compatibilism

[Flannel Jesus]

I think you're mistaken to think randomness and Determinism are opposites, just as the video says.

Last paragraph of the vid., where he sums up the problem he sees with the "randomness" idea.

Listened to that again. He didn't say that, or anything that I would reasonable paraphrase as that.

In fact he does exactly the opposite. Somewhere near 2.20 and a bit after, he presents the idea of physics that's not deterministic, and what's the very first description of a non deterministic physics he gives? Physics with randomness. The extent to which it's not deterministic, it's random - he says that, I've been saying that. Seems like he fully agrees with my spectrum.

[Immanuel Can]

I think you're mistaken to think randomness and Determinism are opposites, just as the video says.

Last paragraph of the vid., where he sums up the problem he sees with the "randomness" idea.

Listened to that again. He didn't say that, or anything that I would reasonable paraphrase as that.

I disagree.

He points out that whether you believe in Materialistic Determinism of the traditional kind, or appeal to "random swerving in a vacuum" (his words), you end up with the same conclusion: no "place" as he says, for personhood, identity, consciousness, choice, and so on. That's what you'll hear in the video.

His objection is correct, because whether we say that physics forces all the rules to be 'fixed', so that there's only one possible outcome, or whether we say that "randomness" causes everything, the outcome for free will is the same -- that people cannot have any information from their environment that can allow them to make an intelligent choice.

In the former case, the information they assume will not change the decision anyway; but in the latter, in a "randomness" situation, there are no laws or rules anymore at all, because everything is reacting randomly, and the decider can't know what choice is even likely to result in any particular outcome. So in neither case can "will" contribute one thing to the situation...it doesn't function to lead to prediction in either case.

Of course, neither reflects the way things actually are experienced in the real world. Not a single person in history has ever been able to live as if things are just being totally Determined, and if he did, he'd live entirely without even trying to make one choice. And not a single person in history has lived as if his choices can't be guided toward successful outcomes by calclulating, predicting and expecting that things will tend to work out in a readable sort of cause-effect way.

That's why people "choose." They think that what they choose matters, and that by choosing something different they can get a different outcome than they would receive if they did not choose. See?

Meanwhile, they cannot do any of this if "randomness" pertained -- who can predict "randomness," by definition? And if they supposed they were choosing, under Causal Determinism, they'd only be fooling themselves -- there never was anything they could "choose." There was only one possible outcome, ever.

So "randomness" and Determinism are to ideologies that have never, even once, worked out in human experience. Thus, they cannot be taken for granted, but rather must be proved somehow, with a vast mountain of human experience stacked against them.

[BigMike]

Carroll is, like the majority of academic philosophers, a compatibilist.

Sean Carroll, to be clear, does not believe in libertarian free will. To the extent that he is a compatibilist, it is between determinism and some other non-libertarian form of free will. I'm not sure what kind of free will that is; it's confusing. Dan Dennett, like Carroll, is an other perplexing compatibilist who rejects libertarian free will. Dennett redefines free will as "whatever it takes to hold people morally accountable," (not an exact quote) or something along those lines. That's not exactly what most people mean when they talk about free will.

It's as if they're redefining free will to fit with scientific knowledge, regardless of whether it's even close to what most people mean by the term.

According to William James, an American philosopher, historian, and psychologist, compatibilists, when arguing for their point of view, have made "a quagmire of evasion."

And Immanuel Kant, a prominent German philosopher who lived during the Age of Enlightenment, says their explanations are a "wretched subterfuge" and "petty word-jugglery."

And Wallace Matson, an American philosopher, and professor, described it as "the most flabbergasting instance of the fallacy of changing the subject to be encountered anywhere in the complete history of sophistry… [a ploy that] was intended to take in the vulgar, but which has beguiled the learned in our time."

[Flannel Jesus]

Carroll is, like the majority of academic philosophers, a compatibilist.

Sean Carroll, to be clear, does not believe in libertarian free will. To the extent that he is a compatibilist, it is between determinism and some other non-libertarian form of free will.

Yes, that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism rejects libertarian free will in favour of a different approach

[BigMike]

Carroll is, like the majority of academic philosophers, a compatibilist.

Sean Carroll, to be clear, does not believe in libertarian free will. To the extent that he is a compatibilist, it is between determinism and some other non-libertarian form of free will.

Yes, that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism rejects libertarian free will in favour of a different approach

If so, then what is that other approach? How is free will defined in that other non-libertarian meaning of the term? Feel free to step right into the quagmire.

[Flannel Jesus]

If so, then what is that other approach? How is free will defined in that other non-libertarian meaning of the term?

For me, the first part of the thought process came in realising that libertarian free will, which opposes itself with determinism and therefore relies on indeterminism, is not really coherent. If free will is incompatible with determinism, that means it requires randomness. But if there's randomness in the universe, and that randomness is affecting your choices... how is that free? How is that any more free than the alternate universe without any randomness?

It's not. It's not any kind of freedom I can find any reason for wanting, it's not any kind of freedom I can base the concept of responsibility on

[BigMike]

If so, then what is that other approach? How is free will defined in that other non-libertarian meaning of the term?

For me, the first part of the thought process came in realising that libertarian free will, which opposes itself with determinism and therefore relies on indeterminism, is not really coherent. If free will is incompatible with determinism, that means it requires randomness. But if there's randomness in the universe, and that randomness is affecting your choices... how is that free? How is that any more free than the alternate universe without any randomness?

It's not. It's not any kind of freedom I can find any reason for wanting, it's not any kind of freedom I can base the concept of responsibility on

With all due respect, FJ, that's not a definition. Try again.

[Flannel Jesus]

I wasnt trying to define it, I was trying to walk you through step 1 of the thought process and see what you thought of it.

Do you see why indeterminism, aka randomness, is no basis for free will or morality?

[BigMike]

I wasnt trying to define it, I was trying to walk you through step 1 of the thought process and see what you thought of it.

Do you see why indeterminism, aka randomness, is no basis for free will or morality?

Please just provide your definition of free will. Clearly you must know what it is you claim is compatible with determinism?

[Flannel Jesus]

Wikipedia has this to say:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."[14] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism.[2] This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

That seems fine to me. I reason, I want, I desire, I have ethical motivations, and if all of those things combined in my brain produce what we call a "choice" that I can then act on, then I've acted according to my free will.

[BigMike]

Wikipedia has this to say:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."[14] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism.[2] This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

That seems fine to me. I reason, I want, I desire, I have ethical motivations, and if all of those things combined in my brain produce what we call a "choice" that I can then act on, then I've acted according to my free will.

No, you acted according to your will, not your free will.

Your definition of free will has a few problems. Firstly, it suggests that an agent's motives are determined, which seems to imply that their choices and actions are not truly free. If everything about an agent, including their motives, is predetermined, then it is unclear how their choices can be said to be free.

Additionally, the definition does not take into account the concept of alternative possibilities, which is often seen as an important aspect of free will. According to this view, a choice is considered to be truly free only if the agent could have done otherwise. If an agent's motives are determined, then it seems that they could not have done otherwise and their choices are not truly free.

Finally, the definition does not address the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If an agent's choices and actions are determined by factors outside of their control, it becomes difficult to hold them morally responsible for those choices and actions. This is a key concern for many philosophers and theorists who study free will.

[Flannel Jesus]

Wikipedia has this to say:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."[14] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism.[2] This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

That seems fine to me. I reason, I want, I desire, I have ethical motivations, and if all of those things combined in my brain produce what we call a "choice" that I can then act on, then I've acted according to my free will.

No, you acted according to your will, not your free will.

When you are free to act according to your will, that IS free will.

Your definition of free will has a few problems. Firstly, it suggests that an agent's motives are determined, which seems to imply that their choices and actions are not truly free. If everything about an agent, including their motives, is predetermined, then it is unclear how their choices can be said to be free.

This is why I wanted to to engage in the conversation prior to the definition, which you refused. The type of freedom you're looking for is nonsensical, and can't be found anywhere no matter if physics is deterministic or not

Additionally, the definition does not take into account the concept of alternative possibilities, which is often seen as an important aspect of free will. According to this view, a choice is considered to be truly free only if the agent could have done otherwise. If an agent's motives are determined, then it seems that they could not have done otherwise and their choices are not truly free.

Of course you could have done otherwise - you could have done otherwise if, counterfactually, you wanted to do otherwise.

Finally, the definition does not address the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If an agent's choices and actions are determined by factors outside of their control, it becomes difficult to hold them morally responsible for those choices and actions. This is a key concern for many philosophers and theorists who study free will.

I think the compatibilist approach actually fully captures what anybody wants out of moral responsibility. I think the libertarian form of free will, the one that contradicts determinism, is the one that fails there. But you'd have to engage with the thought processes to understand that, not just definitions.

[BigMike]

Wikipedia has this to say:
That seems fine to me. I reason, I want, I desire, I have ethical motivations, and if all of those things combined in my brain produce what we call a "choice" that I can then act on, then I've acted according to my free will.

No, you acted according to your will, not your free will.

When you are free to act according to your will, that IS free will.

The statement is incomplete and oversimplifies the concept of free will. Free will involves more than just the ability to act according to one's will; it also involves the ability to choose and make decisions freely, without being determined by external factors or pre-existing conditions. Additionally, the concept of free will is a subject of philosophical and scientific debate, and there are differing viewpoints on its existence and nature.

Your definition of free will has a few problems. Firstly, it suggests that an agent's motives are determined, which seems to imply that their choices and actions are not truly free. If everything about an agent, including their motives, is predetermined, then it is unclear how their choices can be said to be free.

This is why I wanted to to engage in the conversation prior to the definition, which you refused. The type of freedom you're looking for is nonsensical, and can't be found anywhere no matter if physics is deterministic or not

I am not looking for any specific type of free will. In contrast, I have repeatedly stated that I reject the concept of the free will entirely. I just pointed out weaknesses in your definition of free will. You now seem to admit that your definition of free will, in which you state that «although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined,» and that truly free will therefore is «nonsensical and can't be found anywhere no matter if physics is deterministic or not.»

Additionally, the definition does not take into account the concept of alternative possibilities, which is often seen as an important aspect of free will. According to this view, a choice is considered to be truly free only if the agent could have done otherwise. If an agent's motives are determined, then it seems that they could not have done otherwise and their choices are not truly free.

Of course you could have done otherwise - you could have done otherwise if, counterfactually, you wanted to do otherwise.

How could you want “to do otherwise” if your motive to act is determined by forces beyond your control?

Finally, the definition does not address the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If an agent's choices and actions are determined by factors outside of their control, it becomes difficult to hold them morally responsible for those choices and actions. This is a key concern for many philosophers and theorists who study free will.

I think the compatibilist approach actually fully captures what anybody wants out of moral responsibility. I think the libertarian form of free will, the one that contradicts determinism, is the one that fails there. But you'd have to engage with the thought processes to understand that, not just definitions.

How can you call yourself a compatibilist if you can't even say what kind of free will you think is compatible with determinism?

[Flannel Jesus]

I feel like your good faith in this conversation has been lost. At least two things in your above post are, as far as I can see, explicitly dishonest engagement. Which tells me you've turned hostile and it's no longer a conversation.

I'm gonna pull out.

[BigMike]

I feel like your good faith in this conversation has been lost. At least two things in your above post are, as far as I can see, explicitly dishonest engagement. Which tells me you've turned hostile and it's no longer a conversation.

I'm gonna pull out.

I may have lost patience and even my temper due to the fact that you never provide rational responses to my clarifying questions. I warned you not to fall into William James' "quagmire of evasions," but you did. You have failed to describe the "free" component of your free will definition.