Philosophy Now Forum

Dave Mangnall wrote:You mention consciousness. I hope I’ve said nothing to lead you to think that I disbelieve in consciousness. My point about Descartes was that his Cogito was supposed to establish his own existence, but that he was assuming his own existence in order to prove it.

An interesting interpretation. I did not understand Descartes to be doing this. Rather, I see a deeper argument: that is, that without a thinking agent, all questions simply disappear. The right translation of the cogito might be "I doubt, therefore I am."

That is, if there is a doubt being expressed, then some consciousness must be expressing it and perceiving the question it raises. If that is not so, then neither is there any question or doubt anymore. But there IS a question or doubt, and I DO perceive it, said Descartes; therefore there must be a "me" to perceive it.

He goes on to admit how hard it is to say what that "me" is. But he's laid that foundation in bedrock, it seems to me: we can't even pose the question of existence unless there is some conscious agent to do so. That conscious agent could be a quadruped, or a brain-in-a-vat, or a ghost, or whatever -- we have not yet said -- but Descartes is saying we are secure in the certainty that one of the above sort of entities does, in fact exist...even if that's all we know.

I don’t seriously doubt my own existence, or even yours.

Agreed.

I'm still not convinced we understand each other on mind changing. What is it you think that determinism would prevent from happening in this respect?

Ah. Well, here I have to remind you of your objection to Spheres. He thinks that "feeing free" is equivalent to "being free." Clearly you don't think that's true; but it does nicely represent the difference between my position and what I think yours might be. For I say that being free is more than a feeling, and you -- if you're a Determinist -- would have to insist it was just a sort of weird, psychological effect or impression overlaid on the pure factuality of predetermination of all things.

But everything happens as it must happen.

What secures our confidence in that axiom?

... the unpredictable future...

How can a Determinist future ever be accorded the adjective "unpredictable"? Not in human practice, I mean; I understand that people quit routinely feel unpredictability -- but rather in theoretical implication. That is, if nothing but causality applies, then IF we had the data and computational ability to do it, then in theory ALL events would be predictable: or so Determinism must hold. So why call any "unpredictable"?

Not that determinism requires me to be a totally rational person, any more than anybody else is.

I don't think it does. Determinism, if true, works as well on rocks and trees as it does on persons. It would rather seem that Determinism is quite indifferent to which you happen to be. It just moves you according to its tides anyway.

And I do confess that at times even I find myself under the thrall of the Free Will Illusion, which is a very powerful illusion, even when I know that an illusion is what it is.

Well, and so do I, and so does every other human being on the planet. At some point, that has to become an interesting fact. And while it cannot prove that Determinism isn't true, it does seem to require some sort of better explanation than, say, "It's just because it was determined to be so."

It's almost as thought we self-aware entities have a built-in doubting ability for Determinism -- or more, that we cannot seem to function as living entities without acting as if physical causality isn't really all that's true, as if it just isn't the whole story. And isn't it odd that physical causality should have built that into us, if indeed, it is purely physical causes that have done that? But it's so generally observable that at least we've got to ask that question, no?

Immanuel Can wrote:

thedoc wrote:No, the pawn does whatever the player wants it to do, whether that is a sacrifice, or an advance to the 8th rank to become a queen. The pawn is a Vehicle for the advancement of the game, nothing more, nothing less. There is a purpose to each move or the game is lost.

Ah, so now there's a "player." And this "player" has "purposes."

So even if the theory leaves us as "pawns" all this still sounds like God talk -- but only of a peculiarly Calvinist kind.

Take out the "player" and the "purposes," and you've got Determinism. By it's lights, we're all pawns; but what's "making us move" is nothing but causality. There is no purpose or direction, no "game," no "player" and certainly no volition from any pawn.

Yes, and this is why I think that referring to people as pawns, is a bad analogy. It would be more accurate to liken the person to the player.

Dave Mangnall wrote:I referred to Honderich as a writer of a detailed account of determinism, having previously said “If anyone, anywhere, has tried to give a detailed account of free will, I'd be hugely grateful if you'd point me at it.” I take your silence on that one as significant.

Oh, you shouldn't. I just didn't consider that you meant it as anything but a rhetorical flourish.

Is the argument you would wish to make from that, "If nobody has given a detailed account of free will, then free will cannot exist"? That seems an odd postulate to me. After all, nobody has given a detailed account of the universe.

Moreover, there are many simple and easily-offered explanations that are dead wrong. For example, it is much easier to believe that all matter is solid than to suppose it's composed of buzzing fields of energy and a disproportionate amount of what appears at first to be a kind of empty space. And yet the second postulate is sounder than the first, as we know.

The existence of a simple explanation of Determinism might just signal that Determinism is simplistic. Either way, I couldn't see what logical point you were trying to advance there.

So I thought you must just be being dramatic.

Why is it, I wonder, that the Free Willies expect determinists to be held to account while they themselves explain nothing about their own beliefs?

Oh, that's not true, of course. The whole field of Philosophy of Mind is hot with this debate. Everybody's trying to explain, alright; but the necessary explanations seem to be complex and subtle, rather than the sledge-hammer simplicity of "causes did it." And why should we be surprised if the right explanation for human consciousness, personhood, volition and rationality itself turns out to be more complex than the very simple, single explanation of cause and effect?

Are you perhaps mistaking the complexity of the subject for its unreality? Why would that follow?

So come on, get off your high horse, let’s have no more about how irrational, inconsistent and possibly insincere it is to claim to be a determinist, and let’s have an explanation of your own position.

I thought we were ambling in that direction already, actually. But I find that so long as a person is a Determinist, he is (to quote Chesterton) "in the clean and well-lit prison of a single idea." For that reason, he can't be convinced until he's shaken loose a bit from Determinism. For he is content to accept his view as already answering everything, and having already accepted that explanation, he starts to "see" it in everything.

So it always seems necessary first to show how serious the holes in Determinism really are -- that it gives no credible account of will, personhood, consciousness, choice, judgment, morality...and so on, phenomena very generally conceded to exist, even if not always with conclusive proof in hand, and essential to our existential world. Once that's recognized, it becomes possible to talk about other answers.

If it seems ill-tempered or one-sided to do that preliminary work first, then I'm sorry. But it does seem necessary to me.

As the late great comedian Eric Morecambe used to say, “Get out of that! You can’t, can you?”

Where would you like to start?

thedoc wrote:Yes, and this is why I think that referring to people as pawns, is a bad analogy. It would be more accurate to liken the person to the player.

Quite true. But in Determinism, there is no "player" but causal forces.

I think the person is a "player."

Immanuel Can wrote:

thedoc wrote:Yes, and this is why I think that referring to people as pawns, is a bad analogy. It would be more accurate to liken the person to the player.

Quite true. But in Determinism, there is no "player" but causal forces.

I think the person is a "player."

In determinism isn't the player equivalent to some of the casual forces.

The Doc wrote:

In determinism isn't the player equivalent to some of the casual forces.

Yes, but just as a causal force such as gravity doesn't cause something to happen all by itself, neither do persons cause something to happen without other causes such as a law of nature, or predisposing causes.

What do you think is more probable, that a person is the absolute origin of an event or that other events cause the person to act as they did?

If it were the case that a person can be the absolute origin of an event that person's choice would not be caused by their upbringing, their state of health, their age, the influence of other people, or any other cause whatsoever. How likely is that?

Immanuel Can wrote:

Dave Mangnall wrote:I referred to Honderich as a writer of a detailed account of determinism, having previously said “If anyone, anywhere, has tried to give a detailed account of free will, I'd be hugely grateful if you'd point me at it.” I take your silence on that one as significant.

Oh, you shouldn't. I just didn't consider that you meant it as anything but a rhetorical flourish.

Hi, Immanuel.

Thanks for your detailed response to my latest posts. I'll take a little time to digest, and prepare a considered response to, most of it, but this bit I can come back on straightaway.

I don't do rhetorical flourishes. I'm genuinely asking for help in accessing a detailed account of free will. I gather from what you said later that such accounts do exist, and I'd be very grateful if you'd point me in the right direction. I have searched, unsuccessfully, for such a thing, finding nothing but attacks on determinism and the compatibilist arguments that determinism isn't really that important 'cause you can have freedom and moral responsibility anyway.

"I'm genuinely asking for help in accessing a detailed account of free will."

Why not begin with the best resource and reference you have: you and your own experience of choosing and self-directing?

Belinda wrote:The Doc wrote:

In determinism isn't the player equivalent to some of the casual forces.

Yes, but just as a causal force such as gravity doesn't cause something to happen all by itself, neither do persons cause something to happen without other causes such as a law of nature, or predisposing causes.

What do you think is more probable, that a person is the absolute origin of an event or that other events cause the person to act as they did?

If it were the case that a person can be the absolute origin of an event that person's choice would not be caused by their upbringing, their state of health, their age, the influence of other people, or any other cause whatsoever. How likely is that?

Very rarely is an individual the absolute origin, or cause, of an action. Usually there are many influences to any action, but if only a few are freely made, the decision is of free will, and a decision that is freely made does not have to be devoid of caused influences to be of free will. The attempt to label influences as deterministic, is incorrect.

henry quirk wrote:"I'm genuinely asking for help in accessing a detailed account of free will."

Why not begin with the best resource and reference you have: you and your own experience of choosing and self-directing?

Hi, Henry. Nice to hear from you again.

"Choosing" proves nothing.

We choose, but we do not choose how we choose. We choose, but we do not “make choices”. The choices come to us, appear before our consciousness, during the course of the unfolding of events, the rolling revelation to ourselves of our personal script.

Similarly with "self-direction". When you think of yourself as making a decision, what you're really doing is finding out what it is that you're going to find yourself doing.

Try a bit of introspection at the moment of choice or decision and then tell me I'm wrong! And then tell me, in detail, of your experience of "choosing".

thedoc wrote:In determinism isn't the player equivalent to some of the casual forces.

In a sense, yes: but whereas persons are capable of having purposes, causal forces are not. Causal forces have neither conscious intentions nor goals-in-mind, nor opinions about what happens.

Every actual "player" has those.

Dave Mangnall wrote:I don't do rhetorical flourishes. I'm genuinely asking for help in accessing a detailed account of free will.

Good to know. I'll note it for further reference.

I gather from what you said later that such accounts do exist, and I'd be very grateful if you'd point me in the right direction.

Well, let me try.

You can find the discussions in any good and recent compendium of articles on issues like mind and consciousness. A good starting point would be the Blackwell Guide, http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1035 ... hy_of_Mind, which gives a nice bunch of pro-con types of treatments of various sides to the "mind" debates. Or Routledge has another that will offer you essentially the same practical value:
https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Mind- ... 0415283566.

If you haven't read the treatment of the essential issues in "Mind and Cosmos," by Thomas Nagel, I'd recommend maybe beginning there, because the book is short and accessible. He's an Atheist, but perhaps unexpectedly, he has come independently to have severe reservations about Materialism and Developmentalism, particularly because of their inability to account for phenomena like consciousness. Worth a read, I'm sure you'll agree.

Another avenue, but one you may not care to take, is through the theological arguments involving Calvinism, Compatibilism and Free Will. If you were interested, say, in getting a view of how Theists in particular address their aspects of the controversy, you could go that way. I'd still recommend grounding first in the Blackwell or Routledge Guides, then moving on.

Hope this helps a bit. In any case, it's certainly a very live area of philosophical debate right now, and interesting stuff's being written about it.

Immanuel Can wrote:

thedoc wrote:In determinism isn't the player equivalent to some of the casual forces.

In a sense, yes: but whereas persons are capable of having purposes, causal forces are not. Causal forces have neither conscious intentions nor goals-in-mind, nor opinions about what happens.

Every actual "player" has those.

Agreed. A player is not the sum total of all casual forces, only a small part of them.

Immanuel Can wrote:

Dave Mangnall wrote:I don't do rhetorical flourishes. I'm genuinely asking for help in accessing a detailed account of free will.

Good to know. I'll note it for further reference.

I gather from what you said later that such accounts do exist, and I'd be very grateful if you'd point me in the right direction.

Well, let me try.

You can find the discussions in any good and recent compendium of articles on issues like mind and consciousness. A good starting point would be the Blackwell Guide, http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1035 ... hy_of_Mind, which gives a nice bunch of pro-con types of treatments of various sides to the "mind" debates. Or Routledge has another that will offer you essentially the same practical value:
https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Mind- ... 0415283566.

If you haven't read the treatment of the essential issues in "Mind and Cosmos," by Thomas Nagel, I'd recommend maybe beginning there, because the book is short and accessible. He's an Atheist, but perhaps unexpectedly, he has come independently to have severe reservations about Materialism and Developmentalism, particularly because of their inability to account for phenomena like consciousness. Worth a read, I'm sure you'll agree.

Another avenue, but one you may not care to take, is through the theological arguments involving Calvinism, Compatibilism and Free Will. If you were interested, say, in getting a view of how Theists in particular address their aspects of the controversy, you could go that way. I'd still recommend grounding first in the Blackwell or Routledge Guides, then moving on.

Hope this helps a bit. In any case, it's certainly a very live area of philosophical debate right now, and interesting stuff's being written about it.

Excellent! Thank you very much.

Dave Mangnall wrote: Excellent! Thank you very much.

You are most welcome.

Nagel has caused a lot of fuss among the Materialist set. I'd be very interested to know whether you find yourself sympathetic to his kinds of argument or put off by them. If you get a chance to read him, maybe you'll be kind enough to give me your take on the central thesis of "Mind and Cosmos".