Philosophy Now Forum

Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 3:55 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 3:50 pm Fucked if I know what you mean, and fucked if I care. Any reason I should?

Would a paper called Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity do it?

Checked the references, the first 8 were to the author of the paper, generally not a good start. Scanned the paper. Nothing leaping out. What is your take? What about this paper persuades you that I should invest more time in it?

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:22 pm Checked the references, the first 8 were to the author of the paper, generally not a good start.

Generally, that's a fucking stupid heuristic. The references are in alphabetical order.

The author's surname is "Aaronson". The other 132 references (which don't start with "Aa") are right after that.

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:22 pm Scanned the paper. Nothing leaping out. What is your take? What about this paper persuades you that I should invest more time in it?

My take is summed up in the intro paragraph. A quote by Turing.

The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject.

Which ties up nicely with Shannon's conception: Surprise is a measure of new information.

Together, these two ideas touch on that video about Feynman you just posted about "computing the consequences of a physics law"... Well. Can you compute the consequences?

Computational complexity theory adds a qualitative component to "observationally equivalent formulations". Even if two different formulations produce the same mathematical result they may not be equivalent in the computational resources (time, memory, entropy) required to perform the computation.

That's a difference that makes a difference. There's more information than Feynman was willing to admit (or knew how to identify).

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am
I have read your points and responded accordingly.

No, you didn't. I derived the logical consequences of your answer to the question 'does the universe exists if there are no humans?'. Saying "none of the above" is not a response.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am The Kantian sort of transcendental idealism [aka empirical realism] will not lead to solipsism.

Kant himself avoided it by not being a strong phenomenalist and somehow acknowledging the necessary existence of the thing in itself. But some Kantians actually interpret his work exactly the way Kant didn't want to, that is, making it equivalent to Berkeley's version of idealism. Solipsism is often attributed to Berkeley.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am Other types of idealism [which I do not agree with, e.g. Berkeley's] may lead to solipsism [incoherent anyway.] Usually that is based on the wrong interpretation of Berkeley's idealism.

While you say you endorse Kant's idealism, your words point to Berkeley's.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am What higher levels of systematization of knowledge in philosophy and science?

Materialism, realism and natural science.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am Bertrand Russell never present any "systematization of knowledge in philosophy and science" to prove nor justify the independent external world.
He argued based on common sense that the independent external world is just more realistic by comparing it to Berkeley's God driven idealism.

I never said Bertrand Russell had set himself to prove anything, but that what you said he "conceded", applies only to our "original" common sense beliefs, not to systematized knowledge in philosophy and science, where one does come by argument to a belief in an independent external world.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am

Conde Lucanor wrote:
So, the answer to the point in contention: 'does the universe exists if there are no humans' is a categorical YES.

Note I stated based on "empirical realism", wonder you understand what is that.

Note that the question only asks for what is the truth about the external world (a universe without humans) being real. If you think your empirical realism delivers the truth about it, and justifies the existence of a real external world, then indeed your only possible answer to the question of 'does the universe exists if there are no humans' is a categorical YES.

I'm waiting for your comments on my quotes from the Prolegomena.

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:09 pm For practical purposes, 'matter' is a bunch of measurable 'facts', which can only be measured relative to other measurable facts.

Just curious for a source for that definition.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Where in the above did Kant assert nor implied the thing-in-itself is real and in is independent of the human conditions, or human mind.
What Kant did assert above is he did not claim space and time are elements of experience like Berkeley did [see above].
Since Kant claimed space and time are pure intuition underlying all things of sensations, the enable objective reality which differentiate truths from illusion.

Kant did not assert in the above the thing-in-itself is real and in is independent of the human conditions, or human mind.

Kant clearly talks about cognition receiving objective reality, and that experience is no sheer illusion. But let's keep digging the Prolegomena and Kant's views about the things in themselves:

You will say: Is not this manifest idealism?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, 1. e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.

There's no doubt Kant is saying here that bodies are independent of human conditions, which you deny: "I grant by all means that there are bodies without us". He admits those things are the cause of our representations and affect our senses, as "transmitting the waves that generate the sense-data in the brain", which you deny. He says of those things "we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances", but "no less actual", real, which you deny. Kant even denies here he's an idealist.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Ultimately the thing-in-itself is demonstrated to be an illusion but nevertheless can be thought-of and is useful.

Show me where in the quote above does Kant say bodies are ultimately an illusion. He says "bodies no less actual".

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am There is definitely a difference [assuming average person] between one who had merely scan through Kant's work, study it for one month, one year and one who had researched Kant's work for three years full time.

First of all, I don't think that reading Kant all by myself would be the wisest approach to his work, not because of the complex philosophical matters in themselves, but because of his well-known obscurity and inconsistency in language. So one must rely heavily on his interpreters, of which there are many, and not all of them in agreement about what he meant. In any case, I'm just interested in a broad understanding of his philosophical project, its purpose, his accomplishments and how he influenced those who came after him. This as a counterpoint to the philosophical project that I found to be more robust and intellectually fruitful: materialism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am This is why I am able to pin point where you go wrong in the above when you merely based on selected passages from a side source and not the main source [CPR].

It's quite the opposite: it's easier for me to pin point your mistakes because you're trying to reinvent the wheel. Kant has already been thoroughly studied, you can add no new insight really.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Btw, which translation of the Prolegomena are you using so that I can refer to it to counter?
I have 7 translations of the Prolegomena; I believe your reference is the James Fieser's revision of Paul Carus's 1902 translation.

It is Carus's.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:53 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:09 pm For practical purposes, 'matter' is a bunch of measurable 'facts', which can only be measured relative to other measurable facts.

Just curious for a source for that definition.

Hard to say. The basic idea goes back to Protagoras' 'Man is the measure of all things'. It's there in Andreas Osiander's preface to Copernicus' 'On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres'. Copernicus didn't publish his heliocentric work during his lifetime, because any suggestion that the Earth isn't the centre of god's universe would undermine the Catholic church's claim to infallibility, given they had preached geocentrism for over a millennium. Anyway, Osiander pointed out that it doesn't matter what model you choose, “If they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough.” It's the basic premise of empiricism, it's the ethos of the Royal Society, the script of Isaac Newton's "hypotheses non fingo" and the contempt for philosophy of anyone who has said 'Shut up and calculate' and meant it. In that youtube clip Richard Feynman points out that as a physicist, you don't have to know how gravitational, electromagnetic or any other field works; all you need to know is how 'matter' behaves in the field - and you only know the properties of a field by seeing how matter behaves in it. Why anyone thinks things behave as they do, or what they are made of is philosophical and won't have any effect on behaviour. For practical purposes matter is its behaviour.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:33 pmMy take is summed up in the intro paragraph. A quote by Turing.

The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject.

Then your argument is with mid twentieth century philosophers and mathematicians. I took another look, it is a better paper than I initially gave it credit for, but as I'm not an analytic philosopher, it's not really written for me.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 11:42 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 5:37 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 11:11 am
So at the temporal point of the big bang, for example, human beings are entangled with that event via?

Via the concept of time and temporality.
Time is entangled with the human conditions.
When humans realized the BB is appx 13 billion years old [time], the entanglement is implied.
This realization is subsumed within the human conditions.

Then there is the other perspective, i.e. via the principle of determination [open ended not absolute].

Why you are clinging to your existing realist views which is opposite to the above is due to psychological desperation arising from the existential crisis and cognitive dissonance.

At the temporal point of the big bang concepts exist?

Within the common and conventional sense,
according to the theory of the big bang which preceded human existence,
therefore concepts [inevitably humans] do not exist relative to that theory.

But in the ultimate sense of reality,
the theory of the big bang is grounded on concepts.
There is no theory of the big bang without concepts.

Note; [mine]

• Model-dependent realism is a view of scientific inquiry that focuses on the role of scientific models of phenomena.
  It claims reality should be interpreted based upon these models, and where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist.
  It claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
  The only meaningful thing is the usefulness [or credibility] of the model.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism

My use of FSK is similar to the Model-Dependent-Realism, i.e. FSK-dependent-Realism.

Suggest you affirm or deny [if so why?] the above.

Whether there was a really real big-bang, no humans will ever know it.

Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:54 pm

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am
I have read your points and responded accordingly.

No, you didn't. I derived the logical consequences of your answer to the question 'does the universe exists if there are no humans?'. Saying "none of the above" is not a response.

Then that is a straw man.
I never agreed to your 'does the universe exists if there are no humans?'.
There are a lot of difference in the manner of phrasing the issue.

Mine is;
"reality is never independent of the human conditions"
the above has to be considered within transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am The Kantian sort of transcendental idealism [aka empirical realism] will not lead to solipsism.

Kant himself avoided it by not being a strong phenomenalist and somehow acknowledging the necessary existence of the thing in itself. But some Kantians actually interpret his work exactly the way Kant didn't want to, that is, making it equivalent to Berkeley's version of idealism. Solipsism is often attributed to Berkeley.

Just after the publication of the CPR, his critiques branded Kant's CPR in the light of Berkeley idealism due to ignorance.
That is why Kant had to publish the prolegomena to correct the misinterpretation and present his transcendental idealism and critical idealism.
Kant also presented his 'refutation of idealism' in the 2nd edition of the CPR.
Thereafter no philosopher can accuse Kant's work as the same as Berkeley version of idealism nor any Kantian should do the same.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am Other types of idealism [which I do not agree with, e.g. Berkeley's] may lead to solipsism [incoherent anyway.] Usually that is based on the wrong interpretation of Berkeley's idealism.

While you say you endorse Kant's idealism, your words point to Berkeley's.

Didn't you read your own quote from the Prolegomena where Kant rejected Berkeley's type of idealism as problematic-idealism?

Note the confusion with Berkeley's idealism is not exactly problematic.
It is only problematic because the realists and others were too literal when Berkeley's used the phrase 'in the mind' i.e. using the container metaphor which was typical in his time.
Berkeley was mocked for that, i.e. if all of reality is "in" the mind, then then there is nothing outside of one's mind, thus solipsism.
Your thinking would be very shallow if you buy into that seriously.

Unlike Kant, Berkeley did not [not that I am aware of] correct the misinterpretation of "in the mind" as if the mind is literally a container.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am What higher levels of systematization of knowledge in philosophy and science?

Materialism, realism and natural science.

Berkeley had debunked 'materialism' in the first of his two phase argument in rejecting the existence of matter.
That is why the current view is not 'matter' but' physical' defined as anything that is studied by Physics. [Have you read Berkeley's argument?]
Philosophical Realism is not ultimately realistic - note the "ism".
Natural science is most useful but at best scientific knowledge are merely polished conjectures.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 7:11 am

Conde Lucanor wrote: So, the answer to the point in contention: 'does the universe exists if there are no humans' is a categorical YES.

Note I stated based on "empirical realism", wonder you understand what is that.

Note that the question only asks for what is the truth about the external world (a universe without humans) being real.
If you think your empirical realism delivers the truth about it, and justifies the existence of a real external world, then indeed your only possible answer to the question of 'does the universe exists if there are no humans' is a categorical YES.

I'm waiting for your comments on my quotes from the Prolegomena.

Note I had stated elsewhere, empirical realism [external independent world] is subsumed within transcendental idealism.

I had answered you quotes from the Prolegomena in my subsequent post.

Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:17 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Where in the above did Kant assert nor implied the thing-in-itself is real and in is independent of the human conditions, or human mind.
What Kant did assert above is he did not claim space and time are elements of experience like Berkeley did [see above].
Since Kant claimed space and time are pure intuition underlying all things of sensations, the enable objective reality which differentiate truths from illusion.

Kant did not assert in the above the thing-in-itself is real and in is independent of the human conditions, or human mind.

Kant clearly talks about cognition receiving objective reality, and that experience is no sheer illusion. But let's keep digging the Prolegomena and Kant's views about the things in themselves:

Thus to Kant what is objective reality is confined to cognition and experiences, i.e. whatever is empirical only.
Kant never asserted the thing-in-itself is objectively real.
see the B397 quote from CPR in the later part of this post.

You will say: Is not this manifest idealism?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact.

Whereas [on the contrary] I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, 1. e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses.

Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual.

Can this be termed idealism?
It is the very contrary.

There's no doubt Kant is saying here that bodies are independent of human conditions, which you deny: "I grant by all means that there are bodies without us". He admits those things are the cause of our representations and affect our senses, as "transmitting the waves that generate the sense-data in the brain", which you deny. He says of those things "we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances", but "no less actual", real, which you deny. Kant even denies here he's an idealist.

I did not focus on the Prolegomena because I know whatever is in the Prolegmonena is subsumed within the Critique of Pure Reason as the related main philosophy.
Thus in this discussion I have to spent a bit more effort to justify Kant's real position.

The above quote is from S13 Remark II of the Prolegomena.
I added [on the contrary] to 'whereas' as with other translations.
The above passage was Kant's explanation on the conflation of Kant's idealism with the rest of idealism. That is why he used "contrary" explicit and impliedly.
The above passage is not an explanation of what the thing-in-itself really is which is explained in context within 834 pages in the CPR.

When Kant used the phrase "I grant by all means that there are bodies without us" he was using that within Empirical Realism.
I have stated many times [here? and elsewhere] the empirical realism of Kant recognized the reality of the independent external world within sensibility and experience, BUT this empirical realism is subsumed within Transcendental Idealism [as defined by Kant]. The grounding of Transcendental Idealism is grounded by human conditions, e.g. space and time.

Kant stated later in the same Remark II,

Kant wrote:I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism.
Undoubtedly, I should say,
that the Representation of Space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our Sensibility has to Objects - that I have said –
but that it is quite similar to the Object, -
an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I said that the Sensations of red has a similarity to the property of vermilion, which in me excites this Sensations.

You are not familiar with Empirical Realism;

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Ultimately the thing-in-itself is demonstrated to be an illusion but nevertheless can be thought-of and is useful.

Show me where in the quote above does Kant say bodies are ultimately an illusion. He says "bodies no less actual".

"No less actual" is confined to empirical realism.

But subsequently in the context of the 834 pages of the CPR, the thing-in-itself is ultimately an illusion, note this.

Kant in CPR wrote: 1. There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

2. These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title [rational], since they [conclusions] are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

3. They [conclusions] are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself.
Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them [the illusions].
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him.
B394

The something which we know is the supposed 'thing-in-itself' you are referring to above, but it has no qualities of sensibilities and experience.
But due to psychological desperations, the majority of humans, speculated and REIFY that inevitable illusion [the thing-in-itself] which they ascribe Objective Reality even when there are no empirical elements nor empirical concepts.
This Illusion will unceasingly mocks and torments him. This is why some realists like Peter, Sculptor, PantFlashers and their likes [not you] are so desperate and aggressive to condemn others who do not agree with them, with venom, just like the arrogant logical positivists [defunct] and the classical analytic philosophers of old.

You will not have any credibility to represent nor express Kant's view accurately unless you are very familiar [not necessary agree] with what are in the 834 pages of Kant's CPR.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am There is definitely a difference [assuming average person] between one who had merely scan through Kant's work, study it for one month, one year and one who had researched Kant's work for three years full time.

First of all, I don't think that reading Kant all by myself would be the wisest approach to his work, not because of the complex philosophical matters in themselves, but because of his well-known obscurity and inconsistency in language. So one must rely heavily on his interpreters, of which there are many, and not all of them in agreement about what he meant. In any case, I'm just interested in a broad understanding of his philosophical project, its purpose, his accomplishments and how he influenced those who came after him. This as a counterpoint to the philosophical project that I found to be more robust and intellectually fruitful: materialism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am This is why I am able to pin point where you go wrong in the above when you merely based on selected passages from a side source and not the main source [CPR].

It's quite the opposite: it's easier for me to pin point your mistakes because you're trying to reinvent the wheel. Kant has already been thoroughly studied, you can add no new insight really.

I say again, as evident from your omission and off tangent,
you will not have any credibility to represent nor express Kant's view accurately unless you are very familiar with what are in the 834 pages of Kant's CPR.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:11 am Btw, which translation of the Prolegomena are you using so that I can refer to it to counter?
I have 7 translations of the Prolegomena; I believe your reference is the James Fieser's revision of Paul Carus's 1902 translation.

It is Carus's.

If you quotes Carus' again, provide the Chapter or page reference.

The point is whatever is in the Prolegomena cannot override what is in the 2nd edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

uwot wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 5:23 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 8:53 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Thu Apr 15, 2021 4:09 pm For practical purposes, 'matter' is a bunch of measurable 'facts', which can only be measured relative to other measurable facts.

Just curious for a source for that definition.

Hard to say. The basic idea goes back to Protagoras' 'Man is the measure of all things'. It's there in Andreas Osiander's preface to Copernicus' 'On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres'. Copernicus didn't publish his heliocentric work during his lifetime, because any suggestion that the Earth isn't the centre of god's universe would undermine the Catholic church's claim to infallibility, given they had preached geocentrism for over a millennium. Anyway, Osiander pointed out that it doesn't matter what model you choose, “If they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough.” It's the basic premise of empiricism, it's the ethos of the Royal Society, the script of Isaac Newton's "hypotheses non fingo" and the contempt for philosophy of anyone who has said 'Shut up and calculate' and meant it. In that youtube clip Richard Feynman points out that as a physicist, you don't have to know how gravitational, electromagnetic or any other field works; all you need to know is how 'matter' behaves in the field - and you only know the properties of a field by seeing how matter behaves in it. Why anyone thinks things behave as they do, or what they are made of is philosophical and won't have any effect on behaviour. For practical purposes matter is its behaviour.

Ah, so basically you're saying it's your philosophical view, not that it's a standard view in physics.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 9:53 amAh, so basically you're saying it's your philosophical view, not that it's a standard view in physics.

Well, it's basically instrumentalism, which is fairly common among physicists, but yeah, it is just my philosophical view.

uwot wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 10:00 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 9:53 amAh, so basically you're saying it's your philosophical view, not that it's a standard view in physics.

Well, it's basically instrumentalism, which is fairly common among physicists, but yeah, it is just my philosophical view.

I'm my experience, instrumentalism tends to be an "I don't want to worry about/spend any time thinking about what's really going here ontologically" approach (and of course that extends to not wanting to worry about the epistemological aspects of that as well), which I think there's merit to for practical/applied contexts. What I think is problematic, especially because it happens too often, is when people take the instrumentalist approach and/or particular instrumentalist interpretations to BE what's really going on ontologically (and/or to indicate that nothing is really going on ontologically). That's just the opposite of the whole point of instrumentalism in my view.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:18 pm I'm my experience, instrumentalism tends to be an "I don't want to worry about/spend any time thinking about what's really going here ontologically" approach (and of course that extends to not wanting to worry about the epistemological aspects of that as well), which I think there's merit to for practical/applied contexts. What I think is problematic, especially because it happens too often, is when people take the instrumentalist approach and/or particular instrumentalist interpretations to BE what's really going on ontologically (and/or to indicate that nothing is really going on ontologically). That's just the opposite of the whole point of instrumentalism in my view.

You can think all you want, the ontology isn't going to reveal itself to you.

The only path to understanding fundamental physic particles is via the Mathematics that describes their behaviour. There is nothing "underneath" those particles except Mathematics.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:18 pmI'm my experience, instrumentalism tends to be an "I don't want to worry about/spend any time thinking about what's really going here ontologically" approach (and of course that extends to not wanting to worry about the epistemological aspects of that as well), which I think there's merit to for practical/applied contexts.

Well, it takes all sorts. When physicists are going about the business of making things work, they will pick up whatever tool is handy. The engineers on the Apollo mission for instance could easily fly a man to the Moon and back using Newton's law of gravitation, so they did. No need to bust a gut with Einstein's field equations. The huge bulk of physics is this sort of problem solving and some physicists do wear their indifference to ontology as a badge of honour. As for epistemology, some physicists are understandably content to stick with 'I know, because it works.' But then there are physicists who do want to know what the world is made of and why it works.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Fri Apr 16, 2021 1:18 pmWhat I think is problematic, especially because it happens too often, is when people take the instrumentalist approach and/or particular instrumentalist interpretations to BE what's really going on ontologically (and/or to indicate that nothing is really going on ontologically). That's just the opposite of the whole point of instrumentalism in my view.

That's just a general problem with people thinking that because an interpretation works, it must be true. That's why the nut jobs on this forum get shirty if you disagree with them; they've worked something out and think the world should thank them for sharing it.