emergence
2. Weak emergence of course implies that lower levels of causality are the root "explanation" for any physical event - even if we don't know how that lower level of casualty works. Lower meaning, less emergent, more fundamental
3. That despite 2 being the case, and despite the fact that any emergent phenomena existing in any given specific circumstance could also be "explained" fully, in principle, by a complete understanding of the low level phenomena, that it still makes sense to talk about high level emergent phenomena being causal, or "having causal power" - not as an exception to the lower level description of reality, but simultaneously to that

There's a certain tension between #2 and #3, and I believe it's this tension that's the source of a lot of the problems people have with the ideas at hand here. In particular I think that, though he hasn't and might not word it this way, it's what's at the center of Biggy's problems here.

How could WE be causing something, as thinking human beings, if humans are fully reducible to the matter that makes us up?

This was nicely put and it is similar to conclusions I have in a more general way. I'm fairly pluralist. I notice that I have different models for the same things in different situations (and different moods, likely also). The desire to have the one perfect model, I think, is problematic because is entails the idea that we can put into words (notice the conduit metaphor http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf) something that will work all the time and is the way we should view things all the time in all contexts. I think there are several problems with this one practical - I don't think language can do this, nor can we - and one philosophical - see the Reddy. I am not sure language is primarily a conduit for truth (and other stuff). I think that's a limited model.

Your link is not working for me unfortunately.

I think you're right though, one model might encapsulate all of physics but it will never satisfactorily encapsulate all of the things human beings want to model - which is paradoxical, because everything we want to model in our world is ostensibly the direct result of physics...

I think that you guys are talking at a level of abstraction that is too low.

Forget about physics, forget about atoms, forget about laws of conservation. Raise the level of abstraction.

Mary has motivations, beliefs, attitudes.

She decides based on that. She is influenced by her friend (or not) based on that.

If free-will Mary and determined Mary have the same motivations, then logically her friend should have the same influence.

If her friend can talk free-will Mary out of an abortion but can't talk determined Mary out of it ... then why? What happened to Mary's thinking?

[Iwannaplato]

Your link is not working for me unfortunately.

here's another place that has it...
https://www.reddyworks.com/the-conduit- ... or-article

I think you're right though, one model might encapsulate all of physics but it will never satisfactorily encapsulate all of the things human beings want to model - which is paradoxical, because everything we want to model in our world is ostensibly the direct result of physics...

Even in physics you're going to ignore some things in certain circumstances and use them in others. People still use Newtonian laws in physics in many contexts. We still use the little solar system model for atoms, even though it's not necessarily what's going on, looks like, etc.

[BigMike]

I think that you guys are talking at a level of abstraction that is too low.

Forget about physics, forget about atoms, forget about laws of conservation. Raise the level of abstraction.

Mary has motivations, beliefs, attitudes.

She decides based on that. She is influenced by her friend (or not) based on that.

If free-will Mary and determined Mary have the same motivations, then logically her friend should have the same influence.

If her friend can talk free-will Mary out of an abortion but can't talk determined Mary out of it ... then why? What happened to Mary's thinking?

That, in my mind, is a dangerous proposal.

If our arguments about the world are not based in the real world physics, then they are likely to be flawed or inaccurate. Without a foundation in real world physics, our arguments would be based on speculation or belief, rather than empirical evidence and scientific reasoning.

For example, if we were to argue that objects fall up instead of down because we believe that they should, rather than because of the force of gravity, our argument would be inconsistent with the laws of physics. Similarly, if we were to argue that the earth is flat, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, our argument would be based on a false premise and would be easily refuted.

In general, arguments that are not based in real world physics are likely to be vulnerable to logical inconsistencies, contradictions, and factual errors. Without a foundation in the laws of the physical world, our arguments about the world would lack the rigor and precision necessary for accurate analysis and reliable predictions.

[Iwannaplato]

I think that you guys are talking at a level of abstraction that is too low.

Too low for what?

Forget about physics, forget about atoms, forget about laws of conservation. Raise the level of abstraction.

Mary has motivations, beliefs, attitudes.

She decides based on that. She is influenced by her friend (or not) based on that.

If free-will Mary and determined Mary have the same motivations, then logically her friend should have the same influence.

Well, free will Mary could decide not to be influenced by her motivations, presumably. This doesn't mean that she would, it just means she can decide anything (physically possible, I guess). Note: I am not arguing that this is possible (or not). Nor am I saying it's a great thing if one can go against one's own motivations. But presumably she could. Motivations are part of the causal conditions. If she is not determined by causal conditions in her choices then this would include both external and internal causes.

But here's the thing: that doesn't make it better or worse, as far as I can tell than determined outcomes. It seems extremely important to Imbiguous, which was the context for our posts, though we went broad, to know which is the case: determinism or free will.

I am not sure why. I get that the outcomes might be different. But for me, for it to be important, one has to think that things would be better with free will or things would be better with determinism. And also, he seems to think it is better to know. I can't really see why.

There will still be abortions. There will still be people who decide after conversations with friends to do X. And also to do Y.

Since we don't know outcomes - given our limited knowledge - it doesn't change how we approach other people, even if it is determined.

If her friend can talk free-will Mary out of an abortion but can't talk determined Mary out of it ... then why? What happened to Mary's thinking?

I think the reverse question is more appropriate. If determined Mary is talked out of it, free will Mary might not be. Since she is not bound by causes.

I just cannot for the life of me see what good knowing if free will or determinism is true does for me. I don't see knowing as something that changes my life. If I think Mary shouldn't get it, well, I'll go tell her that. (maybe she had one before, and felt so guilty she tried to kill herself many times, whatever) I'll do that convinced we have free will. I'll do that convinced we don't. If that's my reaction to the situation. Now if we have free will I could go against my urge to protect my friend. I could ignore my values, desires, feelings about the other person, etc. But I don't see a good reason to do this or even to think about it.

Oh, I have free will. I don't have to do what I want to do. Sure, that's true. and for small stuff I might test out my free will, I guess, and perversely do what I don't want to do.

But free will would entail that freedom. And presumably some people would be oddly perverse (not in the sexual sense) when it comes to big stuff.

[phyllo]

Too low for what?

Too low to say anything pertinent to a real world example like Mary's abortion.

How are the laws of physics linked to decisions and action?

It's so far removed that it's not even a case of not seeing the forest for the trees, it's not even seeing the trees for the atoms.

Well, free will Mary could decide not to be influenced by her motivations, presumably. This doesn't mean that she would, it just means she can decide anything (physically possible, I guess).

If Mary is not influenced by her motivations then what is the basis of her decision? This is where the word "random" comes to mind. Is her decision baseless? I don't see how that can logically be the case.

If she "weighs the pros and cons", then those pros and cons are derived from some previous experience.

If she acts "in her own best interest", then that is the cause of her decision.

[BigMike]

How are the laws of physics linked to decisions and action?

The laws of physics have implications for human behavior at a fundamental level. For example, research in neuroscience has shown that the behavior of neurons and other cells in the brain is subject to the laws of physics, which govern how we perceive the world around us and make decisions.

[Iwannaplato]

If Mary is not influenced by her motivations then what is the basis of her decision?

You said it would be the same in a free will situation. In free will the past conditions, which includes her desires, motivations and so on also does not determine her actions.

This is where the word "random" comes to mind. Is her decision baseless? I don't see how that can logically be the case.

Well, you could take that up with someone who believes in free will. But you can't say her choice is based on her motivations and desires and also call it free will. Because that's still determinism. Causes are causes.

If she "weighs the pros and cons", then those pros and cons are derived from some previous experience.

If she acts "in her own best interest", then that is the cause of her decision.

It certainly seems that way to me. But then, that's not free will. I don't know what free will is, but if choice A is caused by her motivations and the pros adn cons, which in turn were caused by her temperment, external influences, memories...the whole batch of inner and outer influences, well, that's determinism.

If the point of your post is that there is no such thing as free will distinct from determinsm, that wasn't clear.
You said there wouldn't be anything different if free will was the case or determinism was, but you based this on causes that are included in determinism.

So, if you are trying to point out problems for people arguing we have free will, fine. I think it's very hard to explain what the benefits of a free will would be if you did not allow your motivations, preferences, values (how you weigh pros and cons) to determine your decision. If free will is the case, then I guess you could ignore those. You'd be free to not have your preferences and values, etc., lead to your decision. But that's hardly a benefit.

[Iwannaplato]

Too low for what?

Too low to say anything pertinent to a real world example like Mary's abortion.

How are the laws of physics linked to decisions and action?

It's so far removed that it's not even a case of not seeing the forest for the trees, it's not even seeing the trees for the atoms.

I can see that, but that wasn't the context of us talking about physics. We were arguing in favor, in different ways, of allowing for more complicated communication about causation. You'd have to read our ongoing exchange to see our focus there.

[phyllo]

If Mary is not influenced by her motivations then what is the basis of her decision?

You said it would be the same in a free will situation. In free will the past conditions, which includes her desires, motivations and so on also does not determine her actions.

This is where the word "random" comes to mind. Is her decision baseless? I don't see how that can logically be the case.

Well, you could take that up with someone who believes in free will. But you can't say her choice is based on her motivations and desires and also call it free will. Because that's still determinism. Causes are causes.

If she "weighs the pros and cons", then those pros and cons are derived from some previous experience.

If she acts "in her own best interest", then that is the cause of her decision.

It certainly seems that way to me. But then, that's not free will. I don't know what free will is, but if choice A is caused by her motivations and the pros adn cons, which in turn were caused by her temperment, external influences, memories...the whole batch of inner and outer influences, well, that's determinism.

If the point of your post is that there is no such thing as free will distinct from determinsm, that wasn't clear.
You said there wouldn't be anything different if free will was the case or determinism was, but you based this on causes that are included in determinism.

So, if you are trying to point out problems for people arguing we have free will, fine. I think it's very hard to explain what the benefits of a free will would be if you did not allow your motivations, preferences, values (how you weigh pros and cons) to determine your decision. If free will is the case, then I guess you could ignore those. You'd be free to not have your preferences and values, etc., lead to your decision. But that's hardly a benefit.

I don't see how or why free-will Mary would/could drop her motivations.

If you ask free-willers, they admit that they are reacting to the environment and to past experiences.

So I'm not sure what free-will Mary is actually doing. That's why I refer to her "magic mojo".

The best I can figure it out is that free-will Mary is deciding/acting on her ideal authentic self, while determined Mary is deciding on a limited physical brain. Some sort of Platonic idealism.

[phyllo]

Too low for what?

Too low to say anything pertinent to a real world example like Mary's abortion.

How are the laws of physics linked to decisions and action?

It's so far removed that it's not even a case of not seeing the forest for the trees, it's not even seeing the trees for the atoms.

I can see that, but that wasn't the context of us talking about physics. We were arguing in favor, in different ways, of allowing for more complicated communication about causation. You'd have to read our ongoing exchange to see our focus there.

I wasn't referring just to the latest round of posts.

Some of these posts sound like they should be on physicsforums.com rather than a philosophy site.

[BigMike]

If Mary is not influenced by her motivations then what is the basis of her decision?

The basic human needs are the fundamental physical and psychological requirements that are necessary for human survival, growth, and well-being. There are various models and theories that describe the basic human needs, but one of the most widely accepted is Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. According to this model, the basic human needs are organized into five levels, with each level building upon the previous one:

Physiological needs: These are the most basic and essential human needs, such as food, water, shelter, sleep, and clothing. These needs are necessary for human survival.

Safety needs: Once physiological needs are met, the next level of needs includes safety and security, such as protection from harm, stable and secure environment, and financial stability.

Love and belonging needs: Humans have a fundamental need for social connection, love, and belonging. This includes friendship, family, and intimate relationships, and it's important for mental and emotional well-being.

Esteem needs: Esteem needs include the desire for self-esteem, achievement, recognition, respect, and status. Humans have a need to feel valued and respected by others and to achieve a sense of accomplishment.

Self-actualization needs: The highest level of human needs is self-actualization, which includes the desire to reach one's full potential, pursue personal growth, and achieve a sense of fulfillment and purpose in life. This involves exploring and expressing one's creativity, autonomy, and personal values.

To a large extent, almost everything we do is motivated by these basic human needs. These needs provide the fundamental framework for understanding human behavior, and they can help us to understand why people behave in certain ways and what motivates them.

For example, our physiological needs, such as hunger and thirst, motivate us to seek out food and water. Our safety needs motivate us to seek out secure and stable environments and to protect ourselves from harm. Our need for love and belonging motivates us to form relationships with others and to seek out social connections. Our esteem needs motivate us to achieve success and recognition in our personal and professional lives. Finally, our need for self-actualization motivates us to pursue personal growth and fulfillment.

Of course, individual circumstances and cultural factors can also influence how these needs are expressed and prioritized. Nonetheless, the basic human needs provide a useful framework for understanding human motivation and behavior across different contexts and cultures.

As soon as a need or combination of needs arises, the brain begins searching for the "best" solution. The best solution is the best not because we want it to be the best, but because the brain perceives it as such. Thus, the brain informs us of our desires; of our will. Our will is not our own; it is bestowed upon us. The more experience our brain gains, the better it becomes at assisting us in providing us with intelligent decisions.

[BigMike]

Some of these posts sound like they should be on physicsforums.com rather than a philosophy site.

Discussions or arguments that do not take into account reality or factual information may not be grounded in reason or logic. In order to have a meaningful discussion, it is important to acknowledge and consider the facts and evidence that are relevant to the topic at hand.

When discussing a topic, it is also important to be aware of any biases or assumptions that we may have, and to challenge them with critical thinking. Without acknowledging our own biases, we risk making unfounded claims or arguments that are not based on reality.

Overall, in order to have a productive and meaningful discussion, it is essential to base our arguments on facts and evidence, and to be willing to consider and evaluate differing perspectives.

If you insist on discussing only unsubstantiated wild speculations, the majority of enlightened readers will leave, leaving you with only idiots to deliberate nonsense with.