Noax wrote:A monist determinist has volition and personhood, and has no need to initiate cause to have that.
I think that's true. But if he does, then he's not a Determinist. He only thinks he is, but he's inventing non-determined entities and introducing them into his chain of causality without justifying that move.
Why do you call him a pawn then?
I don't. His Determinism if he logically follows its implications,
tells him that's all he is.
I don't agree, but I'm not a Determinist either. But that doesn't stop me from seeing where his logic compels him. In fact, that's a good reason for doubting Determinism: existentially, we all feel and act as if it's untrue.
Soft determinism says there are a bunch of movies playing, none of which can be touched by the viewer, but he still can choose which one to watch, effectively initiating (only for the free-willed viewer) any effect that is uncaused, and there are plenty of them in physics, even if no biological entity seems sensitive to them.
If that's Soft Determinism, then it should probably be called "Inconsistent Determinism," for it denies Determinism, essentially. And even supposing we could get past that, which logically, we can't, there can be no "free-willed viewer" if the "bunch of movies" so to speak "cannot be touched by the viewer." Then he's just prisoner to a
bunch of forces, instead of one. He's no better off, and no different, from the Hard Determinist, except he hasn't really figured out where he is, and allegedly at least, the Hard Determinist has.
If he "chooses" among "movies," then that is compatible with some measure of free will ("choosing") but has no explanation that fits Determinism at all.
However, ad hominem...not legit, in this case. A straightforward fallacy. My attitude, even if wholly "programmed by my biases," might still be correct. You need to show the truth or falsehood of the statement, not your like or dislike of the person who offers it.
Confused by this. Did I express an ad-hom?
Yes. You supposed I must have "programming biases" instead of supposing I was trying to speak rationally to you about what I actually believe to be true. All I wanted to say is that "biases" can be for the truth or against it; and one cannot tell which is the case without examining the argument, rather than supposing knowledge of the motives of an interlocutor...especially one that one has never met...but in any case.
I actually like you since you're substantially above the median civility on this forum.
Thank you. Likewise.
I think there are a fair number of folks here who don't actually get what arguing is about, and think they
secure their position with "clever" abuse, rather than
demonstrating their lack of ability to stay with civil conversation. But I don't get that from you. If you meant no
ad hominem, then perhaps "biases" was just a poor (or Deterministic?) choice of words. No hard feelings there anyway.
Your claim that you can initiate causes stands against all physics,
That' s a
non-sequitur, for two reasons.
Firstly, because there's nothing about saying that I can initiate a cause that means physics can't, or that physics might not even be a generally accurate explanation for why most things happen. Free will can accept some determined things; but the view maintains that human will can be a causal factor in its own right as well. So it's not against "all" physics, or "any" physics at all. It just does not take for granted that physics is all there is.
Secondly, if physics is a causal chain, then it cannot be eternal in the past. It must have had an initiation point. Physics cannot be eternal without producing an incoherent causal regress. So the supposition that physics, in itself, can be a complete causal explanation is simply wrong.
So while your view might be correct, inductive reasoning puts it well down the probability scale.
Oh, I don't think so. It seems to me highly improbable, for example, that a phenomenon like "consciousness" would ever have "emerged" from pure physics; and physics itself is utterly devoid of explanation as to how such a thing could come about, so I think that's an existentially-powerful case.
You seem to be aware of this since you avoid taking a stance on even simple issues like where memory, will, and cognition reside. Do they reside in the brain, the soul, or mixed or what? Or do you decline to take a stance since that would destabilize your position that looking at the man behind the curtain is a bad thing to do?
When did I "avoid" this question? I musts have missed the point at which it was asked. However, if you're looking for me to tie "memory, will and cognition" to pure physics, my reasons for not doing so are that I don't believe that it IS pure physics: and to offer any such explanation would simply be to deny my own position, so why would you suppose I ought to? I'm not prepared to take Physicalism on faith, and it does not appear more than reductional in the case of dealing with the (epi?-)phenomena you mention.
...the combination of them that makes up a person does want things.
A combination of nothing-but-purely-physical entities in a causal chain
wants things? Explain how that happens, please. The reason for my quotation marks around "wants" is that the very term really has no place in a Physicalist universe. It's a redundancy for "caused by physics," or else it's illegitimately imported to try to explain something physics actually isn't explaining.
I suspect the latter, so when I speak of "wants" in a Physicalist paradigm, it has to remain a suspect usage. There's simply no other honest way I can see at the moment. But perhaps when you explain the answer to my question about "wants" above.
Under monism, 'want' is a product of a functioning system that is a person with volition and personhood, I know you need to drop into this fundamental particle mode to avoid discussion of a functioning whole. I can similarly claim a tornado doesn't suck since there is nothing but individual electrons and protons and such interacting with each other, none of which is an actual tornado or sucks.
Ah! This is the problem.
Determinists use metaphorical language (of which "wants" is a part, for them). Physical entities can't actually
want things. Rather, the true description of what they are doing is that previous causal forces are
obliging them to react (without volition or choice) in particular ways that
appear to us as wants -- but are not, because we are all somehow confused about the factual truth of Determinism and can't find the language to speak the truth to ourselves.
It's the
metaphors that confuse, in that case. We need to stop allowing Physicalists to speak of wants. We need them to tell the truth of what they believe: that apparent wants are nothing but impersonal chain reactions. They should call them impersonal chain reactions.
Well, that's how Determinists have to think it is. I think they're being reductional.